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Submittal-Melissa Tapanes-Zoning Atlas Corrective Action and Nonsuccesional Zoning of the Property Located at 240 SE 14 Street
Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 on 6/27/2019 , City Clerk 014 BERcow RADELL FERNAN DEZ & LARKI N ZCDNING;. LANG USE ANO t_AVV MEMORANDUM TO: Mayor and City Commission, City of Miami FROM: Jeffrey Bercow, Esq. Melissa Tapanes Llahues, Esq. Emily K. Balter, Esq. RE: Zoning Atlas Corrective Action and Nonsuccesional Zoning of the Property Located at 240 SE 14 Street DATE: June 26, 2019 This memorandum provides a summary and analysis of the current process to correct zoning atlas errors in the City of Miami (the "City"). Miami 21 provides that successional zoning is required to manage the growth and evolution of the City. However, as the City has confirmed on a number of occasions, successional zoning does not apply to corrective actions that address mapping errors from the original adoption of the Miami 21 Zoning Atlas, such as the request to rezone the property located at 240 SE 14 Street (the "Property") commonly referred to as the Babylon. Miami 21 Rezonin- Regulations. Pursuant to Miami 21 Article 7, Section 7.1.2.8, "growth and evolution over time" will inevitably require changes to the boundaries of Transect Zones, and these changes shall occur successionally to a lesser or greater Transect Zone or within the same Transect Zone to a greater or lesser intensity. The intent is to provide transitions in intensity, density, building height, and scale as the City develops. All successional zoning changes are outlined in a table found in Section 7.1.2.8.a.3. There is no express provision or intent in Article 7 for map corrections. The rezoning process is intended to address and promote gradual evolution of the City. Subpart b of Section 7.1.2.8, provides that the Miami 21 Atlas may be amended two (2) times per year, unless the City is the applicant, and the Planning, Zoning and Appeals Board ("PZAB") shall make recommendations to the City Commission. Except where a request to rezone a property extends an existing Transect boundary, no rezoning of land shall be considered that involves less than 40,000 square feet of land area or 200 1 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 on 6/27/2019 , City Clerk feet of frontage. Therefore, property owners must follow Section 7.1.2.8.c.1, and extend boundaries or have large lots or long frontages. There is no provision that permits otherwise, regardless of the circumstances such as a request to correct a mapping error. The recommendation from the PZAB shall show that the PZAB has considered and studied the application in regards to the criteria found in Section 7.1.2.811.1 Further, pursuant to Section 7.1.2.8.g.2., the City Commission may, by a vote of not less than three (3) members, approve the rezoning to a Transect Zone of a less intensity than applied for in situations where, in the opinion of the Commission and recommendation of the Planning Director, the specific rezoning applied for would work to the detriment of the health, safety, or welfare of the surrounding neighborhood, whereas a rezoning to a less intense Transect Zone would not. Approval by the City Commission of a lesser zoning would be meaningless if all rezonings must be successional.2 Once the PZAB considers and studies the application and the City Commission finds that a lesser Transect Zone is more appropriate, this will result in nonsuccesional zoning. The City Commission has the inherent and general power, pursuant to Section 7.1.1.5.a., "to consider and act upon proposed amendments, including rezoning, to the Miami 21 Code, after consideration of the recommendation by the Planning, Zoning and Appeals Board." This section grants the City Commission power to review and consider typical rezoning applications and corrective action rezoning applications. Further, Section 2.2.5.2, where a Transect Zone designation is not indicated for an area in the 1 For all amendments, the PZAB shall show consideration and study of"(a) the relationship of the proposed amendment to the goals, objectives and policies of the Comprehensive Plan, with appropriate consideration as to whether the proposed change will further the goals, objectives and policies of the Comprehensive Plan; the Miami 21 Code; and other city regulation;" and "(b) the need and justification for the proposed change, including changed or changing conditions that make passage of the proposed change necessary." Consistency with the City's Comprehensive is mandated by Florida Statute Section 163.3194 (1)(a). A request to fix a mapping error of a property's zoning designation is evidence of both a need and justification for a change of zoning in order to restore the property owner's development rights. Specifically, for rezonings the PZAB shall show consideration and study of, "[(1)] a change may be made only to the next intensity Transect Zone or by a Special Area Plan, and [(2)] in a manner which maintains the goals of this Miami 21 Code to preserve Neighborhoods and [(3)] to provide transitions in intensity and Building Height." Ultimately, the criteria for rezonings provides what must be considered and studied, not what is required of every rezoning application. 2 To elaborate, if all property owners that apply for rezonings are restricted to successional zoning requests to the next higher Transect Zone, T6-8 to T6-12 for example, the City Commissions power to approve a less intense Transect Zone would effectively be a denial of the request. This is inconsistent with the general principles of legislative interpretation. "A basic rule of statutory construction provides that the Legislature does not intend to enact useless provisions, and courts should avoid readings that would render part of a statute meaningless." Quarantello v. Lerov, 997 So. 2s 648, 652 (5th DCA 2008) (citing Am. Home Assur. Co. v. Plaza Materials Corp., 908 So. 2d 360, 366 (Fla. 2005). 2 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 on 6/27/2019 , City Clerk Miami 21 Atlas, the area shall be construed to be zoned as the most restrictive Abutting Zone, until corrective action shall be taken by the City Commission. This provision grants the City Commission the power to correct scrivener's errors where a property has no effective Miami 21 zoning Transect. Article 2 cannot restrict corrective actions of the City Commission be done accordance with successional zoning. It would unreasonably restrict the authority. Therefore, Miami 21 inherently and expressly grants the authority to the City Commission to correct zoning atlas errors without regarding to successional zoning for typical and atypical rezoning applications. Babvlon Request to Rezone. In 2014 and in accordance with Section 7.1.2.8.c.1, the Babylon submitted a request to rezone the Property from T6 -8-R to T6 -48a-0. The City joined this application as a co -applicant and the Babylon resubmitted its application in 2015. See Exhibit A, 2014 and 2015 Rezoning Applications. The 2014 application was withdrawn and later resubmitted in 2018, with the exact same request to rezone the Property from T6 -8-R to T6 -48a-0. The request from T6 -8-R to T6 -48a-0, rather than any other request, is because the Property is smaller than 40,000 square feet and does not contain 200 feet of frontage. Therefore, the Babylon must continue the Transect Boundary from the northwest of T6 -48a-0. The City accepted and joined this request, accepted its compliance with Miami 21, in 2014,3 and again accepted this request in 2018 as a means to correct a scrivener's error. The Planning Department still finds that there is a scrivener's error with regards to the zoning designation of the Property. See Exhibit C, 2019 Planning Department Recommendation. The rezoning application today is the same: T6 -8-R to T6 -48a -O in order to correct a mapping error when Miami 21 was adopted. The Miami 21 draft maps provided to the public were incorrect as applied to this Property.4 The Property, under the previous Zoning Code 11000, was zoned Office and the maps showed it at zoned R- 3 The City joined the request in 2014 finding that the designation of T6 -8-R was a mapping error, and the rezoning to T6 -48a-0 would remedy the mistake regardless of successional zoning. See Exhibit B, 2016 Planning Department Analysis. At the January 6, 2016, PZAB hearing Planning Reviewer David Snow (01:31:42) stated under oath that the Law Department confirmed that correction of a mapping error may be done out of successional zoning. Rafael Suarez -Rivas, Chief Assistant City Attorney, (1:49:13) provided the PZAB with the criteria found in Section 7.1.2.81 and advised that the Board must consider the criteria and facts of this case. Further, the Chief Assistant City Attorney stated under oath that when there is a mistake on the map on the category given it can be corrected without following the successional zoning. In response to the PZAB's questions regarding the mapping error, Planning Director Francisco Garcia (2:03:06) stated that the Planning Departments concurs that there is an error in this case, and the only avenue to correct the error is the rezoning process. The requirement for successional zoning is intended for the growth and development of the City, not mapping corrections, and the Legal and Planning Department of the City firmly confirmed this position from 2014-2016. 4 The draft Miami 21 Zoning Atlas Maps are available online at http://www.miami2l.orR/zoningatlas East Archives.as.p. W Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 on 6/27/2019 , City Clerk 4. As a result of this error, the Property was erroneously grouped with the properties to the south and zoned T6 -8-R. In accordance with 7.1.2.8.c.1, the Planning Department accepted this application again to correct the mapping error. At the PZAB hearing on May 1, 2019, Deputy Director Jeremy Gauger (2:04:30) and the Chief of Comprehensive Planning Sue Trone (1:51:44) attested under oath that the Babylon's current zoning is an error. They stated that the zoning is inconsistent with the Comprehensive Plan, demonstrated that the Property was previously zoned Office under Zoning Ordinance 11000, that office uses are not permitted in the T6 -8-R Transect Zone although they were previously permitted under the prior zoning code, and that unlimited height is no longer permitted, and then curiously concluded that T6-12-0 is an appropriate remedy because of successional zoning. The PZAB fully considered and studied the criteria and the Planning Department's new interpretation of Miami 21 Zoning Atlas corrections, and found that T6 -24b-0 would be an appropriate zoning correction for the Property. See Exhibit D, PZAB-R-19-014. This recommendation of a lesser Transect Zone is consistent with Section 7.1.2.8.g.2. Therefore, the City Commission has the inherent and express power to review the PZAB's consideration of the criteria and take corrective action to amend the Zoning Atlas of Miami 21 with regards to the Babylon. Legal Remedv for Corrective Action. Adoption of the Miami 21 Zoning Atlas, designating the Babylon Property T6 -8-R is null because the public received incorrect substantive notice of the changed zoning. See Williams v. City of N. Miami, 213 So.2d 5 (3d DCA, 1968); N. Beach Medical Ctr. Inc., v. Citv of Fort Lauderdale, 374 So.2d 1106 (4th DCA 1979). Pursuant to Section 116.041(2) the Florida Statutes sufficient notice must be given to property owners when there are proposed changes to the actual zoning map designation of a parcel or parcels of land. This notice must include correct information, such as the prior zoning designation and the new zoning designation. Showing an incorrect designation renders the new zoning designation invalid. Notice pertaining to proposed changes in the zoning laws is sufficient only when it informs the public —the average citizen who is presumably not versed in technical zoning law—of the essence and scope of the proposed changes. N. Beach, 374 So.2d at 1108. In short, unless notice is clear, unambiguous, and readily intelligible to the average citizen, it is insufficient. Id. Moreover, the actual zoning amendment must conform substantially to the proposed change outlined in the notice. McGee v. Citv of Cocoa, 168 So.2d 766, 768 (2d DCA 1964). The draft Miami 21 Zoning Atlas maps were insufficient because they incorrectly identified the Babylon as R-4, Multifamily High -Density Residential when the correct 4 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 on 6/27/2019 , City Clerk zoning was Office. The public was not informed of the essence and scope of the proposed change. The error is significant and affects the property owner substantially since the permitted uses and development entitlements under these designation vary greatly and the Office designation gave Babylon unlimited height. The deviation is substantial and material and renders the notice insufficient and the City's rezoning ineffective and invalid. See Williams, 213 So. 2d at 5. Babylon is exhausting its administrative remedies in order to correct the invalid zoning. See generally Metropolitan Dade Countv v. Recchi American, Inc., 734 So.2d 1123 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); 011os v. Dade Countv, 242 So.2d 468 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970). Miami 21 fails to expressly outline a procedure for property owners to request corrections of scrivener's errors. The most appropriate avenue for a corrective action of the zoning atlas is a rezoning application under the procedures outlined in Section 7.1.2.8(c)(1) of Miami 21.5 The Babylon is now before the City Commission that has the power to approve this application, and thus finally correct the City's scrivener's error. A correction would end the Babylon's deprivation of its constitutionally protected interests and further the constitutional protection of property rights. See Gardens Country Club, Inc. v. Palm Beach Cntv., 712 So.2d 398,403 (4th DCA 1998) (citing Executive 100, Inc. v. Martin Cntv., 922 F.2d 1536, 1541 (11th Cir. 1991) (finding a constitutional deprivation of property rights when City Commission arbitrarily and capriciously denies a rezoning application that has the effect of substantially decreasing a property's value); Fla. Stat. § 70.001(1) (the Bert J. Harris, Jr., Private Property Rights Protection Act). Nonsuccessional Zoning Precedent. The City has corrected scrivener and other technical errors on Future Land Use and Zoning Atlas maps both administratively and through private rezoning applications without regard to successional zoning. Attached please find a supplemental narrative and exhibits of this precedent. 5 Form -based zoning codes are unique. "Municipalities are given police powers to conserve, not to impair, private rights." Maxwell v. City of Miami. 87 Fla. 107,117 (Fla. 1924). In addition, courts have held that zoning decisions of local governments cannot be arbitrary, unreasonable, or confiscatory and thus not "fairly debatable." Citv Com'n of Citv of Miami v. Woodlawn Park Cemetery Co., 553 So. 2d 1227, 1231 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (citing Rural New Town, Inc. v. Palm Beach Countv, 315 So.2d at 480; Citv of Miami Beach v. Silver, 67 So.2d at 647; Metropolitan Dade Countv v. Kanter, 200 So.2d 624,626 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 204 So.2d 329 (F1a.1967); see Citv of St. Petersburg v. Aikin, 217 So.2d 315 (F1a.1968); Dade County v. Beauchamp, 348 So.2d 53, 55 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), cert. denied, 355 So.2d 512 (F1a.1978); Neubauer v. Town of Surfside, 181 So.2d 707, 709 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 192 So.2d 488 (F1a.1966); see also Larkins v. Metropolitan Dade County, 237 So.2d 343 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970)). 5 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 , on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk Conclusion. When Miami 21 was adopted, the Miami 21 Zoning Atlas showed an incorrect underlying zoning designation for the Babylon. This incorrect notice, rendered the new zoning designation invalid and ineffective. Therefore, the City Commission has the inherent and express authority, pursuant to Sections 2.2.5.2 and 7.1.1.5 of Miami 21, to take corrective action where a Transect Zone designation is not indicated for an area in the Miami 21 Atlas. With regard to the Babylon, a rezoning application was the only avenue to bring the corrective action to the City Commission. This is the same request that the City firmly found from 2014-2016 did not require successional zoning to correct a mapping error. Denial of review of this rezoning application would be a denial of Babylon's constitutionally protected property rights, as well as an arbitrary, unreasonable, and confiscatory legislative action. 0 EXHIBIT BiWn Sumber i E' Qa ATTORNEYS AT LAW December 18, 2015 Via Hand Delivery Francisco Garcia Director Planning & Zoning Department, City of Miami 444 SW Second Avenue, 3rd Floor Miami, Florida 33130 A, Vicky Garcia -Toledo, Esq. -rel 306.350.2409 Fax 305.351.2233 vgarela-toledo@bllzln.com Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 , on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk Re: Amended and SuDDlemental Letter of Intent: Joint Rezonina Application by Babvion International. Inc, and the City of Miami for Prooerty Located at 240 SE 14th Street, Miami, Florida Dear Mr, Garcia; This firm represents Babylon International, Inc. ("Babylon"), the owner of property located at 240 SE 14th. Street, Miami, Florida (the "Property"). Babylon previously submitted to the City of Miami (the "City") an application requesting a rezoning of the Property from its current zoning designation of T6 -8-R to a designation of T6 -48a-0, consistent and compatible with neighboring properties and the intensity of the surrounding area. The City's Planning Director has interpreted the current zoning code, Miami 21, to allow for this rezoning based on the Property's location adjacent to a T6 -48a-0 Transect Zone. - - - - -- --- Following thorough study and consideration of the application, the City has determined that the Property's present zoning designation of T6 -8-R is the result of a scrivener's error that occurred when the zoning maps under Miami 21 were initially drawn. It is evident from the location of the Property in relation to the current Transect boundaries that the Property was inadvertently omitted from the neighboring T6 -48a-0 Transect. Based on that conclusion, the City of Miami now wishes to join in the application for the rezoning of the Property in order to correct this error. Based on numerous discussions with the Planning Director, Babylon now submits this amended and supplemental letter of intent and an amended portion of the rezoning application in order to join the City of Miami. Also enclosed please find a copy of the initial application complete with all necessary affidavits and disclosures on behalf of Babylon, Please do not hesitate to contact me should you have any questions. Sincerely, . A. Vicky Garcia -Toledo BILZIN 8WHAMPA5431915,111,40POW160 AXELROD LLP 1450 Brickell Avenue, 23rd Floor, Miami, FL 33131-3456 Tel 305,374.7580 Fax 305,374.7593 www.bilzin.com Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13� 0 t . on 06-27-2019 . Crty Clerk t D GAP'PLICATION " , �qj pr// to Article 7.1.2.8 of the Miami 21 Code for Rezoning information. on International, Inc. and the City of Miami Iress(es) and folio number(s): 240 SE 14th Street, Miami, FL, 01-4139-068-0001 nation(s): T6 -8-R 4. Proposed zoning designation(s): T6 -48a-0 5. Per Miami 21, Article 7.1.2.8, c.2 (g), an analysis of the properties within a one-half mile radius of the subject property, including aerial photo of the site as to why the present zoning designation is inappropriate and proposed zoning designation is appropriate. 6. One (1) original, two (2) 11x17' copies and one (1) 8%2x11 copy of the survey of the property prepared by a State of Florida registered land surveyor within six (6) months from the date of the application. 7. A clear and legible copy of the recorded warranty deed and tax forms of the most current year showing the present owner(s) and legal description of the property to match the legal description on .the survey. 8. A clear and legible copy of the subject property address(es) and legal descriptlon(s) on a separate sheet, labeled as "Exhibit A", to match with the current survey's legal description. 9. At least two photographs showing the entire property showing land and improvements. - -10 Copy 7of the lobbyist registration processed by the Office of the City Clerk, if applicable. 11. Affidavit of Authority to Act and the Disclosure of Ownership of all owner—and contract purchasers, if applicable—of the subject property. 12. For all corporations and partnerships Indicated: a) Articles of Incorporation; b) Certificate from Tallahassee showing good standing, less than one (1) year old; c) Corporate Resolution or a Power of Attorney signed by the secretary of the Corporation authorizing the person who signed the application to do so; d) Non-profit organizations: A list of Board of Directors less than one (1) year old. 13. Certified list of owners of real estate within 500 feet of the subject property. 14. Original Disclosure of Consideration Provided or Committed for Agreement to Support or Withhold Objection Affidavit. 15. Original Public School Concurrency Management System Entered Requirements form. 16. The subject property(les) cannot have any open code enforcement/lien violations. 17. What is the acreage of the project/property site? 0.367 acres Rev. 07-2013 3 Submitted into the public record for items) PZ.13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk( rRZ EZO N I N G APPLICATION RE C -; PLANNING DEPARTMEN.1 Please refer to Article 7.9.2.8 afthe Miaml 29 Code for Rezoning information. 29I4 JUL I rn 12; 48 'plicant(s); Babvion International. Inc. ` 2" S6bfq.at property address(es) and folio number(s): 240 S.E. 14th Street. Miami, FI_ Folio No. 01- ` 41�-Ct6'8-0001 3. Present zoning designatlon(s); TS -8-R 4. Proposed zoning designation(s): TB -0-0 5. Per Miami 21, Article 7.1.2.8, 0.2 (g), an analysis of the properties within a one-half mile radius of the subject property,. including aerial photo of the site as to why the present zoning designation is Inappropriate and proposed zoning designation is appropriate. 6. One (1) original, two (2) 11x17" copies and one (1) 6'/3x11 copy of the survey of the property prepared by a State of Florida registered land surveyor within six (0) months from the date of the application. 7. A clear and legible copy of the recorded warranty deed and tax forms of the most current year showing the present owner(s) and legal description of the property to match the legal description on the survey, 8. A clear and legible copy of the subject property address(es) and legal description(s) on a separate sheet, labeled as "Exhibit A", to match with the current survey's legal description. 9. At least two photographs showing the entire property showing land and improvements. 10. Copy of the lobbyist registration processed by the Office of the City Clerk, if applicable. 11. Affidavit of Authority to Act and the Disclosure of Ownership of all owner—and contract purchasers, if applicable—of the subject property. 12. For all corporations and partnerships indicated: a) Articles of Incorporation; b) Certificate from Tallahassee showing good standing, less than one (1) year old; c) Corporate Resolution or a Power of Attorney signed by the secretary of the Corporation authorizing the person who signed the application to do so; d) Non-profit organizations: A list of Board of Directors less than one (1) year old. 13. Certified list of owners of real estate within 500 feet of the subject property. 14, Original Disclosure of Consideration Provided or Committed for Agreement to Support or Withhold Objection Affidavit, 15. original public School Concurrency Management System Entered Requirements form. 16. The subject property(les) cannot have any open code enforcement/lien violations. 17. What is the acreage of the project/property site? 0.367 acres Rev. 07-1013 3 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 , on 66-27-2019. City Clerk REZONINGAPPLICATION 1,8. -bat" is the purpose of this application/nature of proposed use? Rezoning .for consistencv with abuttirid nrobertles. •19. Is the 'property within the boundaries of a historic site, historic district or archeological zone? Please contact the Planning and Zoning Department on the 3`d Floor for information. The peo6brty Is vAthin an archeological conservation area. The orooerty is not within a historic site or historic district. 20. is the property within the boundaries of an Environmentai Preservation District? Please contact the Planning and Zoning Department on the 3rd Floor for information. No. 21. What would be the anticipated duration of the presentation in front of the: J Planning, Zoning and Appeals Board 1 hour and/or J City Commission 1 hour 22. Cost of processing according to Section 62-22 of the Miami City Code*: Change of zoning classification to: a. CS, T3 -R, T3 -L, T3-0, T4 -R, T4 -L, T4-0, T5 -R, T5 -L, T5-0, T6 -R, T6 -L, Cl: Per square foot of not lot area $ .50 Minimum (Assumes a 5,000 square -foot lot) $ 2,500.00 b. T6-8 0, T6-12 0, T6-24 0, D1, D2, D3, T6-36 0, T648 0, T6-60 0, T6-80, CI -110: Per square foot of net lot area $ .70 Minimum $ 5,000.00 c, Advertising $1,500.00 d. School Concurrency Processing (if applicable) $ 150,00 e. Mail notice fee per notice $ 4.50 f. Meeting package mailing fee per package $ 6.00 Fees over W, she aid in Pe form of a certified check, cashier's check, or money order. Signat Address 1450 Brickell Ave, 23rd Floor Name Jav, r F. AvIM6 Miami. FL 33131 Telephone 305-350-7202 E-mail iavino.O.bilzin.com STATE. OF FLORIDA-- COUNTY OF MIAMi-DADE r-'" Th foregoing wa nowled o e thiso2.5;1- day of ; VK.0— 20,r 1w by who Is a(n) indIA all artner/agent/corporati a(n) individual/partnetwiplcorporatlon a is personally kn wo em or who has produced as Identification ancHFusmNE A. SOW o MY C0N1,118510N ! F� Q74088 ICD G) (Stamp) EXPIAES:FOW2a,2018 na a�^�orPt4''T Bondtdiuu9odp�Nobry3�^'1at Rev. 07.2013 4 Submitted into the public I t. record for item(s) PZ.13 , REZONINGAPPLICATION on 6-27-2019. City Clerk i AFFIDAVIT OF AUTHORITY TO ACT , Before me this day, the undersigned personally appeared Francisco Martinez-Celeiro , who being by me first deposes and says: 1. That he/she is the owner or the legal representative of the owner, submitting the public hearing application as required by the Code of the City of Miami, Florida, affecting the real property located in the City of Miami, as listed on the foregoing pages. 2. That all owners who he/she represents, if any, have given his/her full and complete permission for hlm/her tp act In his/her behalf for the change or modification of a classification or regulation of zoning as set out in the foregoing petition, El including gr CI not including responses to day to day staff inquires. 3. That the foregoing and following pages are part of this affidavit and contain the current names, mailing addresses, telephone numbers and legal descriptions of the real property of which he/she is the owner or legal representative. 4. That the facts, as represented In the application and documents submitted in conjunction with this affidavit, are true and correct, Further Affiant sayeth not. Francisco idlartinez-Celeiro Appticant(s) Name STATE OF FLORIDA - COUNTY OF MIAMI -DARE jo IV - The foregoing was acknowledged before me this 20 day of 20_L�_by *7Vn0sc1J War47'7&Z Ce leirb who isn individualVprqi'h�,orporation of dab► 3r►lemrira��l , ire a(n) Individuablpartnershioe/She is personally known o me or who has produced as lden`iii ato and who id did not) take an oat i� � C7 (Stamp) Signature AUCIAMCIA MY COMMI891AM 1 EE 202680 EXPIRE$: May 2s, 20t6. �'arFc�a�o� 6mdadihu8udgetNotuyServkec $Lev. 07-2013 5 RE--'zx0°ISI N G APPLICATION DISCLOSURE OF OWNERSHIP 1 Submitted into the public record for items) PZ.13 , on 6-27-2019. City Clerk i 1, +LI1 _th�6,Qjaer(s) of the subject property and percentage of ownership. Hots: The Miami City Code requires disclosure of all parties having a financial Interest, elthef direct or Indirect, with respect to a presentation, request or petition. Accordingly, disclosure of shareholders of corporations, beneficiaries of trusts, and/or any other interested parties, together with their address(es) and proportionate interest are required. Please supply additional lists, if necessary. Owner's Name(es) Babvlon International, Inc. Percentage of Ownership 100% nwiAPA b� 'N1110Coy�.) .Pe�aso GN_YF� ,i s =% 6W►AeA % Subject Property Address(es) 240 S.E. 14th Street, Miami. FL Tyayic,(SGo I' oAAe 2, list all street address(es) and legal descriptions) of any property located within 500 feet of the subject property owned by any and all parties listed in question #1 above. Please supply additional lists, if necessary. Street Address(es); 240 S.E. 14th Street, Miami, l=L. Francisco Mattinez-Celeiro Owner(s) or Attomey Name STATE OF FLORIDA -- COUNTY OF MIAMI-DADE Legal Description(s); Lppt 5, Block 2 and the South. 1/2 of Out Lot 5 T3icok 2, according to the AMENDED PLAT CSF POINT VIEW as recorded In Plat Book 2, Page 1915 of the public records of Miami -Dade County, Florida, LESS the Northers 10 feet borders on and runs parallel to the public right of way of South Bayshore Drive. The foregoing was acknowledged befgre me tht ZO day of J04-- 20 IK , by hers ilr'ft/Ie2- Ca.�eiro who isles Indlvidual/pan�naqorporation of �4(7� fad .11�a�a 1 T a(n) individual/partnership oHe/She Is personally known to me or who has produced as identif16ation and who(gXdld not) take an oath, (Stamp) �� f�°� A'ICIAWGI' Signature nature / Rev, 07-201 * MY COMMISSIONiEE202660 6 SXPIR✓:S; May 20, 2016 �r''�oF� QT Bonded Thru BudodN*q Se'vbd i REZONINGAPPLICATION (Date CITY OF MIAMI HEARING BOARDS P O BOX 330708 MIAMI, FL 33233-0708 Submitted into the public t 'record for items) PZ.13 , on 6-27-2019. City Clerk Re:. Property Owrier's List Within 500 Feet of., 240 S.E. 14th Street, Miami, FL Street Address(es) Total number of labels without repetition: M . I certify that the attached ownership list, map and mailing labels are a complete and accurate i representation of the real estate property and property owners within a 500400t radius of the subject property listed above. This information reflects the most current records on file in the Miami -Dade County Tax Assessor's Office, Sincerely, Signature Babylon international, Inc. Name or Company Name 555 NE 15th Street Suite 100, Mlami, FL 33132 Address 308-571.-5050 Telephone javino a@bilzin.com E -mall Rev. 07-2073 8 REZONI.NGCH'ECKLIST Reviewer. Name Review Etat® Babylon.lnterrlatinnal, Inc, 305-350-7202 ApplldOt'NA'me Contaot information 240 S.E. 14th Street, Miami, FL Project Name and Address Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 , on 6-27-2019 . City Clerk Q Yes ❑ No ❑ N/A Analysis pursuant to M21 Article 7,128, c.2 (g) 0 Yes ❑ No 0 NIA One original survey dated within six months of application, with building baseline established by the Department of Public Works ❑ Yes 0 No U N/A Two (2)11x17° and one (1) 8Y2xl V copies of the survey ❑ Yes ❑ No Q N/A Current Zoning Referral ❑ Yes n No ❑ N/A Pre -application meeting comments Q Yes IC No Q N/A One (1) copy of Recorded Deed (legal description on Deed must match legal description Q Yes ❑ No Q N/A on survey) 11 Yes Cl No ❑ NIA "Exhibit A", legal description must match survey and Deed El Yes ❑ No O NIA Current photos, twc (2) minimum, showing the entire property Covenant running with the land ❑ Yes Q No ❑ N/A Proof of Lobbyist Registration Q Yes Q No ❑ N/A Affidavit of Authority to Act Q Yes 0 No ❑ N/A Disclosure of Ownership of all owners Q Yes Q No ❑ N/A Dlsclosure of all contract purchasers U Yes ❑ No Q NIA Certificate of Status from Tallahassee dated within 1 year of application for Profit and Non-profit owners and contract purchasers Q Yes ❑ No ❑ N/A Corporate Res, or Power of Atty. from all owners or Board of Directors R Yes 0 No 0 NIA Corp, Res, or Power of Atty, from all contract purchaters a Yes Cl No Q N/A Non -profits: List of Board of Directors (owners) D Yes ❑ No Q N/A Non -profits: List of Board of Directors (contract purchasers) 13 Yes Q No Q N/A Certified list of adjacent owners within 500 feet Q Yes C No 0 WA Disclosure of Agreement to Support or Withhold Objection 0. Yes rJ No Q N/A Public School Concurrency ❑ Yes U No ❑ N/A Code Enforcement vlolatlon(s) ❑ Yes ❑ No 0 N/A All property addresses subject to this request listed * Yes U No 0 NIA All questions answered ❑ Yes U No U N/A Paid receipt 1, Babvlon International. Inc. . , authorize any refund to be issued to Babylon International. Inc. 555 ME 95th Street. Suite 100, A&MI, FL 331 2 (Name and Complete Address). *If any information/documentation required above is missing, application Is not accepted and all documents are returned to the applicant. *If all required information/documentation Is presented, date stamp and Initial the application. Rev. 07-2013 9 Submitted into the public l record for item(s) PZ.13 , on 6-27-2019 . City Clerk Analysis Rezoning Application for Babylon International, Inc., 240 S.E.14th: Street, Miami, Florida - This is a request for rezoning from T6-8 to T6-48. - Under the prior Code this property was office, consistent with the abutting property, now zoned T6-48. - The current land use designation of Restricted Commercial with an Urban Central Business District overlay and a Brickell Residential Density Increase .Area overlay is not consistent with the current zoning of T6-8. The current land use is the same as the abutting T6-48 property. - The current T6-8 designation, is inappropriate as the Property, being adjacent to and in a neighborhood of T6W48 and higher, is an inconsistency within Miami 21. - The property's adjacency to a T6-48 property allows for an application for a zoning change from T6-8 to T6-48 with a bonus. As such, a rezoning is the only solution that will allow for development of this site. This designation will allow for a residential development, which is consistent and. compatible with the surrounding area. Submitted into the public record for items) PZ.13 , C14 Bilzin Sumberg 1 ( on 6-27-2019 . City Clerk ATTORNEYS AT L A W A. Vicky Garcla-Toledo, Esq, Tel 305.350,2409 Fax 305.351,2233 vgarcla-toledo@bllzin.com Via Hand Delivery June 18, 2014 Irene Hegedus, Zoning Administrator Zoning Department, City of Miami Miami Riverside Center 444 S.W. Second Avenue, 4th Floor Miami, Florida 33130 Re: Letter of Intent/ Rezoning Application for Babylon International, Inc., 240 i S.E. 14th Street, Miami, Florida j Dear Ms. Hegedus: i On behalf of Babylon International, Inc. (the "Applicant"), we would like to request a zoning referral regarding the Applicant's rezoning application for the property located at 240 S.E. 14th Street, Miami, Florida (the "Property"). The Property is presently zoned T6 -8-R and we are proposing a zoning designation to. T6 -48a 0. We have met with the City Planning Director and the current interpretation is that the Property's adjacency to .a T6 -48a O property allows for an application for a zoning change from T6-8 to T6 -48a O. Enclosed please find the survey for the proposed rezoning application; Please do not hesitate to contact me should you have any questions. As time is of the t essence we appreciate your prompt attention to this matter. B.ILZIN AXELROD LLP 1450 Brickell Avenue, 23rd Floor, Miami, FL 33131-3456 Tel 305.374.7580 Fax 305.374.7593 www.bilzin.com Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 , REZONINGAP�LACATION ori 06-27-2019 . City Clerk Please refer to Article 7.1.2.8 of the Miami 21 Code- for Rezoning Information, 1L Applcant(s): Babvlon International, Inc. .dub}ect property address(es) and folio number(s): 24:0 S.E. 14th Street, Miami. FL Folio No. 01- ' '`419068-0001 3. Present zoning designation(s): T6 -8-R 4. Proposed zoning designation(s): T6 -48a O 5. Per Miami 21, Article 7.1.2.8, c.2 (g), an analysis of the properties within a one-half mile radius of the subject property, including aerial photo of the site as to why the present zoning designation is inappropriate and proposed zoning designation is appropriate. 6. One (1) original, two (2) 11x17" copies and one (1) 8'/zx11 copy of the survey of the property prepared by a State of Florida registered land surveyor within six (6) months from the date of the application. 7. A clear and legible copy of the recorded warranty deed and tax forms of the most current year showing the present owner(s) and legal description of the property to match the legal description on the survey. 8. A clear and legible copy of the subject property address(es) and legal description(s) on a separate sheet, labeled as "Exhibit A", to match with the current survey's legal description. 9. At least two photographs showing the entire property showing land and improvements. 10. Copy of the lobbyist registration processed by the Office of the City Clerk, if applicable. 11. Affidavit of Authority to Act and the Disclosure of Ownership of all owner—and contract purchasers, if applicable—of the subject property. 12. For all corporations and partnerships indicated: a) Articles of Incorporation; b) Certificate from Tallahassee showing good standing, less than one (1) year old; c) Corporate Resolution or a Power of Attorney signed by the secretary of the Corporation authorizing the person who signed the application to do so; d) Non-profit organizations: A list of.Board of Directors less than one (1) year old. 13. Certified list of owners of real estate within 500 feet of the subject property. 14. Original Disclosure of Consideration Provided or Committed for Agreement to Support or Withhold Objection Affidavit. 15. Original Public School Concurrency Management System Entered Requirements form. 16. The subject property(les) cannot have any open code enforcement/lien violations. 17. What is the acreage of the project/property site? 0.367 acres Rev. 07-2013 3 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 , on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk Analvsis Rezoning Application for Babylon International, Inc., 240 S.E. 14th Street, Miami, Florida - This is a request for rezoning from T6-8 to T6 -48a O. - Under the prior Code this property was office, consistent with the abutting property, now zoned T6 -48a O. - The current land use designation of Restricted Commercial with an Urban Central Business District overlay and a Brickell Residential Density Increase Area overlay is not consistent with the current zoning of T6-8. The current land use is the same as the abutting T6 -48a O property. - The current T6-8 designation is inappropriate as the Property, being adjacent to and in a neighborhood of T6-48 and higher, is an inconsistency within Miami 21. - The property's adjacency to a T6 -48a O property allows for an application for a zoning change from T6-8 to T6 -48a O with a bonus. As such, a rezoning is the only solution that will allow for development of this site. - This designation will allow for a residential development, which is consistent and compatible with the surrounding area. i i I Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 , on 106-27-2019. City Clerk i i(Cnece reserved for Clerk of C mitt 'Mis instrument prepared by, and after recording return to: Name: Javier F. Avifl6, Esq. Address: Bilzin Sumberg Baena Price & Axelrod LLP 1450 Brickell Avenue, 23rd Floor Miami, Florida 33131 DECLARATION OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS, THIS DECLARATION OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS (the "Declaration"), made this day of July, 2014, by Babylon International, Inc. (the "Owner"), in favor of the City of Miami, a Florida Municipal Corporation (the "City"). WITNESSETH: WHEREAS, the Owner holds fee -simple title to certain property in the City of Miami, Florida, located at approximately 240 S.E. 14th Street, Miami, Florida, legally described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto and made a part hereof (the "Property"); and WHEREAS, an approval was obtained for a zoning change for the Property from the City Commission of the City of Miami, on July _, 2014 and attached hereto and made a part hereof as Exhibit "B"; and WHEREAS, it is the Owner's intent to develop the Property for use as a residential building. NOW, THEREFORE, the Owner voluntarily covenants and agrees that the Property shall be subject to the following restrictions that are intended and shall be deemed to be covenants MIAMI 4219565.180765/43686 6/30/2014 1 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 , on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk running with the land and binding upon the Owner of the Property, its successors in interest and assigns, as follows: 1. Recitals. The recitals and findings set forth in the preamble of this Declaration are hereby adopted by reference thereto and incorporated herein as if fully set forth in this Section. 2. Zoning Relations, Irrespective of the approved T6 -48a O zoning, the Owner agrees to develop the property with residential and lodging uses including but not limited to single family residence, community residence, two family residence, multi family housing, dormitory, home office, live -work, bed & breakfast, inn, and hotel, as presently defined in Miami 21. 3. Effective Date. This instrument shall constitute a covenant running with the title to the Property and be binding upon Owner, its successors and assigns upon recordation in the Public Records of Miami -Dade County, Florida. These restrictions shall be for the benefit of, and a limitation upon, all present and future owners of the Property and for the public welfare. 4. Term of Covenant. This voluntary covenant on the part of the Owner shall remain in full force and effect and shall be binding upon the Owner of the Property, its successors in interest and assigns for an initial period of thirty (30) years from the date this instrument is recorded in the public records. and shall be automatically extended for successive periods of ten (10) years, unless modified, amended or released prior to the expiration thereof, MIAMI 4219565.1 80765/43686 6/30/2014 0) Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 , on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk 5. Inspection and Enforcement. It is understood and agreed that any official inspector of the. City of Miami may have the right at any time during non -nal working hours to enter upon the Property for the purpose of investigating the use of the Property, and for detennining whether the conditions of this Declaration and the requirements of the City's building and zoning regulations are being complied with. An action to enforce the terms and conditions of this Declaration may be brought by the City and may be by action at law or in equity against any party or person violating or attempting to violate any covenants of this Declaration or provisions of the building and zoning regulations, either to restrain violations or to recover damages. This enforcement provision shall be in addition to any other remedies available under the law. 6. Amendment and Modification,. This instrument may be modified, amended or released as to any portion of the Property by a written instrument executed by the owner(s) of the fee -simple title to the Property to be effected by such amendment, modification, or release and the City of Miami with the approval by the City of Miami City Commission at a public hearing, which public hearing shall be applied for by, and be at the expense of the Owner. Any modification, amendment, or release of this covenant will be subject to the approval as to legal form by the City Attorney. 7. Severabilitv. Invalidation of any one of these covenants by judgment of Court shall not affect any of the other provisions of this Declaration, which shall remain in full force and effect. MIAMI 4219565.180765/43686 6/30/2014 3 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 , i do 06-27-2019. City Clerk 8. Recording. This Declaration shall be filed of record among the Public Records of Miami -Dade County, Florida, at the cost of the Owner. The Owner shall submit a recorded copy to the Zoning Administrator at 444 SW 2nd Avenue, 4th Floor, Miami, Fl., 33130-1910 within thirty (30) days of recordation. ACKNOWLEDGMENT CORPORATION Signed, witnessed, executed and acknowledged on this day of July,. 2014, IN WYNESS TVHEREOF, has caused these presents to be signed in its name by its proper officials. Witnesses: Babylon International, Inc.. Signature 5.55 NE 15th Street, Suite 100 Miami, Florida 33132 Print Name Signature Print Name STATE OF FLORIDA COUNTY OF MIAIVII-DADE The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me by the President of Babylon International, Inc., a corporation, on behalf of the corporation. He is personally known to me or has produced Florida Driver's licence; , as identification. Witness my signature and official seal this day of , 2014 in the County and State aforesaid. My Commission Expires:. MIAMI 4219565,1 80765/43686 6/30/2014 M Notary Public -State of FLORIDA APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CORRECTNESS: VICTORIA M$NDEZ City Attorney APPROVED: FRANCISCO 1. GARCIA MENS S. HEGEDUS Director of Planning and Zoning Zoning Administrator MIAMI 4219565.180765/43686 6/30/2014 5 Submitted into the public fecord for item(s) PZ. 13 , on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk I Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 , on 06-27-2019. City Clerk EXHIBIT A Property Legal Description Lot 5, Block 2 and the South 1/2 of Out Lot 5, Block 2, according to the AMENDED PLAT OF POINT VIEW, as recorded in Plat Book 2, Page 93 of the public records of Miami -Dade County, Florida, LESS the Northerly 10 feet borders on and runs parallel to the public right of way of South Bayshore Drive, MIAMI 4219565.180765/43686 6/30/2014 0 S CITY OF MIAMI DISCLOSURE OF CONSIDERATION PROVIDED OR COMMITTED FOR AGREEMENT TO SUPPORT OR WITHHOLD OBJECTION The City of Miami requires any person or entity requesting approval relief or other action fiom the City Commission or any of its boards, authorities, agencies, councils or committees, to disclose at the commencement (or continuance) of the hearing(s) on the issue, any consideration provided or committed, directly or on its behalf, to any entity or person for an agreement to support or withhold objection to the requested approval, relief or action. "Consideration" includes any gift, payment, contribution, donation, fee, commission, promise or grant of any money, property, service, credit or financial assistance of any kind or value, whether direct or implied, or any promise or agreement to provide any of the foregoing in the future. Individuals retained or employed by a principal as a lobbyist as defined in Sec. 2-653, and appearing before the City Commission or any of its boards, authorities, agencies, councils or committees solely in the capacity of a lobbyist and not as the applicant, or owners' legal representative are not required to fill out this form. NAME' Francisco (First Name) HOME ADDRESS: i CITY: Miami HOME PHONE: 305-571-5050 EMAIL: paco@pegasocoip.com (Middle) 555 NE 15th Street, Suite 100 (Address Llne 1) (Address Line 2) STATE: FL CELL PHONE: BUSSINESS or APPLICANT or ENTITY NAME Babylon International, Inc. BUSINESS 555 NE 15th Street, Suite 100 ADDRESS: (Address Line 1) Miami, FL 33132 (Address Line 2) Martinez-Celeiro (Last Name) ZIP: 33132 FAX: 305-576-8300 1. Please describe the issue for 'which you are seeking approval, relief or other action from the City Commission, board, authority, agency, council, or committee. Seeking approval for rezoning of property located at 240 S.E. 14th Street, Miami, FL (folio no. 01-4139-068-0001) fiom T6 -8-R to T6 - 48a 0, 2. Has any consideration been provided or committed, directly or on your behalf, to any entity or person for an agreement to support or withhold objection to the requested approval, relief or action? ❑ YE=S ❑ NO If your answer to Question 2 is No, do not answer questions 3, 4 & 5 proceed to read and execute the Acknowledgment. If your answer to Question 2 is Yes, please answer questions 3, 4 & 5 and read and execute the Acknowledgement. Doc. No.:86543 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 , on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk Qty of Miami �2Y oP b F to�t4 Transaction Statement Financial Transacfion ID: 437476 Transaction Data- Jul 4 2D141.46PM FEE SUMMARY Babylon lntemational 555 NE 45TH STRl=ET, STE 100 (305)350-2409 Fee Category Fee Fee Description Quantity Unit Type Amount Code cam, HEARING BOARDS - MS -205 REZONING (T6-6, 0, 76-17, 0, 15977.0000 SQ IT. $11,183.90 APPLICATONJAPPEAL TS24 O, D1, D2, D3. T6 -3S 0, N �� b � T6 -4B 0, T6-60 0,T6-80, cv .— 1 CL -HD) s F(EkRING BOARDS - PUBLIC HEARING X'S -22S PUBLIC HERRING - METING 96.0000 NGH X HRGS $432.00 1.. MAIL NOTICE - NEIGHBORS HEARING BOARDS -PUBLIC HFAFMG MS-�28 PUBLIC HEARING- 1.0000 UNITS $1,5D0.00 _ i ADVERTSING -- HEARING BOARDS - PUBLIC HEARING MS -226 PUBLIC HEARING - LU POLICY 45.0000 NGH X HRGS $20250 15.4 ,n Jul/01/2014 1:45 PM HEARING BOARDS - PUBLIC HBkMG MS -222 PUBLIC HEARING - PUBLIC 0.9167 UNITS $66.00 MEE3 NG PACKAGE HEARING BOARDS - PUBLIC HEARING MS -241 PUBLIC HEARING - MEEIING 3.0000 HEARINGS $1350 . MAIL NOTICE - 11 APPiICVU)/APREAL� HEARING BOARDS -PUBLIC HEARING MS -716 CONCURRJ5\ICY REVIEW- 0.0000 N/A $LL50.00 SCHOOLBOARD C2 Ci a•� v Total; $13,547.90 � I rn rn cam, �r•�i C� U } �?-� t� f1 N �� b � • o vt g cv .— 1 s Z� 1.. G V _ i -- R� ,n Jul/01/2014 1:45 PM Total; $13,547.90 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 , on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk � I rn rn cam, .y C� U } C6 !3 93 � 3E iG 1 s ,n Jul/01/2014 1:45 PM Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 , on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 , on 06-27-2019. City Clerk e ' M %ii.•..�I�p�Odk�k�l�r11' ;j�,1'�IV�YIYIFyyaVw �IIIIfY.61IIIYli� I��I��YIi°Yib� IIIdYl 111.y1I�I I; �. !�. I���MVI��IIVVYV�WI4 rea:a, r�III, ui„ x,4:.l.Yifil.[�.Y:h�l Nltu:i»n Wi.l.i i41i•5 YV41 w :� VII ' it � IVB �YY li� �Y . " y . �Ar:3Yl�t�h1`I l t�lA'#'1ipNgt: 60cANlio.a Qi*> WAY : , CoralOeb 566 Nt. WH OTFAEFT t3s•foBol�rb $UrrE too . 6/23/2014 . MIAMI', M 33132 T. PAY 70TH!; CITY OF MIAMI , *"13,647.90 ORDER OF • A 'i Thirteen Thousand Five Hundred Forty -Seven and DOLLARS ) CITY OF MIAMI. g MFM) g p I International _ Y m-' "" " Rezonig Apllcation ee-- a y on ......+.4w�auiuuu:�44Ya✓A�L,4�•yL7v.L'Wu � „'rn��� ,. .�.. Babylon Rezoning Application Fee Calculation 22 Cost of Proms per unit Total fee b Change of zoning classification to T6.48 $9.70 sq ft 15,977 $ 11,183.90 c Advertising $ 1,500.00 d School con currency S 150.00 Fla. RE decislons_ 32 mailing labels, ' plus $215 for mairmg to e Marl notice fee per notice $4 50 nelghboring HOAs 32 $ 64&00 f Meeting package mailing fee per package $6.00 Per Crty. U $ 6600 Check Total 1 $ 13-47.99 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 , on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 , on 06-27-2019. City Clerk INDEX: REZONING CHECKLIST 1. Analysis pursuant to M21 Article 7.1.2.8, c.2 (g) 2. One original survey dated within six months of application, with building baseline established by the Department of Public Works 3. Two (2) 11x17' and one (1) 8'1/2x11' copies of the survey 4. Current Zoning Referral 5. Pre -application meeting comments 6. One (1) copy of Recorded Deed 7. 'Exhibit A", legal description must match survey and Deed 8. Current photos of property 9. Proposed Declaration of Restrictive Covenants 10. Proof of Lobbyist Registration T I. Affidavit of Authority to Act 12. Disclosure of Ownership of all owners 13. Certificate of Status from Tallahassee dated within I year of application 14.Articles of Incorporation of owner 15. Certified list of adjacent owners within 500 feet 16. Disclosure of Agreement to Support or Withhold Objection 17. Public School Concurrency 18. Code Enforcement violation(s) MIAMI 4220220.180765/43686 REZONING APPLICATIONF.i _ ECEV _, rLA";iHING DEFRARTMzWI1.�/ Please refer to Article 71.28 of the Miami 21 Code for Rezoning information. -' 1aIL JUL -1 ;-H 0 28 s ]icant(s): Babvlon lntemational, Inc. 2` :Sub}ect property address(es) and folio number(s): 240 S_E 14th Street. Miami. FL Folio No. 01- 41y-P3t3-0o01 3. Present zoning designation(s): 76-8-R 4. Proposed zoning designation(s)J:.45#8 0 5_ Per Miami 21, Article 7.12.8, c2 (g), an analysis of the properties within a one-half mile radius of the subject property, including aerial photo of the site as to why the present zoning designation is inappropriate and proposed zoning designation is appropriate. 6. One (1) original, two (2) 11x17" copies and one (1) 8'/2;,11 copy of the survey of the property prepared by a State of Florida registered land surveyor within six (6) months from the date of the application. 7_ A clear and legible copy of the recorded warranty deed and tax forms.of the most current year showing the present owner(s) and legal description of the property to match the legal description on the survey. 8. A clear and legible copy of the subject property address(es) and legal description(s) on a separate sheet, labeled as `Exhibit A', 'to match mill the current surveys legal description. 9. At least two photographs showing the entire property showing land and improvements. 10. Copy of the lobbyist registration processed by the Office of the City Clerk, if applicable. 11. Affidavit of Authority to Act and the Disclosure of Ownership of all owner—and contract purchasers, r applicable,- of the subject property. 12 For all corporations and parinerships indicated: a) Articles of Incorporation; b) Certificate from Tallahassee showirig good standing, less than one (1) year old; c) Corporate Resolution or a Power of Attorney signed by the secretary of the Corporation authorizing the person who signed the application to do so; d) Non-profit organizations: A list of Board of Directors less than one (1) year old_ 13. Certified list of owners of real estate within 500 feet of the subject property. 14. Original Disclosure of Consideration Provided or Committed for Agreement to Support or !Nrthhold Objecdon Affidavit 15. Original Public School Concurrency Management System Entered Requirements for. 16. The subject property(ies) cannot have any open code enforcement/lien violations_ 17. What is the acreage of the projectiproperty site? 0.367 acres Rev. 07-1013 Submitted into the public record for items) PZ.13 , on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk REZONING APPLICATION :_'•.1$" What is the purpose of this application/nature of proposed use? Rezonino for consistencv with -a$utiiiiaplooerhes. - 19. Is the "pioper`y within the boundaries of a historic site, historic district or archeological zone? Please -contact the Planning and Zoning Department on thee Floor for information. The 6fooeity is within an archeoloo;cal conservation area. The orooertv is not within a historic site or historic district 20. Is the property within the boundaries of an Environmental€ Preservation District? Please contact the Planning and Zoning. Department on the 3°d Floor for infounabon. No. 21. What would be the anticipated duration of the presentation in front of the: J Planning, Zoning and Appeais Board 1 hour and/orf City Commission 1 hour 22 Cost of processing according to Section 62-22 of the Miami City Code*: Change of zoning ciassincation to: a. CS, T3 -R, T34_ T3-0, T4 -P, T44, T4-0, T5 -R T54_ TS -0, T6 -R, T6-1, CL Per square foot of net lot area $ .50 minimum (Assumes a 8,000 square -foot lot) $ 2,500.00 b. T6-8 0, T6-12 O, T6-24 0, D1, D2, D3, T636 0, T6-48 O, T6-60 0, T6-80, Cl -HD: Per square foot of net lot area $ .70 Minimum $ 5,000.00 e. Advertising $ 1,500.00 d. School Concurrency Processing (if applicable) $ 150.00 e. Mail notice fee per notice $ 4.50 f Meeting package mailing fee per package $ 6.00 Feesover $ EY Oce shall aid in form of a cen57ed check cashier`s check or money order. Signa Address 145-0 Brickell Ave. 23rd floor Name Ja . r F. Avind Miami. FL 33131 Telephone 305-350-7202 E-mail iavino0-bil2in.com STATE OF FLORIDA— COUNTY OF hdAMI-RADE 20�Th foregoing nowledord ore me this '25. day of IJP by K who is a(n) md" " rtnWagen corporate --• a(n) individualIpartnpfcorporation a is personally;mown or who has produced as iden+t."icaiion an M -r D-7V�R, �?��Com''A WCOW SSMIRISM!L? (Stamp) a„!�� ➢aaEadir+u2�tp^�Y�� Rea 0120]3 4 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 , on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk nnn f I Submitted into the public REZiJ i V I I V � APPLICATION record for items)) PZ.13 , on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk AFFIDAVIT OF AUTHORITY TO ACT Sefore me this day, the undersigned personally appeared Francisco Martinez-Ceieiro , who being by me first deposes and says: 1. T i,at he/she is the owner or the legal repr-aseniaave of the owner, submitting the public hearing application as required by the Coda of the City of Miami, Florida, affecting the real property located in the City of Miami, as listed on the foregoing pages- 2- That all owners who he/she represents, if any, have amen his/her full and complete permssion for him/her to act in his/her behalf for the change or modification of a classification or regulation of zoning as set out in the foregoing petition, D including yl Q not including responses to day to day staff inquires. 3. That the foregoing and following pages are part of this affidavit and contain the current names, mailing addresses, telephone numbers and legal descriptions of the real property of which he/she is the Owner or legal representative. 4_ That the facts, as represented in the application and documents submitted in conjunction with this affidavit, are true and correct Further A-Mant saveth not Francisco Martinez-Ceteiro Applicant(s) Name STATE OF FLORIDA - COUNTY OF MIAMI-DADE APpli amts Si nature 1h 1 The foregoing was. a6mowledged before me this Zj� day Of J A,- 20 is by �rnGsw ce who is'�Ln) individual1prar' - a en rte,�Gon of �zry�[zt srr'�. a4aloi .1=ne a(n) individua11paAnershi .co oraYro He/She Is persojraJiv known to me or who has produced _ as id and who id did not) take an oath (Stamp) Signature � ,� 1�'i0F8$5ph'FE�2025� �'IP.ES: FI.aF 2°, Z7f6 +,E���' rnmetn.ns�pWcvj Savcc Acs. 07-2013 5 R Z A NINE APPLICATION DISCLOSURE OF OWNERSHIP i.:. i4stitis Aja7er((s) orf the subject property and percentage of ownership. Note: The Miami City Code requiYos'disciosure of all parties having a financial interest, either direct or indirect, with respect to a presentation, request or pet>€ion_ Accordingly, disclosure of shareholders of corporations, beneficiaries of trusts, andlor any other interested parties, together with their address(es) and proportionate interest are required. Please supply additional Frsis, if necessary. Owner's Name(es) Babvlon International. Inc. Percentage of Ownership 100% OW VleA - 1 ►tee JZO C�Y�t p�0� %Yl iS t!J °% CA(111CA Subject Property Address(es) 240 S_E- 14th Street- Miami- FL a +r1'�t+LKc o Main 2. List all street address*) and legal description(s) of any property located within 500 feet of the subject property owned by any and all parties listed In question 41 above. Please supply additional lists, if necessary- SlreetAddress(es), 240 S.E. 14th Street, Miami, FL Francisco Martinez-Celeirn Owner(s) or Aftomey Marne STATE OF FLORIDA — COUNTY OF MIAMI-DADE Legal Description(s): Lot 5, Block 2 and the South 1/2 of Out Lot 5 Block 2, according to the AMENDED PLAT CSF POINT VIEW, as recorded in Plat Book 2, Page R 5 of the public records of Mianf-Dade County, Florida, LESS the Northerly 10 feet borders on and runs parallel to the public right of way of South Bayshore Drive_ The foregoing was acknowledged me this 2fl day of <}d1�2— 20 `i by y£tElcFsc4k tdFt�ez- Celeiro w% indMduallpartne en rporatioti of baby Lin Orli l Trca(n) individuaUparfnershi orporatio F!elShe is Fsersonaliy !mown #a ma or who fres produced as ides on and whogXdid not) take an o (Stamp) �°" mNNsmalora ti A stgrramre i� Roo m -2o t EkFIStiES: May 24, 2016 6 e'.oy� Y �itril5ad�UNcfaJ 50'!L's Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 , on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk Submitted into the public REZO[� � � j� ,�,��� record for items) PZ.13 , [ N GAPPLICAon 06-27-2019 . City Clerk Date CITY OF MIAMI HEARING BOARDS P O BOX 330708 MIANTI, FL 33233-0708 Re: Property Owners List Within 500 Feet of. - 240 f:240 S -E. 94th Street Miami, FL Street Address(es) Total ntEnber of labels yr hob -t rnpegbon_ ,32 I certify That the attached ownership list, map and mailing labels are a complete and accurate representation of the real estate property and property owners within a 500 -toot radius of the subject property L"sted above This infomz26on reflects the most current records on Ile in the Miami -Bade Colmy Tax Assessor's Oflce. Sincerely, i` r Signature J Babylon intematonal- tnc. Name or Company Name 535 NE i5th Street Suite 100, MiamL FL 33132 Address 305-571-5050 Telephone javino@,bilzin.com E-mail Rev W-2= 8 REZONI.NGCHECKLIST Reviewer.. Name Review Date BGbyipn_lnte,rnatJonal, Inc, 305-350-7202_ Appac-Mt Name Contact information 240 S.C. 14th Street, Miami, FL Project Name and Address D Yes D No 0 NIA Analysis pu=uarr'. to M21 Article 7.128, r-2 (g) n Yes ❑ No M WA One original survey dated vdtlih six months cf application, with btrtldngbaserhs established by the Departmentof Public Works n Yes D No ❑ NIA Two (2)11x17- and one (1) 8%x11" copies of the surrey ' ❑ Yes D No rZJ N/A CurrentZonmg Refeml D Yes C No 17 NIA Pru application meeting comments D Yes 0 No 13 WA One (1), ropy of Recorded Deed (legal description on Deed mustmatch legal description on survey) D Yetis D No D NLA 'E�hbit A', legal description must match survey and Desi D Yes D Yes D No D No El WA D WA Cumentphofns, two (2) minimum, showing the entire property Covenant running with the land n Yes Q No D NIA Proof of Lobbyist RegiSation •Yes DNo El NIA AffidavitafAuthority ioAct D Yes D No D WA Disclosure of Ownership of all owners Ct Yes D No n NIA Disclosure of all contract purcImseis :2 Yes D No II NIA Ceff5cote of Status from TaU2h2ssee dated within 1 year of application for Prost and Non-profit amens and contract purctrasers IZ Yes O No D WA Corporate Res. or?ower of Atty. from all owners or Board ufDirectors D Yes ❑ No II NrA Corp. Res. or Powar eAdy. from all contact purthesem 12 Yes D No Q NIA Non-profr list of Board of Directors (owners) D Yes 0 No E! NIA Non-protr'ts: list e` Board of Directors(contract purchasers) 12 Yes ID No DWA CernedFist ofaciacentowners within BDOfeM Q Yrs DNo DWA Disclosure ofAgreernentto Support or Withhold Objection ❑ Yes D No D NIA Public School Concurrency zi Yes D No 7 WA Code Enforcement violation(s) 0 Yes D No lD NIA All property addresses subject to this request listed 12Yes D No D N/A Ali questions answered 12 Yes D No D NIA Paid recrpt 1, $abvlon InternaSonaL Inc - authorize anyre;rind to be issued to Babylon InfemationaL Inc- 555 NE 15.'h Street Sufte 100. MpamL FL 33132 (Name and Com-pleteAddress). 'if any informationfdocumentation required above is missing, application is not accepted and all documents are retumed to the applicant 'L all required information/documentation is presented, date stamp and initial the application. Rev. 07-2013 9 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 , on 06-27-2019. City Clerk - Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 , on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk Analvsis Rezoning Application for Babylon International, Inc., 240 &E. 14th Street, NDAmi, Florida - This is a request for rezoning from T6-8 to ± ' - Under the prior Code this property was office, consistent with the abutting property, now zoned T6-48. - The current land use designation of Restricted Commercial with an Urban Central Business District overlay and a B dckell Residential Density Increase Area overlay is not consistent with the (current zoning of T6-8. The current land use is the same as the abuttli -WEW— - mty- - The current T6-8 designation is inappropriate as the Property, being adjacent to and in a neighborhood o�d higher, is an inconsistency within. Miami 21. - The property's adjacency to a TGA#opertty allows for an application for a zoning change from T6-8 to .1649.,vith a bongs- As such, a rezoning is the only solution that will allow for development of this site - This designation will allow for a residential development, which is consistent and compatible with the surrounding area CRY of Miami Address of property{ es): 1-9 MIAMI 21 CODE ZONING REFERRAL Attached docwnants for the following permit application: F—lWaivsr appeal F-lexeption Speaal Area Plan f -7Warrantappeal ❑Amendmend to the Code �Zoning C4artcz Variance QOin�r COMMENTS: ky. .ij orZoni g Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 , on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 > PLANNING AND ZONING DEPARTMENT on 06-27-2019 .City Clerk PROJECTS REVIEW MEETING RE -ZONING Babylon ]rrtemational, LLC 240 SE 14 STREET PR -14-075 ZONING DESIGNATION: T6-8-0 & T6 -4-8A-0 NET DISTRICT. DOWNTOWN 6.23.14 The project is subject to review and compliance with the requirements of all Cit departments, as applicable_ The following comments were generated based the Pre -application meeting of June 23, 2014 and are intended to assist and expedite permit applications based on the applicant's voluntary modifications of the project 1 plans suggested herein. This application has been reviewed for the following permit o Rezoning per Article 7, Section 7.1.2-8 (c) (1), to allow a rezoning from T6-8-0 to TE Q$a 9:thmugh the extension of an existing Transect boundary. The following comments should be addressed: 1. Provide school concurrency letter. Applicant may contact Afina Mencio at 305.415.1425 with any question concerning the concurrency process. 2. if the applicant chooses to proffer a covenant associated with the rezoning request the applicant should submit' he document with the rezoning application package for review and approval by the City of Miami s Law Department and Planning and Zoning Department prior to the anticipated Planning, Zoning, and Appeals Board meeting. Additional comments will be provided upon review of a more detailed submittal_ Consequently. the City of Miami reserves the right to comment further on the project as details andlor explanations are provided and may revise previous comments based on this additional information- - Please note that the Planning and Zoning Department re -views Permit proposals based on Miami 21 and City Code. �• - .'i�1{L'1: 1 "!t '��1rI Rl^ff,TT 7rNr�l'll� 'j3( {r { j,'i }l'fr:lif{LF tfr ' �) .,�11 tir j�vrYt •ful' I 7117-77 i,77.0" + 'r51rf�S>�4�fra�d�{ftr" t .I ., l t r. 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P 1•, i rlYl L / r •+ tV �� ��I���r �(,1}{ ' , ...}11•;' •�,. r, r ���� , • lr i .v';., f 3 't• �' 1.a rw;, ss• hrF•Fr r ��tyy��''"��r - try ..,.rSCiyl4�1Sa�9't+ IrpRMY'4tnG-! rt nr' a T � _ ., 't � - 1 Fti� ur r t s y11jy {• y� f i��'_ ,}� i � t .�,• ��7,ra>i N� 'Ali .. ... �1W(iNf F � J . \tr }� S h t3 .✓ � 4yt.r } titrtiy{�I ° 1. rri +�� } �t}lYil'� ti P t if "Kt + 1 , a1y5`f• lit rte�!)� 2 I�JJj),ll�xy(s�rtr Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk Inds iusb mc=pxepe dby and aft xc d=gnt=tx L�-- ^�^^`�•n..c-Mc � Name Jnxf r. Avmd, Esq. Rd&ess BiLdn Smnbag Ba® Price &Axdmd LLP 1450 Brickdl Avcmzo, 23rdEom hrmmi, Florida 33 _1^1 IPROPOSEDI DECLARATION OF RESTRIC'TWE COVENANTS THIS DECLARATION OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS (the `Declaration), made this day _ of July, 2014, by Babylon mtemational, Inc_ (the "Owner', in favor of the City of Miami, a Florida Municipal Corporation (the "City D. WITNESSETH WHEREAS, the Owner holds fee -simple title to ccrtam property in the City of Miami, Florida, located at approximately 240 S.E_ 14th Street, Miami, Florida legally described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto and made a part hereof (fhe ` Property'D; and VVEEREAS, an approval was obtained for a zoning change for the Property from the City Commission of the City of Miami, on July � 2014 and attached hereto and made a part hereof as Exhibit "B"; and WHEREAS, it is the Owner's intent to develop the Property for use as a residential _ building. NOW, THEREFORE, the Owner voluntarily covenants and agrees that the Property shall be subject to the following restrictions that are intended and shall be deemed to be covenants running with me land and binding upon the Owner offhe Property, its successors in interest and assigns, as follows= 1 Submitted into the public record for items) PZ.13 , on 06-27-2019. City Clerk 1. Recitals. The recitals and findings set forth in the preamble of this Declaration are hereby adopted by reference thereto and incorporated herein as if fully set forth in this Section. 2. Zoning Reaulafions_ Irrespective of the approved'T'60-pig=die Owner agrees to develop the property with residential and lodging uses including but not limited to single family residence, community residence, two family residence, multi family housing, dormitory, home office, live -work, bed & breakfast, inn, and hotel, as presently defined in Miami. 21. 3. Effective Date. This instrument shall constitute a covenant running with the title to the Property and be binding upon Owner, its successors and assigns upon recordation in the Public Records of Nfiami-Dade County, Florida. These restrictions shall be for the benefit of, and a limitation upon, all present and future owners of the Properly and for the public welfare. 4. Term of Covenant This voluntary covenant on the part of the Owner shall remain in full force and effect and shall be binding upon the Owner of the Property, its successors in interest and assigns for an initial period of thirty (30) years from the date this instrument is recorded in the public records and shall be automatically extended for successive periods of ten (10) years, unless modified, amended or released prior to the e-piration thereof 5. Inspection and Enforcement It is understood and agreed that any official inspector of the City of Miami may have the right at any time during normal working hours to enter upon the Property for the purpose of investigating the use of the Property, and for determining whether the conditions of this Declaration and the requirements of the City's building and zoniuig regulations are being complied with- An action to enforce the terms and 2 conditions of this Declaration may be brought by the City and may be by action at law or in equity against any party or person violating or attempting to violate any covenants of this Declaration or provisions of the building and zoning regulations, either to restrain violations or to recover damages. This enforcement provision shall be in addition to any other remedies available under the law. 6. Amendment and Modification. This instrument may be modified, amended or released as to any portion of the Property by a written instrument executed by the owner(s) of the fee -simple title to the Property to be effected by such amendment, modification, or release and flee City of Miami with the approval by the City of Nfiami City Commission at a public hearing, which public hearing shall be applied for by, and be at the expense of the Owner. Any modification, amendment, or release of this covenant will be subject to the approval as to legal form by the City Attorney. 7. Severability. Invalidation of any one of these covenants by judgment of Court shall not affect any of the other provisions of this Declaration, which shall remain in fall force and effect_ 8. Recording. This Declaration shall be filed of record among the Public Records of Miami -Dade County, Florida, at the cost of the Owner. The Owner shall submit a recorded copy to the Zoning Administrator at 444 SW 2 d Avenue, e Floor, lvsami, Fl., 33130-1910 within thirty (30) days of recordation - 3 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 , on 06-27-2019 . City -Clerk ACKNOWLEDG HNT CORPORA'T'ION Signed, witnessed, executed and acknowledged on this day of July, 2014. 12V WITNESS W=REOF, Has canned these presents to be signed in its name by its proper officials_ 'Witnesses: Babylon International, Inc. Signature 555 NEE 15th Street Suite 100 Miami, Florida 33132 Print Name Signature By: Print Name STATE OF FLORIDA COUNTY OF WE AAR RADE The foregoing ins **gent was acknowledged before me by the President of .Babylon International, Inc., a corporation, on behalf ofthe corporation. IIe is personalIyknowa to me or has produced Florida Driver's licence: . as identification. Witness my signature and official seal this day of 2014 in the County and State aforesaid- -My foresaid -My Can mission Fomes: APPj20VED AS TO FORM AND CORRECTNESS: 4 NotaryPablic�State ofFLORIDA Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 , on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk VICMRU Mt�IDEz cityAM-cy APPROVED: FRANMOO 7_ CTARa& Director ofMmmng and Zoning W1 IRENE S_ HEGMUS ZcminaAdmids ator Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 , on 06-27-2019. City Clerk Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 , on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk SIT A Property Legal Descrivd— Lot 5, Block2 and the South 112 of Out Lot 5, Block 2, aecxdhg to the AMIDiD$D PLAT OF POINT VIEW, as recorded inPlat BoA Z Page 93 of the public records of Mfami Dade Couaty, Florida, LESS the Nortbady 10 felt borders on and nms parallel to the public right of way of South Bayshore Drive - 6 (3) Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 , on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk CM OF NaAftff _ LOJMYISTREGISTF2frTIQ1Y (1) Lobbyist NTamc: Avi56- Javier F- lat Name, Fns Nem Ivt die le tr l Business Fhoae: 305-350-7202 Business Address: I450 33riekell Aventz..- Suite 2300--W=i. FL Zip 33131 F -Mail Address: javiaofalbilzv.com (Z) Principal Reprcaeuted: Babvlon Tnternatsonai_ Inca - Princigars Easiness Address: do Francisco Marmez-Celeiro. 555 NE 15 St- Suite 100. Miami. FT— L (3) Specific issue lobbyist has been retained to Iobby (rf reprem3ting a corporaton, pzmership or trust, give business address of chiof officer, partner, or beneficiary of same, and the names and addresses of all ptrsons holding, directly or indElcctly, at least five percent (51) ownership interest in said corporation, parmcrship or tnrst). A I matters nertainine to land use- aDmrrc„ and develonmmt of aranerty located at 240 S -E- 14 Sfrectti Miami FL (4) Lobbyists shall state Lire extent of arty business association or financial relationship with any member(s) ofthe City Commission, any member of City s'.azi before whom h --/--,he lobbies or intends to lobby. (If applicable, please expla. ri) Lorre Lobbyists shah pay all registmcnion fees 5525.00 annu, L , plus $105.00 for eachpri o7iTal represented and for each issue a Iobbyist hes been retained to lobby on behalf of any one prncipal}, and spectrally define the issue for which thy are employed. The Clerl` s-rall reject any statement which does not derail the issue far which the lobbyist has been employed. I do solermly swear that all of the foregoing facts are- true and correct, and I have read or am familiar with the provisions contained in Sections 2-653 through 2-658 of the City of-Mraxni Code, as amended, including "annual registration, wiifldrawal, reporting.leaniremMIM defi�on�,� � unations, pen—, ties forviolatiorrs and contingency fees." n r —� State of Floiida, County of-vfiami-> de Sworn to and subserzbed Pefore me this day of A4&Lr-t— , 2414. Nf,',NC 4074725.190'765143 686 vier F. hviiib lryarrF%Qmy Cleric ,R- k . yy p1�r651piFFr OBlf9E EX r5- Fdcu731.20]8 ''-.,� 9eidik¢Mgtlk+aYl�r CITY OF NHAAff LOEBYIS T REGISTRATION Lobbyist Nsme: Csarnia-Toledo. Vickv A. Last FrstNmoG Middlc InirW SUSLIe35 Phone! 305-356-2404 Business .address: 1450 Brickell AvenLe_ Shite 2300.7.irami F1.. zip 33131 E-YIA Address: Yzemiatoledo0hilzimcom Principal Reprmn ed: Babvloo International. Inc. Prludp2rs $mess Add-ess: c(o Francisco Mar<inez-Celeiro-555 NF I5 St. Suits 100. Mi2mtFL Specific issue lobbyist has been retained to lobby (if representing a corporation, partnership or trust, give business address of chief o ncc , paw, or beneficiary of swsse, and the names and addresses of all persons holding, directly or indirectly, at least five percent (5%) ownelship ui amt in said corporation, partnership or trust). All tamers oertainkm to land use, zonin7- and develocment of arooe-rtv loca ed at 240 S.& 14 Strect� MiamL FL Lobbyists shall swe the extent ofwW business association or financial nelationsh::r with any mcmber(s) of tate City Commission, any membcrof City staff before whom helsho lobbies or intmids to lobby. (if applicable, please explain) Luton Lobbyists shall pay all mgistratior. fees $525.00 annually, plus $105.00 fot each principal represented mid for each ssae a lobbyist has been retained to lobby on behalf of any one p-utcipal), and specifically dcfne tine issue for which they are employed T#te Clerk shag rejeK any statement which does not detail the issue for which the lobbyist has been employed - I do solemnly swear Etat al t of the foregoing facts are true and coavct, and I have read or am familiar with the provisions contained in Sections 2-651 through 2-658 of the City of Miami Code, as amended, including "armual registration, withdrawal, reporting refmitions, examinations, permltics for violations and contirgenoy fees_" A. Vicky State of 3 briez f oumty of ]HsFami--B'ade Sts rn to amd subscribed before me this day a.- .2011 . Notary MFAMI 4074661.1 807657,0686 l aFAS"': J24 -N14 6cKedtSvPd3tilGsr� Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 , on 06-27-2019. City Clerk REZON I N G APPLiCATiON AFFIDAVIT OF AUTHORITY TO ACT Before me this day, the undersigned personally appeared Francisco Martinez-Celeiro . who being by me first deposes and says: 1. That he/she is the owner or the legal representative of the owner, submitting the public hearing application as required by the Code of the City of Miami, Florida, affecting the real property lo --:-lied in the City of Fuliami, as listed on the foregoing pages- 2- That all owners who he/she represents, if any, have given his/her full and complete permission for him/her to act in his/her behalf for the change or modifica8on of a classification or regulation of zoning as set out in the foregoing petition, Q including Q 13 not including responses to day to day star inquires. 3. That the foregoing and following pages are part of this a,Tid2vit and corrtain the current names, mailing addresses, telephone number and legal descriptions of the real property of which he/she is the owner or legal representative. 4. That the facts, as represented in fie anpllca5on and documents submitted in conjunction with this affidavit are true and correct Further A7,;ant sayeth not Francisco Marin-Ceieco Applicam(s) Dame STATE OF FLORIDA— COUNTYi OF MIMAI-DADE r. Applicant(s) Sign re The foregoing was aclmoMedged before me this 20 day of Jun -- 20 P , by ancfscv i are r`z�z-Cjerro who is "{n individuallpartrre i en borporation o �(y--� �riern? i. Jnr- a(n) individuallpartnershi orpora ro . He/She is person known to me or who has produced as iden` cation and wh did did not) e an oath_ (Stamp) Signal. AcMsr-iA * rNc0M3310N,EEX co EK.°1.5c3:kax 29, 1016 �Wne� �nmrs�.tr�ysm;� Res. 07-2M 5 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 , on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk Submitted into the public - record for item(s) PZ. 13 , ON I N G APPLICATION on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk Z DISCLOSURE OF OWNERSHIP 1. 1 it3ia�?wmer(s) of the subject property and percentage of ownership. joie: The Miami City Code requires' disclosure of all parties having a financial interest, either direct or indirect., with respect to a presentation, request or petition. Accordingly, disclosure of shareholders of corporations, benefirdaries of trusts, and/or any other interested parties, together with ;fidT address(es) and proportionate interest are tequired. Please supply additional lists, if necessary_ Owner's Name(es) Babvlon international. Inc_ Percentage of Ownership 100% E;wyieA b� Fetoso..Co ; l'��a �,yiz iS 4th%zx KeA Subject Property Address(es) 240 S -E. 14th Street Miami. FL 1 lc' -a ietSG0 maviiyel-- - Cete� 2. List all street address(es) and legal description(s) of any properly located within 500 feet of the subject property owned by any and all parties listed in question ;91 above. Please supply additional lists, if necessary. Sheet Address(es): 240 S.E. 14th Street, Miami, Fl- Francisco L Francisco Martinez-Celeiro Owner(s) or Aitomey Name STATE OF FLORIDA — COUNTY OF M[AMI-DADE Legal Description(s): Lot 5, Block 2 and the South 1/2 of Out Lot 5 Block 2, according to the AMENDED PLAT dF POINT VIEW. as recorded in Plat Book 2, Page 9 S of the public records of Mitami-Dade County, Florida, LESS the Northerly 10 feet borders an and nuns parallel to the public right of way of South Bayshore Drive. fli�l ,3y� The foregoing was acknowledged betgra me this ZO day of Jcn2-- 20 aK by �rtc:.:cvrhlfez- C>i(Qiro who i a Ind-rvidual/partnP aae�icorporation of 3a�an intea-�rn� i Tr�a(n) irs ividuailpartnersh!p�rpouatiory? He/She is personaltme or who has produced as Iden t •&citron and who�i (did not) � , (imp) '� F�YCQI9ASSWB ff# Signature R.av 07,207.9i' * EXPIRESNayZ8.7At6 6 !r�,��a° Bodedi6mEtdyetN'wYSb�sa Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ -13 , .xMiT79��.i�l�� on 06-27-2019 ..City Clerk l certit-, ir-om the records of this office fiat BABYLON INi D?MATIOhiAL, NC., is a cofporatiion organized Lmder ;ire lays of the State of Ronda- Pled on Deceen3ber 13, -198,0- The 'Jam_The anent numberof t.`Yis co,por2.tion iv L35642. J further Carafy the, said corporation has paild all fees due this of5ce through Decambar 3#, 2014, ti-iat fts most runt annul reportlunUiarm businass report was filed on Mard� 26, 2014, and. i 'm status is acive. 1 lwtlaer oer , that said comaraipr: has not filed Arzicies of Dissolufan. Gfven unde3 my hand and ft Greed Seal of the Slate of Eich atTaBaN§see, the Cam, this ttse Tfflrfanrth clay of .ltd 2014 ARTIC'EES OF T_iFCURsORATIOa' of SA3)mOH, 1-C. ARTICLE I NAFSF, The name of this Corpo=atioa iz_ SABY%,DN, INC. ARTICr•L' II DURAtT_ON n_ G This cczporatioai shall have perpetual existence. ARTICLZ III PUR?OSE This Corporation is crganized for the purpose of trasactiafg any or all lawful business. ARTI= Ii/ CAPITAL STUCK This Corporation is auth-rined to Issue sixty E60) shares of common stock without par value. ARTICLE V INITIAL REGISTERED OFFICE ZUND AGEENT The street address of initial registered office of this Corporation is: 480 ISLAND DR, Xey Biscayne Hiami. Fl. 33149 The Mase of the initial registered agent of this Corporation at that address is: FRANCISCO MARTINEZ-C^cLEIRO Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 , S on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk i I i Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 , on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk 2LIMICLE VI INITIAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS This Corporation shell have two '12} directors initially. tae aurbsr of d1rector may oe either increased or dlminishe3 from time to time by the BY -Latins, but shall never be less tin one (1). 4AME ADDRESS FRANCISCO :tiiP1tTINE2- 189 Island Dr Cv*EERO KEY BISCAY'iE 6SIAM3 FLr 33149 EVA MIYASHM 1430 Island Dr. KEY BiSCAYH-- MMIM F_T., 33149 ARTICLE VII INCOP.PORA RS The nave and address of person signing these articles is 'ti_AMB ADDRESS FRANCISCO MARTINEZ- 180 Island Dr. CELE-TRD. TTY SISCPYN= MTAC:i FL, '33749 ARTICSaE VIII AAL om sNT This Corporation reserves the right to amend or repeal any provI-sions contained xn these Articles of 2ncorporation, or arty amendment to them, and right conferred upon the sha<-ehosders Is subject to this reservation. IN WITNESS WELIRECF, the undersigned suberiber has executed these Articles of Incorporation on this 11 day of Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 , on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk D=KSBR .LNWR?Ue-&TUR: ru4rcr-12-:;7-t ,csisu STATE D? mapanA k COUNTY CSP D&DE 1 BEFORE HE, a notary public, authorized to take ac_knowl- dgment in the State and County, set Porth above, personally appeared FRANCISCOFLFt4TT_ttEZ-CEE.n�1RD,kaown to m -z and known to _ he the person who executed the foregoing Articles of Incorpo,- -- ration and he acknowledged before me that he executed these Articles of T_corporation. IN 11TTWESs WaEREGF-I have hereunto set my hand and affixed icy official seal, in the State =srd Cosnty aforesaid,this 11 day ofDECEMBER '1989 nvcrucs runi.i�.,y:ttti c'c U- GLUSIl UH AT LARGE -- My Commission Expires: xouer FMIC sr.7F 7% R.J'7DA rr Coxaf;,4 E%P ,W IU,cr}2 004MO 2Hau GMRik1 ITS. m. CERTIFICFTE Or REGISTERED AMER Flaving been named to accept service of proccess for tate abcve Cdrpor=_tion at the place designated in these Articles of Tncarporation, i hereby agree to act in thzs capac=ty, and I €srther agree to comply whith the provisions of all statutes relative to the proper and complete performance of my duties. t - 4-- k FRMCISCO Y..ARTIN3BZ-Cv-PL3 rn Registered Agent DATE December 11 , 1989 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 , on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk H I Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 , on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk ARTICLES OF AMENDTIM—NT ARTICLES OF INGORP£>RATiON ?c!rsuas f t� e or�visias� of Guar, �tari�a Staie�Yes, L urrcfe itsd cDrpOraSrit{' . e�� fafia�i �r1icF of 3r; enoma�: is arkISS di i;,n=POT.UO . FIST: Tne rr� Oi tie —F- -i;-, is: B AB ICLa1 , 1NC. SLC.jM'D: The ioroi;xr{g amandmert(s) to t e arty c. u _ was, (Vvar e) adapt by tE'te motion: The name of the oorpQration is changed and the eo_porzt on shall henceforth 3e known as BABk�LON INT-EnIATIONAL,, TPC. --i'3?i�: T - a�endme` s) was twerel adopted by the Si arehold— of the ��[<re�a�.�a {az ice ML- I ice-♦ � � � t O3rao � W11W 1.WC. BY Prasidece s[ nt Secreta �tst[Ft�etxa By Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ 13 M. on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk S F ATE OF FLORIDA � COUNTY OF Before me. the undersigned auno persDrWy appealed gRNcisc O r.�� to me well known to by the person(( -who executed the foregoing arilcfes of anMdMWA to ar• - Udes of incorporation and acknowledged before me, accorckng to lair, Mat he made and sub. scribed the ss-ne for the Virposes therein meniloned and set forth. _ iN �JUNEESS WHEREOF.[ have hareunb set my hand and seat this qday of -is—. - / NctaryTlubic My commission expl es: 20 MY PM It SME OF 7LOPTU M CUMS51O8 W M-ZD.IPZ - MED IMS TAMIL 3YS OR2, y ,Tile 9, 2014 city of Miami Hearing Boards Division Planning, Building and Zoning DivisIon 444 SW 2nd Avenue, 7th Floor Miami, Florida 33130 Re: Property Owners List Within 500 feet of: BABYLON TOWERS CONDO POINT VIEW SUB PB 2-93 LOT 5 LESS NLY 10FT FOR R/W & Sl/2 OF OUT LOT 5 LESS ELY 25FT FOR R!W BLK 2 240 SE 14 ST 1M5 ATE. Is AMzcbe Suite 306 3E`e�, IL 33162 (3007 7bl-b 4 1500 West CyY z Creeks& suibe409 Ft,Lw=I.raz7e FL33M9 G95Q 761- 9003 12290 Forest EM Blvd - suite Tno-W We]Eagia FL38414 (Ses)7s8-4428 w w mimx; is Com "is is to certify that the attached ownership list, map and mailing labels are a complete and accurate representation of the real estate property and property owners -within 500 feet of the subject property listed above_* This reflects the most current records on file in the Miami -Dade County Tax Assessor's office. Sincerely, Maureen E. Hudson y I. MEE/= cc: Rena Kelley, Esq. BILZTN SUMBERG BAENA PRICE & AXELROD LLPt• :*.E`y _��y 1450 Brickell Ave, 23rd Floor '��'•- Miami, Florida 33131 s S• Number of Labels: 32 •' 3 ' ✓ ' *I£ property is declared to be a Cond'+xairi=, only the Association is notified. Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 , on 06-27-2019. City Clerk 0102100501010 1395 BRI=,T AVE �S SUB PB 1-164 LOTS 1 & 2 & W10FT LOT 3 & TR A OF UPC SOB PB 121-93 LESS PORT DESC IN CONDO DECL OR 22613-1195 NAD 01 4139 083 K/A = FIEiD CONDO & LESS PORT DESC IN CONDO DELL OR 25234-2213 NAD 01 4139 102 0001 K/A THE HOLBORN HOTEL CONDO LOT SIZE 100747 SQ FT 0102100503210 1250 BRZCB .L BAY DR ADO COURT A RE -SOB PB I4-44 LOTS 23 & 25 LOT SIZE 85.000 % 63 0102100504160 190 12 TER SE H_',=COS PLACE PB 3-110 L4 Tr A BLK 3 LOT SIZE 50.000 % 120 ESTORIL INCORPORATED & WIMP.N Lr - 1395 C1395 BRICEELL AVE MTIAML, FL 33131-3353 (MCI IA ZURITA WASEINGTOM 4A SCONEZ PO BOX 310216 MLAMI, FL 33231-0216 C= OF NIAVT DEPT OF P & D ASSET MA1Ss[ FaMT DIVISION 444- SW 2ND AVE STE 325 MIAMI, FL 33130-1910 0102100504180 SOL.ARIS AT BRICZELL BAY LLC 170 12 TER SE 353 PONCE DE LEON BLVD H ISCUS PL P3 3-110 CORAL GATxrrc, FL 33146-1816 LOFT STRIP OF LAND -WW= -V-R=E ALLEY LYG S & ADS TO LOTS 1 2 &3 MK 3 7382419 LOT SIZE 1500 SQ FT 0102100504250 CECILTA ZL022TA 1260 BRICXELL BAY DR PO BOX31 0216 EE3ISCUS PLACE PB 3-210 MLAML, FL 33231 LOFT STRIP S OF LOTS A & B HLR 3 LOT SIZE 1300 SQ FT 0102100507010 1401 BEICXELL AVE 2.02 AC M/L FORTE PLAZA PB 96-21 TRACT A 0141390260001 1450 BRICKELL BAY DR COS -A Bre-•LS CONDO COSH Br;.LA -.UB PB 107-14 TRACT A 0141390280001 1440 BRIO M BAY DR. BRICMLL SHORES CONDO B'FT-LA B: 31A SUB SS 109-13 TRACT A OR 10159-200 SERVICE'S F< PROMTIONS 'MTARCT LLC C/O SANTAMER MOBAL PROP 1401 BRICBML AVE STE 810 SIIA*D=, FS. 33131-3503 COSTA.BELLA CONDO ASSOCIATION, IlVC_ I9NAGPCNF OFFICE 1450 BRIC ELL BAY DR m- =, FL 33131 BRIC.*ELL SEO-RES CONDO ASSOCIATION, INC. BECIM & POL=O=- - REG AGENT 3111 STIRLING RD FT LAUDERDALE, FL 3 3312-652 5 Flanda, Real Estate De6sions, Lic. Page 1 of 5 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 , on 06-27-2019. City Clerk 0141390280001 1440 BRIC .L BAY DR BRICIML SHORES CONDO 3EFd A BAHTA SUB PB 109-13 RACT A OR 10159-200 0143390350010 1221 BRIO-KELL AVE B L R SUB PB 117-70 TR A IAT SIZE 89864 SQ F -- 0141390560001 T 0141390560001 1402 BRICKELL BAY DR C01MODORE BAY CONDO Atm PLAT OF POINT V= PB 2-93 LOT 4 ELK 2 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 , on 06-27-2019. City Clerk BRICKELL• SHORES CONDO ASSOCIATION, INC_ M2,10 ANGULO - OFFICER DIRECTOR 6611 CAST!ANM:xA ST CORPS, GABLES, FI, 33146-3415 FL 1221 BRICKELL LLC C/O EQUITY OFFICE MGT LLC 2 N RIVERSIDE PLZ STS 2100 CHICAGO, IL 60606-2621 COMMDORE BAY CONDO ASSOCIATION, INC - C/o NAIMG� OFFICE 1402 32ICE= PAY DR 7Jrr T, 33131 0141390640010 VII MP MIME HOTEL OWNER LLC 1441 BRICKELL AVE C/O WESTBROOK PARTNERS =C=L CHASE PB 153-67 T-2017 645 MADISON AVE 18TH FLOOR TR A LESS PORT DESC IN OFF REC 21766-4639 NEW YORK, NY 10022 I=LMMI= TOWER 3E=ENCBS CONDO E. 017 REC 21766-4920 V=T.xmMOX TOWER CONDO HOTEL 0141390650001 185 14 TER. SE FORTUNE HOUSE CONDO ST JAMES AT 3RICK1i.L PB 146-99 TRACT A LOT SIZE 55060 SQ FT 0141390650001 185 14 TER SB FORTUNE HOUSE CONDO ST JAMES AT 3RSCICELL PB 146-99 TRACT A LOT SIZE 55060 SQ FT FORTUNE 30USE CONDO ASSOCIATION, =VC - JOSE L PALdYRA,RSQ - REG AGENT 2950 SFT 27 AVE, STE 100 MIAMI, FL 33133 FORTUNE HOUSE CONDO ASSOCSATSON, INC - ROBERT QUAE.I - OFFICER/DIRECTOR 901 BRICIMLL KEY BLVD'03806 Ta AnR r, FL 33131 0143390660001 BP3SHORB COOPERATIVE INC 1430 BRI-CKET.T• BAY DR DAVID 8 ROOT , ESQ - REG AGENT AAPSHORE CO OP 3MC 121 21.17ATMA PLAZA., 10TH FLOOR POINT VIEW APTS CORAL GABLES, FL 33134 POINT VIEW SUB PB 2-93 S175FT OF LOT 34 & S175FT OF OUT IAT 34 LESS 912FT N OF LOT 35 MM 2 LESS W=5FT FOR R/W Florida Real Estate Decisions, Inc. Page 2 of 5 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 , on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk 0141390660001 BA-YSHORE COOPERATIVE INC 1430 BRICKELL = DR GERATD MC GYNLEY - OFFTCER/DZRECTOR BA.YSHORE CO OP INC 1430, ERIC ML BAY DR, 41103 POINT V_.SW APTS MIAMI, FL 33131 POINT VTEw SO'B PB 2-93 S175FT OF LOT 34 r. S175FT OF OUT LOT 34 LESS S12FT N OF LOT 35 BLE 2 3,ESS iALLYSFT FOR R/W 01_1390670001 1420 BRICEML BXY DR BAY HCRE PLACE CCNDO P0=VIENl PB 2-93 S30OFT OF R235FT OF LOT 34 LESS SWLY 52T BLK 2 BAYSHORE PLACE CONDO -ASSOCIATION, INC. FRANK DIAZ - REG AGENT 1420 =CREI.:, MAY DR,` OFFICE MIAMI, y 33131 0141390670001 BAYSEORE, MACE CCMO ?SSOC PION, INC_ 1420 BRICKELL BAY DR ADRTANA ACOST - OFFICER/DIRBCTOR BAYMORE PLACE CC%= 1420 BRICKELL BAY DR #j1508B POINT VIEW PB 2-93 MIAMI, FL 33131-3615 S300FT OF N235FT OF LOT 34 LESS SWLY 5FT ELK 2 0141390710010 TVU 1201 LLC 1201 BRICKELL BAY DR 100 S B=SCA--= BLVD STE 900 BAYS30RE PATMG R.PPL•AS PB 155-100 T-20560 XZAMS, FL 33131-2031 TR B LOT SI7,E 108726 S4 FT 0141390760001 Tr.TT.T_79_ rrn.T TOWER RES ENCES CONK) BRIMELL CHASE PB 153-67 PORT OF TRACT A AS DESC IN OFF REC 21766-4639 0141390760001 IM&ENNIOM TOWER RESIDENCES CONDO BRICKEMI CHASE PB 153-67 PORT OF TRACT A AS DESC IN OFF REC 21766-4639 0141390780001 xrr r.yam ItH TOWER CUMO HOTEZCONDO BRICTELL CASE PB 153-67 PORT OF OLIRACT A AS DESC'. IN OFF REC 21766-4820 NrrT:r.MDrIUM TWR RESIDENCES CONDO ASSOC-, INC. MIR-= F^RMMURO - RECzTSTHRED AGENT N�SIS6GEMENT OFFICE 1435 'RICKELL AVE MIAMI, FL 33131 *TTT•T•=�T*T�TTMT TWR RESIDENCES CONDO ASSOC_, INC - FRED DRAMUM - OFFICER/DIRECTO_R 1425 BRZCF= AVE, #54E Z=Xla, FL 33131 M ZZ—mauum TOWER CONDO HOTEL ASSOC., INC _ MIRIET_ FERREIRO - REGIS'TE'RED AGENT MAIULGEMEN ` OFFICE 1435 BRICKELL AVE TjrT' , FL 33131 MOF14Ta Real Estate Decisions, IAC. Page 3 Of 5 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 , 0141390780001 tKrT.TEMUCUM TOWER CONDO EOTw—ASSOC., INC_ on 06-27-2019. City Clerk 3.435 BP -IC=— AVE EMANUEL ORGANET - OFFICSR/DIIZ^.CTOR NTTS•='MTM TOWER CONDOMI -+IIM 7-07-M CONDO 2255 GLAMS RD, SPE 234W BPJCKELL CHASE PB 153-67 BOCA BATON, FL 33431 PORT OF TRACT A AS DESC IN OFF REC 21766-4820 01 13908200DI 1331 BRSCRELL BAY DR ,TnT+R RESIDENCES AT Ml= -,L BAY CONDO BAY -SHORE PALMS REPLAT PB 155-100 TRACT C AS DESC IIT OR 22571-3837 LOT SIZE 111893 SQ FT M/L 0141390820001 1331 BT =CHL B21_1' DR JADE REST^Mn•'z'S AT BRICKELL BAY CONDO B8Y OBz PAizs REPzAT PB 155-100 TRACT C AS DESC IN OR 22571-3837 LOT SIZE 111893 SQ FT MIL 0141390950001 THE MIERaTn AT BR -TCS= CONDO POINT VIEW SOB PB 2-93 LOTS 6 THRII 8 & N25FT OF OUT LOT 5 MK 2 AS DESC ID DECL OR 24468-2002 LOT SIZE 28281 SQ FT 0141390950001 218 14 ST SE THE MIJAMA D AT 3R£C sKK� CONDO P03MT VIEW SUB PB 2-93 :ATS 6 TERU 8 & N25FT OF OUT LOT 5 MK 2 AS DESC IN D -_-CL OR 24468-2002 LOT SIZE 28281 SQ FT JADE RESIDENCES AT BR.ICY ' BAY CONDO ASSOC., INC. ?'Z E DIEZ - REGISTERED AGENT 1331 BRIM= B_n3 DR 00200 MIANZ, FL 33131 MOO RESIDENCES AS BRICK= BAY CONDO ASSOC., INC. JCNnmaaN EMT, - OFFICEER/DIRECTOR 1331 BRICKEIL BAY DR, -41805 Ni=, FL 33131 TEE RMPULD AT SRICKEL CONDO ASSOC., INC. STEVEN T.aCMMMAN P.A._ - REG AGENT 2655 LE JEMM RD, PH 1-D CORAL GAIrr , FL 33134 THE M RATD AT BRICKELL CONDO ASSOC., A -NC. JUDY SANTOS - OFFICER/DIRRCPOR 218 SE 14 STREET, *1403 L�TBMI1 FL 33131 0141390980001 SOLARIS AT BRIC_ML BAY CONDO ASSOC_, INC. 186 12 TER SE SKRLD, INC. - REG AGENT SOLMUS AM BRICIUML BAY CONDO 201 ALMMMRA CSR, STE 1102 BIBISCUS PL PB 3-110 COPAL QARTRc, FL 33134 LOTS 1 THRU 3 & LOT B LESS NSFT BLE 3 AS DESC IN DEC OFF REC 24995-4525 LOT SIZE 23250 SQ FP 0141390980001 SOLARIS 1T BRIC=Z BAY CONDO ASSOC., INC. 186 12 TER SE LORMM ARNOLD - OFFICER/DIRECTOR SOLAPSS AT SRICKELL BAY CONDO 186 SE 12TH TERRACE, UNIT 1709 RTRTRCUS PL PB 3-110 XIAMi, FL 33131 LOTS 1 TEIRU 3 & LOT B LESS N5PT = 3 AS DESC IN DEC OFF REC 24995-4525 LOT SIZE 23250 SQ FT Florida Real Estate Decisions, Inc. Page 4 of 5 0141391000001 THE SAIL CONDO ASSOCIATION, MBC_ TEE SAM CONDO POINT VIEW SUB PB 2-93 170 Sk 147H AVE, APT 1807 LOT 9 & 10 & E40F1 OF LOT 11 LESS RIM SLK M=, FL 33131-3339 2 & NLY 1/2 OF lOFT ALLEY LYG SLY & AW AS DESC IN DEC:, OR 25201-0844 LOT SIZE 20344 SQ FT 0141391250001 BR==,HODSE CONDO ASSOCIATION, INC_ BRICKML.HOUSE CONDO C/O BRI-MEL•LAOUSE HOLDING LLC HIGHLY MANS SOB PB 1-184 1200 B-R"CKELT_ AVE, STE 1500 B28FT OF LOT 7 & ALL LOT 8 & TA100 OF LOT 9 MI:A=, FL 33131-3221 LESS S10FT FOR R/W & LOT 20 LESS W7FT & ALL LOTS 22 & 24 & 26 OF NSRADO COURT A RE SUB PB 14-44 LESS R/W AS DFSC 125T DELL OR 28283-3663 LOT SIZE 43755 SQ FT 0141400250001 1408 BRICKELL BAY DR BIUCKELL• BAY TOWER COMIDO POINT VIEW PS 2-93 LOTS 1-2-3-31-32 & 33 & ZLY 5FT OF LOT 30 & PORT OF LOT 34 BEC- AT NE COR S257T SWLY TO W/L NBFT TO NW COR NELY TO POB Sc PORT OF 10FT ALLEY LYG S OF SLY/L OF LOT 4 a= W & NLY OF M/L OF LOT 34 W LESS STS BLK 2 BRICTLSC.L BAY TOWER CONDO ASSOC_, INC. C/O JORGE HEVIA III ESQ 1408 BRIO ML BAY DR APT 205 MIAMZ, FL 33131-3618 Florida Real Estate DecsioDs, Inc. Page 5 of 5 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 , on 06-27-2019. City Clerk Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 , on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk BAYSHORE COOPERATh7= INC DAVID A ROG'�Lr.. , ESQ - RSG AGENT 121 Ar EIANMRA PLAZA, 10TH FLOOR CORALGAALES, FL33I34 BA.YS30RE PLACE CONDO ASSOCIATION, INC. ADRFANA ACOSTA - u- on 1420 BRTCIUML BAY DR L1508B MLAML FL.33131i615 BRK3=SHORE, CONDO ASS 0C -INC_ MARIO ANGULO - OFFIC'R/DMECTi1R 6611 C-ASTANEI)A ST CORALGABLES, FL S3146r,415 C_CLLIAZURTLA WASRNGTON VASCONEZ PO BOIL 31Q2I6 MIANdL F1.332314216 COSTA SEUA A CONDO ASSOCIATION, INC OFFKFRIDIRECTOR MANAGEMENT OFFICE 1450 BR1CL'E2.L BAY DR M7AM1, EL 33133 POPTUNE i30USE CONDO ASSOCIATION, INC JOSE L BALOYRA, ESQ - PS -G AGENT 2950 SW 27AVE, STE 100 MIAMI, FL n1:3 JADE RESIDENCES AT BRICKELL13AY CONDO ASSOC- INC. JONATHAN EYAL- OFFICERMIR--CTOR 1331 MCCKII.J_ BAY DR -1805 MLQ,V, FL 33131 NUL FNNIUM TOWER RESIDENCES CONDO ASSOC, INC NMMTT FERREBRO - REGLSTFRED AGENT 1435 BRICZEi L AVE M'AUa, ELM 31 SOIARIS AT BRICKEI.L BAY CONDO ASSOC, INC SKRLD, INC. - REG AGENT 20I ALHANIBRA C1R, STE 1102 CORAL GABLES, FL 33134 BAYSHORE COOPERATIVE INC GERALD MC GATISY - OFFICERODIRELTOR 1430 BRICM I_ BAY DR, 7103 MIAMI, FL33131 BRICKELL BAY TONER CONDO ASSOC, INC - C/O JORGE HEVIA III ESQ 1409BRICKELL BAY DR AFT 203 MLAML PL 331"31-3618 BRlC)CE rROUSE CONDO ASSOCLSTION, DqC. C!O BRICUCL T10USE HOLDING UC 1200 BRICI=AVE, STE 1500 M ANILFL33131-3721 GTTY OF M1AM7 DEPT OF P & D ASSET MANAGrMIENr DIV 444 SW 2NDAVE STE 325 MIANO, FL 33130-19; 0 ESTORM INCORPORATED & HOLBORN LC 1395 BR)CKMJ- AVE MIAMI, FL33131-3353 FORITJNE BOUSE CONDO ASSOCIATION. INC ROBERT Q1UMESM - 0FF3CER/DTDU3CMX 901 1MUCKELL KEY BLVD #3806 MLAm4FL33151 Mn r ci.T'IOM TOWER wlvw tauAri. ASSOC, INC. M1RI£T FERREIRO-REGIS EREDAGENT 1435 BR10al.. AVE M1AML FL 3MI MMLENNIUM TOWER RESIDENCES CONDO ASSOC_ INC ? RED DRASNEP,-OFFICER/DIRECTOR 1&25 BRICKELL AVP.t64E MLAMI, FL »L3l SOLARLS ATBRJCI=BAY CONDO ASSOC, INC. LORENAARNOLD - OFTICER/DI RECTOR 186 SE 12TH T-liRACE, UNIT 1709 Mlk)a FL33331 TIS E, ERATD AT BP.ICKELL. THE EMERALD AT BRICE= CONDO ASSOC, INC. CONDO ASSOC- INC STEIFN L9CHTEl-,9N PA - P.EG AGEKT JUDY SANTOS - OFFICER/DIRECTOR 2655 LE JEUNE RD, PH 1 D 21 B SE 14 STREET. :7403 CORAL GABIa, FL 33134 MLSML FL 33131 BRJCR_LL SHORES CONDO ASSOC- INC. BECKER &. POLIAKOFF-REG AGENT 311I STOUINGRD FF LAUDERDALE, FL 33312-65-_5 CE -CILIA ZURTTA PO BOX 310216 COMMODORE BAY CONDO ASSOC-INC C/OMANAGE/dENTOF ICE 1402 BRICKELLBAY DR MLAMI, 33131 FL 121 BRICKELL LLC C10 EQ= OFFICE MNCT= 2 N RLVFRSIDE PLZ STE 2100 CHICAGO, IL 60606-2621 JADE RESIDENCES AT BRICKUL BAY CONDO ASSOC, INC- F=IPE DIEZ-REGISTERED AGENT 1331 MCKELL BAY DR 8200 NaAM1-FL 33I31 MaiEN IIOM TOWER CONDO3= ASSOC., LNC. EMAN= ORGLANET-OFACE R/DBi=-CIUR 2255 GLADES RTD, STE 234W BOCA RATON. FL33431 SERVICrS &.PROMOTION'S MANE LLC 00 SANTATDr GLOBAL PROP I401 BRICKELL AVE SIE 810 MIAMI, FL 3313I-3503 SOLARM AT BRICKELL BAY LLC 4353 PONCE DE LEON BLVD CORAL GABLES, , FL S3146-1816 THE SAIL CONDO ASSOCIATION, ITEC 170 SE 14TH AVE, AFT 1807 MIAMI, FL3313 i-3339 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 > 1�1AACEEE CONDO ASSOCIATION, INC. on 06-27-2019 City Clerk 14M BRX-4ZFT t BAY DR MANAGMYENr OFFICER MIAMI, FL 33131 BRJCR_LL SHORES CONDO ASSOC- INC. BECKER &. POLIAKOFF-REG AGENT 311I STOUINGRD FF LAUDERDALE, FL 33312-65-_5 CE -CILIA ZURTTA PO BOX 310216 COMMODORE BAY CONDO ASSOC-INC C/OMANAGE/dENTOF ICE 1402 BRICKELLBAY DR MLAMI, 33131 FL 121 BRICKELL LLC C10 EQ= OFFICE MNCT= 2 N RLVFRSIDE PLZ STE 2100 CHICAGO, IL 60606-2621 JADE RESIDENCES AT BRICKUL BAY CONDO ASSOC, INC- F=IPE DIEZ-REGISTERED AGENT 1331 MCKELL BAY DR 8200 NaAM1-FL 33I31 MaiEN IIOM TOWER CONDO3= ASSOC., LNC. EMAN= ORGLANET-OFACE R/DBi=-CIUR 2255 GLADES RTD, STE 234W BOCA RATON. FL33431 SERVICrS &.PROMOTION'S MANE LLC 00 SANTATDr GLOBAL PROP I401 BRICKELL AVE SIE 810 MIAMI, FL 3313I-3503 SOLARM AT BRICKELL BAY LLC 4353 PONCE DE LEON BLVD CORAL GABLES, , FL S3146-1816 THE SAIL CONDO ASSOCIATION, ITEC 170 SE 14TH AVE, AFT 1807 MIAMI, FL3313 i-3339 TWS 1201 LLC VM he I -UAW HOTEL OVMEK LLC loo SBLSCAYNE31AM S1c900 VO VaWHROOKPARTNEtS MIAI+1i. FI.33131-20'31 645 MADISON AVE 18TH RMR NEW YORt ;NY 10022 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 , on 06-27-2019. City Clerk r Jpdatceper revised list of 11/13 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 Downtown NET The Honorable Marc Samuff 06-27-2019 City Clerk vonCeroi i(inchens, Administrator Dis et2 st3 on . 900 S. Miami Avenue €183 3500 Pan American Drive —^^�-�^ Mam4 Florida 33430 Miami, FL 33133 Downmwn Miami Partnership Brickelt Area Assoc. DowntcNm Development Authority Eddie Padilla, Executive Director Maria Gomez, Administrative Secretary Alyce Robertson 25 SE 2Avenue, SuhB 240 1395 BrickeU Avenue, Suite #108 200 S. Biscayne Blvd., Sulte 2929 Miami, FL 33431 Miami, FL 33431 Miami, FL 33131 The Palace Condominium Venetia..? Causeway Neighborhood AliPance CRA Dr_ arty Imber Jack Hariog President Chelsa Arscott Douglas 1541 Brickell Avenue 1505 NE 13k Place 49 NW 5�' Sceet, Suite 100 Miami, FL 33129 Miami, FL 33139 Miami. FL 33128 Dade Heritage Trust Brickell Homeowners Association SecWRoper M. -acv, P. ydc--tJCEO Enrw.so Cuesra, President �, ��-„n �- ,__-• - 190 SE 12ID Terrace P_O_ Box 452403 44A SIPA^- Nfrwni FL 33131 MiamL FL 53145 A a m� FL 333; 39 Omni Park West Redevelopment Assoc. Miami River Commission Gay Robinson, PA Bradley Knoeflar, President Brett Bibeau, Managing Director Atte Gary Robinson 597 N. Mlami Ave #`2 1407 NW 7 Suet. Ste D 1221 Brickell Ave., Suite #1600 Miami, FL 33436 Marrs, FL 331,25 Miami, FL 33131 Venetian Causeway Miami entertainment Distr . Assn_ 500 Bricke6 Neighborhood Alriance MicFaer, Srvder, Presidents ScoR Femerman, Comm_ Assoc. Mhgr Jade Hartog at Gary Robinson PA TCany Eaton Esq. 55 SE e Street, Suite #1194 1221 Brickell Ave., Suite #1600 225 South 21 Avenue Miami, FL 33131 M"am4 FL 33131 Hctlyw , FL 33020 Jpdatceper revised list of 11/13 Submitted into the public ,963!6v,711MoCITY { CITY OF N�T�It� record for item(s) PZ.13 , *>„n �m?��, DISCLO SURF, OF CONSIDEPUMN PROVMED OR C01 =TED FORAGREE1VIEh'T TO On 06-27-2019 . City Clerk `s SUPPORT OR NATMROLA OBJECTION The Ciiy of Mann requires any person or emIrty regoestng approval relief or other a.=on from the Crty Co=assion or any of its boards, authorities, ag-nic-s, ccuaca or conunitrees, to disclose at TRe commencement (or conks) of tae heating(s) on the =ac, any consideration provided or commuted; dize.,tiy or on its behalf; to any entry or person for an. agreemeat to support or withhold objection to the requested approval, relief or action- "Considerarion inclndea any ,pis% payment, c=t-ibutioa, donation, fee; co -mission, prorase or gn— of any money, property, service, credit or financial assistance of any kind or value, whether direct or unplied, or any promise or a-,etmentto provide any of the £ortgoing u the fatm- Ind-vidnals retaintd or employed by a principal as a Iobbyist as dfined in Sec_ 2-653, and appeari ag before the City Commission or any of its boards nacho, ties agencies, counc-is or committees solely in the capacity of a lobbyist and not as the appicarrt or owners' Icgalrepresentative are not regniredto f[II out this form. NATE: Francisco (Fast Name) HOIJ—PADDRESS: CITY: Miami HOME PRONE: 305-571-5050 EThnLL: paco@cpegasocccp.com NFardnez-Celtiro (Mlndle) (test Name) 555 NE 15th Street, Suite I00 (AodrP55 tine t) (Address Line 2) SLATE: FL ZLn: 33132 CELLPHONE- FAA 305-576-8300 BLISSL'4ESS or APPLICANTP or EtT=1 NAME Babylon International, lnc SUSF2qEsS 555 NE 15th Street, Suite 100 ADDRESS: (Address Line 1; Miami FL 33132 (Address Line 2) L Please describe the issue for which you are seeking approval, relief or other action from. the Cky Commission, board, 2ntbority, agency, councal, or committee. Se6; ng approval for rezoning ofproperty located at240 SY. 14th Sleet, 2v5ami, FL (folio no. 01-413M68-0001) from T6 -8 -R.%' -T&; ' L ttas`ai4 consideration been provided: or committed, directly or on your behalff, to any entity or person for an 2gzeement to support or withhold objection to the requested approval, relief or action? ❑ YES 7 f uo LIF your answer to Question 2 is Na, do not ansv-er questions 3, 4 & 5 prerRd t^ read and ez�te the Ac> wledgment If your answer to Question 2 is Yes, please answer questions 3, 4 & 5 and read 2nd execute the AcImowledgemen t- rbc N -E6543 3_ Please provide the name, address and phone number of' be person(s) or eni ies to whom consideration has been provided or committed. Name Address phone z b - c ' Additional names can be placed on a separate page attached to this form. 4. Please describe the nature of the consideration. 5. Desoibe what is being requested in exchange for the consideration. ACIUOWLEDGEMENT OF COMPLIANCE I hereby admuwledge that it is unlawful to employ, any device, scheme or artifice to circumvent the &mlosnre regairemems of Ordinance WIS and such circumvention shall be de med a violation of the Ordinancez and that in addition to the dual or civil penalties that may be imposed under the CRy Code, upon determination by the City Commission that he forboiag disclosure - ;.y— � -was not fully and timely satisfied the following may occur: 1. the application or order, as applicable, sball be deemed void withont hirther force or effect; and 2. no appruation from ay person or entity for the same issue sball be reviewed or considered by the appfinble boards) tent expiration of a period of one year niter the munm^afion of the application or order. PERSON SUFSMI=G DISCLOSURE: aignawi - Fmnd= Martinez-Celeiro Print Name Sworn to and su5scined before me this 00 day of it --W- . 3001 EY . r ne forego:ig instrument was x-kmowledged before me by :Fit ,Iosco t-0t3r'rrn&z-Cef41r-0 . who hos produced as idaur <craion andior ispetsonalh,known ro me.mtd who &d -did not talc. an oath STATE OF FLORIDA CITY OF MIAMI Wry COM -mix i o � - �tArMAW.. /nrI EXPIRES:*�' �MYCOrB45SON'=-2CW 'Eier� G�rcla — E:PIREES:%a�WV'-_ Enclosm(sl "�ccnd•�T BmdedTluvBatlpeNelaY Bevim' Doc Na 36543 Page 2 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 , on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk Javier F. Avino Owners)/Atiorrey/Applicant Name Owners omey tt igrtatt.uz " STATE OF FLORIDA COUNTY OF MIAMI-DADE r The floregeing was acknowledged before me thisa day of Gf L �- .20 who is a(n) individuallpartnerlagen a(n) indivtduaUcartnersttip/corpc:atiorL e/She is nail Imown who has produced 2s identification and who d 'id at) take an ath. (S--mp) e9 r- (N-RSMEA.BCWEP ign2fura ' *UrCOh6MCNtFr- EXPIRsES_Febamy r17, ffii8 1yp,pe, Baditrt Bid7stNa'ay Savks MIAMI3497533_I 79628/42001 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 , on 06-27-2019. City Clerk UPublic School Concurrencv Conanrency, Management System Entered Requiramerts Applicard Fields Information i Appllcffion Type Public Hearing Application Sub -Type Zoning AppEcation ,Marne Babylon International, Inc_ I AzDriraticn Phone * 305350.7202 1 A Diic don Email * j2vinoLdb1e-cacrr A=Iiotion Address * 1450 Brickell Avenue, 23rd Aoor Nuami, Florida 33131 Contaci Fields Information I CoatacY Ramo * Javier F. Avmo Corn,a.± Phone * 3oS350-7202 Contact Err - iavho@7` rdn. nI I f•'� Local Govt. !dame City of Mrami F I GovL Phone 305-416-1200 I - Local GcvL E—iF .:..�..:e,..:...y....:e.. r,,.,,.�m Local Govt App. Number (oFicuL us✓= ONLY) i 1[I Prooertv Fields Infomlation Fhzs Folio Nvriber + 01-4199-058-0001 Additional Foto Nucnber 1 Tatat Aa„oge 0.357 acres Proposed Land li-elZoninq " Residential t StngterarviSV Cetac.�ed Unrb, ` 0 f 5ng1eF2miN Attached Urns (Dvolex) 0 4 Muftl=rmaEtV Units * 184 T=1 Z of Units + 184 - ` I �anlep d Sl 6dv Sian en�tiva (f�Sat}Number(OFrICIALUSECNLY) . fiaCru lopcer<- :r`urmfinn (mUSPs) - M aPpu-t se tr ff�e ver„ for vttC: a 1c�1 ,pc, . ne2 ha poridC —c M dello: or for an alm6v inq[wed property which does rothum to be re -platted a; deeread by ffe kcal go—e-L The rmmber rE—ft be be inpA hibo tt G (A•15 L the net creren¢ between 2n a$Lrq VGted nurwar o.`muts antl LS¢ awry pmvsea rmmber d eNts —pl. an olSona 2G -1G sftMt— wit be axn :(v for :eyevaj pm The +re pt po ,Y Cs+WopmaMdL t 40 bdf anis Local gorxpmonr --W Dgiut 20 1.1b m rhe GWS (net arerence bec xen Me 20 imES v.qf toss V e —fy proDomd 4 urgW. - �-- Repuimd Rands for ADDAcaCion Javier F. Avino Owners)/Atiorrey/Applicant Name Owners omey tt igrtatt.uz " STATE OF FLORIDA COUNTY OF MIAMI-DADE r The floregeing was acknowledged before me thisa day of Gf L �- .20 who is a(n) individuallpartnerlagen a(n) indivtduaUcartnersttip/corpc:atiorL e/She is nail Imown who has produced 2s identification and who d 'id at) take an ath. (S--mp) e9 r- (N-RSMEA.BCWEP ign2fura ' *UrCOh6MCNtFr- EXPIRsES_Febamy r17, ffii8 1yp,pe, Baditrt Bid7stNa'ay Savks MIAMI3497533_I 79628/42001 City of Warm As PAULA DI VEROLI BL= SUR BERG BA. ?'Lk PRICE & AX=0D LLP 1450 BRICKELL AVI�-NUF, 2.3RD FLOOR MIAMI, FL 33131 Page 1 of 3 06/062014 Property Search Nonce Per your request (copy -attached), the undemgned has searchod the records of the Director oflmance is and for the City of Nr, =; Florida, for any Hens and other fees outstanding agaadnst the following described property as of 06/062014_ The result is valid up to 30 days Bum the processing date_ In addition, due to daily penalty andmtcest calculations, the amount shown is subjectto chaagc as rflectedbelow. Folio Number: 0114139-068-0010 Property Andress 240 SE 14 ST02A LegalDescriptiou: BABYLON TOWERS COND01jNIT2ATJND V0.1I57594%INT INCON2AON 1TiS OFF RBC 18463-3005 Amount Pay2ble fin_ 06/0520I4 to 07/06/2014 0.00 Tnis notice does not include liens imposed by federal, state, county or Cuy agencies or boards or any other Hers recorded m the public records ofNfiami Dade Counry. Jose NE Fernandez Finance Director To ensure proper credit of your payment, include a copy of an pages of the p operty search Endings along with your payment and mal to_ City of Mimi, Treasury Manab ert/aaymenr Processing, 444 SW 2°a Avenue, 6-,h Floor, Room 636-1, luau, FL 33130. If you have any questions, please call (305) 416-1570. Please retai:a this page for your records. Estoppel Document e 2 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ -13 , on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk City ®f lai r~ PAULA DI VEROLI RUZN SUMBERGBAMNAMCE & AXELLROD LLP 1450 BRI= -L AVENUE, 23RD FLOOR MIAaa FL 33131 Page 2 of 3 06/06/2014 Folio Plumber. 01-1139-063-0010 Property Address: 240 SE 14 ST42A Legal Description: BABYLON TOWERS CONDO UNIT 2A UNDIV 0.I1575840/. ANT IN OOMMON ELEMENTS OFF REC 18463-3005 Property Search Findings - Pending Liens Lien No. (Case Nmnber) Description Ifyo¢ have auy 4=sd=s> please can (305) 416-1570. PImse re=11 s page%your retards. Estoppel Document e 3 Address Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 , on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 , on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk City of Miami 0 PAULA DI VEROLI BM= SUMBERG BA 24A PRICE & AXELROD LLP 1450 BRICK= AVM -TUE, 23RD FLOOR ML4NII, FL 33131 Page 3 of 3 06!062014 Fo&o Number 0111139-068-0010 Property Address: 240 SE 14 SMA LeggDescripdon: BABYLON TOWERS COTIDOTJIar2AUNDIV01157564%INP INCOMNION ELEIGU S OFF REC 18463-3005 Property Search F -dings - Open Invoices Invoice Reference No: Lien No. Descripima AmomatDue Smb-Torsi 0A0 Ifyouhaveani'4aesdons,Pleasecall (305)416-1570. Please re mthispageforyaurrecords- Estoppel Document • 4 Folio Number: Property Address: Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 , on 06-27-2019. City Clerk Violaidons Dem Report 01.4139-06MM Page 1 of 1 06 -JUN -201412:52:55 NO OPEN VIOLATIONS FOUND. Violation Docament o i G CHECKLIST 1v I, Inc. Applicd'WNarrte 240 S.E. 14th Street, Miami, FL Project Name and Address Submitted into the public t record for item(s) PZ. 13 , on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk Review Date 305-350-7202 Contact Information Yes L3No ❑ N/A Analysis pursuant to M21 Article 7.1.2.8, c.2 (g) Yes ❑ No ❑ N/A One original survey dated within six months of application, with building baseline established by the Department of Public Works t1�Yes ❑ No ❑ N/A Two (2) 11x17" and one (1) 8Y2x11" copies of the survey t,Yes ❑ No ❑ N/A Current Zoning Referral dAYes ❑ No ❑ N/A Pre-appllcatlon meeting comments C11 -Yes ❑ No ❑ N/A One (1) copy of Recorded Deed (legal description on Deed must match legal description dyes ❑ No ❑ N/A on survey) 421 -Yes ❑ No ❑ N/A "Exhibit A", legal description must match survey and Deed ( I_Yes ❑ No ❑ N/A Current photos, two (2) minimum, showing the entire property Covenant running with the land kYes L3No LlN/A Proof of Lobbyist Registration Yes ❑ No ❑ N/A Affidavit of Authority to Act 4Yes ❑ No Cl N/A Disclosure of Ownership of all owners ❑ Yes ❑ No AN/A Disclosure of all contract purchasers t141Yes ❑ No ❑ N/A Certificate of Status from Tallahassee dated withln 1 year of application for Profit and Non-profit owners and contract purchasers ❑ Yes ❑ No Cl!�N/A Corporate Res, or Power of Atty. from all owners or Board of Directors ❑ Yes ❑ No U N/A Corp. Res, or Power of Atty. from all contract purchasers ❑ Yes ❑ No IWN/A Non -profits: List of Board of Directors (owners) ❑ Yes ❑ No gil�N/A Non-proflts: List of Board of Directors (contract purchasers) .Yes ❑ No ❑ N/A Certified list of adjacent owners within 500 feet ``t tYes ❑ No ❑ N/A Disclosure of Agreement to Support or Withhold Objection lit -Yes ❑ No ❑ N/A Public School Concurrency ❑ Yes Pko ❑ N/A Code Enforcement violations) 13dYes ❑ No ❑ N/A All property addresses subject to this request listed Yes ❑ No ❑ N/A All questions answered ❑ Yes ❑ No ❑ N/A Paid receipt 1, Babvion International. Inc. , authorize any refund to be issued to Babylon International Inc. .555 NE 15th Street. Suite 100. Miami. FL 33132 (Name and Complete Address). *If any information/documentation required above is missing, application is not accepted and all documents are returned to the applicant. *If all required information/documentation is presented, date stamp and initial the application. Rev. 07-2013 9 Submitted into the public ' ( l record for item(s) PZ. 13 , on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk ., � i.,,11 t1••' ice! ... . - .. _. _ K'i , 1'11,R (U C 1`1 4:05 CITY OF MIAMI LOBBYIST REGISTRATION (1) Lobbyist Name: Avif16. Javier F. j Last Name, First Name, Middle Initial Business Phone; 305-350-7-202 Business Address: 1450 Brickell Avenue. Suite 2300. Miami. FL Zip 33131 E -Mail Address: iavinona.bilzin.c91n (2) Principal Represented- Babvlon International. Inc, Principal's Business Address- c/o Francisco Martinez-Celeiro. 555 NE 15 St„ Suite 100. Miami.. FL (3) Specific issue lobbyist has been retained to lobby (if representing a corporation, partnership or trust, give business address of chief officer, partner, or beneficiary of same, and the names and addresses of all personsholding, directly or indirectly, at least five percent (5%) ownership interest in said corporation, partnership or trust). All matters oertainine to land use. zoning. and development of property located at 240 S.E. 14 Street., Miami. FL (4) Lobbyists shall state the extent of any business association or financial relationship with any member(s) of the City Commission, any member of City staff before whom he/she lobbies or intends to lobby. (If applicable, please explain) None Lobbyists shall pay all registration fees $525.00 annually, plus $105.00 for each principal represented and i for each issue a lobbyist has been retained to lobby on behalf of any one principal), and specifically define the issue for which they are employed. The Clerk shall reject any statement which does not detail i the issue for which the lobbyist has been employed. I do solemnly swear that all of the foregoing facts are true and correct, and I have read or am familiar with the provisions contained in Sections 2-651 through 2-658 of the City of Miami Code, as amended, including "annual registration, withdrawal, reportingeq•� uirements, definitio xaminations, penalties for violations and contingency fees," State of Florida, County of Miami -Dade Sworn to and Sub 1ped pefore me this day of , 2014, MIAMI 4074725.1 80765/43696 vier F. Avif16 J7 `� Nb�eputy Clerk ,rr ► C4E ti HOMER my cOMb WON 1 Fi' O9W IAL * �*r EXpIHES: FebW 20, 2019 T11514 fi�M Tt(VM0*" Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 , 1 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk ,wy4 11I9.I 11All 05 �'ttiiSlmc'St^` I CITY OF MIAMI LOBBYIST REGISTRATION (1) Lobbyist Name; Garcia -Toledo. Vickv A, Last Name, First Name, Middle Initial Business Phone: 305-350.2409 Business Address: 1450 Briekell Avenue, Suite 2300. Miami. FL Zip 33131 E -Mail Address: vearcia-toledord.bilzin.com i - i (2) Principal Represented: Babvlon International. lnc. Principal's Business Address: o/oFranc'ggoMarkinez-Celei.ro.555NE 15 St.. Suite 100. Miami.FL (3) Specific issue lobbyist has been retained to lobby (if representing a corporation, partnership or trust, give business address of chief officer, partner, or beneficiary of same, and the names and addresses of all persons holding, directly or indirectly, at least five percent (5%) ownership interest in said corporation, partnership or trust). All matters pertaining to land use. zoning. and development of proaerty located at 240 S.E. 14 Street, Miami. FL (4) Lobbyists shall state the extent of any business association or financial relationship with any member(s), of the City Commission, any member of City staff before whom he/she lobbies or intends to lobby, (If applicable, please explain) None Lobbyists shall pay all registration fees $525,00 annually, plus $105.00 for each principal represented and for each issue a lobbyist has been retained to lobby on behalf of any one principal), and specifically define the issue for which they are employed, The Clerk shall .reject any statement which does not detail the issue for which the lobbyist has been employed. I do solemnly swear that all of the foregoing facts are true and correct, and I have read or am familiar with the provisions contained in Sections 2-651 through 2-658 of the City of Miami Code, as amended, including "annual registration, withdrawal, reporting re , definitions, examinations, penalties for violations and contingency fees." 0 State of Florida, County of Miami -Dade Sw rn to andsubscribed before me this 14 day of -F'--� , 2014. M[AM] 4074661.180765/43686 A. 'Vicky G1(rcia-Toledo Notary WC"W0) w ""Q EXPIRES: May 24, 2014 sonoganln,tWgd 6avR" Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk City of Miami 'k 151611 011111 Manning and Zoning Department �iMlilSi+n�. ANALYSIS FOR CHANGE OF ZONING FILE ID: 14-00655zc APPLICANT: PROJECT ADDRESS: FOLIO NUMBER: COMMISION DISTRICT: NET OFFICE: GENERAL INFORMATION: Javier F. Avion, esquire, on behalf of Babylon International, Inc. and Daniel J. Alfonso, City Manager, on behalf of the City of Miami as a co -applicant. Approximately 240 SE 14th Street 01-4139-068-0001 District 2 Downtown REQUEST: Pursuant to Article 5 and Article 7, Section 7.1.2.8 of Ordinance 13114, as amended, the applicant is requesting a change of zoning for a single parcel located at 240 SE 14th Street. The proposed change of zoning for a portion of the subject parcel is from T6 -8-R (Urban Core Transect Zone Restricted) to T6 -48a -O (Urban Core Transect Zone Open). (Complete legal description is on file with the Hearing Boards Section). BACKGROUND: The subject area consists of one (1) parcel located on the south side of SE 141h Street, and is located on an irregularly shaped block bounded by SE 14th Street on the north, Brickell Bay Drive on the East, SE 151h Street on the South, and Brickell Avenue on the West. The subject parcel is split zoned with T6 -8-R on the eastern portion and T6 -48a -O on the northwestern portion. The abutting properties to the east are zoned T6 -8-R and T6 -48a-0. The area proposed to be rezoned is located within the Downtown NET area, and Commission District 2. Most of the area is fully developed with a high density, high intensity character. 14.00655zc Page 1 of 3 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS: FUTURE LAND USE DESIGNATION Subiect Propertv: Restricted Commercial and Brickell Residential Density Increase Area; Maximum of 500 D.U. per acre Surroundinq Properties NORTH: Restricted Commercial and RDIA Maximum of 500 D.U. per acre ZONING Subiect Propertv: T6 -8-R; Urban Core Transect Zone Restricted and T6 -48a-0; Urban Core Transect Zone Open Surrounding Properties NORTH: T6 -48a-0; Urban Core Transect Zone Open SOUTH: High Density Multifamily SOUTH: T6 -8-R; Urban Core Transect Residential and RDIA Zone Restricted Maximum of 500 D.U. per acre EAST: High Density Multifamily EAST: T6 -8-R; Urban Core Transect Residential and RDIA Zone Restricted Maximum of 500 D.U. per acre WEST: Restricted Commercial and RDIA WEST: T6 -48a-0; Urban Core Transect Maximum of 500 D.U. per acre Zone Open ANALYSIS: Following the above referenced "Background", this proposal for rezoning is taking in consideration criteria set forth in Article 7, Section 7.1.2.8 (a)(3) & (f)(2) of Miami 21: Rezone of 240 SE 94th Street from T6 -8-R to T6 -48a-0. Criteria: For rezoning: A change may be made only to the next intensity Transect Zone or by a Special Area Plan, and in a manner which maintains the goals of the Miami 21 Code to preserve Neighborhoods and to provide transitions in intensity and building heights. Analysis: Previously under Zoning Ordinance 11000, North Miami Avenue south of NE 42nd Street was zoned 0 (Office) with an abutting SD -5 (Brickell Avenue Area Residential -Office District) overlay. The intent of these designations were to promote the use of structures to facilitate permanent and transitory residential facilities such as hotels and motels, general office uses, clinics and laboratories and limited commercial activities incidental to the principal uses. In addition, 14.00655zc Page 2 of 3 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk building height for Office and SD -5 uses were unlimited. Within the Office zone, building height for residential use were limited by R-4 zoning regulations, while within the SD -5 residential building height was unlimited; Under the Miami 21 Code, the parcels in this area have been rezoned into two zoning categories; T6 -8-R and T6 -48a-0. Finding: The current FLUM designation is "Restricted Commercial" with a "Brickell Residential Density Increase Area" of 500 du/ac. Under Zoning Ordinance 11000 the parcel was zoned "Office" (0) with an abutting SD -5 (Brickell Avenue Area Office -Residential District) overlay, permitting uses and building heights much greater than the Miami 21 designation of T6 -8-R. CONCLUSION: The proposed change of zoning is compatible with the density and intensity of the adjacent Transect Zones. Staff finds the change of zoning request to be consistent with the goals of the Miami 21 Code as it is compatible with the surrounding zoning district, and the current zoning designation is likely the result of a scrivener's error. RECOMMENDATION: Pursuant to Article 7, Section 7.1.2.8 of Ordinance 13114, as amended on the aforementioned findings, the Planning & Zoning Department recommends Approval of the proposed rezoning as presented. Christopher Brimo, AICP Chief of Land Development 14.00655zc Page 3 of 3 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 , on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk MIAMI 21 ZONING MAP (EXISTING) S47 sT SE 13 ST l 1,22 TER o m SE 14Tfi �N 016 sry , ;6=24-R 9 U J -CIL we 162f/ 0 150 300 600 Feet ADDRESS: 240 SE 14 ST Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 , on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk MIAMI 21 ZONING MAP (PROPOSED) SE 13 ST $e sr sF�- Sf 1, Or ]T6 -48A -O T6-8 R 0 150 300 600 Feet ADDRESS: 240 SE 14 ST Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk 150 300 600 Feet ADDRESS: 240 SE 14 ST A. REQUEST Pursuant to Miami 21 Code, Article 7, Section 7.1.2.8. c.2(g) of Ordinance 13114 ("Miami 21"), as amended, Babylon International, Inc., the "Applicant" requests a change to zoning at 240 SE 14 Street (the "Property"), Miami, Florida. The Applicant proposes to change the zoning of the property from 76-8-R" Urban Core — Restricted Transect Zone to 76- 48A-0" Urban Core — Open Transect Zone. The underlying Future Land Use (FLU) designation is Restricted Commercial; therefore, the proposed change to the Zoning Atlas does not require an amendment to the Future Land Use Map (FLUM) of the Miami Comprehensive Neighborhood Plan (MCNP). Below: Existing and Proposed Zoning Designations for .,hove: Subject Property with existing Above: Subject Proeprty with proposed zoning at T6 -8-R. zoning at T6 -48 -AO. Submitted into the public EXHIBIT record for item(s) PZ.13 E City Clerk "�`?:, City of Miami on 06-27-2019 . .; �,, � ... Planning Department Division of Land Development Staff Analysis PZ-18-313 Location 240 SE 14 Street Folio Number 0141390950001 Transect Zone "76-8-R" Urban Core Transect MCNP Designation Restricted Commercial MCNP Overlays Brickell Residential Density Increase Area (RDIA) and Urban Central Business District (UCBD) Commission District 2 (Ken Russell) NET District Downtown-Brickell Planner E. Sue Trone, AICP, Chief of Comprehensive Planning Jacqueline Ellis, Chief of Land Development Applicant and Property Babylon International, Inc. Owner Project Representative Melissa Tapanes Llahues A. REQUEST Pursuant to Miami 21 Code, Article 7, Section 7.1.2.8. c.2(g) of Ordinance 13114 ("Miami 21"), as amended, Babylon International, Inc., the "Applicant" requests a change to zoning at 240 SE 14 Street (the "Property"), Miami, Florida. The Applicant proposes to change the zoning of the property from 76-8-R" Urban Core — Restricted Transect Zone to 76- 48A-0" Urban Core — Open Transect Zone. The underlying Future Land Use (FLU) designation is Restricted Commercial; therefore, the proposed change to the Zoning Atlas does not require an amendment to the Future Land Use Map (FLUM) of the Miami Comprehensive Neighborhood Plan (MCNP). Below: Existing and Proposed Zoning Designations for .,hove: Subject Property with existing Above: Subject Proeprty with proposed zoning at T6 -8-R. zoning at T6 -48 -AO. Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk B. BACKGROUND The Property is an interior lot of approximately 15,977 Sq. Ft. (.367 acres) of land on the south side of SE 14 Street. The Property is on a block bounded by SE 14 Street (north), Brickell Bay Drive (east), Brickell Avenue (west), and by SE 14 Terrace (south) and was developed with a 13 -unit structure currently undergoing demolition. The Property is located within the Downtown-Brickell Net Area. According to the Letter of Intent dated November 14, 2018, "[A]pproval of this application will encourage appropriately scaled development in a mixed-use, walkable area where existing public facilities, including high frequency local and Miami -Dade County bus routes and Metromover services, meet or exceed the minimum standards." To support the current request, the Applicant references the change of zoning from Office (0) under Zoning Ordinance 11000 to T6 -8-R (Urban Core Zone — Restricted) under Miami 21 and a staff analysis for an identical proposal in 2014 in which staff concluded the current zoning (T6 - 8R) had been given to the Subject Property erroneously in 2010. In 2014, staff supported the request, concluding that the T6 -8-R designation with Miami 21 was an error. Close examination into the history of this site since the early 1980s reveals that very careful contemplation of the property's zoning designation and its attendant intensity and density was at the base of the Planning analysis that accompanied the 1983 change of zoning (Ord. 9758) which was, to some degree, made more amenable to the 1983 City Commissioners due to restrictions voluntarily proffered by the applicant at that time (See Declaration of Restrictions adopted with Ord. 9758, Attachment 1). The adoption of new Zoning Ordinances (Ord. 11000 and Ord. 13114 [Miami 21]) have necessitated the reinterpretation of the 1983 zoning designation of this property. The rapid pace of change in the City of Miami over the past century and the unique configuration created by the plat in this part of the City established circumstances for this Property that warrant a close review of the origin and intent of the Property's current entitlements. History: 20'x` Century Settlement The Subject Property was platted in 1914 as part of the Amended Plat of Point View, recorded in the Official Records of Miami - Dade County in Plat Book 2, Page 93. This area of Miami, originally referred to as Miami's Gold Coast, was originally developed with spacious single- family homes for capitalists of the Gilded Age. The aerial photo below is of the Point View area in the 1920s. Image 1: Aerial photograph of the Point View Plat circa 1920. Source, Miami History Blog, http://mlami- h_istory.com/point•view-subdivision-in-brickell/, accessed: January 17, 2019. File ID; 18-313 Page 2 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk With the passage of time, the urban fabric of Miami's Gold Coast changed. Around the 1960s, properties in this area were redeveloping as high-rise condominiums. By the time Zoning Ordinance 9500 was adopted in 1982, it was recognized that the City was mostly built out and that "future City development would, in almost all instances, be redevelopment (from the Introduction of Ordinance 9500—Attachment 2). The Subject Property—"the Babylon"—was last rezoned on November 18, 1983. The application presented to the City Commission for that change to the Zoning Atlas under the Zoning Ordinance of that time—Zoning Ordinance 9500—involved five other lots' in addition to that of the Babylon. The entitlements for the Babylon today are contemporary reinterpretations of the entitlements eventually adopted by the City Commission under the 1983 zoning regulations in Miami. To analyze the current request and provide a recommendation that is appropriate for the City of Miami in 2019, the following analysis first examines how the current entitlements were arrived at in 1983 and how those entitlements have evolved over the Intervening decades and Zoning Ordinances. With this analysis, we examine the following: 1) How did the City arrive at the entitlements that it did for the Subject Parcel in 1983? 2) How did Zoning Ordinance 11000 reinterpret the 1983 entitlements for the Subject Parcel? 3) What circumstances changed the local context under the 11000 Zoning Ordinance? a. To this end, the analysis reviews changes to the Zoning Atlas to the five parcels that joined the Subject Property in the 1983 application; and b. The analysis reviews the adoption and updates to the Miami Comprehensive Neighborhood Plan which occurred during the life of Ord. 11000. 4) How did Zoning Ordinance 13114 (Miami 21) reinterpret the entitlements to the Subject Parcel? A review of the Study Area Prior to 1983: Individual Lots and Context The owners of the Subject Property requested a change to the zoning of the Property in the early 1980s. In doing this, they joined with three other property owners to submit an application to change the zoning for a total of six lots: Lots 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 30. Lot 4, the easternmost parcel, faces Biscayne Bay; the remaining lots do not face the Bay. This lot configuration is critical to understanding a significant finding in the planning analysis for the public hearings. The image below shows the lots in the Point View Amended Plat that were involved in the application to change the Zoning Atlas in 1983-1984. 1 For the purpose of this analysis, Lots 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 30 form the basis of a study area. Occasionally, surrounding properties are also analyzed for context or to compare nearby zoning districts or land uses. File ID: 18-313 Page 3 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk The Lots Involved in the 1983-1984 Change of Zoning The Important Role of Context 8 7 6 The six lots depicted in the image to the left are 4 those that were involved in the 1983-84 30 application for the change of zoning. Lot 5 is the Babylon, or the lot which is the subject of the current application. Lots 6, 7, 8, and 30 were owned by a single applicant with a contract for purchase, and Lot 4 was owned by another " applicant. Understanding the Subject Parcel in context is essential to understanding how the 1983 City Commission voted to change the Zoning Atlas at the time. Image 2: lots 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 30 in the Point View Amended Plot. The Study Area Prior to the 1983 Change to the Zoning Atlas At the time the applicants were preparing their application, the Zoning Ordinance 6871 was the law of the land in Miami. The Zoning Atlas that survives from that ordinance is useful to review because it helps to understand the context at that time. Below, is an excerpt, showing the study area, as it was zoned under Zoning Ordinance 6871. Excerpt of Zoning Atlas 6871 Understanding the Study Area: A Coherently Zoned N Residential District 4 The portion of the Zoning Atlas, to the left, designated R-5, all had a coherent zoning designation when the City converted from Zoning Ordinance 6871 into Zoning Ordinance 9500. All properties In this image showing an R-5 designation were re -designated to RG -3/7 (General Residential) on July 29, 1982 when the City adopted Zoning Ordinance 9500. Thus, when the applicants presented their proposal to change the Zoning Atlas, it represented a break from this somewhat large, cohesive district, characterized as having residential development throughout. Image 3: The excerpted atlas image shows the six lots reviewed in the Point View area, making a study area for purposes of this analysis. Change of Zoning in 1983: Background of Subject Property and adjoining Lots In 1983, the then -owner (Cucusa, Inc.) of the Subject Property (Lot 5, the Babylon) applied for a change of zoning with three other owners, for a total of six lots to be considered. The General File ID: 18-313 Page 4 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk Residential designation (R/G-3/7) is fundamentally a high-density residential zoning category for densities of up to 80 dwelling units per acre and buildings of up to 16 stories. These applicants requested a change in zoning to "SPI -5" (Brickell-Miami River Residential -Office District)—a high density, high intensity zoning designation in the Brickell area under that Zoning Ordinance. The Planning Department supplied an analysis that recommended denial for the initial request. The Planning Department's analysis reasoned the following: (1) the change represented an encroachment into the stable, high density, multifamily residential area; (2) the change created a precedent for further changes to the zoning; (3) the change would conflict with the comprehensive plan; (4) the change would adversely influence living conditions—namely, stressing the sewer system; and (5) the change was out of scale. However, as the applicants prepared for First Reading, their representatives had engaged with the attorney retained by the Point View Association—the neighborhood association representing the homeowners in the Point View area. By First Reading, some agreement was beginning to form that the "RO" (Residential Office) zoning designation would be a more tolerable designation for the applicants facing SE 14 ST by neighbors in Point View. City Commission First Reading: October 27, 1983 At First Reading, the City Commission voted to approve the proposed zoning change to SPI -5 despite that the Commissioners did not support the application. This was done for procedural purposes to allow the applicants time to negotiate further with the local Point View Association. According to Minutes from the hearing (See Attachment 3), the attorney representing the Babylon, Mr. Bob Traurig, stated, "We don't need on Lot 5 the SPI -5 ... excess development potential which would have been inimical to the interests of the residential condominium owners along the Bayshore Drive corridor, so we urge you to rezone this property to the RO-3.7." 2 City Commission Second Reading (A): November 18, 1983 Change of Zoning for Lot 5 ONLY from RG -3/7 to RO-3/6 By the time the application returned to City Commission for Second Reading, the owner of the Babylon (Lot 5) voluntarily offered to modify the request for the zoning change from SPI -5 to a less intense Residential Office, "RO-3/6", with an FAR of 1.21. (See the Schedule of Regulations from 9500, with FAR details, in Attachment 4) In addition, the owner voluntarily proffered a covenant restricting certain uses and granting certain community benefits in response to concerns from the Point View Association (See Attachment 1). With regard to use restrictions, the covenant states: The property and building may be used only for the following uses: residential, offices (not selling merchandise on the premises), banks and savings and loan associations, subject to the additional restrictions contained herein: 3. The top floor of the building shall be used for residential uses only.... Z From page 99 of the minutes from City Commission public hearing on 10/27/1983, the abridged version of which is contained in Attachment 3. File ID: 18-313 Page 5 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk (From the Declaration of Restrictions adopted with Ordinance 9758). The overall effect of the zoning change was to give the property ability to be mixed-use as a mostly office building with residential uses on the top floor. As such, there was an explicit recognition of this Property as being a transition between the residential character found in lots facing Biscayne Bay and the lots facing SE 14 Street. Mr. Whipple, representing the Planning Department stated during this hearing: The Planning Department, for many years, along with this Commission and the City Board has maintained and recommended that the water front lot[s] in the Point View area be maintained in a high density residential classification. On the other hand, we have likewise recommended, in the Brickell area, Brickell frontage, and the office district, that highrise, high intensity office development take place. (Minutes from City Commission, 10/27/83 -Attachment 3) Planning Analysis The Zoning Fact Sheet provided with Ordinance No. 9758 offers the Planning Department's recommendation for the request. In its recommendation, the Department states that the majority of the lots face SE 14 ST and property zoned SPI -5, justifying a request for a change to a zoning designation with higher intensity for Lots 5, 6, and 7. The Analysis recommends denial for Lot 4 because it: ... is the first lot facing the water and should be maintained residential with the rest of the sites facing the water along South Bayshore Drive [now, Brickell Bay Drive]). It is understood that the structure on Lot 5 [the Babylon] will be retained with residential use in the upper portion and this will serve as a buffer between the residential and non- residential zoning districts. The existing residential area should be preserved to retain the concept of needed housing close into the downtown area. (Page 3 of Ord. 9758 packet, See Attachment 5) As Lot 5 fronts SE 14 Street, Ms. Cooper (representing Point View Association) expressed support for the Commission to approve a change to zoning for similarly positioned Lots 6, 7, 8, and 30 to RO-3/6. This zoning designation for these lots was not contentious; however, the City Commission was reluctant to vote without further review from the Planning Advisory Board (PAB) relative to the newly proposed zoning designation for procedural reasons. City Commission Second Reading (B): January 26, 1984 Consideration of Lots 4, 6, 7, 8, and 30 Having changed the 9500 Zoning Atlas for Lot 5 from RG -3/7 to RO-3/6, the application had, in effect, been "splintered." At this meeting of the City Commission, the zoning designation for Lots 6, 7, 8, and 30 were changed to RO-3/6 (Ord. 9791). When the owner of Lot 4 approached the Commission with his request to have his zoning changed, the Commission expressed the concern that, because Lot 4 faces the Bay, the uses and intensity were inappropriate for that area. However, if that Applicant wished to make a voluntary proffer of restrictions similar to that of Lot 5, the Babylon, the Commission was willing to entertain the request. During this meeting, no proffer was made. The Applicant for Lot 4 was referred back to the PAB; however, the zoning for Lot 4 was never changed to RO-3/6. File ID: 18-313 Page 6 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk Discussion Based on the above, it is clear that the entitlements for the current Subject Property were actually bestowed upon Lots 5, 6, 7, 8, and 30, though only Lot 5 (the Subject Property) received a change to its zoning with a restrictive covenant. Thus, the zoning district of RO-3/6 was established under the 9500 Zoning Ordinance within the study area. It is important to note that on February 9, 1989, the City of Miami adopted Ordinance 10544, the Miami Comprehensive Neighborhood Plan, in compliance with the Growth Management Act of 1985, Section 163, Florida Statutes. A component of the comprehensive plan is the Future Land Use Map, future modifications of which take on importance to the current application, under Zoning Ordinance 11000. Adoption of Zoning Ordinance 11000 Reinterpretation of RO-3/6 to 0, Office Designation On March 3, 1990, the Commissioners of the City of Miami adopted Zoning Ordinance 11000. This ordinance repealed Ordinance 9500, including the Zoning Atlas in effect at that time. The new Zoning Atlas adopted with Ordinance 11000 reinterpreted the RO-3/6 zoning designation in the study area as "O", Office. Below is a comparison of the two atlases: Side -by -Side Comparison of the 9500 Zoning Atlas and the 11000 Zoning Atlas (at Adoption) _ Above: The zoning designations in the Point View area under Ordinance 9500. 11 Above: The reinterpretation of the zoning designations from Ordinance 9500 to Ordinance 11000 in the Point View area. From the side-by-side comparisons, it is discernable that the City of Miami re -designated lots 5, 6, 7, 8, and 30 from RO-3/6 to "O," or Office. Water -facing lots that had been designated RG -3/7 under Zoning Ordinance 9500 were re -designated to "R-4", or Multi -Family High Density Residential. File ID: 18-313 Page 7 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk For a period of time, the lots that were adopted as RO-3/6 under the previous Zoning Ordinance remained intact as a small district of residential -office property. However, over time, the City received two separate private applications to amend the Zoning Atlas for property within this O district. With the adoption of the zoning amendments due to these applications, the Zoning Atlas that existed at the end of the life of the 11000 Zoning Ordinance looked different for the study area. Private Application 141: Rezoning of 18S SE 14 TER from 0 to SD -5 On October 3, 1994, the Zoning Atlas was changed for property at 185 SE 14 Terrace from O, Office to SD -5, Brickell Avenue Area Residential -Office District. The Intent section of the 11000 Zoning Ordinance says this about the SD -5 Zoning designation, which encompassed the most intense and most dense parts of the Brickell area: [The SD -5] district is of special . . , interest because of its prime location on Brickell Avenue along the bayfront and the Miami River, close to and visible from the CBD and Biscayne Bay, and its importance to the economic well-being of the City as a prestigious high-rise office district housing banking, finance, international trade, and other professional office uses. In the interest of reduction of travel and traffic ... conservation of energy, maintenance of principal views .. , it is intended that development at appropriately high intensity, shall be so designed as to assure open character, attractive and secure open space available to the general public at ground level, and appropriately located recreation space serving residential uses. It is intended that multifamily residential occupancy in this area is to be promoted and encouraged.... Excerpt of the 11000 Zoning Atlas after Ordinance 11202 at 185 NE 14 TER Image 4: The City Cbmnussion approved n request to change the zoning for Lot 30 to 50-5 in 1994. In the application, the applicant made the case that the single lot on SE 14 Terrace with O zoning was a challenge to develop due to the fact that, under the 11000 Zoning Ordinance, it was substandard—it was less than 20,000 square feet and it lacked the minimum 100 feet street frontage required for development. However, abutting the parcel to the west were parcels designated as SD -5 and to the east were parcels designated as R-4. The Planning Department was supportive of the application and the Zoning Board voted to recommend approval of the request unanimously by a vote of 7-0 on September 12, 1994. The City Commission approved the change to the Zoning Atlas on October 3, 1994, Ord. 11202 (See Attachment 6). The amendment to the atlas is shown in the image above. Private Application # 2: Rezoning of 2.18 SE 14 ST and 170 SE 14 ST from 0 to SD -5 In 1998, Bayhaven Investments requested a change of zoning for Lots 6, 7, and 8. This application for a change to the Zoning Atlas under Ordinance 11000 was adopted by the City Commission on June 23, 1998. The address for the site was 194-218 SE 14 ST. The File ID: 18-313 Page 8 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk Department of Planning and Development offered the following findings (See "Analysis for Zoning Change," included in Ordinance 11668, found in Attachment 7): It is found that the subject properties are adjacent north and west to the SD -5 zoning designation. It is found that the requested change to SD -5 Excerpt of the 11000 Zoning `Brickell Avenue Area Office -Residential Atlas after Ordinance 11668 District" on the subject property is a logical was adopted extension of the adjacent parcels and will unify the designations and therefore allow for a more unified development proposal to serve the Brickell core. "%•� It is found that the requested zoning :°" c designation change is consistent with the �;#1 underlying land use designation and therefore does not require an amendment to the Future Land Use Map of the Comprehensive Plan. The Zoning Atlas change that resulted from Ordinance 11668 shows clearly that Lots 6, 7, 8 were effectively zoned away from the O zoning designation, and absorbed into the SD -5 designation. This left Lot 5 (the Subject Parcel of this application) as a remnant designation in the O designation. Discussion Image 5: Selection of the Zoning Atlas under Ordinance 11000 illustrating that Lots 6, 7, and 8 were zoned away from O to SD -5 under Zoning Ordinance 11000 existed from 1990 through Ordinance 11668 an June 23,199s. 2010. During the life of this Zoning Ordinance, the lots examined for this analysis encountered the following: - The zoning designation for Lot 30 was changed from O to SD -5 in 1994; - The zoning designations for Lots 6, 7, and 8 were changed from O to SD -5 in 1998; - The zoning for Lot 4 was R-4 and remained as such for the entire life cycle of the Zoning Ordinance; and - The zoning for Lot 5 (the Subject Parcel) was O and remained as such for the entire life cycle of the Zoning Ordinance. In the midst of these changes to the Zoning Ordinances, the City amended the Future Land Use Map of the Miami Comprehensive Neighborhood Plan on January 24, 1991 through Ord. 10832 to include Residential Increase Areas (RDIAs). One of the City's RDIAs is located in the study area—the Brickell RDIA and it establishes that density is 500 dwelling units an acre. While the analysis here focuses primarily on densities allowed by zoning, there is great merit to contemplating the underlying density allowed through the comprehensive plan. With the establishment of the Brickell RDIA in 1991, the two private applications detailed above followed in succession to implement the FLUM in 1994 and again in 1998. The Planning Department notes that Lot 5, the Subject Property, was (and remains) the easternmost lot of the RDIA, where the FLUM allows density of up to 500 du/ac. File ID: 18-313 Page 9 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk Future Land Use Map of the Study Area High Density Multlfamily Residential C30g1 el Pppilcanon Rezme Lots (9500) sutpect Parcel lG PWkptl RDIA FLU D"lgnattdns In Study Ar" High Density Mululamity RacidenOal Re acted Commercial 001 0005 d 0.01 MIN �+„ 0 Inwgk: b: the mop above shows the FLU designations and RDIA Jur the study area, Notobly, Lot 5—the Subject Property—was included in the RDIA as early as 1991, with o bose density of SOO dwelling units per acre, u density that stands in stark controst with the 150 units per acre for the abutting properties outside the RDIA with only 150 units per acre. Adoption of Miami 21, in 2010 and the T6 -8-R Transect Zone Designation Zoning Ordinance 13114, also known as Miami 21, was adopted on April 22, 2010. As was done with the previous zoning ordinance, the new zoning code reinterpreted the Zoning Atlas; the entitlements of properties throughout the City were reinterpreted from the old zoning designations into the new zoning designations of Miami 21. Miami 21, being form -based, uses transect zoning, an approach to zoning that delineates zoning designations through transitions from Natural Zone Transects (T1) to Urban Core Transects (T6). Within each of these Transects, there are sub -categories, Restricted, Limited, and Open. These subcategories indicate how intense each Transect is with regard to uses. With the adoption of Miami 21, the lots in the study area previously designated as SD -5 (Lots 6, 7, 8, and 30) were reinterpreted into Miami 21 as "T6 -48A -O," Urban Core – Open. This Transect is very dense (in this part of the city, it is as dense as 500 du/ac) and allows nearly the most liberal non-residential uses in the City. Lots 4 and 5, previously designated R-4 and O under the 11000 Zoning Ordinance, were reinterpreted under Miami 21 as "T6 -8R," Urban Core – Restricted. This allows very dense development with tight restrictions against non-residential uses. In fact, T6 -8R prohibits office uses—a curious observation for Lot 5 given that it had long File ID: 18-313 Page 10 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 , on 06-27-2019. City Clerk been entitled to that use since Ordinance 9758 and the covenant executed when it was rezoned in 1983 anticipated mostly office uses. Understanding the evolution of the zoning entitlements of the lots within the study area from 1983 to present guides the planning analysis and recommendation. The table below summarizes this evolution. Table 1: Summary of Zoning Changes in Study Area, 1983 -Present Changes to Zoning Designations of the Lots in the Study Area, 1983 -Present Lot 4 Lot 5 Lot 6 Lot 7 Lot 8 Lot 30 Zoning Ordinance* Date 9500 1983 RG -3/7 RG -3/7 RG -3/7 RG -3/7 RG -3/7 RG -3/7 9758 1983 x RO-3/6 x x x x 9791 1984 x x RO-3/6 RO-3/6 RO-3/6 RO-3/6 11000Adoption 1990 R-4 O 0 O O O 11202 1994 x x x x x SD -5 11668 1998 x x SD -5 SD -5 5D-5 x End of 11000" 2010 R-4 O SD -5 5D-5 SD -5 SD -5 Miami 21 PRESENT ZONING 2010 T6 -8R T6 -8R T6 -48A-0 T6 -48A-0 T6 -48A-0 T6.48A-0 Planning Dept. Recommendation 2019 x T6-12-0 x x x x 'This table lists the zoning designation given for each lot by each ordinance examined In this report at the time of the adoption of each ordinance. -This column lists the zoning designation for all lots at the time Zoning Ordinance 11000 was rescinded ad Miami 21 was adopted. This information is provided so as to summarize the evolution of all entitlements overtime, through all ordinances, up through 2010. The intention Is to provide a convenience for the reader, so that they can easily understand the zoning for each lot when Miami 21 was adopted, at a glance. T6 -8-R Transect Zone designation Under Miami 21, Lot 5 was zoned with the same designation as all the parcels facing the water: T6-8 R. This designation has high density (150 dwelling units per acre, plus density from the fact that this is within the RDIA, hence 500 du per acre—the parcels facing water are not in the RDIA). The non-residential uses are relatively restrictive. Below is a copy of Article 4, Table 3, as attached to Ordinance 13114, reflecting uses allowed by Transects, when the ordinance was adopted. File ID: 18-313 Page 11 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk Below: Reproduced Image of Article 4. Table 3 from Miami 21, as Adopted by the City Commission THI5 DOCUMENTIS A SUBSTITUTION TO ORIGINAL. BACKUP ORIGINAL CAN BE SEEN AT TK ENO or THIS DOCUMENT. ARTICLE 4. TABLE 1 BUILDING FUNCTION: USES AS ADOPTED • OCTOBER 2009 U iq.Nra,w,unAw, I REY[REW — MJIy6,l�StZtlC R ®� ...art u,r�cwR.�xi u,.R ERm,r.ettowee.ur --- n*vwawe,w .ua, r,10@1,.K M�MAW] uwnRenu v.no:m,r — ,.nc.<rlil.erra --- uasegEK�q'JfBq!---- asrulle+.. --- nrzvR:m, --- ac+svak,uart F E f RamxrcRm I E E E anR ErEm � ca.u.n wsw,o noun — r.,ns.rn.s rsou+agti w r w.a rxYm — nu E.R..a gEYtFr[Eaa nELf.fMfwq { E F IE,1NI114 idiN YmP�,+a crop, f t E rPE:ncrR [ L E ��Rw�rram iF1Yl rR.rRurEuamrr Et w I i u- ,w a RA r q R P -_IM Mno �� r �It•mom ME" OM i a I � � �� om LIIIIIRl: l R aF, P.Y ■as�M Fri AR�ywF��OC 6Mir�P Ea WI E rR�.f, E..qr PAs NwR �Pvh Ptrtf R�wR b.. E iy.r R.rt Image 7: Article 4. Table 3, as it was originally adopted on October 22, 2009 by the City Commission. Rezone application in 2014 Mlaml21 Reinterpretation Here is the exact reproduction of the "use table" in Miami 21. Through the adoption of Miami 21, the City converted its zoning philosophy from a use -based approach to a form -based approach. The nature of a form -based code is such that the urban fabric dictates policy; however, externalities being what they are, some regulation of uses cannot be avoided. One of the ways Miami 21 addresses this necessity is through Article 4, Table 3. The T6 -R Transect is highlighted with red outline. A red arrow points to the empty cell for "Office" uses. This empty cell indicates that office uses are prohibited in T6 -R Transects, Designating this property as T6 -8-R prohibited the major use contemplated at the time of the zoning adopted to this properly in 1983 with the covenant. Furthermore, the previous zoning designation allowed office use. In 2014 the current owner of the Subject Property filed an application to amend the zoning atlas for this site from T6 -8-R to T6 -8 -48 -AO. Staff analysis for that application found that the FLUM for the area is Restricted Commercial with the RDIA, allowing 500 dwelling units per acre for the site. The Restricted Commercial designation was found to exist on abutting properties to the north, east, and west, but High Density Multifamily Residential (with a density limit of 150 units File ID: 18-313 Page 12 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk per acre and tight restrictions on non-residential uses) was found on abutting property to the south. With this finding, liberal commercial uses are permitted in all directions abutting the property except to the south. The application for the change to the zoning atlas was submitted to the City and the Planning Department undertook its initial analysis of the request. The Planning Department made the following findings about the Subject Property in the course of its review; 1. It is zoned T6 -8-R. 2. The FLUM designation for it is Restricted Commercial, granting it extremely liberal residential and non-residential uses, densities, and intensities. 3. It is located within the Brickell Residential Density Increase Area (RDIA). Due to this, the density for the property is actually 500 dwelling units per acre. With the square footage for the site, it could conceptually achieve a density of 183 dwelling units. 4. Under the prior zoning code, it was designated O. The entitlements for that designation are more liberal, especially with regard to non-residential uses, than the Miami 21 reinterpretation of T6 -8-R. Chief among the restrictions among Miami 21 is that of the Office Use. 5. The property abuts a T6 -48A-0 district. Having made these findings, the Planning Department concluded that a scrivener's error had been made with the Miami 21 reinterpretation of the O designation under Zoning Ordinance 11000 for Lot 5. As a result, the 2014 application to amend the Zoning Atlas for the Subject Parcel was amended so that the City co be a co -applicant. This application to change the zoning for the Subject Parcel proceeded as far as First Reading to City Commission, but the item was continued on February 25, 2016, and indefinitely deferred in March 2016 and again in September of 2016. Ultimately, the Applicant decided to withdraw the application in February of 2017. Historic Designation and Appeal As the Applicant attempted to change the zoning for Lot 5 with its 2014 application, the City's Unsafe Structures Board found the Babylon unsafe on October 28, 2015. This order gave the owner 300 days to repair or demolish the building. On March 9, 2016, the Applicant applied for a demolition permit. In response to this, the City's Historic and Environmental Preservation Board (HEPB) mailed notices of intent to consider a preliminary evaluation of the structure for historic designation on April 6, 2016. This mailing had the effect of prohibiting the issuance of the demolition permit pursuant to Section 23-4 of the City of Miami Code. Ultimately, the building was designated as historic through the HEPB. This determination was appealed by the owner. On January 25, 2018, the City Commission appealed the HEPB designation through Resolution R-18-0034 finding that the property was not "exceptionally important." C. ANALYSIS Miami Comprehensive Neighborhood Plan (MCNP) The Future Land Use (FLU) designation for the subject Property is Restricted Commercial. Interpretations of the City's FLU designations follow the pyramid concept, meaning that, in File ID: 18-313 Page 13 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk general, as each FLU designation is listed in the Interpretation of the 2020 Future Land Use Map in the MCNP, these designations are cumulatively inclusive. Thus, within the High Density Multifamily Residential FLU designation, the MCNP establishes the Residential Density Increase Areas (RDIA). The Brickell (RDIA) is established within this FLU designation. The Brickell RDIA is an overlay that increases the maximum density for this area of the city to 500 dwelling units per acre. The property is located within the Urban Central Business District (UCBD)overlay on the FLUM which allows it an FLR of 37.0 by the MCNP—the most liberal FLR in all of the City. Based on these observations, this property is located within an area of the FLUM which is nearly the densest and most intense within the City. Image 8: An excerpt of the Future fond Use mop for the study area and beyond, showing the Qr%Ckell Area RDIA outlined in blue hatch. D. PROJECT DATA A review of project data is intended to bring to the fore current regulations in an applied fashion. In this way, the following analysis reviews the Miami 21 regulations for the subject Property and the surrounding context in a general sense. Then the analysis reviews the specific regulations applied toward the Subject Property when the Property's zoning designation was modified in 1983 under Ordinance 9758, then when those entitlements were reinterpreted with the adoption of Zoning Code 11000 in 1990, and then again, with the reinterpretation of those entitlements with the adoption of Zoning Code 13114 (Miami 21). Having reviewed the succession of entitlements under the zoning codes over time, staff analysis considers the merits of the request based on Miami 21 criteria. File ID: 18-313 Page 14 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk Neighborhood Context First, an analysis of neighborhood context provides some insight to the general area and how it relates to surrounding properties. The general area is characterized as having a high density, though the uses permitted vary greatly. The table below summarizes the characteristics found in the area. Table 2: Neighborhood Context MCNP / Density Restricted Commercial with the Brickell Residential Density Increase Area (RDIA)and Urban Central Business District (UCBD) FLUM Overlay High Density Multifamily Residential, UCBD FLUM Overlay Existing Use Multi -family, Mixed -Use Hotel, Office, Mixed -Use and Commercial High Density Multifamily Residential Multi -Family Residential UCBD FLUM Overlay Restricted Commercial with the Brickell Residential, Office, RDIA and UCBD FLUM Overlay Mixed -Use and Commercial Evolution of Entitlements Once the zoning designation for the Subject Property was established in 1982, what was the nature of the reinterpreted zoning designations? How did the changing designations address such things as density, floor area ratio (or floor lot ratio), height limits, and related allowances under the respective Zoning Ordinances? The table below summarizes these details for each relevant Zoning Ordinance for the Subject Property. Table 3: Evolution of development capacity and standards under Zoning Ordinances 9500, 11000, and 13114 (Miami 21) for Lot 5, located at 240 SE 14 Street (the Babylon) 9500 Zoning Ordinance (adopted in 1982) Density 50-80 LUI Floor Area Ratio (FAR) Gross Land Area Height By Right 11000 Zoning Ordinance (adopted in March 1990) Density 150 du/acre Floor Area Ratio (FAR) Gross Land Area RO-3/6 (covenant applied) 21-30 du/ac 1.21 X 23,680 sq. ft. = 28,652.8 sq. Ft. FAR calculated to the street centerlines 16 -stories O (Office) 55 dwelling units 1.72 X 23,680 = 40,729.6 sq. Ft. FAR calculated to the street centerlines In the 11000 Zoning Ordinance: Floor area, nonresidential. Nonresidential floor area is the sum of areas for nonresidential use on all floors of buildings, measured from the outside File ID: 18-313 Page 15 Miami 21 Zoning North T6 -48A-0 South T6 -8-R East T6 -8-R West T6 -48A-0 MCNP / Density Restricted Commercial with the Brickell Residential Density Increase Area (RDIA)and Urban Central Business District (UCBD) FLUM Overlay High Density Multifamily Residential, UCBD FLUM Overlay Existing Use Multi -family, Mixed -Use Hotel, Office, Mixed -Use and Commercial High Density Multifamily Residential Multi -Family Residential UCBD FLUM Overlay Restricted Commercial with the Brickell Residential, Office, RDIA and UCBD FLUM Overlay Mixed -Use and Commercial Evolution of Entitlements Once the zoning designation for the Subject Property was established in 1982, what was the nature of the reinterpreted zoning designations? How did the changing designations address such things as density, floor area ratio (or floor lot ratio), height limits, and related allowances under the respective Zoning Ordinances? The table below summarizes these details for each relevant Zoning Ordinance for the Subject Property. Table 3: Evolution of development capacity and standards under Zoning Ordinances 9500, 11000, and 13114 (Miami 21) for Lot 5, located at 240 SE 14 Street (the Babylon) 9500 Zoning Ordinance (adopted in 1982) Density 50-80 LUI Floor Area Ratio (FAR) Gross Land Area Height By Right 11000 Zoning Ordinance (adopted in March 1990) Density 150 du/acre Floor Area Ratio (FAR) Gross Land Area RO-3/6 (covenant applied) 21-30 du/ac 1.21 X 23,680 sq. ft. = 28,652.8 sq. Ft. FAR calculated to the street centerlines 16 -stories O (Office) 55 dwelling units 1.72 X 23,680 = 40,729.6 sq. Ft. FAR calculated to the street centerlines In the 11000 Zoning Ordinance: Floor area, nonresidential. Nonresidential floor area is the sum of areas for nonresidential use on all floors of buildings, measured from the outside File ID: 18-313 Page 15 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 , on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk faces of the exterior walls, including interior and exterior halls, lobbies, enclosed porches and balconies used for nonresidential uses. Not countable as nonresidential floor area are: (a)Parking and loading areas within buildings; (b)Open terraces, patios, atriums or balconies; (c)Stairways, elevator shafts, mechanical rooms; or (d)Floor areas specifically excluded from floor area limitations by special provisions of these regulations. Height By Right Unlimited stories MIAMI 21 Zoning T6 -8-R Ordinance (adopted in 2010) Density 500 du/ac 1183 dwelling units Floor Lot Ratio (FLR of 5) 5 x 15,977 sq. Ft. =79,885 sq. Ft. FLR is the Multiplier applied to the Lot Area that determine Max Floor Area above grade Miami 21 defines Floor Area as : The floor area within the inside perimeter of the outside walls of (lie Building including hallways, stairs, closets, thickness of walls, columns and other features, and parking and loading areas, and excluding only interior Atria and open-air spaces such as exterior corridors, Porches, balconies and roof areas. Also means Building or Development Capacity. Public Benefit FLR 25% 179,885 sq. ft x .25 = 19,971 sq. Ft, Max floor area w/Public 179, 885 sq. Ft +19,971sq. Ft = 99,856 sq. Ft. Benefits Height By Right 18 -stories Height w/ Public Bonus 112 -stories MIAMI 21 Zoning I T6-12-0 Ordinance (adopted in 2010) Density 500 du/ac 1183 dwelling units Floor Lot Ratio (FLR of 8) 8 x 15,977 sq. Ft. =127,816 sq. ft. FLR is the Multiplier applied to the Lot Area that determine Max Floor Area above grade Public Benefit FLR 30% 1127,816 sq. ft x .30= 38,344.8 sq. Ft. Max floor area w/Public 1127,816 sq. Ft +38,344.8 sq. ft = 166,161 sq. ft, Benefits Height By Right 112 -stories Height w/ Public Bonus 120 -stories Having reviewed the evolution of the entitlements for the Subject Property through three Zoning Ordinances, the analysis turns its focus on the current Zoning Ordinance. The prevailing concern is what is the best zoning designation for the Subject Property for the health, welfare, safety, and morals of the City, with an eye toward the rights of the property owner. Having File ID: 18-313 Page 16 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk already reviewed the local context, the table below reviews the existing zoning, proposed zoning, and the zoning recommended by the Planning Department. Table 4: Existin-1, Successional, and proposed Zoning and Development Capacity MIAMI 21 Existing Zoning Successional Zoning Proposed Change of Zoning T6 -8-R T6-12-0 Transect T6 -8-R (5 FLR / 25 % T6-12-0 (8 FLR / 30% T6 -48 -AO (11 FLR / 50% Public Zones Public Benefit) Public Benefit) Benefit) FLR 79,885 sq. ft. 127,816 sq. ft. 175,747 sq. ft. Public Benefit 19,971 sq. ft. 38,344.8 sq. ft 87,873.5 sq. ft. FLR + Public 99,856 sq. ft. 166,161 sq. ft. 263,620.5 sq. ft. Benefit Density 500 183 dwelling units 183 dwelling units 183 dwelling units du/ac (MCNP Brickell RDIA) By Right 8 -stories 12 -stories 48 -stories Heiqht Additional 4 -stories 8- stories 32 -stories Floors permitted via Public Benefits E. CRITERIA FOR CHANGE OF ZONING The following is a review of the request of change of zoning from T6 -8-R to T6 -48-A-0 pursuant to the criteria in Article 7, Section 7.1.2.8 (a)(3) & (f)(2) of Miami 21. Sections A through D of this report are hereby incorporated into the analysis and its corresponding criteria by reference. In accordance with Article 7, Section 7.1.2.8.a., a change may be made to a Transect Zone in a manner which maintains the goals of Miami 21. In the recommendation, staff must show that it considered and studied the request with regard to the three criteria identified in Miami 21 Article 7, Section 7.1.2.8.f. The criteria and staffs findings are provided below. Criteria 7.1.2.8.f.1.a The relationship of the proposed amendment to the goals, objectives 1.a and policies of the Comprehensive Plan, with appropriate consideration as to whether the proposed change will further the goals, objectives and policies of the Comprehensive Plan_ ; the Miami 21 Code; and other city regulations. Analysis Land y Use Policy LU -1.1.7: Land development regulations and policies that will 1.a allow for the development and redevelopment of well-designed mixed-use neighborhoods that provide for the full range of residential, office, live/work spaces, File ID: 18-313 Page 17 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk neighborhood retail, and community facilities in a walkable area and that are amenable to a variety of transportation modes, including pedestrianism, bicycles, automobiles, and mass transit. The Miami Comprehensive Neighborhood Plan (MCNP) has assigned this property a Future Land Use (FLU) designation of Restricted Commercial. The Restricted Commercial designation allows for and envisions the development of residential, general office and commercial uses that generally serve the daily retailing and service needs of the public. Miami 21 code is a form -based code and the Transect sub -categories of Restricted, Limited, and Open regulate uses within forms. The Property has a zoning designation of 76-8-R" Urban Core -Restricted. The "R" Restricted Transect prevents the establishment of many Uses that generally serve the daily retailing and service needs of the public garnered form the Restricted Commercial FLU. Additionally, the Property is included within the Brickell RDIA and it can be reasoned that the development capacity and Uses allowed on this Property were anticipated to be greater than those properties with the T6 -8-R designation to the east. The Restricted Commercial FLU designation is not incompatible to the property, the FLU may exceed the Transect Zone for a site it is located on. Because the FLU is already compatible with the proposed "0" Open Use category there is an opportunity change the Transect Zone to further the tenets of the MCNP. This area has changed since the T6 -8-R designation was placed on the property with the adoption of Miami 21 in 2010. Abutting three sides of the Property (240 SE 14 Street) are properties that have the MCNP Restricted Commercial FLU designation with a T6 -48-A-0 Transect Zone designation. The "0" Open Transect is an important component of the request as it allows an array of non-residential Uses that the "R" Restricted Transect excludes; Uses and activities that supported by the existing FLU designation. To the east, the Property abuts properties with frontage on Brickell Bay Drive, which is high density residential in nature. The proposal to change the zoning of the 15,977 square feet Property from T6 -8-R to T6-48-0 would eliminate buffering provided by this Property from the heights and intensity of Uses established on properties found along SE 14 S from the stable residential neighborhood to the east. The Change of Zone as proposed by the Applicant increases the Floor Lot Ratio (FLR), Height, and increases the variety of Uses permitted on the property. The residential density allowed By Right on the Property remains the same with or without the Change of Zoning. However, the change of the zoning increases the FLR, increased the mix of uses allowed and provides a greater opportunity to achieve the residential density already allowed. A Change in Zoning designation from 76-8-R" to a higher T6- "Open" Transect Zone will help to achieve the goals of Policy LU -1.1.7. However, a Change of zoning to T6 -48 -AO is not successional and does not provide a gradual transition. File ID: 18-313 Page 18 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk The extension of the T6 -48 -AO Transect Zone, as proposed, allows development capacity that is incompatible with the abutting T6 -8-R properties to the east. Planning recommends that the property be rezoned to T6-12-0 which creates a gradual transition of development capacity and heights that fit in the immediate neighborhood context. Finding The proposed change of zoning from T6 -8-R to an "0" Open Transect is consistent 1.a with the goals, objectives, and policies of the Comprehensive Plan pursuant to Article 7, Section 7.1.2.8.E 1.a. of Miami 21 Code. The "0" Open Transect will help provide a mix of uses is a walkable neighborhood. The better fit for the proposed rezone is not the Applicant's request to change the zoning from T6 -8-R to T6 -48-A-0, but a successional Change of Zoning from T6 -8- R to T6-12-0. The "O" designation will allow a variety of uses on site as anticipated for the site as per the Change of Zoning under Zoning Ordinances 9500 and 11000, and as anticipated in the Covenant. Criteria 7.1.2.8.f 1.b. The need and justification for the proposed change, including changed 1.16 or changing conditions that make the passage of the proposed change necessary. Analysis The request to change the zoning from T6 -8-R to an "0" open Transect is consistent 1.b with the goals, objectives, and policies of the Comprehensive Plan pursuant to Article 7, Section 7.1.2.8. f. 1. b. of Miami 21 Code. The growth, development and redevelopment within the of the City area support the requested rezoning at 240 SE 14 Street to an "0" Open Transect, which can continue to be a buffer and transition from the higher T6 -48 -AO sites to the west to the residentially zoned T6 -8R sites that are abutting the site to the east. The neighborhood context, history of the development capacity and heights under the previous 9500, 11000 Zoning Ordinances, and the Miami 21 Code. The best fit for the proposed change of zoning is not the Applicant's request to change from T6 -8- R to T6-48-0, but the successional Change of Zoning from T6 -8-R to T6-12-0 which is successional to the T6-8 zoning transect and allows a full array of Uses on the site. Criteria 2 Section 7.1.2.8.f.2. "A change may be made only to the next intensity Transect Zone or by a Special Area Plan, and in a manner which maintains the goals of this Miami 21 Code to preserve Neighborhoods and to provide transitions in intensity and Building Height. " Analysis Section 7.1.2.8.2. establishes that changes shall occur in succession, in which the 2 change of zoning may be made only to a lesser Transect Zone; within the same Transect Zone to a greater or lesser intensity; or to the next higher Transect Zone, or through a Special Area Plan. The request to rezone from property from T6 -8-R is an extension of the abutting T6-48-0 Transect Zone; however, the request is not successional pursuant to Article 7, Section 7.1.2.8(a)3. of Miami 21. What is successional and supportable is a rezone to T6-12-0. File ID: 18-313 Page 19 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk Above: Existing T6 -8-R Transect Zoning with by right height shown in white and public benefit height shown in yellow. Above: Successional to the T6 -8-R , the above T6-12-0 Transect Zoning with by right height shown in white and public benefit height shown in yellow. The proposed change of zone as requested by the applicant for the property at 240 SE 14 Street is an encroachment of the abutting T6 -48 -AO Transect Zone within an established T6 -8-R Transect Zone. This particular site with its T6 -8-R designation has historically acted as a buffer between the T6-48 properties to the west on SE 14 Street and the T6 -8-R properties that front Brickell Bay Drive to the East. Under the former Zoning Ordinance 11000, the properties along Brickell Avenue were zoned "R-4" Multifamily High -Density Residential and the properties along SE 14 Street were zoned "0" Office and Restricted Commercial. While the 11000 Ordinance was not a form -based code, the "0" Office Zoning was applied to this site and it remained as a buffer area between the residential and File ID: 18-313 Page 20 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk nonresidential district as originally conceptualized under Ordinance 9758. Although this "0" Office zoning allowed for greater flexibility in development of the land, nonresidential development in this district was subject to the residential standards of the "O" Office zoning district in addition to specific development standards of the R-4 zoning district related to minimum lot size, setbacks, site accessibility, and landscape buffer requirements, among others. These standards ensured proper transition and buffering between adjacent residential uses. The transitional development pattern that existed under the 11000 Ordinance and that currently exists along SE 14 Street to Brickell Bay Drive demonstrates a guiding principal of the Miami 21 Code (Section 2.1.2.a.2.) which aims to create a harmonious relationship "between low Density Residential neighborhoods and adjacent Commercial Corridors with appropriate transitions of Density and Height following the theory of the Transect." The proposed zoning change would permit a maximum Height and Density that are incompatible with the existing context and the goals of the Miami 21 Code. The appropriate change of zoning—rather than T6-48-AO—is to T6-12-0. Finding The request to change the zoning from T6 -8-R to an "0" open Transect is 2 consistent with the goals, objectives, and policies of the Comprehensive Plan pursuant to Article 7, Section 7.1.2.8.f.1.b. of Miami 21 Code. Based on the neighborhood context, history of the development capacity and heights under the previous 9500, 11000 Zoning Ordinances, and the Miami 21 Code. The better fit for the proposed rezone is not the Applicant's request to change the zoning from T6 -8-R to T6-48-0, but the successional Change of Zoning from T6 -8-R to T6-12-0. F. CONCLUSION Staff recommends Denial of the applicants request to change the zoning of the property located at 240 SE 14 Street from T6 -8-R to T6 -48 -AO, this zoning is not successional and does not create a transition of the heights, intensity, and capacity on the site and intensity that are permitted in the T6 -48-A-0 transect zone. However, based on analysis of the history of zoning of the site and neighborhood context, staff recommends approval for a successional change of zoning from T6 -8-R to T6-12-0 Transect Zone. The T6-12-0 Transect Zone will provide appropriate transitions and capacity in line with being a bridge between the higher T6 -48 -AO west of the site to the lower capacity T6 -8-R properties to the east. File ID: 18-313 Page 21 Pursuant to Miami 21 Code, Article 7, Section 7.1,2.8. c.2(g) of Ordinance 13114 ("Miami 21 "), as amended, the Department of Planning recommends denial of the Applicant's non -successional request to Change the Zoning from T6 -8-R to T6 -48-A-0 and recommends approval for a Change of Zoning to T6- 12-0 based upon the facts and findings in this staff report. The Comparison of these designations is found in the images, right. Jaequeline E tis Chief of Land Development Exhibit A: Legal Description Attachments Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk Comparison of Existing Zoning, Applicant's Proposal, and Planning Department's Recommendation L-xistmg Zoning: T6 -8-R Proposed Zoning: T6 -48 -AO r Planning Dept. Recommendation: T6-12.0 Images, L -R: Exising, proposed, and recommended zoning designations for the nearly 16,000 SF parcel that exists between the stable, T6 -8-R district, facing Biscayne Bay, that is predominantly high-density residential, and the more intense, mixed-use T6.48 -AD district that Is characteristic to the north, west, and south of the parcel. File ID: 18-313 Page 22 File ID: 5567 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk City of Miami PZAB Resolution Enactment Number: PZAB-R-19-014 EXHIBIT g o� _ City Hall 3500 Pan American Drive Miami, FL 33133 www.miamigov.com Final Action Date: 5/1/2019 A RESOLUTION OF THE MIAMI PLANNING, ZONING AND APPEALS BOARD RECOMMENDING APPROVAL OF AN ORDINANCE OF THE MIAMI CITY COMMISSION, WITH ATTACHMENT(S), AMENDING THE ZONING ATLAS OF ORDINANCE NO. 13114 ("MIAMI 21 "), AS AMENDED, BY CHANGING THE ZONING CLASSIFICATION FROM 76-8-R," URBAN CORE TRANSECT - RESTRICTED, TO "76-2413-0," URBAN CORE TRANSECT - OPEN, FOR THE PROPERTY LOCATED AT APPROXIMATELY 240 SOUTHEAST 14 STREET, MIAMI, FLORIDA, MORE PARTICULARLY DESCRIBED IN EXHIBIT "A", WITH A LIMITATION AGAINST THE PROPERTY ACCESSING ANY PUBLIC BENEFIT BONUS HEIGHT OR FLOOR LOT RATIO ("FLR") AS ESTABLISHED IN ARTICLE 3, SECTION 3.14 OF THE MIAMI 21 CODE; MAKING FINDINGS; CONTAINING A SEVERABILITY CLAUSE; AND PROVIDING FOR AN EFFECTIVE DATE. WHEREAS, the property located at approximately 240 Southeast 14 Street, Miami, Florida, as more particularly described in Exhibit "A," ("Property") is currently zoned "76-8-R," Urban Core Transect – Restricted; and WHEREAS, on November 9, 2018, Babylon International, Inc. (the "Applicant") submitted to the City of Miami ("City") a request to change the zoning classification of the Property to "76 -48 -A -O," Urban Core Transect - Open; and WHERAS, the subject Property was platted in 1914 as part of the Amended Plat of Point View, as recorded in the Official Records of Miami -Dade County in Plat Book 2, Page 93; and WHEREAS, the Point View area of the City was initially developed as large, single family dwellings in the early 2011 Century, and the City has maintained that properties facing Biscayne Bay should maintain a predominantly residential character; and WHEREAS, when Zoning Ordinance 9500 was adopted in 1982, its authors recognized that the City was mostly built out and that "future City development would, in almost all instances, be redevelopment"; and WHEREAS, in 1983, Lots 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 30 of the Point View Amended Plat requested a change of zoning from "RG -3/7" (General Residential) to "SPI -5" (Brickell-Miami River Residential -Office District); and WHEREAS, on November 18, 1983 the zoning for Lot 5—the subject Property—was changed from "RG -3/7" to "RO-3/6" (Residential Office) with a Restrictive Covenant with the following commitments and provisions: 1) It restricted the top floor to only residential uses, restricted other floors to residential and specific non-residential uses; City of Miami Page 1 of 5 File ID: 5567 (Revision: 8) Printed On: 5/2312019 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk 2) It provided parking requirements; 3) It provided design and aesthetic commitments; 4) It conferred landscaping commitments; 5) It conferred a financial contribution to the neighborhood for a traffic study; 6) It detailed release provisions; and WHEREAS, on January 26, 1984, the zoning for Lots 6, 7, 8, and 30 was changed from "RG -3/7" to "RO-3/6"; and WHEREAS, in 1990, the City adopted Zoning Ordinance 11000 and repealed Zoning Ordinance 9500; and WHEREAS, with the adoption of Zoning Ordinance 11000, zoning for Lots 5, 6, 7, 8, and 30 was reinterpreted/changed from TO -3/6" to "O" (Office); and WHEREAS, in 1994, a private application was accepted by the City to change the zoning for Lot 30 from "O" to "SD -5" (Brickell Avenue Area Residential -Office District) and adopted by the City Commission; and WHEREAS, in 1998, a private application was accepted by the City to change the zoning for Lots 6, 7, and 8 from "O" to "SD -5" and adopted by the City Commission; and WHEREAS, in 1989, the City adopted the Miami Comprehensive Neighborhood Plan ("MCNP") in response to the 1985 Growth Management Act, Section 163, Florida Statutes; and WHEREAS, in 1991, the City amended the Future Land Use Map ("FLUM") of the MCNP to include the Brickell Area Residential Area Increase Area ("RDIA"), which increases the Density of the general area in Brickell to 500 Dwelling Units per acre; and this area includes Lot 5; and WHEREAS, in 2010, the City adopted Zoning Ordinance 13114, known as Miami 21, and repealed Ordinance 11000; and WHEREAS, with the adoption of Miami 21, zoning for Lot 5 was reinterpreted/changed from "O," Office, to "76-8-R," Urban Core Transect - Restricted; and WHEREAS, the Property had Uses such as office, recreational facilities, retail and the like under Zoning Ordinance 11000 as it was zoned "O," Office, but these Uses are prohibited under the Miami 21 zoning designation of 76-8-13," Urban Core Transect - Restricted; and WHEREAS, the Property had unlimited height under Zoning Ordinance 11000 as it was zoned "O" Office, but the maximum height under Miami 21 is twelve (12) stories through Public Benefits as it is zoned 76-8-R," Urban Core Transect - Restricted; and WHEREAS, in 2014, the owner of the Property applied to change the zoning of Lot 5 from "76-8-R" Urban Core Transect to "76 -48 -A -O," Urban Core Transect — Open, and the City's Planning Department determined that there had been a scrivener's error in the course of changing the zoning from Zoning Ordinance 11000 to Miami 21, and therefore, the City joined the application as a co -applicant; and City of Miami Page 2 of 6 File ID: 5567 (Revision: t3) Printed On: 5123/2019 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk WHEREAS, the Planning, Zoning and Appeals Board ("PZAB") voted to deny that 2014 application and City Commission continued and indefinitely deferred the item twice; and WHEREAS, the Applicant withdrew that application to change the Miami 21 Zoning Atlas in February 2017; and WHEREAS, the City's Unsafe Structures Board found the structure built on the Property, "the Babylon," unsafe in October 2015; and WHEREAS, the City's Unsafe Structures Board gave the Owner 300 days to repair or demolish the structure; and WHEREAS, on or about March 9, 2016, the owner applied for a demolition permit; and WHEREAS, on or about April 6, 2016, the City's Historic and Environmental Preservation Board ("HEPB") mailed notices of intent to consider a preliminary evaluation of the structure for historic designation and this designation was ultimately approved; and WHEREAS, on or about January 25, 2018, the City Commission granted an appeal filed by Babylon International, Inc. and thereby reversed the decision of the HEPB approving the local designation as a historic resource of the Property via Resolution R-18-0034; and WHEREAS, the City's Planning Department observes that the Property, Lot 5, exists between a large district of 76 -48 -A -O," Urban Core Transect – Open, zoning and 76-8-R," Urban Core Transect – Restricted, zoning—two zoning designations with very different development capacities; and WHEREAS, the City's Planning Department recommended a change to the Miami 21 Zoning Atlas to 76-12-0," Urban Center – Open, because: 1) the Open Transect versus the Restricted Transect better preserves the Uses to which the Lot had been entitled under previous Zoning Ordinances; 2) The development capacity is more in character with the current urban fabric of the adjacent 76-48-A-0" and "76-8-R" neighborhoods; and 3) This allows Lot 5 to be an appropriate, transitional buffer between the 76-48-A-0" and "76-8-R" districts; and WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 7.1.2.8.g.2., the City Commission may, by a vote of not less than three (3) members, approve the rezoning of property to a Transect Zone of less Intensity than that applied for in situations where, in the opinion of the commission and upon the recommendation of the Planning Director, the specific rezoning applied for would work to the detriment of the health, safety or welfare of the surrounding Neighborhood, whereas a rezoning to a Transect Zone of less Intensity would not; and WHEREAS, on May 1, 2019, this matter was considered at a duly noticed public hearing of the Miami Planning, Zoning, and Appeals Board ("PZAB"); and WHEREAS, at the public hearing of the PZAB, members recommended approval of the 76-246-0" district with a limitation against the property accessing any public benefit bonus City of Miami Page 3 of 5 File ID: 5567 (Revision: B) Printed On: 512312019 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk height or Floor Lot Ratio ("FLR") as established the Miami 21 Code, so as not to exceed 24 floors in height; and WHEREAS, the proposed zoning change as indicated herein, is appropriate in light of the intent of the Miami 21 Code and particularly in relation to the effects on adjoining properties; and WHEREAS, PZAB has considered the goals, objectives, and policies of the MCNP, the Miami 21 Code, and all other City regulations; and WHEREAS, PZAB has considered the need and justification for the proposed change, including changing and changed conditions that make the passage of the proposed change necessary; and WHEREAS, the proposed change maintains the goals of the Miami 21 Code to preserve neighborhoods and provide transitions in intensity and building height; NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE PLANNING, ZONING AND APPEALS BOARD OF THE CITY OF MIAMI, FLORIDA: Section 1. The recitals and findings contained in the Preamble to this Resolution are adopted by reference and incorporated as if fully set forth in this Section. Section 2. The PZAB recommends that the City Commission amend the Zoning Atlas of Ordinance No. 13114, as amended, by changing the zoning classification from "76-8- R," Urban Core Transect — Restricted, to 76-2413-0," Urban Center — Open, with a limitation against the property using public benefits bonus height and Floor Lot Ratio ("FLR") that would enable the property to be built beyond 24 stories, for the property located at approximately 240 Southeast 14 Street, Miami, Florida, as more particularly described in Exhibit "A". Section 3. If any section, part of a section, paragraph, clause, phrase, or word of this Resolution is declared invalid, the remaining provisions of this Resolution shall not be affected. Section 4. This Resolution shall become effective upon adoption by the PZAB. Francisco Garcia, Director Department of Planning STATE OF FLORIDA ) COUNTY OF MIAMI-DADE ) 1-2-31 < Execution Date Personally appeared before me, the undersigned authority, EV1'CCt U�'�- , Clerk of the Planning, Zoning and Appeals Board of the City of Miami, Florida, and acknowledges that s/he executed the foregoing Resolution. SWORN AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE ME THIS 1_7 DAY OF N -Aa .,t I %t ►�,Z A\ ICtYe7- Print Notary Name Personally know ,/ or Produced I.D. Type and number of I.D. produced City of Miami Page 4 of 5 ,2019 Notary Public State of F(ida My Commission Expire =,aA'''0rp? BEATRIZALVAREZ ;.. Commission # GG 153775 EX Ire$ W%mber 20.2021 Nfy6Jsf"KAM'o6i9S:762 12019 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 , on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk Did take an oath or Did not take an oath City of Miami Page 5 of 5 File ID: 5667 (Revision: B) Printed On: 5/2312019 Evaluating unlicensed DynamicPDF feature. Click here for details. [31:45:d351] Its NOTICE t.+ar�avn�„aoe�r..n //A r�,..,// CoOtay aosoer,rem Tn Wr�Kd<+�r��MrwObp, Fl�►lYE b, EXHIBIT PZ -18-313 V1, 02/19/19 ' LEGAL DESCRIPTION: Lot 5, Block 2 and the South 1/2 of Out Lot 5, Block 2, according to the AMENDED PLAT OF POINT VIEW, as recorded in Plat Book 2, Page 93 of the public records of Miami—Dade County, Florida, LESS the Northerly 10 feet borders on and runs parallel to the public right of way of South Boyshore Drive. Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 , on 06-27-2019. City Clerk Nonsuccessional Zoning Precedent.. In December 1972, the developer of 1000 Brickell Inc., dedicated to the City of Miami 12,000 square feet (the "Allen Morris property") at the intersection of SE 10 Street and 1 Avenue. The Allen Morris property encompassed three parcels 20 SE 10 Street, 25 SE 10 Street, and 15 SE 10 Street. Under Zoning Ordinance 11000, the existing zoning code at the time, the Allen Morris property was designated Parks and Recreation ("PR"), presumably as a result of the dedication. See' Exhibit E, Investigation of Zoning at Southeast 10 Street and 1 Avenue. Then in 2013, pursuant to Ordinances No. 13396 and 13397 the City changed the land use and zoning designation of the parcel located at 20 SE 10 Street from PR to Restricted Commercial with Urban Central Business District ("UCBD") and from Civic Space ("CS") to T6 -48B-0, respectively. See, Composite Exhibit F, Ordinance 13396 and Ordinance 13397. The zoning change from CS to T6 -48B -O is not compliant with the successional zoning outlined in Section 7.1.2.8.a.3. of Miami 21. In July 2017, the Miami Comprehensive Neighborhood Plan was once again amended to change the future land use designation of 20 SE 10 Street from Restricted Commercial with UBCD overlay to Public Parks and Recreation with UCBD overlay. This was done to revert one of the Allen Morris parcels to its original designation as a public park and to insure an improved pedestrian experience in the urban core. Ordinance No. 13397 was repealed and 20 SE 10 Street reverted to its CS zoning. See' Exhibit G, PZAB File ID # 1118. This switch from T6-4813-0 to CS, again, was done without any regard for successional zoning. The City conducted an Investigation of Zoning pertaining to all three parcels in the Allen Morris property in February 2018. See, Exhibit E. Planning Staff, citing the 1972 dedication of the land and an Official City Zoning Atlas from 1990 and neglecting to mention the flip-flopping in land use and zoning designations that had occurred with 20 SE 10 Street, unexpectedly concluded that "it [was] clear that the spilt zoning" of these parcels "was not a scrivener's error." Further, Planning Staff held that when no scrivener's error is found, formal procedures outlined in Article 7, Section 7.1.2.8 of Miami 21 must be followed. Planning Staff's statements were in direct conflict with the zoning history of 20 SE 10 Street, which in a five year period went from being zoned CS to T6 -48B -O and then rezoned again to CS without any consideration for successional zoning. In April 2018, Planning Staff issued another report pertaining to one of the parcels on the Allen Morris property 15 SE 10 Street, also known as the Perricone's property. See, Exhibit H, Planning Analysis regarding 15 Southeast 10 Street. Curiously, Planning Staff found no evidence indicating that any portion of the Perricone's property should be Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk zoned CS. On the other hand, Planning Staff found sufficient documentation evidencing that the entirety of Allen Morris Park, which encompassed 20 SE 10 Street and 25 SE 10 Street in whole had been dedicated and should be zoned CS. Accordingly, Planning Staff concluded that the zoning of the Perricone's property as CS was in fact a scrivener's error and that the CS designation should have been applied to the remainder of the Allen Morris Park parcel at 25 SE 10 Street. Since a scrivener's error was found, the Perricone's property was rezoned administratively. The administrative correction was a discussion item on the May 10, 2018 City Commission agenda, and the map was corrected to reflect the Perricone's property zoning as T6 -48B-0. See' Exhibit I, File No. 4052 Discussion Item and Backup. The Perricone's property did not follow the formal rezoning application process and was rezoned without regard to successional zoning because it was merely correcting a mapping error. Submitted into the public g EXHIBIT record for item(s) PZ. 13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk INVESTIGATION OF ZONING AT SOUTHEAST 10 STREET and 1 AVENUE SUBJECT PROPERTIES: 15 Southeast 10 Street, Miami, FL 33131 25 Southeast 10 Street, Miami, FL 33131 20 Southeast 10 Street, Miami, FL 33131 FOLIOS: 01-020-7020-1080, 01-020-7020-1070, and 01-020-7030-1011 DISTRICT: 2 PREPARED BY: Guillermo De Nacimiento REQUEST: A constituent has requested that the City investigate the current zoning for the properties located at 15 Southeast 10 Street, (Folio # 01-020-7020-1080), 25 Southeast 10 Street, (Folio # 01-020-7020-1070), and 20 Southeast 10 Street, (Folio # 01-020-7030-1011). The constituent believed the existing zoning is a scrivener's. Both 15 Southeast 10 Street and 25 Southeast 10 Street are split zoned CS (Civic Space) and T6 -48-B- 0 (Urban Core). The property at 20 Southeast 10 Street is zoned "T6 -48-B-0" (Urban Core). Below the subject sites are highlighted in blue City of Miami Planning Department BACKGROUND: Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk On December 14, 1972, Resolution 72-774-13, was passed and adopted, dedicating 12,000 square feet of property, to the City of Miami, at the intersection of Southeast 10 Street and 1 Avenue. The dedication included two (2) tracts of land containing fifteen large Oak trees, which was subsequently designated PR (Park and Recreation) in order to preserve the fifteen large oak trees on the two (2) tracts (spanning three (3) Platted Lots). Currently, the CS (Civic Space) Transect Zone designation spans three (3) Parcels: 15 SE 10 Street (Perricone's Marketplace & Caf6), 25 SE 10 Street (Allen Morris Brickell Park), and 20 SE 10 Street (on the south side of 10 Street). Previously, the three sites were zoned PR under the previous 11000 Zoning code. See below for an excerpt of the exact language in Resolution No. 72-774-B. Resolution 72-774-B: Section 1. - The developer, 1000 Brickell Inc., realizing that the variances as granted in Resolution No. 7A27- 74 -would greatly increase the density of the area, and in consideration therefore, agrees to dedicate to the City 12, 000 square feet of land at the intersection of S. E. 10th Street and 1st Avenue. Said land is divided into two tracts of approximately 3, 000 square feet on the south side of 10th Street and approximately 9, 000 square feet on the north side of 10th Street (Exact legal description to be provided by the developer). Section 2. - The developer, 1000 Brickell Inc., agrees to perpetually maintain the land described in Section 1, and more particularly to provide for the preservation of the fifteen large oak trees. The following is the exact legal description provided by the developer in the official Warranty Deed executed November 15, 1974 by 1000 Brickell, Inc.: Leqal Description A portion of Lots 7 and 8, Block 72 South, CITY OF MIAMI, according to the plat thereof recorded Plat Book "B" at Page 41 of the Public Records of Dade County, Florida, being particularly described as follows: Begin at the South east corner of said lot; then run Northeasterly along the Southeasterly boundary of said Lots 7 and 8 a distance of 103.66 feet to the most Easterly corner of said Lot 8, thence run Westerly along the North boundary of said Lot 8 a distance of 103.51 feet to a point, said point being 109.56 feet East of the West boundary of said Block 72 South; thence run Southerly over and across said Lots 7 and 8 along a line parallel to the West boundary of said Block 72 South a distance of 100.09 feet to the point of intersection with the South boundary of said Lot 7; thence run Easterly along the South boundary of said Lot 7 a distance of 76.28 feet to the Point of Beginning, containing an area of 9, 00 square feet, more or less, And: Lot 1, Block 73, SOUTH CITY OF MIAMI, according to the plat thereof recorded in Plat Book "B" at Page 41 of the Public Records of Dade County, Florida. 2 1 P a g e Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 , on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk City of Miami Planning Department LESS AND EXCEPTING THEREFROM the South 94 feet and the West 84.94 feet thereof. Containing an Area of 3, 000 square feet, more or less. Below is an image of page 37 of the Official City Zoning atlas from 1990, showing the properties zoned PR (Parks and Recreation), which pre -dates the August 1, 1997, the purchase of the property. S M Sales Information Previous Sale 09/2812017 09/2812017 08/01/1997 CONCLUSION: Price OR Book -Page I Qualification Description $16,180,200 30701-0401 jQu.l on DOS, multi -parcel sale $100 30701-0405 Corrective, tax or QCD; min consideration $725,000 17753-3474 Other disqualified It is clear that the split zoning of 15 SE 10 Street and 25 SE 10 Street is not a scrivener's error. The intent of resolution R-72-07746 was to preserve 15 large oak trees at the intersection of SE 10 Street and 1 Avenue. Said trees are indeed located on both 25 SE 10 Street and 15 SE 10 Street parcels, as well as 20 SE 10 Street (across the street on the Southside of 10 street). The site was zoned PR (Parks and Recreation) prior to the 1000 Brickell Inc, purchase of the properties in 1997. The 1997 Warranty Deed recorded on August 7, 1997 clearly states that the property is "SUBJECT TO: Zoning, restrictions, reservations, prohibitions and other requirements imposed by governmental authorities. 3 1 P a g e Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 '(.. City of Miami on 06-27-2019. City Clerk -. - Planning Department The existing zoning of the properties is not a scrivener error. To amend the existing zoning and FLUM for the site(s) the request must comply with the criteria found in Miami 21, Article 7, Section 7.1.2.8. Lastly, anyone who pursues an amendment to the zoning and FLUM for the properties must comply with the City's no net loss policy for Park Lands, 4 1 P a g e Tile Number: 06-00613lu Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 on 06-27-2019. City Clerk City of Miami Legislation Ordinance: 13396 EXHIBIT E E 1 City Hall 3500 Pan American Drive Miami, Fl- 33133 www.miamigov.com Final Action Date: 6/27/2013 AN ORDINANCE OF THE MIAMI CITY COMMISSION, WITH ATTACHMENT(S), AMENDING ORDINANCE NO. 10544, AS AMENDED, THE FUTURE LAND USE MAP OF THE MIAMI COMPREHENSIVE NEIGHBORHOOD PLAN, PURSUANT TO SMALL SCALE AMENDMENT PROCEDURES SUBJECT TO §163.3187, FLORIDA STATUTES, BY CHANGING THE FUTURE LAND USE DESIGNATION OF ACREAGE DESCRIBED HEREIN OF REAL PROPERTY LOCATED AT APPROXIMATELY 20 SOUTHEAST 10TH STREET, MIAMI, FLORIDA, FROM "PUBLIC PARKS AND RECREATION" WITH AN "URBAN CENTRAL BUSINESS DISTRICT" ("UCBD") OVERLAY TO "RESTRICTED COMMERCIAL" WITH A "UCBD" OVERLAY; MAKING FINDINGS; DIRECTING TRANSMITTALS TO AFFECTED AGENCIES; CONTAINING A SEVERABILITY CLAUSE; AND PROVIDING FOR AN EFFECTIVE DATE. WHEREAS, the Miami Planning, Zoning and Appeals Board, at its meeting on January 16, 2013, following an advertised public hearing, adopted Resolution No. PZAB-R-13-002 by a vote of ten to zero (10-0), item no. 2, recommending APPROVAL of the Future Land Use Change as set forth; and WHEREAS, the land use change will not result in a net loss of park space; and WHEREAS, the City Commission, after careful consideration of this matter, deems it advisable and in the best interest of the general welfare of the City of Miami and its inhabitants to grant this change of land use designation as hereinafter set forth; NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF MIAMI, FLORIDA: Section 1. The recitals and findings contained in the Preamble to this Ordinance are adopted by reference and incorporated as if fully set forth in this Section. Section 2. Ordinance No. 10544, as amended, the Future Land Use Map of the Miami Comprehensive Neighborhood Plan, pursuant to small scale amendment procedures subject to §163.3187, Florida Statutes, is further amended by changing the Future Land Use designation of 0.07± acres of real property at approximately 20 Southeast 10th Street, Miami, Florida, from "Public Parks and Recreation" with an "Urban Central Business District' ("UCBD") Overaly to 'Restricted Commercial' with a "UCBD" Overaly; as depicted in "Exhibit A", attached and incorporated. Section 3. It is found that this Comprehensive Plan designation change involves a use of 10 acres or fewer and: (a) Is necessary due to changed or changing conditions; (b) The cumulative annual effect of the acreage for all small scale City of mliand Page l of 2 rile Id: 06-00613Gi (Yersion: 5) Printed Ox: 6/612019 File Number: 06-00693lu Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk Eaaconent Nrrrnber: 13396 development amendments adopted by the local government does not exceed a maximum of 120 acres in a calendar year; (c) The proposed amendment does not involve a text change to goals, policies, and objectives of the local government's comprehensive plan, but proposes a land use change to the future land use map for a site-specific development. However, text changes that relate directly to, and are adopted simultaneously with the small scale Future Land Use Map amendment shall be permissible; (d) Is one which is not located within an area of critical state concern, unless the project subject to the proposed amendment involves the construction of affordable housing units meeting the criteria of §420.0004(3), Florida Statutes, and is located within an area of critical state concern designated by §380.0552, Florida Statutes or by the Administration Commission pursuant to §380.05(1), Florida Statutes; (e) Density will be "Restricted Commercial" within the Brickell Residential Density Increase Area, equal to 500 dwelling units per acre, per the Miami Neighborhood Comprehensive Plan, as amended, and intensity will be as established in Article 4 of the City of Miami Zoning Ordinance, the Miami 21 Code, as amended; and (f) The proposed amendment complies with the applicable acreage and density limitations set forth in the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act including, without limitation, §163.3187, Florida Statutes. Section 4. The City Manager is directed to instruct the Director of the Planning and Zoning Department to promptly transmit a certified copy of this Ordinance after its adoption on second reading to: the reviewing agencies pursuant to §163.3184(1)(c), Florida Statutes; and any other person or entity requesting a copy. Section 5. If any section, part of a section, paragraph, clause, phrase, or word of this Ordinance is declared invalid, the remaining provisions of this Ordinance shall not be affected, Section 6. This Ordinance may not become effective until thirty-one (31) days after second reading and adoption thereof pursuant and subject to §163.3187(5)(c), Florida Statutes. {1) Footnotes: (1) This Ordinance shall become effective as specified herein unless vetoed by the Mayor within ten days from the date it was passed and adopted. If the Mayor vetoes this Ordinance, it shall become effective immediately upon override of the veto by the City Commission or upon the effective date stated herein, whichever is later. City of Miaml Page 2 of 2 File Id: 06-006131a (Version: 5) Prbded Oa: 6/6/2019 File Number: 06-00613ze City of Miami Legislation Ordinance: 13397 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk City Hall 3500 Pan American Drive Miami, FL 33133 www.mlamigov.com Final Action Date: 6/27/2013 AN ORDINANCE OF THE MIAMI CITY COMMISSION, WITH ATTACHMENT(S), AMENDING THE ZONING ATLAS OF ORDINANCE NO. 13114, AS AMENDED, BY CHANGING THE ZONING CLASSIFICATION FROM "CS" CIVIC SPACE ZONE TO 76-4813-0" URBAN CORE ZONE, FOR THE PROPERTY LOCATED AT APPROXIMATELY 20 SOUTHEAST 10TH STREET, MIAMI, FLORIDA; MAKING FINDINGS; CONTAINING A SEVERABILITY CLAUSE; AND PROVIDING FOR AN EFFECTIVE DATE. WHEREAS, the Miami Planning, Zoning and Appeals Board, at its meeting on January 16, 2013, following an advertised public hearing, adopted Resolution No. PZAB-R-13-003 by a vote of ten to zero (10-0), item no. 3, recommending APPROVAL of the Zoning Change as set forth; and WHEREAS, the City Commission, after careful consideration of this matter, deems it advisable and in the best interest of the general welfare of the City of Miami and its inhabitants to grant this change of zoning classification as hereinafter set forth; NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF MIAMI, FLORIDA: Section 1. The recitals and findings contained in the Preamble to this Ordinance are adopted by reference and incorporated as if fully set forth in this Section. Section 2. The Zoning Atlas of Ordinance No. 13114, as amended, is further amended by changing the zoning classification from "CS" Civic Space to 76-4813-0" Urban Core Zone, for the property located at approximately 20 Southeast 10th Street, Miami, Florida, as described in "Exhibit A", attached and incorporated. Section 3. If any section, part of a section, paragraph, clause, phrase, or word of this Ordinance is declared invalid, the remaining provisions of this Ordinance shall not be affected. Section 4. It is the intention of the City Commission that the provisions of this Ordinance shall become and be made a part of the Miami 21 Code of the City of Miami, Florida, as amended, which provisions may be renumbered or relettered and that the word 'ordinance" may be changed to "section", "article", or other appropriate word to accomplish such intention. Section 5. This Ordinance shall become effective thirty-one (31) days after second reading and adoption thereof, pursuant and subject to §163.3187(3)(c), Florida Statutes.(1) City of rlliand Page 1 of 2 File 1d: 06-00613zc (Version: 3) Printed Ott: 616/2019 File Number: 06-00613zc Footnotes: Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk Enactment Number: 13397 {1} This Ordinance shall become effective as specified hereln unless vetoed by the Mayor within ten days from the date It was passed and adopted. If the Mayor vetoes this Ordinance, it shall become effective immediately upon override of the veto by the City Commission or upon the effective date stated herein, whichever Is later, City OfM111114 Page 2 of 2 File 1d: 06-00613sc (Version: 3) Printed On: 6/6/2019 Submitted into the public EXHIBIT record for item(s) PZ.13 , on 06-27-2019. City Clerk' PLANNING, ZONING AND APPEALS BOARD FACT SHEET File ID: (ID # 1118) Title: A RESOLUTION OF THE MIAMI PLANNING, ZONING, AND APPEALS BOARD RECOMMENDING APPROVAL OR DENIAL OF AN ORDINANCE OF THE MIAMI CITY COMMISSION, WITH ATTACHMENT(S), REPEALING ORDINANCE NO. 13397, ADOPTED ON JUNE 27, 2013, WHICH AMENDED THE ZONING ATLAS OF ORDINANCE NO. 13114, AS AMENDED, BY CHANGING THE ZONING CLASSIFICATION FROM "CS" CIVIC SPACE ZONE TO 76 -48B -O" URBAN CORE ZONE, FOR THE PROPERTY LOCATED AT APPROXIMATELY 20 SOUTHEAST 10 STREET, MIAMI, FLORIDA; CONTAINING A SEVERABILITY CLAUSE; PROVIDING FOR AN EFFECTIVE DATE. LOCATION: 20 S.E. 10 Street. [Commissioner Ken Russell - District 2] APPLICANT(S): Daniel J. Alfonso, City Manager, on behalf of City of Miami. FINDING(S): PLANNING AND ZONING DEPARTMENT: Recommends approval. See companion File ID 16-006621u / Accela 1091. PURPOSE: Repeal of Ordinance No. 13397; changing the above property from ""CS - Civic Space Zone to T6-4813-0 Urban Core Transect Zone Open". City of Miami PZAB Resolution 1. J Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk City Hall 3500 Pan American Drive Miami, FL 33133 www.miamigov.com A RESOLUTION OF THE MIAMI PLANNING, ZONING, AND APPEALS BOARD RECOMMENDING APPROVAL OR DENIAL OF AN ORDINANCE OF THE MIAMI CITY COMMISSION, WITH ATTACHMENT(S), REPEALING ORDINANCE NO. 13397, ADOPTED ON JUNE 27, 2013, WHICH AMENDED THE ZONING ATLAS OF ORDINANCE NO. 13114, AS AMENDED, BY CHANGING THE ZONING CLASSIFICATION FROM "CS" CIVIC SPACE ZONE TO 76.4813.0" URBAN CORE ZONE, FOR THE PROPERTY LOCATED AT APPROXIMATELY 20 SOUTHEAST 10 STREET, MIAMI, FLORIDA; CONTAINING A SEVERABILITY CLAUSE; PROVIDING FOR AN EFFECTIVE DATE. WHEREAS, the City Commission, at its meeting on June 27, 2013, following an advertised public hearing at which all interested persons were afforded the opportunity to be heard, adopted Ordinance No. 13397 which amended the Zoning Atlas of Ordinance No. 13114, as amended, by changing the zoning classification from "CS" Civic Space Zone to "76-486-0" Urban Core Zone, for the property located at approximately 20 Southeast 10 Street, Miami, Florida ("Property"); and WHEREAS subsequent to that date, litigation and related proceedings involving multiple parties have precluded the realization of the public benefits that were envisioned by the foregoing legislation; WHEREAS, the Miami Planning, Zoning and Appeals Board, at its meeting on July 20, 2016, following an advertised public hearing, adopted Resolution No. PZAB-R-_ by a vote of _ to —( — -_), item No. _, recommending of the Repeal of Ordinance No. 13397, adopted n June 27, 2013, as set forth; and WHEREAS, the City Commission, after careful consideration of this matter, deems it advisable and in the best interest of the general welfare of the City of Miami and its inhabitants to repeal Ordinance No. 13397; NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF MIAMI, FLORIDA: Section 1. The recitals and findings contained in the Preamble to this Ordinance are adopted and incorporated as if fully set forth in this Section. Section 2. The City Commission finds and concludes that: a. Ordihance No. 13397 is hereby repealed and shall be of no force and effect for any or all purposes. b. The City Clerk is hereby directed to reflect in the records of the City of Miami ("City") the repeal of Ordinance No. 13397, and any notations to the effect of such repeal made by the City Clerk are hereby approved. Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk c. The Property will revert to the zoning classification of Civic Space that existed prior to the enactment of Ordinance No. 13397. d. The City Manager or his designee is hereby directed to enter into the records of the City the act of the City Commission repealing Ordinance No. 13397 and to cause the zoning classification of the Property located at approximately 20 Southeast 10 Street to be classified in the Zoning Atlas as "CS" Civic Center Zone. Section 3. It is the intention of the City Commission that each provision hereof be considered severable, and that the invalidity of any provision of this Ordinance shall not affect the validity of any other portion of this Ordinance. Section 4. All rights, actions, proceedings of the City, including the City Commissioners, the City Manager, or any of its departments, boards or officers undertaken pursuant to the existing Code provisions, shall be enforced, continued or completed, in all respects, as though begun or executed hereunder. Section 5. If any section, part of a section, paragraph, clause, phrase or word of this Ordinance is declared invalid, the remaining provisions of this Ordinance shall not be affected. Section 6. This Ordinance shall become effective thirty (30) days after final reading and adoption thereof. APPROVED AS TO LEGAL FORM AND CORRECTNESS: VICTORIA MENDEZ CITY ATTORNEY Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk ANALYSIS FOR CHANGE OF ZONING File ID: 16-00662zc Applicant(s): Daniel J. Alfonso, City Manager, on behalf of the City of Miami 3500 Pan American Drive, Miami, FI. 33133 Location: Approximately 20 Southeast 10th Street (3,092 sq. ft.) Miami, FI. 33130 Commission District Commissioner Ken Russell - District 2 Net District Office: Downtown NET A. GENERAL INFORMATION: REQUEST: Pursuant to Article 7, Section 7.1.2.8.2.b.1, of Ordinance 13114, as amended, the "Zoning Ordinance of the City of Miami" to repeal Ordinance 13397, adopted on June 27, 2013; and request per litigation and related proceedings Involving multiple parties, to revert the existing zoning back to "Civic Space Transect Zone" (CS) with "Urban Central Business District" from "Urban Core Transect Zone (T6 -48B-0)" with "Urban Central Business District" for 20 Southeast 101" Street (3,092 sq. ft.) Miami, FI. 33130 (Folio 01-020-7030-9099) in order to accurately reflect its original designation of "Public Parks", do to changing conditions that would result in an improved pedestrian realm to the urban core. A change to the Future Land Use Map (FLUM) classification corresponding to the proposed Transect Zone changes would be required as a companion item (File ID No. 16-006621u). ,.^ y.,�,,1�� � t�p"" �� ronir„nunt � ii 6'�IQ➢6➢G91G➢G;J �]Gll� ��G➢tlG➢cll �'-)�'-`��7�1G'>i;Gu➢CG1t�; ANALYSIS FOR CHANGE OF ZONING File ID: 16-00662zc Applicant(s): Daniel J. Alfonso, City Manager, on behalf of the City of Miami 3500 Pan American Drive, Miami, FI. 33133 Location: Approximately 20 Southeast 10th Street (3,092 sq. ft.) Miami, FI. 33130 Commission District Commissioner Ken Russell - District 2 Net District Office: Downtown NET A. GENERAL INFORMATION: REQUEST: Pursuant to Article 7, Section 7.1.2.8.2.b.1, of Ordinance 13114, as amended, the "Zoning Ordinance of the City of Miami" to repeal Ordinance 13397, adopted on June 27, 2013; and request per litigation and related proceedings Involving multiple parties, to revert the existing zoning back to "Civic Space Transect Zone" (CS) with "Urban Central Business District" from "Urban Core Transect Zone (T6 -48B-0)" with "Urban Central Business District" for 20 Southeast 101" Street (3,092 sq. ft.) Miami, FI. 33130 (Folio 01-020-7030-9099) in order to accurately reflect its original designation of "Public Parks", do to changing conditions that would result in an improved pedestrian realm to the urban core. A change to the Future Land Use Map (FLUM) classification corresponding to the proposed Transect Zone changes would be required as a companion item (File ID No. 16-006621u). MIAMI 21 (EXISTING) 16-W62zc Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 , on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk MIAMI 21 (PROPOSED) 10 00662zc -1L p " w fxnsf ' 1 B. RECOMMENDATION: I_ una�:ocefocr ! �1 w Based on the aforementioned information request, the Department Planning and Zoning recommends to revert back and repeal Ordinance 13397, adopted on June 27, 2013; to "Public Park and Recreation" with "Urban Central Business District" elu41ine Olis Chief of Land Development Attachment: File-06-00613zc AEP 9/21/2016 J I d ST 45 1 N 90 1 1 20 SE 10 ST MIAMI 21 (EXISTING) 16-00662zc 180 Feet SEF.1oT / HIS ST__ ti co� Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 , on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk ADDRESS: 20 SE 10 ST I ST L Q Q MIAMI 21 (PROPOSED) 16-00662zc -'E' 10TH,ST� co Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 , on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk N ADDRESS: 20 SE 10 ST 0 45 90 180 Feet Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 AERIAL on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk 16-006621u/zc 0 62.5 125 250 Feet I I I I ADDRESS: 20 SE 10 ST A EXHIBIT Submitted into the public E record for item(s) PZ.13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk SUBJECT PROPERTY: 15 Southeast 10 Street, Miami, FL 33131 ® December 14, 1972 — a resolution (72-774-B) was passed and adopted, dedicating 12,000 square feet of property, to the City of Miami, at the intersection of Southeast 10 Street and 1 Ave. o The dedicated land included two (2) tracts of land containing fifteen large Oak trees, to be preserved, on two (2) tracts (spanning three (3) Platted Lots). © November 15, 1974 — The exact legal description was provided by the developer (1000 Brickell, Inc.) on the official Warranty Deed. The legal description exactly describes a parcel of approximately 9,000 ftz (Allen Morris Park) on the north side of Southeast 10 Street, and a parcel of approximately 3,000 ft2 (20 SE 10 ST) on the south side of 10 Street. U In my research I have not found a legal document indicating that any portion of 15 SE 10 ST (Perriconne's) should be zoned CS. However, I have found sufficient documentation which clearly delineates the entirety of the Allen Morris Park parcel as being the land deeded over to the City to be used as Park space. Therefore, it is my belief that the CS designation on the Perriconne's site is indeed a scrivener's error and should have been applied to the remainder of the Allen Morris Park parcel (25 SE 10 ST). File Number: 4062 Final Action Date: 6110/2018 A DISCUSSION TO PRESENT AN ADMINISTRATIVE ATLAS CORRECTION AFFECTING PROPERTIES AT 15 SOUTHEAST 10TH STREET AND 25 SOUTHEAST 10TH STREET. City ormlaml Page 1 of 1 File ID: 4052 (Revision:) Printed On: 611112010 Submitted into the public EXHIBIT record for item(s) PZ.13 06-27-2019. City Clerk E on e City of Miami :,. Legislation City Hall 3500 Pan American Drive Miami, FL 33133 •�fi ii�)•>>� www.mlamlgov.com %c'' Discussion Item File Number: 4062 Final Action Date: 6110/2018 A DISCUSSION TO PRESENT AN ADMINISTRATIVE ATLAS CORRECTION AFFECTING PROPERTIES AT 15 SOUTHEAST 10TH STREET AND 25 SOUTHEAST 10TH STREET. City ormlaml Page 1 of 1 File ID: 4052 (Revision:) Printed On: 611112010 City of Miami Master Report Enactment Number: Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 , on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk City Hall 3500 Pan American Drive Miami, FL 33133 www.mlamlgov.com File Number: 4052 File Type: Discussion Item Status: DISCUSSED Revision: Controlling Body: City Commission File Name: Discussion - Administrative Atlas Correction Introduced: 4/20/2018 Requesting Dept: Department of Planning Final Action Date: 5/10/2018 Title: A DISCUSSION TO PRESENT AN ADMINISTRATIVE ATLAS CORRECTION AFFECTING PROPERTIES AT 15 SOUTHEAST 10TH STREET AND 25 SOUTHEAST 10TH STREET. Sponsors: Notes: Links: Attachments: History of Legislative File: Revision: Acting Body: Date: City Commission 5/10/2018 City Commission 5/10/2018 Action: Result: Meeting Completed DISCUSSED Passed City of Miami Page 1 of 1 Printed on: 5/11/2018 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 , on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk AGENDA ITEM SUMMARY FORM File ID: #4052 Date: 04/20/2018 Requesting Department: Department of Planninq Commission Meeting Date: 05/10/2018 Sponsored By: District Impacted: District 2 Type: Discussion Item Subject: Discussion - Administrative Atlas Correction Purpose of Item: To present an administrative atlas correction affecting properties at 15 Southeast 10th Street and 25 Southeast 10th Street. Budget Impact Analvsis Item has NO budget Impact Item is NOT Related to Revenue Item is NOT funded by Bonds Total Fiscal Impact: Reviewed By Department of Planning Luciana Gonzalez Department Head Review Completed 04/25/2018 0:32 PM Office of Management and Budget Fred Pericles Budget Analyst Review Completed 04/27/2010 4:32 PM Office of Management and Budget Christopher M Rase Budget Review Completed 04/28/201810:34 AM City Manager's Office Nzeribe Ihekwaba Assistant City Manager Review Completed 04/30/2018 2:23 PM City Manager's Office Nlkolas Pascual City Manager Review Completed 05/01/201812:17 PM Legislative Division Carolina Bazall Legislative Division Review Skipped 04/30/20181:13 PM Office of the City Attorney Carolina Bazall Deputy City Attorney Review Skipped 04/30/20181:13 PM Office of the City Attorney Carolina Bazall Approved Form and Correctness Skipped 04/30/20181:13 PM City Commission Maricarmen Lopez Meeting Completed 05/10/2018 9:00 AM Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 , Quarantello v. Leroy, 977 So.2d 648 (2008) on 96-27-2019 . City Clerk 33 Fla. L. Weekly b517 977 So.2d 648 District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District. Margaret M. QUARAN'TELLO, etc., Appellant, V. David T. LEROY, Terry Leroy, etc., et al., Appellees No. 5Do6-2340. Feb. 15, 20o8. Rehearing Denied March 31, 2008. Synopsis Background: Court-appointed guardian for minor child filed personal injury action against child's maternal grandmother, to recover damages for injuries child sustained in motor vehicle accident that resulted in child being thrown from booster seat and sustaining severe injuries, including quadriplegia. Grandmother filed motion for partial summary judgment. The Circuit Court, Orange County, Reginald K. Whitehead, J., granted motion, concluding that statute prohibited introduction of any evidence that she failed to provide or use an appropriate child passenger restraint. Guardian appealed. 2 Cases that cite this headnote [2] Statutes 1;r-- Intent Legislative intent is the most important factor that informs court's statutory construction analysis. Cases that cite this headnote 131 Statutes Q-- Language and intent, will, purpose, or policy Because legislative intent is determined primarily from the text of the statute, court begins its interpretation of a statute with the actual language used by the legislature. 1 Cases that cite this headnote [4] Statutes Giving effect to statute or language; construction as written [Holding:] The District Court of Appeal, Sawaya, J., held that in an apparent matter of first impression, there was no statutory prohibition on introduction of evidence that 151 grandmother might have failed to use appropriate child passenger restraint provided by child's mother. Reversed and remanded. Palmer, C.J., dissented, with opinion. West Headnotes (13) [1] Appeal and Error -i— De novo review Standard of review governing a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment posing a question of law is de novo. If a statute's language is clear and unambiguous, court proceeds no further and applies the statute as written. Cases that cite this headnote Automobiles g, Equipment Automobiles Contributory and comparative negligence; apportionment of fault Statute providing that failure to provide and use child passenger restraint was not to be considered comparative negligence, nor was such failure to be admissible as evidence in trial of any civil action with regard to negligence, did not prevent introduction of evidence that minor child's maternal grandmother, who was child's caretaker at time of car accident, might have failed to use appropriate child passenger restraint provided by child's mother, in context of personal injury action brought by child's court- WESTLAW © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. Quarantello v. Leroy, 977 So.2d 648 (2008) 33 Fla. L Weekly 5517 appointed guardian against grandmother, to recover damages for injuries child sustained in accident that resulted in child being thrown from booster seat and sustaining severe injuries; rather, statute barred only evidence of comparative negligence and similar evidence of negligence that could be used to reduce child's recovery, and did not provide grant of immunity to grandmother. West's F.S.A. § 316.613(3). Cases that cite this headnote 161 Statutes -�— Statute as a Whole;Relation of Parts to Whole and to One Another Statutory interpretation is a "holistic endeavor," and when engaged in the task of discerning the meaning of a statute, court will not look merely to a particular clause in which general words may be used, but will take in connection with it the whole statute. 4 Cases that cite this headnote 171 Statutes Superfluousness Court, in interpreting a statute, is required to give effect to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute, if possible, and words in a statute should not be construed as mere surplusage. 3 Cases that cite this headnote 181 Statutes ;— Superfluousness A basic rule of statutory construction provides that the legislature does not intend to enact useless provisions, and courts should avoid readings that would render part of a statute meaningless. Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 - -- -- -on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk Construing together;harmony Statutes ti'-- Superfluousness Related statutory provisions must be read together to achieve a consistent whole, and where possible, courts must give full effect to all statutory provisions and construe related statutory provisions in harmony with one another. 1 Cases that cite this headnote [101 Statutes �- General and specific terms and provisions;ejusdem generis Statutory canon of "ejusdem generis" means that, where an enumeration of specific things is followed by some more general word or phrase, such general word or phrase will usually be construed to refer to things of the same kind or species as those specifically enumerated. Cases that cite this headnote [111 Statutes - Associated terms and provisions; noscitur a locus Statutes ,;— General and specific terms and provisions;ejusdem generis For purposes of statutory construction, the doctrine of ejusdem generis is actually an application of the broader maxim "noscitur a sociis" which means that general and specific words capable of analogous meaning when associated together take color from each other so that the general words are restricted to a sense analogous to the specific words. Cases that cite this headnote 4 Cases that cite this headnote 1121 Automobiles v Contributory and comparative 191 Statutes negligence;apportionment of fault - Related provisions Statute providing that the failure to provide and use a child passenger restraint is not Statutes WESTLAW © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 , Quarantello v. Leroy, 977 So.2d 648 (2008)_ _ on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk 33 Fla. L. Weekly D517 to be considered comparative negligence, nor is such failure to be admissible as evidence in trial of any civil action with regard to negligence, prohibits evidence of comparative negligence and evidence of negligence similarly used to reduce an injured child's recovery. West's F.S.A. § 316.613(3). Cases that cite this headnote [13] Statutes �.— Unintended or unreasonable results; absurdity Courts must abide by the rule of statutory construction that requires them to interpret a statute to avoid absurd or unreasonable results. 1 Cases that cite this headnote Attorneys and Law Firms *649 Brian T. Wilson, of Dellecker Wilson King McKenna & Ruffier, A Limited Liability Partnership, Orlando, and Stephan W. Carter, Maitland, for Appellant. Angela C. Flowers, of Kubicki Draper, Ocala, for Appellees. Opinion SAWAYA, J. We are called upon to interpret the meaning of section 316.613(3), Florida Statutes (1999), which states that "[t]he failure to provide and use a child passenger restraint shall not be considered comparative negligence, nor shall such failure be admissible as evidence in the trial of any civil action with regard to negligence." This particular provision is part of a broader statutory scheme intended to protect children five years of age or younger from injury in automobile accidents by requiring that they be secured in a proper *650 child passenger restraint. § 316.613, Fla. Stat. (1999). The issue we must resolve, which appears to be a matter of first impression, is whether section 316.613(3) prohibits introduction of any evidence of failure to provide and use a proper child passenger restraint in a negligence action brought by an injured child against a caretaker who allegedly failed to secure the child in such a device prior to the automobile accident that caused the injuries. We conclude that it does not and reverse the summary judgment entered in favor of the caretaker. Margaret Quarantello, as court-appointed guardian of Alexander Swope, brought a personal injury action against Terry Leroy, Alexander's maternal grandmother, to recover damages for injuries the child sustained in a motor vehicle accident that occurred on November 15, 1999. At the time of the accident, Alexander was eleven months old, and he was under the care of Mrs. Leroy. Mrs. Leroy placed Alexander into a child booster seat in the backseat of her car in preparation for a drive. Mrs. Leroy and Alexander were both passengers in the vehicle, which was driven by Mrs. Leroy's husband, David Leroy. When the Leroys' vehicle collided with a vehicle driven by Frederick Lindsey, Alexander was thrown from the booster seat and sustained severe injuries, including quadriplegia. Mrs. Quarantello filed an amended complaint alleging in Count IV that Mrs. Leroy was negligent because she breached a common law duty to use reasonable care in caring for the child—the complaint did not allege breach of a duty of care created by section 316.613, Florida Statutes (1999). 1 In order to meet her burden of proof, Mrs. Quarantello intended to introduce evidence that Mrs. Leroy failed to use a proper child passenger restraint to ensure that Alexander was transported safely. Specifically, Mrs. Quarantello contended that the booster seat in which Alexander was placed was designed for older children and that the appropriate restraint device would have been an infant safety seat. This allegation is in direct reference to section 316.613(1), Florida Statutes (1999), which provides that "[f]or children aged through 3 years, such restraint device must be a separate carrier or a vehicle manufacturer's integrated child seat." She claimed Alexander's mother had provided Mrs. Leroy with an appropriate infant seat and that Mrs. Leroy failed to use it. Mrs. Leroy filed a motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that section 316.613(3), Florida Statutes, prohibits introduction of any evidence that she failed to provide or use an appropriate child passenger restraint. In essence, she contended that the statute WESTLAW © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3 Quarantello v. Leroy, 977 So.2d 648 (2008) 33 Fla. L. Weekly D5 77 provides her with immunity from any negligence suit where evidence of failure to provide or use an appropriate child passenger restraint is attempted to be introduced. She further argued that Mrs. Quarantello's action was predicated solely on the admission of this prohibited evidence and that summary judgment should therefore be entered in her favor. The trial court agreed and entered the judgment we now review. Mrs. Quarantello appeals, contending that section 316.613(3), Florida Statutes, only *651 bars evidence of comparative negligence and similar evidence of negligence that can be used to reduce an injured child's recovery. [11 Because the issue we address presents a question of law, the standard for reviewing the trial court's ruling on the motion for partial summary judgment is de novo. See Major League Baseball v. Morsani, 790 So.2d 1071, 1074 (F1a.2001) ("The standard of review governing a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment posing a pure question of law is de novo."); see also GTC, Inc. v. Edgar, 967 So.2d 781 (Fla.2007) ("Generally speaking, statutory interpretation is a question of law subject to de novo review." (citing BellSouth Telecomm., Inc. v. Meeks, 863 So.2d 287, 289 (F1a.2003))). Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 , on 06-27-2019. City Clerk negligence and similar evidence of negligence that may be used to reduce an injured child's recovery. The first phrase of section 316.613(3) states that "[t]he failure to provide and use a child passenger restraint shall not be considered comparative negligence," and the very next phrase provides, "nor shall such failure be admissible as evidence in the trial of any civil action with regard to negligence." The conclusion reached by the trial court and advanced by Mrs. Leroy as the correct interpretation literally begs the question: why would the Legislature bother to include the first phrase prohibiting evidence of comparative negligence if it intended to exclude all evidence in all negligence cases in the second phrase? If the trial court and Mrs. Leroy are correct, there would have been no need for the Legislature to have included the first phrase because there would be no cause of action in which a defendant could allege comparative negligence. [61 [71 181 191 In arriving at its conclusion, the trial court apparently considered the first phrase meaningless or in isolation from the second. We are, however, loathe to render statutory language irrelevant in any context, and we discern no valid reason to do so here. Statutory interpretation is a "holistic endeavor," United Savings Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, [21 [31 [4] The courts have compiled a catalogue of Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371, 108 S.Ct. 626, 98 L.Ed.2d 740 rules of statutory construction to provide guidance when (1988), and when engaged in the task of discerning the determining the meaning of a statute. Of these, we first meaning of a statute, we " `will not look merely to a apply the preeminent rule that legislative intent is the most particular clause in which general words may be used, but important factor that informs our analysis. See Knowles v. will take in connection with it the whole statute...."' *652 Beverly Enters. -Fla., Inc., 898 So.2d 1, 5 (F1a.2004) ("It is Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650, 94 S.Ct. 2431, 41 well settled that legislative intent is the polestar that guides L.Ed.2d 374 (1974) (quoting Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. a court's statutory construction analysis."). Because (19 How.) 183,194,15 L.Ed. 595 (1856)). Adverting to our legislative intent is determined primarily from the text of catalogue of rules of statutory construction, the statute, we begin our analysis of section 316.613(3), as we do in any case of statutory interpretation, with the "actual language" used by the Legislature. Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So.2d 189, 198 (F1a.2007); Borden v. E. -European Ins. Co., 921 So.2d 587, 595 (F1a.2006). If it is clear and unambiguous, we proceed no further and apply the provisions as written. See Foley v. State, 50 So.2d 179, 184 (Fla.1951). [51 We do not believe that section 316.613(3) is an exemplar of good legislative draftsmanship. The statute is poorly worded and ambiguous—it is unclear from the text whether the statute prohibits admission of any and all evidence of failure to use a child passenger restraint or whether it simply prohibits evidence of comparative [w]e are required to give effect to "every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute, if possible, and words in a statute should not be construed as mere surplusage." American Home Assur. Co. v. Plaza Materials Corp., 908 So.2d 360, 366 (Fla.2005) (quoting Hechtman v. Nations Title Ins., 840 So.2d 993, 996 (F1a.2003)). Moreover, "a basic rule of statutory construction provides that the Legislature does not intend to enact useless provisions, and courts should avoid readings that would render part of a statute meaningless." Id (quoting State v. Goode, 830 So.2d 817, 824 (F1a.2002)). "[R]elated statutory provisions must be read together to achieve a consistent whole, and ... `[w]here possible, courts must give full effect to all statutory provisions and construe related statutory WESTLAW © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. M Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 , Quarantello v. Leroy, 977 So.2d 648 (2008) nn 06-27-2()19 . C'ity Clerk 33 Fla. L. Weekly D517 provisions in harmony with one another.' " Woodham v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 829 So.2d 891, 898 (F1a.2002) (quoting Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So.2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1992)). Heart of Adoptions, 963 So.2d at 198-99; see also Shively Groves v. Mayo, 135 Fla. 300, 184 So. 839, 841 (1938); Goode v. State, 50 Fla. 45, 39 So. 461, 463 (1905) ("It is the general rule, in construing statutes, `that construction is favored which gives effect to every clause and every part of the statute, thus producing a consistent and harmonious whole. A construction which would leave without effect any part of the language used should be rejected, if an interpretation can be found which will give it effect.' " (quoting 26 Amer. & Eng. Ency. Latin 618 (2d ed.))). Reading section 316.613(3) in its entirety, we conclude that the latter phrase, "evidence ... with regard to negligence," gives effect and meaning to the former phrase, "comparative negligence." Interpreting the statute in this manner indicates that the Legislature intended to prohibit evidence of comparative negligence and evidence of negligence that may be similarly used to reduce an injured child's recovery. In Parker v. Montgomery, 529 So.2d 1145 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), for example, a child was injured in an automobile accident and the defendant asserted comparative negligence as a defense based on the failure of the child's parents to secure the child in an appropriate child passenger restraint in violation of section 316.613. When the trial court entered an order striking that defense, the defendants then filed amended pleadings asserting defenses based on failure to mitigate damages and avoidable consequences, claiming that the damages could have been mitigated or avoided if the parents had complied with section 316.613. Concluding that the defenses of avoidable consequences and mitigation of damages are prohibited under the statute, the court held: Because, however, section 316.613(3) has explicitly precluded the admission of evidence relating to the failure of a child to be placed in a child restraint device for comparative negligence purposes, the concept of mitigation of damages, inseparable, under the circumstances at bar, from the doctrine of comparative negligence, is similarly statutorily inadmissible when such nonuse is attempted to be interjected as a defense. Id. at 1149-50. We believe that the Legislature intended to prohibit defenses similar to those alleged in Parker when it included the second phrase of section 316.613(3). [10) [111 [12] This interpretation is consistent with the statutory canon of ejusdem *653 generis, which means that " `where an enumeration of specific things is followed by some more general word or phrase, such general word or phrase will usually be construed to refer to things of the same kind or species as those specifically enumerated[.]"' Arnold v. Shumpert, 217 So.2d 116, 119 (Fla. 1968) (quoting Children's Bootery v. Sutker, 91 Fla. 60, 107 So. 345, 347 (1926)); see also State v. Hearns, 961 So.2d 211 (F1a.2007); Brown v. Saint City Church of God of the Apostolic Faith, Inc., 717 So.2d 557 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).2 The Legislature first specifically prohibited evidence of "comparative negligence" and then in the same sentence prohibited "evidence ... with regard to negligence." Application of ejusdem generis informs us that the latter general prohibition refers to the former specific prohibition and, therefore, confirms our conclusion that the Legislature intended, through its enactment of section 316.613(3), to prohibit evidence of comparative negligence and evidence of negligence similarly used to reduce an injured child's recovery. Looking to the manner in which similar statutes in other states have been interpreted, as is permissible for us to do, the only state statute that we have found containing language identical to that contained in section 316.613(3), Florida Statutes, is Louisiana Revised Statutes section 32:295(F), which provides: "In no event shall failure to wear a child passenger safety seat system be considered as comparative negligence, nor shall such failure be admissible as evidence in the trial of any civil action with regard to negligence, nor shall such failure be considered a moving violation." La.Rev.Stat. § 32:295(F) (2007). In Salaiman v. Louisiana Casino Cruises, 835 So.2d 823 (La.Ct.App.2002), the court addressed whether this provision provided tort immunity in a suit based on the failure to properly secure a child in a vehicle. The court concluded: WESTLAW O 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 5 Quarantello v. Leroy, 977 Sold 648 (2008) 33 Fla. L. Weekly D517 f [P]aragraph F of La. R.S. 32:295 does not contain an express grant of statutory immunity shielding a defendant from damages caused by his failure to secure a child in a safety restraint device. Further, because the purpose of the law is to protect children, we are bound to read paragraph F in a way that will best accomplish that purpose. Therefore, we hold that paragraph F contains two evidentiary restrictions barring a defendant from introducing evidence that the child -victim was not in a child restraint device during a vehicular accident through the fault of the child or another as a means to reduce the child's recovery. However, it does not immunize a defendant from liability arising from the defendant's failure to properly secure a child in a vehicle. Id. at 826. [131 We agree with the reasoning in Salaiman. In light of that reasoning, the interpretation of section 316.613(3) advanced by Mrs. Leroy would result in an anomaly in Florida law because injured children between the ages of six and eighteen would be allowed to recover in a negligence action against a caretaker based on evidence that the child was not *654 properly restrained by a seat belt under section 316.614, Florida Statutes, see Cybroski v. Wright, 927 So.2d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), but injured children five years of age or younger would not be allowed to recover based on the prohibition of similar evidence under section 316.613(3). Both sections 316.613 and 316.614 were enacted in large part to protect children from injuries in automobile accidents, yet, according to the argument advanced by Mrs. Leroy, the age of the child would determine the right to recover. The illogic that flows from this interpretation of section 316.613(3) is readily apparent and we reject it. We must abide by the rule of statutory construction that requires us to interpret a statute to avoid absurd or unreasonable results. City of Boca Raton v. Gidman, 440 So.2d 1277, 1281 (Fla. 1983) Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 , on 06-27-201.9 City Clerk ("No literal interpretation should be given that leads to an unreasonable or ridiculous conclusion or to a purpose not designated by the lawmakers."); Johnson v. Presbyterian Homes of Synod of Fla., Inc., 239 So.2d 256,263 (Fla. 1970) ("It is fundamental that a statute should be given a reasonable interpretation. No literal interpretation should be given which leads to an unreasonable or ridiculous conclusion."); State v. Sullivan, 95 Fla. 191, 116 So. 255, 261 (1928) ("[N]o literal interpretation should be given that lends to an unreasonable or ridiculous conclusion or a purpose not designed by the lawmakers."); Childers v. Cape Canaveral Hosp., Inc., 898 So.2d 973, 975 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) ("A literal interpretation of the statutory language used is not required when to do so would lead to an unreasonable conclusion, defeat legislative intent or result in a manifest incongruity."). As to Mrs. Leroy's contention that section 316.613(3) is, in essence, a grant of immunity, we disagree. If the Legislature intends to grant immunity from civil suit, it certainly knows how to explicitly do so. See, e.g., § 335.141(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2007) (utilizing the language, "not liable for any action or omission"); § 768.075(1), Fla. Stat. (2007) (employing the phrase, "shall not be held liable for any civil damages"); § 768.12, Fla. Stat. (2007) (using the terminology, "shall have no cause of action"); § 768.125, Fla. Stat. (2007) (using the phrase, "shall not thereby become liable for injury or damage"); § 768.13, Fla. Stat. (2007) (employing the language, "shall not be held liable for any civil damages"). We do not discern a grant of immunity within the provisions of section 316.613(3). We conclude that section 316.613(3) does not prevent introduction of evidence that Mrs. Leroy, the child's caretaker at the time of the accident, may have failed to use an appropriate child passenger restraint provided by the child's mother. We believe that the jury should be able to consider this evidence along with any other evidence presented by the plaintiff, Mrs. Quarantello, and give it whatever weight the jury deems appropriate. Hence, the jury, presented with all of the evidence, will have a better opportunity to find the truth regarding the cause of Alexander's injuries and make an informed decision whether he is due recompense from Mrs. Leroy. REVERSED and REMANDED. WESTLAW © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 6 Quarantello v. Leroy, 977 So.2d 648 (2008) 33 Fla. L. Weekly D517 GRIFFIN, J., concurs. PALMER, C.J., dissents with opinion. PALMER, C.J., dissenting. I respectfully dissent. In my opinion, the language set forth in section 316.613(3), Florida Statutes (1999), is clear and unambiguous and, therefore, it is unnecessary for this court to undertake a "holistic endeavor" or to employ rules of statutory interpretation as a means to apply *655 the statute to the facts presented in this case. The statute provides that evidence as to the failure to provide or use a child passenger restraint is inadmissible "in the trial of any civil action with regard to negligence." The case before us is clearly a civil action with regard to negligence and, accordingly, the trial court properly concluded that such evidence was inadmissible. See State v. Hobbs, 974 So.2d 1119 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008)(noting that the appellate court's first consideration is to give effect to the intent of the legislature as evidenced by the plain meaning of the text). In reversing the trial court, the majority addresses the statute's overall intent, which it finds to be the protection Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 , on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk of children from injury in automobile accidents by requiring that they be secured in a proper child passenger restraint. However, the majority does not address the legislative intent of the specific provision at issue in this case, which precludes a person's failure to use a child passenger restraint from being considered comparative negligence. This provision does not promote the stated statutory intent, since caretakers would have more incentive to use a child passenger restraint if the failure to do so could be considered comparative negligence. Accordingly, the statutory intent of this specific provision must be something else. I Additionally, the majority's concern with the anomaly between the statutory treatment of younger children and older children is not eliminated by its interpretation of the statute, since the failure of a child to use a seat belt is still admissible as comparative negligence, whereas no such evidence is admissible with regard to a younger child in a child passenger restraint. I would affirm. All Citations 977 So.2d 648, 33 Fla. L. Weekly D517 Footnotes 1 The trial court granted summary judgment as to Counts IV and V. Count V alleges that under section 827.03(3), Florida Statutes, which defines criminal child neglect, Mrs. Leroy had a duty not to neglect Alexander and she breached that duty by failing to use a proper child passenger restraint to ensure the child's safety. The trial court struck that count because it alleged ordinary negligence rather than criminal neglect. Mrs. Quarantello does not challenge the correctness of that ruling and we, therefore, do not address it. 2 The doctrine of ejusdem generis is " 'actually an application of the broader maxim 'noscitur a sociis' which means that general and specific words capable of analogous meaning when associated together take color from each other so that the general words are restricted to a sense analogous to the specific words.' " Thomas v. City of Crescent City, 503 So.2d 1299, 1300 n. 2 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) (quoting Transcon Trailers, Inc. v. Northland Ins. Co., 436 So.2d 380, 381 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)); see also Carraway v. Armour & Co., 156 So.2d 494 (Fla. 1963); State ex rel. Wedgworth Farms, Inc. v. Thompson, 101 So.2d 381, 385 (Fla. 1958). 1 The intent could be to avoid litigation among family members, since the most likely defendant in a suit based on the failure to put a child in a child passenger restraint would be a member of the child's family. If indeed that is the intent of the legislation, allowing the instant lawsuit to proceed against the grandmother of the injured party would be in direct conflict with that intent. I do not purport to conclude that such is the intent of this specific statute, but only to point out one logical possible intent, thereby emphasizing the danger of "interpreting" an unambiguous statute. End of Document © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. WESTLAW © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 7 Williams v. City of North Miami, 213 So.2d 5 (1968) 213 So.2d 5 District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District. E. C. WILLIAMS, Barbara Williams, his wife; Milton B. Oshins, his wife; Jerome J. Palacino; Melvin E. Harrison; Jerry J. Fuchs; on behalf of those persons having a common or general interest constituting a class impracticable to bring them before the Court, Appellants, V. CITY OF NORTH MIAMI, Florida, a municipal corporation; and M. A. Grondin, individually and as trustee, Appellees. No. 67-871. 1 July 23, 1968. Synopsis Action by nearby property owners attacking ordinances rezoning property and seeking injunctive relief. The Circuit Court for Dade County, Ralph O. Cullen, J., entered a judgment dismissing cause with prejudice and the protesting property owners appealed. The District Court of Appeal, Hendry, J., held that with respect to certain portions of parcel involved in rezoning the deviation between the ultimate rezoning and that proposed in notice was insubstantial and insufficient to upset the rezoning, but as to three lots requested to be rezoned from single family residences to parking but ultimately rezoned for multiple family residences the deviation was substantial, and the rezoning as to those lots could not be upheld. Affirmed in part and reversed in part. West Headnotes (4) 111 Zoning and Planning Sufficiency of notice or publication Zoning change notice must adequately inform as to what changes are proposed and the actual change must conform substantially to proposed changes in notice, but there must be some realistic latitude in application of this rule. Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk F.S.A. § 176.05. 4 Cases that cite this headnote 121 Zoning and Planning Sufficiency of notice or publication Where tract A of parcel was formerly zoned for liberal business purposes and according to notice was to be zoned partly business and partly parking while it was ultimately zoned neighborhood business, the deviation from notice was neither material nor substantial and the deviation was not a basis for upsetting rezoning ordinance. Cases that cite this headnote 131 Zoning and Planning i - Sufficiency of notice or publication Where lot in parcel concerned with proposed zoning notice had been zoned as single family residences and was to become a lot for parking under provisions of notice, the ultimate rezoning of lot for multiple family residences produced no change, and alleged deviation from proposed change in notice was not a basis for holding rezoning invalid. 1 Cases that cite this headnote 141 Zoning and Planning Sufficiency of notice or publication Where three lots in parcel subject of a rezoning notice had been zoned as single family residence properties and notice requested that change be made to a parking classification, ultimate rezoning of such lots for multiple family residences constituted such substantial deviation from proposal in notice that rezoning as to such WESTLAW O 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. Williams v. City of North Miami, 213 So.2d 5 (1968) lots could not be upheld. Cases that cite this headnote Attorneys and Law Firms *5 Byrd V. Duke, Jr., Miami, for appellants. Simon, Hays & Grundwerg, Miami, Martin D. Kahn, No. Miami, for appellees. Before PEARSON, BARKDULL and HENDRY, JJ. Opinion HENDRY, Judge. This is an appeal by the plaintiffs below from a final judgment rendered in favor of the defendants, M. A. Grondin and the City of North Miami. In March of 1966, the City of North Miami annexed certain property known as the S.L.S. Shopping Center subdivision of Dade County. The subject property was at that time and is presently owned by the defendant, M. A. Grondin, both as trustee *6 for undisclosed principals and in his individual capacity. At the time of the purchase and prior to its annexation, the property was zoned according to county regulations as follows: Tract A was zoned BU -IA, liberal business; Lot 1 was zoned RU -3, multiple family residence; and Lots 2, 3 and 4 were zoned RU -1, single family residence. Subsequent to the annexation of the subject property, Grondin applied to the Zoning Board of the defendant city for the adoption of zoning classifications as illustrated on the accompanying graphic representation. Under the City of North Miami's *7 zoning classification system, 2B is liberal business and P-1 is parking only. The Zoning Board having recommended adoption of the proposed classifications, notices of hearing were sent to all landowners within 500 feet of the S.L.S. Shopping Center tract, and the matter was set before the City Commission. The Commission met upon two separate occasions to consider the matter. On January 14, 1967, it unanimously passed Ordinance No. 380.271 establishing a zoning classification of 1B1, i.e., multiple family residence, as to lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the subject property. Subsequently, on February 14, 1967, the Commission, again by unanimous vote, passed Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk Ordinance No. 380.272 providing for a zoning classification of 2A, i.e., neighborhood business, as to Tract A of the S.L.S. Shopping Center property. i I 1 eats .v 5: rcl.ao.. ; 3 rt e'c r • A' ��• +sato toes LW0 Lkt4 r0 a 13,.xv •.- ,� .y ..t. DLT/1 I L -.awt . Appellants, who were plaintiffs below, are members of that class of persons owning property within 500 feet of the shopping center subdivision boundary. On February 16, 1967, these plaintiffs filed a complaint in Circuit Court seeking to have Ordinances No. 380.271 and 380.272 declared invalid, as well as certain injunctive relief. Issue was joined upon the answers of both Grondin and the City of North Miami, and the cause ultimately came on for final hearing. Having heard the testimony and examined the evidence, the chancellor entered the order appealed which contained the following specific finding: L * * * the Court finds that the acts complained of by the Plaintiffs; to wit: the zoning by the City of North Miami of Tract A to the zoning classification of 2-A (Neighborhood business) and Lots, 1, 2, 3 and 4 to 1B1 (Multiple family) all of said property being located in S.L.S. Shopping Center * * * were proper WESTLAW © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2 Williams v. City of North Miami, 213 So.2d 5 (1968) and within the proper authority of the City of North Miami as granted by its Charter and by the appropriate Florida Statutes * * *' From an order dismissing the cause with prejudice and taxing costs against them, plaintiffs prosecute this appeal. Appellants' initial point on appeal challenges the adequacy of the notice of hearing. Section 176.05, F1a.Stat., F.S.A., and section 29-10.5, Municipal Code of the City of North Miami, require that notice of hearing on proposed zoning classifications be given at least fifteen days in advance of such hearing. This notice is required regardless of whether the classification is to be established initially or merely changed from one to another. There is no contention raised that the notice was not timely. Rather, appellants argue, the actions of the Commission fail to conform to the notice provision as to the action contemplated. In other words, appellants claim that the notice informs them of a proposed change from RU -1, using the example of lots 2, 3 and 4 of the subject property, to P-1, whereas the actions of the Commission resulted in the property being classified 1B 1, which change is totally different from the one they were notified might take place. [11 [1] 131 It is true that the notice must adequately inform as to what changes are proposed, and the actual change must conform substantially to the proposed changes in the notice. McGee v. City of Cocoa, Fla.App.1964, 168 So.2d 766. There must, however, be some realistic latitude in the application of this rule. The opinion in the McGee case, supra, states: `As a general rule the notice must apprise the public of the suggested changes, and the zoning amendment must conform substantially to the proposed changes. Some deviation, however, may be immaterial where the variance is a liberalization of the proposed amendment rather than an enlarged restraint on the property involved. See 101 C.J.S. Zoning s 110. A change may, of course, be `substantial' where an amendment makes a greater or more significant change than *8 that requested. The End of Document Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk instant amendment makes a lesser change than that requested and published in the notice of hearing; the plaintiffs were in attendance and, under all the circumstances, the modification was not of such substantial and material nature as to require a new notice. Cf. Kalvaitis v. Village of Port Chester, 1962, Sup., 235 N.Y.S.2d 44.' So, in the case here before us, we see that Tract A of the subject property, formerly zoned for liberal business purposes, was to be zoned partly business and partly parking under the notice of proposed changes. Tract A was ultimately zoned `neighborhood business' by Ordinance No. 380.272, a deviation neither material nor substantial under the rule in McGee v. City of Cocoa, supra. Lot 1, formerly zoned for multiple family residences, was to have become parking under the provisions of the notice; lot 1 was ultimately zoned for multiple family residences, so that there was no change whatsoever. The chancellor's judgment was correct, then, as to Tract A and Lot 1, and therefore must be affirmed in this regard. III The same is not true concerning lots 2, 3 and 4. These parcels were formerly zoned as single family residence property. The notice requested that this be changed to classification P-1 parking. These lots are now classified 1B1 or multiple family residence. We are of the opinion that the deviation between the zoning requested by the notice and the zoning actually granted as to lots 2, 3 and 4 cannot be regarded as inconsequential. Such a discrepancy cannot be justified under the rule of the McGee case; therefore, insofar as the judgment of the lower court relates to lots 2, 3 and 4, it must be and is hereby reversed. We have examined appellants' remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part. All Citations 213 So.2d 5 © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. WESTLAW © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. Williams v. City of North Miami, 213 So.2d 5 (1968) Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk WESTLAW @2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. North Beach Medical Center, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 374 So.2d 1106 (1979) Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk 374 So.2d iio6 District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District. NORTH BEACH MEDICAL CENTER, INC., 121 Notice Appellant, G -Nature in general V. CITY OF FORT LAUDERDALE, a Municipal Essence of notice, when sufficient in form and Corporation of the State of Florida, and Board of content, is its objective consequence upon one Adjustment of the City of Fort Lauderdale, who receives it, not subjective attitude of one Appellees. who gives it. No. 77-8oi. Cases that cite this headnote Sept. 6,1979• Synopsis [31 Zoning and Planning A final judgment of the Circuit Court, Broward County, Sufficiency of notice or publication John G. Ferris, J., denied relief in a zoning dispute. On appeal by the property owner, the District Court of Notice of proposed changes in zoning must be Appeal, Anstead, J., held that notice which merely clear and unambiguous and readily intelligible advised reader of proposed "revisions or amendments" to to intended reader, average citizen at large, who code sections pertaining to multifamily districts for is presumed to lack technical knowledge of purpose of conforming city code to uniform zoning zoning expert. West's F.S.A. § 176.01 et seq. standards of the county was insufficient where notice did not inform interested public of availability of copies of Cases that cite this headnote proposed ordinance or that manual of uniform zoning standards of county was official document available to every citizen and where there was no indication in notice that contemplated amendments would, if adopted, materially change rights of landowners within zoning 141 Zoning and Planning district affected. Sufficiency of notice or publication Reversed with directions. Notice which merely advised reader of proposed "revisions or amendments" to code sections pertaining to multifamily districts for purpose of conforming city code to uniform zoning standards of the county was insufficient where West Headnotes (4) notice did not inform interested public of availability of copies of proposed ordinance or that manual of uniform zoning standards of [Il Zoning and Planning county was official document available to every Sufficiency of notice or publication citizen and where there was no indication in notice that contemplated amendments would, if Notice of hearing pertaining to proposed adopted, materially change rights of landowners changes in zoning laws must be reasonably within zoning district affected. West's F.S.A. § sufficient to inform public of essence and scope 176.01 et seq. of proposed changes under consideration. West's F.S.A. § 176.01 et seq. 1 Cases that cite this headnote 2 Cases that cite this headnote WESTLAW © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Worl<s. 1 North Beach Medical Center, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 374 So.2d 1106 (1979) Attorneys and Law Firms *1107 Earl B. Hadlow, William D. King and John T. Sefton of Mahoney Hadlow & Adams, Jacksonville, for appellant. Sydney H. McKenzie, III and Donald R. Hall, Fort Lauderdale, for appellees. Opinion ANSTEAD, Judge. This is an appeal by North Beach Medical Center from a final judgment denying its claim for relief in a zoning dispute. At issue is the sufficiency of the notice published in advance of zoning changes made by the city. In 1971, the appellant selected a site in Fort Lauderdale to construct a medical complex. This complex was to consist of a hospital building, a medical office building, parking spaces for both buildings, and connecting facilities. In October of 1971, city authorities issued a letter advising the hospital that the proposed site was zoned R-4, Multiple Family District, and that a medical office building could be constructed there. At that time, R-4 zoning included hospitals and medical offices as permitted uses. The hospital purchased the site in December of 1971 and proceeded with its development. In May of 1972 the hospital applied for a building permit and submitted to the city its plans for construction. The plans showed the site location and floor plans of the hospital building and office building, although the floor plans for the office building were not submitted in detail. No building permit was requested for construction of the office building at that time. Accordingly, the hospital received a permit limited to the construction of the hospital building, overall drainage and parking for both buildings, and a driveway and portico to connect the hospital building with the proposed office building. While construction of the hospital building was underway, a notice was published in the Fort Lauderdale News on January 10, 1973, of a hearing to be held by the Planning and Zoning Board on January 17, 1973, at which the following would be heard: The proposed revisions were actually for the purpose of removing incompatible uses from residential zones and also to bring *1108 terminology and other regulations in line with the Manual of Uniform Zoning Standards for Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk Broward County. The revisions would remove, as permitted uses, schools, museums, philanthropic institutions, private hospitals, medical offices, dental offices, and religious institutions. As to the appellant, the effect of the revisions would be to delete medical office buildings as a permitted use and to only allow those hospitals operated by the public or church to operate as permitted uses. These revisions were approved by the zoning board on Januaiy 17, 1973. On January 30, 1973, and again on February 6, 1973, the following notice was published in the Fort Lauderdale News of a public hearing to be held before the City Commission on February 20, at which time the commission was to consider proposals to Amend Sections 47-10, 47-11, 47-13 and 47-14 of the Code of Ordinances relating to Multiple Family Districts to conform to Manual of Uniform Zoning Standards for Broward County. The purpose of these amendments was to carry out the recommendations of the Planning and Zoning Board. At the February 20 meeting the City Commission approved the recommended amendments. In November of 1973, following completion of the hospital phase of its complex, a certificate of occupancy was issued to appellant for the hospital building. But when appellant applied for a building permit for the office building, the application was denied, based upon the zoning changes enacted on February 20. Appellant then requested a variance, citing its lack of knowledge of the zoning changes and the expenditures already made in anticipation of completing the complex, and the practicality of using the property for any other purpose. The request was denied and appellant subsequently filed a five (5) count complaint against the City of Fort Lauderdale and the Board of Adjustment of that city, contending, among other things, that the amendments were invalid because the city failed to provide adequate and proper notice of the proposed amendments. [11 [21 [31 Reasonable notice of proposed changes in zoning requires more than the publishing of the section or sections to be amended. A notice of hearing, pertaining to proposed changes in zoning laws must be reasonably sufficient to inform the public of the essence and scope of the proposed changes under consideration. Williams v. WESTLAW O 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2 North Beach Medical Center, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 374 So.2d 1106 (1979) City of North Miami, 213 So.2d 5 (Fla.3d DCA 1968); McGee v. City of Cocoa, 168 So.2d 766 (Fla.2d DCA 1964); Glaspey & Sons, Inc. v. Conrad, 83 Wash.2d 707, 521 P.2d 1173 (1974); Anderson, American Law of Zoning 2d s 4.14 (1976). The essence of a notice, when sufficient in form and content, is its objective consequence upon the one who receives it, not the subjective attitude of the one who gives it. Knutzen v. Truck Ins. Exch., 199 Wash. 1, 90 P.2d 282 (1939). The notice must be clear and unambiguous and readily intelligible to the intended reader, the average citizen at large, who is presumed to lack the technical knowledge of a zoning expert. It is not enough that the notice convey to one well -versed in the law of zoning adequate information as to what changes the proposed ordinance would bring about. Federal Building and Development Corp. v. Town of Jamestown, 112 R.I.478, 312 A.2d 586 (1973). 141 The revisions contemplated here were substantial. However, from an examination of the notices pertaining to the hearings before the planning and zoning board and the city commission, it would require a detailed investigation to discover what changes were contemplated. The notice merely notifies the reader of proposed "revisions or amendments" to code sections pertaining to multi -family districts for the purpose of conforming the city code to the uniform zoning standards of the county. Even if notice by cross-reference to other zoning documents is permissible, in this case *1109 informing the public that the essence of the change was to bring the code in line with the Manual of Uniform Zoning Standards of Broward County told the average citizen very little. Did this mean that substantial changes in the uses permitted were contemplated or merely that inconsequential, technical provisions were to be revised to Footnotes Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk conform with the county's manual? The notice did not inform the interested public of the availability of copies of the proposed ordinance nor is there any indication in the record that the Manual of Uniform Zoning Standards of Broward County was an official document available to the average citizen, or in any event decipherable by them in determining what portions of the manual the city intended to follow. Nowhere in the notices quoted, Supra, is there even general reference to the deletion of formerly permitted uses in the R-4 zone. In short, there was no indication in the notice that the contemplated amendments would, if adopted, materially change the rights of those landowners within the zoning district affected. Under these circumstances we do not believe the notice provided here was adequate. We have examined the other points raised by appellant and find them to be without merit. Since our conclusion is that the notice of the proposed amendment was insufficient, the judgment of the trial court is hereby reversed with directions for further proceedings consistent herewith. DOWNEY, C. J., and BERANEK, J., concur. All Citations 374 So.2d 1106 Both the Florida Statutes, Chapter 176, and the Ft. Lauderdale City Charter, Section 323, require notice of proposed zoning change. End of Document © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. WESTLAW @2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3 McGee v. City of Cocoa, 168 So.2d 766 (1964) 168 So.2d 766 District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District. John T. McGEE and Elva M. McGee, Appellants, V. CITY OF COCOA, Florida, a municipal corporation, Appellee. No. 4753• 1 Nov. 20,1964. Synopsis Proceeding for a temporary and permanent injunction against enforcement of an amendatory zoning ordinance which reduced five lots to lower C-3 classification and two lots to only C-1 classification although petition and notice requested change of the seven lots from R-3 to C-3 classification. The Circuit Court, Brevard County, Vassar B. Carlton, J., dismissed plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice, and plaintiffs appealed. The District Court of Appeal, White, Acting C. J., held that the variance from the petition and notice was not so substantial as to require a new notice or to invalidate the ordinance. Affirmed. West Headnotes (9) Zoning and Planning w -Sufficiency of notice or publication Notice of zoning changes must apprise public of what changes are proposed. 2 Cases that cite this headnote 121 Zoning and Planning _ Circumstances affecting validity of amendment in general Zoning amendment must conform substantially to those proposed changes, though some deviation may be allowed as immaterial where Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk variance is liberalization of proposed amendment rather than enlarged restraint on property involved. 1 Cases that cite this headnote [31 Zoning and Planning Change from residential use to business, commercial, or industrial use Zoning and Planning Notice and Hearing Although petitioners requested, and notice specified, reduction of seven lots from R-3 to C-3 zoning, reduction of five lots to lower C-3 and two lots to only C-1 classification was not invalid and modification was not so substantial as to require new notice to neighborhood property owners who attended hearings. 2 Cases that cite this headnote [41 Zoning and Planning 4—Exhaustion of administrative remedies; primary jurisdiction A litigant who is dissatisfied with administrative zoning ruling must, under normal circumstances, first resort to administrative procedures provided by statute. F.S.A. § 176.01 et seq. Cases that cite this headnote [SI Zoning and Planning Who may exercise power Rezoning is a legislative function and is not a proper subject for administrative adjustment. F.S.A. § 176.01 et seq. Cases that cite this headnote WESTLAW © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. McGee v. City of Cocoa, 168 So.2d 766 (1964) 161 Zoning and Planning Issues, proof, and variance A party attacking validity of a zoning ordinance has the heavy burden of alleging and then proving invalidity. Cases that cite this headnote hI Constitutional Law =Zoning and land use Vested rights in a particular zoning ordinance do not accrue to neighboring owners. 1 Cases that cite this headnote 181 Pleading Matters of Fact or Conclusions A party challenging an ordinance which rezones neighboring property must allege something more than bare opinions or conclusions. Cases that cite this headnote 191 Declaratory Judgment Public officers and agencies Zoning and Planning y=Petition, complaint or application Plaintiff homeowners who were affected by rezoning of seven lots but who did not allege facts disclosing they would sustain any special or irreparable damage, from rezoning of two of seven lots to only C-1 classification rather than lower C-3 wholesale commercial classification, which was greater or differed from that sustained by the community at large were not entitled to injunctive relief on that basis and were not entitled to have ordinance declared unconstitutional. Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk Cases that cite this headnote Attorneys and Law Firms *767 Stanley Wolfman, of Hartog & Wolfinan, Cocoa, for appellants. George Ritchie, of Cowart & Ritchie, Cocoa, for appellee. Opinion WHITE, Acting Chief Judge. The plaintiffs appeal an order dismissing with prejudice their complaint to enjoin the defendant city's enforcement of an amendatory zoning ordinance. It appears that a petition was submitted to the City Council of the City of Cocoa requesting that seven lots be rezoned from R-3 multiple family to C-3 wholesale commercial. The plaintiff -appellants are neighborhood property owners who opposed the petition. The city gave requisite notice to the plaintiffs and other interested persons and two hearings were held to determine the propriety of rezoning the seven lots. The resulting ordinance reduced five of the lots to the lower C-3 classification as requested, but the remaining two lots were reduced only to a C-1 classification which is rated superior to the C-3 classification actually requested. *768 Plaintiffs then filed their complaint for a temporary and permanent injunction against enforcement of the rezoning, contending that since the city did not reduce all seven of the lots to the contemplated C-3 classification, the ordinance is invalid; that since two of the lots were not reduced all the way down as requested in the petition, their reclassification as C-1 constituted such an `amendment' as would require new notice and hearing. There is no contention that the petition and notice, as filed, did not comply with the applicable city ordinance' or statutes. If all seven of the lots had been reduced to the lower C-3 classification the plaintiffs, by the very terms of their complaint, in effect concede that they would have no basis for protesting the procedural formalities. The city emphasizes, arguendo, that the petitioners requested reduction of all seven lots from R-3 to C-3 and that the city granted the request as to five of the lots and WESTLAW © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original US. Government Works. 2 McGee v. City of Cocoa, 168 So.2d 766 (1964) denied it only as to the remaining two lots: that as to those two lots the city rezoned only as low as C-1, and since those lots were classified higher than requested, the modification was less amenable to objection than the zoning requested by the petitioners; that C-3 was the lowest classification that could have been granted at the hearing on the notice given, and that, since the rezoning was clearly within permissible limits, the ordinance was validly enacted and the attending plaintiffs, who had been duly noticed, cannot be heard to complain. The plaintiffs urge the generally correct proposition that zoning procedures must be strictly followed. They also contend that when several alternative classifications are to be considered, the notice should list each possibility. Plaintiffs cite as their prime case Castle v. McLaughlin, 1959, 106 U.S.App.D.C. 145, 270 F.2d 448. There the District of Columbia published notice that hearing would be held on certain proposed zoning amendments as outlined by a zoning commission map which was incorporated by reference. Pursuant to this notice, the appellants examined the map and found that the city proposed to change the area in question from AR to R-1-13 which amounted to a minor upgrading in zoning. The appellants supported that plan and no objection was raised. The zoning commission however later amended the map to downgrade the subject area to an R-3 category. No notice and no hearing was held on this change. The appellants there were expecting the property to be upgraded according to the notice given -not downgraded. The Federal Court held that the statute required notice and public hearing before an amendment is put into effect and that a hearing held subsequent to its adoption did not suffice. There the appellants were clearly prejudiced by the change in zoning proposals made without notice. In the instant case the plaintiffs were not prejudiced by any change in classification. Hearing was held on the petition to reduce the zoning to a lower C-3 classification. Plaintiffs objected and at the hearing the city agreed to relieve the strictness of the existing zoning only as far as C-1, which was still more restrictive than that prayed for in the petition. Incidentally the Castle case, supra, recognizes that a minor change in classification may be upheld where the change grew out of matter raised at a duly noticed hearing. il] i21 131 As a general rule the notice must apprise the public of the suggested changes, and the zoning amendment must conform substantially to the proposed changes. Some deviation, however, may be immaterial where the variance is a liberalization of the proposed amendment rather than an enlarged restraint on the property involved . See 101 C.J.S. Zoning § 110. A change may, of course, be `substantial' where an Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk amendment makes a greater or more significant change than that requested. The instant amendment makes a lesser change *769 than that requested and published in the notice of hearing; the plaintiffs were in attendance and, under all the circumstances, the modification was not of such substantial and material nature as to require a new notice. Cf. Kalvaitis v. Village of Port Chester, 1962, Sup., 235 N.Y.S.2d 44. i41 N There is also merit to the defendant's contention that the complaint fails to allege the requisites for injunctive relief. Other than alleging deficient notice, as discussed supra, the complaint displays little more than dissatisfaction with the zoning redesignation. By way of bare conclusion the plaintiffs assert that they have no adequate remedy at law and that they will suffer irreparable harm unless the defendant is enjoined from enforcing said zoning ordinance. In the alternative they pray that the ordinance be declared unconstitutional and void. Normally where a litigant is dissatisfied with an administrative zoning ruling, he must first resort to the administrative procedures provided by statute. See Union Trust Company v. Lucas, Fla.App., App.1960, 125 So.2d 582, Chapter 176, Fla.App., Stat., F.S.A. The instant case, however, concerns `rezoning' which, being a legislative function, is not a proper subject for administrative adjustment. Village of Pembroke Pines v. Zitreen, Fla.App.,App.1962, 143 So.2d 660, 662; cf. Mayflower Property Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, Fla.App.,App.1962, 137 So.2d 849. [6] i71 i81 Although equitable remedy is always available in proper situations, a party attacking the validity of a zoning ordinance has the heavy burden of alleging and then proving invalidity. Village of Virginia Gardens v. Johnson, Fla.App.,App.1962, 143 So.2d 692; Gautier v. Town of Jupiter Island, Fla.App., App.1962, 142 So.2d 321. It must be borne in mind that vested rights in a particular zoning ordinance do not accrue to neighboring owners. Oka v. Cole, Fla.App.,1962, 145 So.2d 233, 235. Accordingly a party challenging an ordinance which rezones neighboring property must allege something more than bare opinions or conclusions. 191 We are impelled to the view that the complaint in question does not aver any material violation of substantive right. It does not allege that the plaintiffs are sustaining or will sustain any special or irreparable damage or any harm differing in kind, rather than degree, from that inuring to the community at large, or that for any reason they are entitled to injunctive relief. See e. g. Conrad v. Jackson, Fla.App.,1958, 107 So.2d 369; 35 Fla.App.,Jur. Zoning, Section 28, 17 F1a.App.,Jur. Injunctions, Section 76 and cases therein cited. In short, it WESTLAW O 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S, Government Works. 3 McGee v. City of Cocoa, 168 So.2d 766 (1964) cannot be gleaned from this complaint, assuming the truth of all its well -pleaded allegations, that the plaintiffs have suffered prejudice with respect to any legal right. Moreover the complaint reveals affirmatively, as a matter of law, than in this context the plaintiffs have no cause of action against the city . Affirmed. Footnotes Ordinance of City of Cocoa, No. 1478. End of Document Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 , on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk ANDREWS, J., and DRIVER, B. J., Associate Judge, concur. All Citations 168 So.2d 766 © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. WIESTLAW © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. �! Metropolitan Dade County v. Recchi America, Inc., 734 So.2d 1123 (1999) 24 Fla. L. Weekly D1143 734 So.2d 1123 District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District. METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY a/k/a Miami—Dade County, Petitioner, V. RECCHI AMERICA, INC., Respondent. No. 98-2461. 1 May 12,1999• Rehearing Denied July 14, 1999• Synopsis Contractor filed breach of contract action against county. County moved to dismiss. The Circuit Court, Dade County, Stuart M. Simons, J., denied motion. County appealed. The District Court of Appeal, Cope, J., held that: (1) contractor was not at liberty to proceed to circuit court without exhausting its administrative remedy, and (2) contractual dispute resolution clause provided adequate due process protections. Certiorari granted. West Headnotes (6) 111 Public Contracts Review The hearing procedures for public contract dispute resolution must be conducted in such a way as to require each party to present openly its side of the controversy and afford an opportunity of rebuttal. Cases that cite this headnote Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk to be on the record made before the contracting officer. Cases that cite this headnote 131 Public Contracts Conclusiveness of Decision Once the contracting officer makes his or her decision regarding public contract dispute, the decision is final and conclusive unless determined by a court of competent jurisdiction to be fraudulent, capricious, arbitrary, so grossly erroneous as to necessarily imply bad faith, or not supported by substantial evidence. Cases that cite this headnote 141 Counties Rights and remedies of contractor and sureties Public Contracts Conditions precedent Dispute resolution provision of contract between contractor and county was administrative remedy, rather than arbitration clause, and thus, contractor was not at liberty to proceed to circuit court without exhausting its administrative remedy; contract did not provide for conclusiveness of decision which was associated with arbitration, but instead embodied more traditional idea of decision rendered by administrative officer, which was reviewable for arbitrariness, capriciousness, or absence of competent substantial evidence to support factual findings. 2 Cases that cite this headnote 1�1 Public Contracts 151 Administrative Law and Procedure Review Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Review of hearing on public contract dispute is WESTLAW O 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 Metropolitan Dade County v. Recchi America, Inc., 734 So.2d 1123 (1999) _ on 06-27-2019 _ City Cleric 24 Fla. L. Weekly D1143 Permitting parties to litigate in court where there without first complying with the contract's dispute is a legal or contractual obligation to proceed resolution clause. We conclude that compliance with the only administratively constitutes a departure dispute resolution clause was compulsory and that the from the essential requirements of law. action should have been dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. We therefore grant the petition for writ of certiorari. 5 Cases that cite this headnote [61 Constitutional Law Public contracts Counties Rights and remedies of contractor and sureties Public Contracts Alternative dispute resolution; arbitration of disputes Contractual dispute resolution clause in contract between contractor and county provided adequate due process protections; such provisions required hearing procedures to be on record and with opportunity for rebuttal, and such procedures were sufficient to provide due process. Cases that cite this headnote Attorneys and Law Firms *1124 Robert A. Ginsburg, Miami Dade County Attorney, and Steven B. Bass, Assistant County Attorney, for petitioner. Cummings, Thomas & Snyder, P.A., and F. Alan Cummings and Anna D. Torres, Tallahassee, for respondent. Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and COPE and GODERICH, H. Opinion COPE, J. The question before us is whether a complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies where a contractor has brought suit in circuit court I. Respondent Recchi America, Inc. entered into a publicly -bid contract with Metropolitan Dade County for construction of a portion of the Metromover Extension Project, a public transportation system. The contractor submitted claims for additional amounts it contended were due under the contract. Prior to resolution of those claims, the contractor filed a breach of contract action in circuit court. The County moved to dismiss, arguing that the contractor had not complied with the dispute resolution clause of the contract, which states: 42. DISPUTES Except as otherwise provided in the Contract, any dispute arising under this Contract which is not disposed of by agreement shall be decided by [Metropolitan Dade County], who shall reduce his [sic] decision to writing and furnish a copy thereof to the Contractor. The decision of the Board of County Commissioners of Dade County, Florida, and those persons to whom it delegates authority to decide disputes, shall be final and conclusive unless determined by a court of competent jurisdiction to be fraudulent, capricious, arbitrary, so grossly erroneous as to necessarily imply bad faith, or not supported by substantial evidence. The County has delegated to its Contracting Officer the authority to resolve disputes under this provision of the contract. The County argued that the just -quoted paragraph 42 was either an administrative remedy which the contractor had not exhausted, or constituted an arbitration clause which should be enforced. The court denied the motion, and the County has petitioned for a writ of certiorari. WESTLAW O 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2 Metropolitan Dade County v. Recchi America, Inc., 734 So.2d 1123 (1999) 24 Fla. L. Weekly D1143 II. Ill 121 131 Public contract dispute resolution provisions comparable to this one have generally been upheld. See, e.g., United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709, 83 S.Ct. 1409, 10 L.Ed.2d 652 (1963); State Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. E.D.S. Federal Corp., 631 So.2d 353 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. New York City Transit Authority, 82 N.Y.2d 47, 603 N.Y.S.2d 404, 623 N.E.2d 531 (1993). The hearing procedures must be " `conducted in such a way as to require each party to present openly its side of the controversy and afford an opportunity of rebuttal.' " United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. at 717, 83 S.Ct. 1409 (citation omitted). Review is to be on the record made before the Contracting Officer. Once the Contracting Officer makes his or her decision, the decision is, as stated in the contract, "final and conclusive unless determined by a court of competent jurisdiction to be fraudulent, capricious, arbitrary, so grossly erroneous as to necessarily imply bad faith, or not supported by substantial evidence." lal The parties have debated whether the dispute resolution provision of the contract *1125 is properly viewed as an administrative remedy or as an arbitration clause. We believe it is the former, not the latter. The contract in this case does not provide for the conclusiveness of decision which is associated with arbitration, but instead embodies the more traditional idea of a decision rendered by an administrative officer, which is reviewable for arbitrariness, capriciousness, or absence of competent substantial evidence to support factual findings. The long and short of it is that Recchi signed the construction contract knowing it contained this dispute resolution procedure. It must comply with the terms thereof. Recchi was not at liberty to proceed to circuit court without exhausting its administrative remedy. Recchi argues that the administrative remedy should not be enforced, but its cases are distinguishable. Two courts have invalidated arbitration clauses contained in collective bargaining agreements which provided for the union executive board to arbitrate a dispute between a union member and a nonunion member. Graham v. Scissor—Tail, Inc., 28 Cal.3d 807, 171 Cal.Rptr. 604, 623 P.2d 165, 168 (1981); Chimes v. Oritani Motor Hotel, Inc., 195 N.J.Super. 435, 480 A.2d 218, 220 (1984). Given the inability of a litigant to obtain review of the merits of an arbitrator's decision under applicable arbitration codes, the courts in Graham and Chimes concluded that the arbitration clauses at issue would not be enforced. See Graham, 171 Cal.Rptr. 604, 623 P.2d at 174-176; Chimes 480 A.2d at 223. Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk An appellate court in New Jersey applied the foregoing logic to a public construction contract in which disputes were to be resolved by the Chief Engineer, and were not subject to further review. See Gothic Construction Group Inc. v. Port Authority Trans Hudson Corp., 312 N.J.Super. 1, 711 A.2d 312 (1998). The court read the contract as providing for the Chief Engineer to serve as the sole arbitrator of disputes. The court did not specifically rule on the validity of the clause, but required further proceedings on the question whether the Chief Engineer would be too biased to serve as sole arbitrator given his personal role in the termination of the contractor's services. See id. at 318.' None of those cases is pertinent to the contract now before us. The dispute resolution clause in the Dade County contract is an administrative remedy, not an arbitration clause, and the merits of the decision of the contracting officer are reviewable on the substantive grounds stated in the contract. 151 We reject Recchi's argument that exhaustion of the contractually provided dispute resolution remedy is not required. "Permitting parties to litigate in court where there is a legal or contractual obligation to proceed only administratively, constitutes a departure from the essential requirements of law." University of Miami v. Klein, 603 So.2d 651, 652 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (citation omitted); accord State Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. E.D.S. Federal Corp., 631 So.2d at 354 n. 1. [61 Further, Recchi is incorrect that the contractual dispute resolution clause does not provide adequate due process protections. As stated above, case law makes clear that such provisions require hearing procedures to be on the record and with an opportunity for rebuttal. See *1126 United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. at 717, 83 S.Ct. 1409 (citation omitted). Such procedures are sufficient to provide Recchi due process. Recchi's remaining challenges to the adequacy of the administrative remedy are rejected on authority of State Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. E.D.S. Federal Corporation, 631 So.2d at 357. We grant the petition for certiorari, quash the order under review, and direct that the complaint be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Certiorari granted. All Citations 734 So.2d 1123, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D 1143 WESTLAW © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 Metropolitan Dade County v. Recchi America, Inc., 734 So.2d 1123 (1999) on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk 24 Fla. L. Weekly D1143 Footnotes The New York courts have arrived at a differing interpretation of a similar contract clause. In New York, if the contract does not specify the standard of judicial review of the Chief Engineer's decision, then the Engineer's decision is reviewable for "'fraud, bad faith or palpable mistake.' " Yonkers Contracting Co. v. Port Authority Trans—Hudson Corp., 208 A.D.2d 63, 621 N.Y.S.2d 642, 645 (N.Y.App.Div. 1995) (citation omitted), aff'd, 640 N.Y.S.2d 866 (N.Y. 1996). End of Document © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. WESTLAW @2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4 011os v. Dade County, 242 So.2d 468 (1970) 242 So.2d 468 District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District. Gustav OLLOS, et al., Appellants, V. DADE COUNTY, et al., Appellees. No. 70-867. 1 Dec. 29,1970• Synopsis Zoning case. The Circuit Court, Dade County, Raymond G. Nathan, J., dismissed cause with prejudice and plaintiffs appealed. The District Court of Appeal held that failure of plaintiffs to exhaust available administrative remedies precluded court review of ruling of zoning appeals board's granting landowner's application for special exception to increase permissible height of intended apartment house building. Affirmed. Pearson, Chief Judge, concurred in decision to affirm. West Headnotes (1) [11 Zoning and Planning a,—Exhaustion of administrative remedies; primary jurisdiction Failure of plaintiffs to exhaust available administrative remedies precluded court review of ruling of zoning appeals board's granting landowner's application for special exception to increase permissible height of intended apartment house building. 1 Cases that cite this headnote Attorneys and Law Firms *468 Daniel A. Kavanaugh, Miami, for appellants. Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 on 06-27-2019. City Clerk Thomas C. Britton, County Atty. and St. Julien P. Rosemond, Asst. County Atty.; Horton & Schwartz, Miami, for appellees. Before PEARSON, C. J., and CHARLES CARROLL and HENDRY, JJ. Opinion PER CURIAM. The appellants filed a complaint in the circuit court for review of a ruling of the Zoning Appeals Board of Dade County. The property involved is located on Key Biscayne, in a district zoned for apartment, houses and hotels (RU -4). The owner thereof filed an application under s 33-309 of the Code of Metropolitan Dade County, for a special exception to increase the permissible height of an intended apartment house building to 270 feet. Section 33-58 of the Code provides that the height of buildings in RU -4 districts shall not be greater than the width of the widest abutting street `except after application is made and permit issued as a result of a *469 public hearing.' The width of the widest street abutting this property was 100 feet. Based on the owner's application, the Zoning Appeals Board published notice of hearing thereon and mailed notice to owners of properties lying within 500 feet of the subject property. The authority for the Zoning Appeals Board to grant a special exception such as that which was applied for here is provided for in s 33-311(d) of the Code, with the guiding considerations therefor set out. The Code provides that an aggrieved party may appeal a ruling of the Zoning Appeals Board to the Board of County Commissioners and prescribes the period for appeal (14 days) and the procedure therefor. s 33-313. Likewise, by s 33-312 of the Code express provision is made for such authorized appeals to be taken to the Board of County Commissioners within fourteen days from rulings of the Zoning Appeals Board, and it is therein provided that if such an appeal is not taken the ruling of the Zoning Appeals Board shall become final. By a further section of the Code (s 33-316) it is provided that no person aggrieved by a ruling of the Zoning Appeals Board may apply to the court for relief unless he has first exhausted the appeal remedy prescribed to the Board of County Commissioners, stating further: `It is the intention of the board of county commissioners that all steps as WESTLAW © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1 011os v. Dade County, 242 So.2d 468 (1970) provided by this article shall be taken before any application is made to the court for relief; and no application shall be made to the court for relief except from resolution adopted by the board of county commissioners, pursuant to this article.' In that section of the Code it is further provided that where review is sought (after exhausting administrative remedies) it should be by petition for certiorari to the circuit court. The latter provision conforms to the requirement of the Florida Appellate Rules, 32 F.S.A. (4.1) that `All appellate review of the rulings of any commission or board shall be by certiorari as provided by the Florida Appellate Rules.' Under those rules a petition for certiorari to review a ruling of a commission or board must be filed within 30 days. In the instant case, following public hearing the Zoning Appeals Board made a ruling granting the landowner's application for height increase. No appeal therefrom was taken to the Board of County Commissioners by the plaintiffs or any other person. Eight months after the ruling of the Zoning Appeals Board the plaintiffs filed this suit seeking review thereof. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. The motion was granted, the cause dismissed with prejudice and judgment was entered for the defendants. The plaintiffs filed this appeal from the judgment of the circuit court. End of Document Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk We affirm the judgment, on the ground asserted by the defendant Dade County that the failure to exhaust administrative remedies precluded the attempted court review of the ruling of the Zoning Appeals Board. The Code of Metropolitan Dade County so provides, and the decisions have recognized the necessity to exhaust administrative remedies as a prerequisite to court review of the rulings of such boards. See Ace Delivery Service, Inc. v. Boyd, F1a.1958, 100 So.2d 417, 419; Hasam Realty Corp. v. Dade County, Fla.App.1965, 178 So.2d 747; Dade County v. Metro Improvement Corp., Fla.App.1966, 190 So.2d 202; Land Corp. of Florida v. Metropolitan Dade County, Fla.App.1967, 204 So.2d 222; City of Coral Gables v. Sakolsky, Fla.App.1968, 215 So.2d 329, 334-335; Baker v. Metropolitan Dade County, F1a.App.1970, 237 So.2d 201. Affirmed. PEARSON, C. J., concurs in the decision to affirm. All Citations 242 So.2d 468 © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. WESTLAW @2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 Gardens Country Club, Inc. v. Palm Beach County, 712 So.2d 398 (1998) on 06-27-2019 .City Clerk 23 Fla. L. Weekly D682 712 So.2d 398 District Court of Appeal of Florida, West Headnotes (12) Fourth District. GARDENS COUNTRY CLUB, INC., a Florida 111 Eminent Domain Corporation, Appellant, Conditions precedent to action; ripeness V. PALM BEACH COUNTY, a political subdivision of Ripeness doctrine requires, as essential the State of Florida, Appellee. prerequisite to regulatory takings claim, a final and authoritative determination of the type and Nos. 96-1165, 96-4189• intensity of development legally permitted on the subject property. March 11,1998• 1 Rehearing Denied April 16, 1998. Cases that cite this headnote Synopsis Country club brought action against county to require it to [21 Eminent Domain grant club's application for rezoning and special w -Conditions precedent to action; ripeness exception in compliance with existing comprehensive plan, after county refused to consider application that did There is futility exception to the ripeness not comply with proposed plan with different density doctrine in regulatory takings claims that can requirements. The Circuit Court, Palm Beach County, render a case ripe for review despite failure to Stephen A. Rapp, J., ruled for county, and on appeal the obtain final and authoritative determination of District Court of Appeal, 590 So.2d 488, reversed and type and intensity of development legally remanded, determining county's failure to consider permitted on subject property. country club's application was improper. On remand, the Circuit Court, Palm Beach County, Thomas E. Sholts, J., ruled in favor of county, determining that there was no 2 Cases that cite this headnote total temporary taking of property in question and that right to develop property was not constitutionally protected and denial was not arbitrary or capricious. County club appealed. The District Court of Appeal, Warner, J., held that: (1) case was ripe under futility 131 Eminent Domain exception to ripeness doctrine; (2) partial temporary Zoning, Planning, or Land Use; Building taking from regulation requires compensation if it Codes amounts to a deprivation of substantially all economically Eminent Domain beneficial use of the property; (3) regulation did not Temporary Use deprive country club of substantially all economically beneficial use of property where remaining value was Taking occurs where regulation denies $3,000 per acre; (4) refusal to consider application under substantially all economically beneficial or then -existing plan precluded substantial use of land and productive use of land, and temporary constituted property right subject to due process deprivation may constitute a taking. protections for § 1983 purposes; but (5) under as -applied challenge, county's refusal attempting to effectuate amendment and not to allow inconsistent development Cases that cite this headnote satisfied rational basis test. Affirmed. 141 Eminent Domain i - What Constitutes a Taking; Police and Other WESTLAW © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1 Gardens Country Club, Inc. v. Palm Beach County, 712 So.2d 398 (1998) 23 Fla. L. Weekly D682 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 on 06-27-2019 ._City Clerk Powers Distinguished To prove compensable section 1983 claim related to property, property owner must first Partial temporary taking based on regulation show deprivation of a constitutionally protected occurs, and requires compensation, if it amounts interest, and secondly, court must determine that to a deprivation of substantially all economically deprivation was result of abuse of governmental beneficial use of the property. power such that government acted arbitrarily and unreasonably in depriving property owner of its constitutionally protected interest. 42 Cases that cite this headnote U.S.C.A. § 1983. Cases that cite this headnote 151 Eminent Domain ,;—What Constitutes a Taking; Police and Other Powers Distinguished 181 Civil Rights Factual inquiry as to whether regulation --Zoning, building, and planning; land use amounted to a taking includes analysis of (1) economic impact of regulation on claimant and Arbitrary and capricious due process claim (2) extent to which regulation has interfered under section 1983 related to property may be with reasonable investment -backed based upon the effect legislative determinations expectations. such as zoning have upon the property. 42 U.S.C.A. 5 1983. Cases that cite this headnote 1 Cases that cite this headnote 161 Eminent Domain ,:-Particular cases 191 Civil Rights Zoning, building, and planning; land use Determination that county ordinance and county's refusal to certify development Property owner had vested right, sufficient to application inconsistent with proposed revised bring section 1983 claim, to have county comprehensive plan that changed density consider proposed development under requirements was not inverse condemnation, as then -existing comprehensive plan, and where regulation did not deprive owner of substantially county refused to consider any development all economically beneficial use of property, was submitted pursuant to that plan and instead supported by finding that value of land before would consider only plans submitted in county refusal for rezoning under former conformance with proposed comprehensive plan comprehensive plan was $8,000 per acre and that reduced density from one unit per five acres after refusal was $3,000 per acre, as remaining to one unit per twenty acres, county precluded a value was more than negligible amount and substantial use of its land. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. constituted significant benefit. Cases that cite this headnote 1 Cases that cite this headnote 1101 Civil Rights 171 Civil Rights Due process of law and equal protection Property rights Civil Rights i—Property and housing WESTLAW @2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2 Gardens Country Club, Inc. v. Palm Beach County, 712 So.2d 398 (1998) 23 Fla. L. Weekly D682 Civil Rights Availability in general Arbitrary and capricious due process claim under section 1983 can be either a facial or an as -applied challenge; on as -applied challenge, remedy is an injunction preventing unconstitutional application of regulation to plaintiffs property and/or damages resulting from the unconstitutional application. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Cases that cite this headnote 1"1 Constitutional Law Reasonableness, rationality, and relationship to object Substantive due process challenges are analyzed under the rational basis test; that is, legislative governmental act will not be considered arbitrary and capricious if it has a rational relationship with a legitimate general welfare concern. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14. 7 Cases that cite this headnote 1'�1 Constitutional Law Particular issues and applications Zoning and Planning Change of regulations as affecting right Attorneys and Law Firms Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk *399 Steven L. Robbins of DeSantis, Gaskill, Smith & Shenkman, P.A., North Palm Beach, and Edna L. Carusa of Carusa, Burlington, Bohn & Compiani, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellant. Robert P. Banks, Assistant County Attorney, West Palm Beach, for appellee. Opinion WARNER, Judge. In ruling in favor of the County on Gardens Country Club's ("Gardens") complaint for inverse condemnation and violation of its substantive due process rights, the trial court determined that while the claims were ripe for review, there had been no total temporary taking of the property in question. The trial court also found that Gardens' vested right to develop the property in connection with the then -existing comprehensive plan did not rise to the level of a constitutionally protected property interest and, in the alternative, *400 that the County's action in denying development had not been arbitrary or capricious. We affirm on both issues. This is the second appearance of this case in this court. Gardens Country Club, Inc. v. Palm Beach County, 590 So.2d 488 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) ("Gardens I "), provides the essential facts of the dealings between the parties leading up to the present suit: County's failure to consider proposed On December 14, 1988, the club contracted to purchase development under then -existing comprehensive 734 acres of land in Palm Beach Gardens which, under plan, and instead considering it only under the then -existing 1980 County Comprehensive Land pending plan that changed density requirement, Use Plan, authorized the property to be designated while a deprivation of property owner's right either Agricultural (AR) or Residential Estate (RE). subject to due process protection under section The AR classification permitted one dwelling unit per 1983, was justified under rational basis test; five acres and the RE category allowed one dwelling county was undertaking general revision of unit per two and one-half or one unit per two acres in a comprehensive plan prior to receiving planned unit development (PUD). At the time the application and did not wish to permit purchase agreement was executed, the county had development inconsistent with plan under under consideration a revision of the 1980 consideration. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14; Comprehensive Plan that would permit a density on the 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. subject property of only one unit per twenty acres. The purchase contract allowed the club to avoid the transaction if the club was unable to obtain approval of Cases that cite this headnote satisfactory land use restrictions on the property. WESTLAW © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3 Gardens Country Club, Inc. v. Palm Beach County, 712 So.2d 398 (1998) 23 Fla. L. Weekly D682 The club entered into negotiations with the county in an attempt to avoid application of the more severe density restrictions to the development but was unsuccessful in the endeavor. Thus, on February 27, 1989, the club filed a formal application for use of the land as a PUD with a density of one unit per two acres as required by the 1980 Comprehensive Plan. The application was reviewed for certification to the county commission, but was found insufficient because (1) the density and acreage data were omitted, (2) the operation agreement for the on-site sewer plant was not acceptable, and (3) a road access had to be changed. Those deficiencies were corrected and the application was scheduled to come before the planning commission at its April 17, 1989, meeting. However, the application was not certified at that meeting because, in the interim, the county commission, on March 29, 1989, had directed its staff not to certify any applications that were not consistent with the density requirements of the incipient 1989 Comprehensive Land Use Plan. That directive became the subject of ordinance 89-10 on July 5, 1989. On May 8, 1989, the club filed a complaint against the county to require it to grant the club's application for use of the property in accordance with the 1980 Comprehensive Plan, to hold the county estopped from enforcing county ordinance 89-10 enacted subsequent to the club's application, and for damages for "taking" the club's property. The record further contains a trial memorandum filed by the county with the trial court which states that "[o]n April 17, 1989, the defendant's [the club] application for rezoning and special exception was in compliance with existing regulations." (Emphasis added). Id. at 489-90. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the County, but this court reversed, holding that ordinance 89-10 conflicted with section 163.3197, Florida Statutes (1989), which provides that an existing comprehensive plan shall continue to have the same force and effect that it had on the date of its adoption until the local government adopts a new revised comprehensive plan, pursuant to the Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act. See id. at 491. Thus, the ordinance was invalid to the extent that it conflicted with the state statute. We remanded for the trial court to reconsider Gardens's application in light of the 1980 Comprehensive Plan. See id. While the appeal in Gardens I was pending, Gardens Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk sought annexation of its property into the City of Palm Beach Gardens, which annexation occurred on March 21, 1991. The City ultimately approved Gardens's development plan, which included a density of one unit per two acres, the density Gardens had previously requested from the county. Gardens then filed a supplemental complaint after remand from this court, seeking damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983 for violation of Gardens's due process rights *401 and for inverse condemnation for a temporary taking of its property. The court granted the County's motion for summary judgment on the section 1983 claim. As to the takings claim (count H), the trial court held a non jury trial. See Department of Agric. and Consumer Servs. v. Mid–Florida Growers, Inc., 521 So.2d 101 (Fla.1988) (in inverse condemnation suit, trial court decides whether taking has occurred and jury decides what is just compensation). The trial court concluded that Gardens's takings claim was ripe for adjudication, but it found that no taking had occurred because the County's actions, "although unlawful" pursuant to Gardens I, did not deprive Gardens of substantially all economically beneficial use of its property. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court compared the property's before and after fair market values—before the county refused to rezone the property, it had a value of $8,000/acre, and afterwards, a value of $3,000/acre. Since the property was still worth $2.2 million, the court concluded that Gardens had not been deprived of substantially all economically beneficial use of its property. The trial court also found that while Gardens had proved some investment -backed expectations, the reasonableness of these expectations was questionable. Gardens appeals from this final judgment. Ill III The County claims that the case was not ripe for consideration of a takings claim because Gardens did not submit a plan for development under the proposed 1989 Comprehensive Plan. The ripeness doctrine requires, as an essential prerequisite to a regulatory takings claim, a final and authoritative determination of the type and intensity of development legally permitted on the subject property. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 348, 106 S.Ct. 2561, 2566, 91 L.Ed.2d 285 (1986); Williamson County Reg? Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 3116, 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985). However, there is a futility exception to the ripeness doctrine. See Tinnerman v. Palm Beach County, 641 So.2d 523 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Glisson v. Alachua County, 558 So.2d 1030 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). In the instant case, the trial court found that the only application which the County would have considered was an application consistent with the WESTLAW © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 Gardens Country Club, Inc. v. Palm Beach County, 712 So.2d 398 (1998) — on 06-27-2019 _-Gity_Uerk 23 Fla. L. Weekly D682 proposed 1989 comprehensive plan which allowed for densities of one unit per twenty acres, instead of the one per five density permitted in the 1980 Comprehensive Plan. Thus, the County's continued refusal to certify an application under the 1980 Comprehensive Plan, together with ordinance 89-10's requirement that all developments comply with the proposed revised comprehensive plan to be certified for approval, shows the futility of applying for any other development plans consistent with the 1980 Comprehensive Plan. Based on the futility exception, we find that the case is ripe for review. We must first address whether the County's action in enacting ordinance 89-10 and refusing to certify applications inconsistent with the proposed revised comprehensive plan amounted to a due process deprivation or to a "taking." In Tampa Hillsborough County Expressway Authority v. A.G.W.S. Corp., 640 So.2d 54 (F1a.1994), the supreme court explained the difference, quoting from Judge Griffin's concurring opinion in Department of Transportation v. Weisenfeld, 617 So.2d 1071, 1080 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993), approved, 640 So.2d 73 (Fla. 1994), as follows: The fifth amendment contains two discrete protections: "No person shall ... be deprived of ... property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. Const. amend. V. The first of these is commonly called the "police power;" the second is the power of eminent domain. Patrick Wiseman, When the End Justifies the Means: Understanding Takings Jurisprudence In a Legal System With Integrity, 63 St. John's L.Rev. 433, 437 (1988). Tampa—Hillsborough, 640 So.2d at 57. The supreme court further explained: Thus, it is evident that while both constitutional theories involve "takings" and "police power," the analysis under due process is different from the analysis under just compensation. Regulations found by the courts to be invalid because they deprive landowners of substantially all use of their property without compensation are not ordinarily *402 struck down as unconstitutional. The government is forced to choose between paying just compensation to keep the regulation in effect or removing the regulation. In situations where state action is declared an improper exercise of police power under due process, the regulation is simply declared unconstitutional. Therefore, a land use regulation can be held facially unconstitutional without a finding that there was an uncompensated taking. The fact that we chose to strike down the statute in Joint Ventures ft. Department of Transportation, 563 So.2d 622 (F1a.1990) ] clearly demonstrates that our decision was grounded upon due process considerations. Had we intended our decision to mean that the filing of the map of reservation constituted a per se taking, we would have left the statute intact. Id. In Gardens I, we invalidated ordinance 89-10 and remanded for the trial court to reconsider the application under the 1980 Comprehensive Plan. Thus, we considered the issue as a due process deprivation, rather than a just compensation taking. Otherwise, similar to Joint Ventures, we would have upheld the ordinance and considered it a per se taking of Gardens's property. [31 N Nevertheless, Tampa Hillsborough points out that "[a] taking occurs where regulation denies substantially all economically beneficial or productive use of land. Moreover, a temporary deprivation may constitute a taking." 640 So.2d at 58 (citing First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 96 L.Ed.2d 250 (1987)). In First English, the county passed a moratorium prohibiting all building in a flood prone area. The Supreme Court held that even though the ordinance may subsequently be declared invalid or be withdrawn by the county, where a landowner is denied all use of his property under the ordinance, a temporary taking occurs which demands a remedy under the just compensation clause. See 482 U.S. at 318, 107 S.Ct. at 2388. Although Tampa Hillsborough relies on First English, it actually expands its holding to cases involving the deprivation of "substantially all economically beneficial or productive use of land," instead of simply all use of property as set forth in First English. See Tampa—Hillsborough, 640 So.2d at 58. We conclude, therefore, that a partial temporary taking requires compensation under Tampa Hillsborough if it VWESTLAW © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works, Gardens Country Club, Inc. v. Palm Beach County, 712 So.2d 398 (1998) 23 Fla. L. Weekly D682 amounts to a deprivation of substantially all economically beneficial use of the property. 151 161 It is implicit that the trial court found that the temporary deprivation claim in this case involved less than all economically beneficial or productive use of land. The court then made factual inquiry as to whether the regulation amounted to a taking. Such an inquiry includes the analysis of (1) the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and (2) the extent to which the regulation has interfered with reasonable investment -backed expectations. See Reahard v. Lee County, 30 F.3d 1412 (11th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1064, 115 S.Ct. 1693, 131 L.Ed.2d 557 (1995). The trial court made an evaluation of whether Gardens was deprived of substantially all economically beneficial use of the property based upon the evidence presented at trial. The trial court found that the value of the land before the County refused the application for rezoning under the 1980 Comprehensive Plan was $8,000 per acre and after the County refused to consider the rezoning application was $3,000 per acre. As the remaining value was more than a negligible amount and constituted a significant benefit, the trial court determined that it did not constitute a taking of substantially all economic benefit. The court also reviewed the evidence as to what the investment -backed expectations of the owners were and concluded that these expectations were not reasonable. See Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So.2d 1374, 1380 (Fla.1981); see also Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Comm'n v. Flotilla, Inc., 636 So.2d 761 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). As there is competent substantial evidence to support the court's findings, we affirm as to the inverse condemnation claim. Gardens also sought relief in its supplemental complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983, alleging: it had a liberty or property interest in having its application *403 certified and heard; the County had directed its staff not to consider any applications for rezoning not in conformance with the 1989 Comprehensive Plan; the County's actions were arbitrary and capricious; and it had suffered resulting damages in its expenditure of fees and costs in establishing the right to have its rezoning application heard. Gardens also sought costs associated with maintaining its interest in the subject property. 171 181 A property owner must meet two prongs in order to prove a compensable claim under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. First, there must be a deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest. Second, the court must determine that the deprivation was the result of an abuse of governmental power such that the government acted arbitrarily and unreasonably in depriving the property Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk owner of its constitutionally protected interest. See Executive 100, Inc. v. Martin County, 922 F.2d 1536, 1541 (11th Cir. 1991). The Executive court noted that, as to the first prong, the plaintiffs alleged that the value of their property had diminished significantly as a result of the County Commission's action in refusing to rezone their property. The court said that, "[i]f the plaintiffs prove that this diminution was more than a simple fluctuation in value incident to governmental decisionmaking, which is a noncompensable hazard of ownership, then they will have shown a deprivation of a property right." Id. (citations omitted). Thus, an arbitrary and capricious due process claim may be based upon the effect on the value of property of legislative determinations such as zoning. The County argues that under McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir.1994), cert. denied by McKinney v. Osceola County Bd. of County Commis, 513 U.S. 1110, 115 S.Ct. 898, 130 L.Ed.2d 783 (1995), Gardens does not have a constitutionally protected interest because its interest is one created by state law, namely a right to a zoning classification. Although the McKinney court determined that substantive due process protection did not include rights created by state law only, it specifically limited its holding to "executive acts" and found that its analysis regarding the substantive/procedural distinction would be "inappropriate" for "Legislative" acts. Id. at 1557 n. 9. This is clarified in Villas of Lake Jackson, Ltd. v. Leon County, 121 F.3d 610 (11th Cir. 1997), in which the court considered the county's down -zoning of the landowner's property, which it assumed for purposes of the opinion was a legislative act. In considering the landowner's arbitrary and capricious due process claim, the court stated, "[a] landowner's vested rights created by state law may indeed constitute property subject to the arbitrary and capricious substantive due process protections under the federal Constitution." Id. at 614 (citations omitted). Thus, we reject the County's reliance on McKinney. 191 In granting summary judgment, the trial court determined that Gardens did not have a constitutionally protected interest. We disagree with this finding. Gardens claimed that it had been denied a lawful use of its property by the legislative act of the county in passing ordinance 89-10 and refusing to certify its application for development, a fact pattern analogous to the one in Villas of Lake Jackson. The trial court reasoned that Gardens I did not require the County to approve the development submitted by Gardens, but merely to consider the plan under the 1980 Comprehensive Plan instead of the 1989 Comprehensive Plan. In reviewing the development plan, the County had the discretion to deny the application on WESTLAW © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 6 Gardens Country Club, Inc. v. Palm Beach County, 712 So.2d 398 (1998) 23 Fla. L. Weekly D682 other grounds even under the 1980 Comprehensive Plan, and it did not have to approve the maximum density allowed under the plan. See Board of County Commis of Brevard County v. Snyder, 627 So.2d 469, 475 (Fla. 1993). While we agree that the County may have had some discretion to deny a request for rezoning under the 1980 Comprehensive Plan, the County refused to even consider any development submitted pursuant to that plan and instead would consider only plans submitted in conformance with the 1989 Comprehensive Plan which reduced density from one unit per five acres to one unit per twenty acres. Gardens challenged the County's actions in refusing to consider any rezoning application under the 1980 Comprehensive Plan. The injuries it alleges as a result of the County's action are only those which resulted from the *404 County's refusal to consider its application through its directions to staff and from the enactment of ordinance 89-10. These consist of the cost to overturn the decision in state court and the carrying costs of the property during that period. Because Gardens had made a valid application for rezoning under the 1980 Comprehensive Plan, which the County stipulated was fully in compliance with existing regulation, it had a vested right to have the County consider its development under the 1980 Comprehensive Plan. By denying Gardens this right, the county precluded a substantial use of its land, because the zoning on its property was reduced to no more than one unit per twenty acres of land. We consider this a property right subject to due process protections. See Villas of Lake Jackson. ["I As to the second prong which a property owner must meet to prove a compensable claim under section 1983, in Eide v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716 (11th Cir. 1990), the court explained that an arbitrary and capricious due process claim could be either a facial or an as -applied challenge. "In the case of an as applied challenge, the remedy is an injunction preventing the unconstitutional application of the regulation to plaintiff's property and/or damages resulting from the unconstitutional application." Id. at 722. Garden's initial complaint in this cause sought to prevent the application of ordinance 89-10 to its property and to prevent the County's direction to its staff not to certify any rezoning requests which were not in conformance with the 1989 Comprehensive Plan. Thus, it was an as -applied challenge to the ordinance. Its supplemental complaint under section 1983 simply requests the consequential damages which it incurred as a result of the unconstitutional application of the ordinance and directives to its property. I'll ["I The trial court determined that the action of the board was not arbitrary or capricious so as to amount to an invalid exercise of its police power. At worst, the trial Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk court said, the board acted pursuant to a misjudgment of law that the concept of zoning in progress applied to rezonings pending the adoption of a new comprehensive plan. See Condor Corp. v. City of St. Paul, 912 F.2d 215 (8th Cir. 1990). Substantive due process challenges are analyzed under the rational basis test; that is, a legislative act of the government will not be considered arbitrary and capricious if it has "a rational relationship with a legitimate general welfare concern." Restigouche, Inc. v. Town of Jupiter, 59 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 1995) (quoting Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 997 F.2d 1369, 1388 (11th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1018, 114 S.Ct. 1400, 128 L.Ed.2d 73 (1994)). In the instant case, the County was undertaking a general revision of its Comprehensive Plan prior to receiving the PUD application on this property. Not wishing to permit development inconsistent with the plan it was considering, it elected to refuse new applications, such as Gardens's. Its direction to its staff and the adoption of Ordinance 89-10 were done in furtherance of its goal of effectuating the planned amendment without allowing development inconsistent with it. Had the County been considering a zoning amendment rather than a planning decision, the rationale of "zoning in progress" may have been appropriate. See Gardens I, 590 So.2d at 491. Because there was "a plausible, arguably legitimate purpose" for the actions of the county in passing Ordinance 89-10, the rational basis test is met, and summary judgment is appropriate. See Restigouche, 59 F.3d at 1214. We distinguish City of Margate v. Amoco Oil Co., 546 So.2d 1091, 1094 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989), in which we held that a governmental agency acts arbitrarily when it avoids its duty by unreasonably delaying a matter so as to effectuate a change in the law adverse to the applicant. In that case, the landowner had applied for a building permit to construct and operate a service station upon a parcel which permitted that use. The city rejected the application without justification, other than the city determined that it did not want a service station at that location. After the city denied the application, and while the land owner was trying to resolve the problem, the city undertook to rezone the property so that a service station could not be permitted. This fact scenario differs substantially from the facts of the instant case. At the time Gardens applied for development *405 approval, the County was extensively involved in amending its Comprehensive Plan, including the downzoning of Gardens's property, a fact which the owners of Gardens knew before they even entered into the contract to purchase the property. Moreover, Margate was not decided under section 1983 and substantive due process analysis. WESTLAW © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 7 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 Gardens Country Club, Inc. v. Palm Beach County, 712 So.2d 398 (1998) on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk 23 Fla. L. Weekly D682 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the summary SHAHOOD and GROSS, JJ., concur. judgment on Gardens's substantive due process claim. We also affirm the trial court's ruling granting summary All Citations judgment on the procedural due process claim. See Bello v. Walker, 840 F.2d 1124, 1128 (3d Cir. 1988). 712 So.2d 398, 23 Fla. L. Weekly D682 Affirmed. End of Docwnent © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. WESTLAW © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original US. Government Works. 8 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 70.001. Private property rights protection, FL ST § 70.001 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk KeyCite Yellow Flag - Negative Treatment Proposed Legislation West's Florida Statutes Annotated Title VI. Civil Practice and Procedure (Chapters 45-89) (Refs & Annos) Chapter 7o. Relief from Burdens on Real Property Rights (Refs & Annos) West's F.S.A. § 70.001 70.001. Private property rights protection Effective: October 1, 2015 Currentness (1) This act may be cited as the "Bert J. Harris, Jr., Private Property Rights Protection Act." The Legislature recognizes that some laws, regulations, and ordinances of the state and political entities in the state, as applied, may inordinately burden, restrict, or limit private property rights without amounting to a taking under the State Constitution or the United States Constitution. The Legislature determines that there is an important state interest in protecting the interests of private property owners from such inordinate burdens. Therefore, it is the intent of the Legislature that, as a separate and distinct cause of action from the law of takings, the Legislature herein provides for relief, or payment of compensation, when a new law, rule, regulation, or ordinance of the state or a political entity in the state, as applied, unfairly affects real property. (2) When a specific action of a governmental entity has inordinately burdened an existing use of real property or a vested right to a specific use of real property, the property owner of that real property is entitled to relief, which may include compensation for the actual loss to the fair market value of the real property caused by the action of government, as provided in this section. (3) For purposes of this section: (a) The existence of a "vested right" is to be determined by applying the principles of equitable estoppel or substantive due process under the common law or by applying the statutory law of this state. (b) The term "existing use" means: 1. An actual, present use or activity on the real property, including periods of inactivity which are normally associated with, or are incidental to, the nature or type of use; or WESTLAW © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 70.001. Private property rights protection, FL ST § 70.001 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk 2. Activity or such reasonably foreseeable, nonspeculative land uses which are suitable for the subject real property and compatible with adjacent land uses and which have created an existing fair market value in the property greater than the fair market value of the actual, present use or activity on the real property. (c) The term "governmental entity" includes an agency of the state, a regional or a local government created by the State Constitution or by general or special act, any county or municipality, or any other entity that independently exercises governmental authority. The term does not include the United States or any of its agencies, or an agency of the state, a regional or a local government created by the State Constitution or by general or special act, any county or municipality, or any other entity that independently exercises governmental authority, when exercising the powers of the United States or any of its agencies through a formal delegation of federal authority. (d) The term "action of a governmental entity" means a specific action of a governmental entity which affects real property, including action on an application or permit. (e) The terms "inordinate burden' and "inordinately burdened": 1. Mean that an action of one or more governmental entities has directly restricted or limited the use of real property such that the property owner is permanently unable to attain the reasonable, investment -backed expectation for the existing use of the real property or a vested right to a specific use of the real property with respect to the real property as a whole, or that the property owner is left with existing or vested uses that are unreasonable such that the property owner bears permanently a disproportionate share of a burden imposed for the good of the public, which in fairness should be borne by the public at large. 2. Do not include temporary impacts to real property; impacts to real property occasioned by governmental abatement, prohibition, prevention, or remediation of a public nuisance at common law or a noxious use of private property; or impacts to real property caused by an action of a governmental entity taken to grant relief to a property owner under this section. However, a temporary impact on development, as defined in s. 380.04, that is in effect for longer than 1 year may, depending upon the circumstances, constitute an "inordinate burden' as provided in this paragraph. In determining whether reasonable, investment -backed expectations are inordinately burdened, consideration may be given to the factual circumstances leading to the time elapsed between enactment of the law or regulation and its first application to the subject property. (f) The term "property owner" means the person who holds legal title to the real property that is the subject of and directly impacted by the action of a governmental entity. The term does not include a governmental entity. (g) The term "real property" means land and includes any appurtenances and improvements to the land, including any other relevant real property in which the property owner has a relevant interest. The term includes only parcels that are the subject of and directly impacted by the action of a governmental entity. WESTLAW © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Worlcs. 2 70.001. Private property rights protection, FL ST § 70.001 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk (4)(a) Not less than 150 days prior to filing an action under this section against a governmental entity, a property owner who seeks compensation under this section must present the claim in writing to the head of the governmental entity, except that if the property is classified as agricultural pursuant to s. 193.461, the notice period is 90 days. The property owner must submit, along with the claim, a bona fide, valid appraisal that supports the claim and demonstrates the loss in fair market value to the real property. If the action of government is the culmination of a process that involves more than one governmental entity, or if a complete resolution of all relevant issues, in the view of the property owner or in the view of a governmental entity to whom a claim is presented, requires the active participation of more than one governmental entity, the property owner shall present the claim as provided in this section to each of the governmental entities. (b) The governmental entity shall provide written notice of the claim to all parties to any administrative action that gave rise to the claim, and to owners of real property contiguous to the owner's property at the addresses listed on the most recent county tax rolls. Within 15 days after the claim is presented, the governmental entity shall report the claim in writing to the Department of Legal Affairs, and shall provide the department with the name, address, and telephone number of the employee of the governmental entity from whom additional information may be obtained about the claim during the pendency of the claim and any subsequent judicial action. (c) During the 90 -day -notice period or the 150 -day -notice period, unless extended by agreement of the parties, the governmental entity shall make a written settlement offer to effectuate: 1. An adjustment of land development or permit standards or other provisions controlling the development or use of land. 2. Increases or modifications in the density, intensity, or use of areas of development. 3. The transfer of developmental rights. 4. Land swaps or exchanges. 5. Mitigation, including payments in lieu of onsite mitigation. 6. Location on the least sensitive portion of the property. 7. Conditioning the amount of development or use permitted. WESTLAW © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original US. Government Works. Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 70.001. Private property rights protection, FL ST § 70.001 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk 8. A requirement that issues be addressed on a more comprehensive basis than a single proposed use or development. 9. Issuance of the development order, a variance, special exception, or other extraordinary relief. 10. Purchase of the real property, or an interest therein, by an appropriate governmental entity or payment of compensation. 11. No changes to the action of the governmental entity. If the property owner accepts a settlement offer, either before or after filing an action, the governmental entity may implement the settlement offer by appropriate development agreement; by issuing a variance, special exception, or other extraordinary relief, or by other appropriate method, subject to paragraph (d). (d) 1. When a governmental entity enters into a settlement agreement under this section which would have the effect of a modification, variance, or a special exception to the application of a rule, regulation, or ordinance as it would otherwise apply to the subject real property, the relief granted shall protect the public interest served by the regulations at issue and be the appropriate relief necessary to prevent the governmental regulatory effort from inordinately burdening the real property. 2. When a governmental entity enters into a settlement agreement under this section which would have the effect of contravening the application of a statute as it would otherwise apply to the subject real property, the governmental entity and the property owner shall jointly file an action in the circuit court where the real property is located for approval of the settlement agreement by the court to ensure that the relief granted protects the public interest served by the statute at issue and is the appropriate relief necessary to prevent the governmental regulatory effort from inordinately burdening the real property. This paragraph applies to any settlement reached between a property owner and a governmental entity regardless of when the settlement agreement was entered so long as the agreement fully resolves all claims asserted under this section. (5)(a) During the 90 -day -notice period or the 150 -day -notice period, unless a settlement offer is accepted by the property owner, each of the governmental entities provided notice pursuant to paragraph (4)(a) shall issue a written statement of allowable uses identifying the allowable uses to which the subject property may be put. The failure of the governmental entity to issue a statement of allowable uses during the applicable 90 -day -notice period or 150 -day -notice period shall be deemed a denial for purposes of allowing a property owner to file an action in the circuit court under this section. If a written statement of allowable uses is issued, it constitutes the last prerequisite to judicial review for the purposes of the judicial proceeding created by this section, notwithstanding the availability of other administrative remedies. (b) If the property owner rejects the settlement offer and the statement of allowable uses of the governmental entity or entities, the property owner may file a claim for compensation in the circuit court, a copy of which shall be served contemporaneously on the head of each of the governmental entities that made a settlement offer and a statement of allowable WESTLAW O 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.` 4 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 70.001. Private property rights protection, FL ST § 70.001 on 06-27-2019 . Cid Clerk, uses that was rejected by the property owner. Actions under this section shall be brought only in the county where the real property is located. (6)(a) The circuit court shall determine whether an existing use of the real property or a vested right to a specific use of the real property existed and, if so, whether, considering the settlement offer and statement of allowable uses, the governmental entity or entities have inordinately burdened the real property. If the actions of more than one governmental entity, considering any settlement offers and statement of allowable uses, are responsible for the action that imposed the inordinate burden on the real property of the property owner, the court shall determine the percentage of responsibility each such governmental entity bears with respect to the inordinate burden. A governmental entity may take an interlocutory appeal of the court's determination that the action of the governmental entity has resulted in an inordinate burden. An interlocutory appeal does not automatically stay the proceedings; however, the court may stay the proceedings during the pendency of the interlocutory appeal. If the governmental entity does not prevail in the interlocutory appeal, the court shall award to the prevailing property owner the costs and a reasonable attorney fee incurred by the property owner in the interlocutory appeal. (b) Following its determination of the percentage of responsibility of each governmental entity, and following the resolution of any interlocutory appeal, the court shall impanel a jury to determine the total amount of compensation to the property owner for the loss in value due to the inordinate burden to the real property. The award of compensation shall be determined by calculating the difference in the fair market value of the real property, as it existed at the time of the governmental action at issue, as though the owner had the ability to attain the reasonable investment -backed expectation or was not left with uses that are unreasonable, whichever the case may be, and the fair market value of the real property, as it existed at the time of the governmental action at issue, as inordinately burdened, considering the settlement offer together with the statement of allowable uses, of the governmental entity or entities. In determining the award of compensation, consideration may not be given to business damages relative to any development, activity, or use that the action of the governmental entity or entities, considering the settlement offer together with the statement of allowable uses has restricted, limited, or prohibited. The award of compensation shall include a reasonable award of prejudgment interest from the date the claim was presented to the governmental entity or entities as provided in subsection (4). (c) 1. In any action filed pursuant to this section, the property owner is entitled to recover reasonable costs and attorney fees incurred by the property owner, from the governmental entity or entities, according to their proportionate share as determined by the court, from the date of the filing of the circuit court action, if the property owner prevails in the action and the court determines that the settlement offer, including the statement of allowable uses, of the governmental entity or entities did not constitute a bona fide offer to the property owner which reasonably would have resolved the claim, based upon the knowledge available to the governmental entity or entities and the property owner during the 90 -day -notice period or the 150 -day -notice period. 2. In any action filed pursuant to this section, the governmental entity or entities are entitled to recover reasonable costs and attorney fees incurred by the governmental entity or entities from the date of the filing of the circuit court action, if the governmental entity or entities prevail in the action and the court determines that the property owner did not accept a bona fide settlement offer, including the statement of allowable uses, which reasonably would have resolved the claim fairly to the property owner if the settlement offer had been accepted by the property owner, based upon the knowledge available to the governmental entity or entities and the property owner during the 90 -day -notice period or the 150 -day -notice period. 3. The determination of total reasonable costs and attorney fees pursuant to this paragraph shall be made by the court and not WESTLAW © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 70.001. Private property rights protection, FL ST § 70.001 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk by the jury. Any proposed settlement offer or any proposed decision, except for the final written settlement offer or the final written statement of allowable uses, and any negotiations or rejections in regard to the formulation either of the settlement offer or the statement of allowable uses, are inadmissible in the subsequent proceeding established by this section except for the purposes of the determination pursuant to this paragraph. (d) Within 15 days after the execution of any settlement pursuant to this section, or the issuance of any judgment pursuant to this section, the governmental entity shall provide a copy of the settlement or judgment to the Department of Legal Affairs. (7)(a) The circuit court may enter any orders necessary to effectuate the purposes of this section and to make final determinations to effectuate relief available under this section. (b) An award or payment of compensation pursuant to this section shall operate to grant to and vest in any governmental entity by whom compensation is paid the right, title, and interest in rights of use for which the compensation has been paid, which rights may become transferable development rights to be held, sold, or otherwise disposed of by the governmental entity. When there is an award of compensation, the court shall determine the form and the recipient of the right, title, and interest, as well as the terms of their acquisition. (8) This section does not supplant methods agreed to by the parties and lawfully available for arbitration, mediation, or other forms of alternative dispute resolution, and governmental entities are encouraged to utilize such methods to augment or facilitate the processes and actions contemplated by this section. (9) This section provides a cause of action for governmental actions that may not rise to the level of a taking under the State Constitution or the United States Constitution. This section may not necessarily be construed under the case law regarding takings if the governmental action does not rise to the level of a taking. The provisions of this section are cumulative, and do not abrogate any other remedy lawfully available, including any remedy lawfully available for governmental actions that rise to the level of a taking. However, a governmental entity shall not be liable for compensation for an action of a governmental entity applicable to, or for the loss in value to, a subject real property more than once. (10)(a) This section does not apply to any actions taken by a governmental entity which relate to the operation, maintenance, or expansion of transportation facilities, and this section does not affect existing law regarding eminent domain relating to transportation. (b) This section does not apply to any actions taken by a county with respect to the adoption of a Flood Insurance Rate Map issued by the Federal Emergency Management Agency for the purpose of participating in the National Flood Insurance Program, unless such adoption incorrectly applies an aspect of the Flood Insurance Rate Map to the property in such a way as to, but not limited to, incorrectly assess the elevation of the property. (11) A cause of action may not be commenced under this section if the claim is presented more than 1 year after a law or WESTLAW @2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U,S. Government Works. 6 70.001. Private property rights protection, FL ST § 70.001 regulation is first applied by the governmental entity to the property at issue. (a) For purposes of determining when this 1 -year claim period accrues: Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk 1. A law or regulation is first applied upon enactment and notice as provided for in this subparagraph if the impact of the law or regulation on the real property is clear and unequivocal in its terms and notice is provided by mail to the affected property owner or registered agent at the address referenced in the jurisdiction's most current ad valorem tax records. The fact that the law or regulation could be modified, varied, or altered under any other process or procedure does not preclude the impact of the law or regulation on a property from being clear or unequivocal pursuant to this subparagraph. Any notice under this subparagraph shall be provided after the enactment of the law or regulation and shall inform the property owner or registered agent that the law or regulation may impact the property owner's existing property rights and that the property owner may have only 1 year from receipt of the notice to pursue any rights established under this section. 2. Otherwise, the law or regulation is first applied to the property when there is a formal denial of a written request for development or variance. (b) If an owner seeks relief from the governmental action through lawfully available administrative or judicial proceedings, the time for bringing an action under this section is tolled until the conclusion of such proceedings. (12) No cause of action exists under this section as to the application of any law enacted on or before May 11, 1995, or as to the application of any rule, regulation, or ordinance adopted, or formally noticed for adoption, on or before that date. A subsequent amendment to any such law, rule, regulation, or ordinance gives rise to a cause of action under this section only to the extent that the application of the amendatory language imposes an inordinate burden apart from the law, rule, regulation, or ordinance being amended. (13) In accordance with s. 13, Art. X of the State Constitution, the state, for itself and for its agencies or political subdivisions, waives sovereign immunity for causes of action based upon the application of any law, regulation, or ordinance subject to this section, but only to the extent specified in this section. Credits Added by Laws 1995, c. 95-181, § 1, eff. Oct. 1, 1995. Amended by Laws 2006, c. 2006-255, § 1, eff. June 20, 2006; Laws 2011, c. 2011-191, § 1, eff. July 1, 2011; Laws 2012, c. 2012-94, § 2, eff. July 1, 2012; Laws 2015, c. 2015-142, § 1, eff. Oct. 1, 2015. Notes of Decisions (71) West's F. S. A. § 70.001, FL ST § 70.001 WESTLAW O 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 70.001. Private property rights protection, FL ST § 70.001 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk Current with chapters from the 2019 First Regular Session of the 26th Legislature in effect through June 18, 2019 End ol'Document O 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. WESTLAW @2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 8 Maxwell v. City of Miami, 87 Fla. 107 (1924) 100 So. 147, 33 A.L.R. 682 87 Fla. logy Supreme Court of Florida. Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 , on 06-27-2019. City Clerk 12 Cases that cite this headnote MAXWELL V. CITY OF MIAMI. 131 Automobiles ;;—Speed and Control Feb. 14, 1924• Synopsis Error to Circuit Court, Dade County; H. Pierre Branning, Judge. Action by David Maxwell against the City of Miami. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error. Reversed. West Headnotes (13) Rights of pedestrians may not be violated by reckless driving of fire extinguishing equipment, where pedestrians are without fault. Cases that cite this headnote 141 Municipal Corporations ,6 -Governmental Powers in General Public duties of municipalities must be performed without injury to private rights, not immediately essential to conserve public peace, health, safety, morals, and general welfare. 1'1 Municipal Corporations Police and Fire Cases that cite this headnote Whether operation of fire department may be technically denominated a governmental function, the rule is that municipality is liable for injuries caused by negligence in failure to keep its streets in reasonably safe condition or by negligent operations or conditions thereon amounting to nuisance. 15 Cases that cite this headnote 151 Municipal Corporations Nature and Scope of Power of Municipality Execution of municipal authority or police power is subject to organic law designed to conserve private rights. Cases that cite this headnote 1�1 Automobiles s -Municipal Corporations; Districts 161 Municipal Corporations Operation on streets of automobile, being part of Nature and Scope of Power of Municipality fire equipment, is not such an essentially or exclusively governmental function as to exempt In exercise of police power, property and city from liability for injuries to pedestrians individual rights may be interfered with or solely caused by grossly negligent manner in injured only in manner and to extent reasonably which automobile is driven. necessary to conserve public good. WESTLAW © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 , Maxwell v. City of Miami, 87 Fla. 107 (1924) on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk 100 So. 147, 33 A.L.R. 682 police power, personal and property rights are 1 Cases that cite this headnote interfered with or injured in manner or by means, or to extent not reasonably necessary to serve the public good. 171 Constitutional Law 3 Cases that cite this headnote Police Power, Relationship to Due Process Unreasonable or unnecessary exertion of municipal authority or police power, in manner or extent in which personal or property rights are curtailed or impaired, violates organic law as depriving persons of liberty and property without due process of law. Cases that cite this headnote 181 Municipal Corporations 4—Nature and Scope of Power of Municipality Municipalities are given police powers to conserve, not to impair, private rights. 1 Cases that cite this headnote 181 Municipal Corporations ,Nature and Scope of Power of Municipality Organic law limits police and municipal powers that may be conferred by statute. Cases that cite this headnote 1101 Automobiles Reckless Operation Automobiles ,:Excessive Speed, Lack of Control, and Racing Reckless operation of motor vehicles or operation at unreasonable and improper speed on public highways is denounced by Acts 1917, c. 7275, §§ 18, 26, F.S.A. §§ 320.34, 320.50, 320.57; Rev.Gen.St.1920, § 1023, § 5605, F.S.A. § 320.57; Acts 1921, c. 8410, §§ 11, 14, F.S.A. §§ 320.40 note, 320.41 note, 320.50, 320.57, providing penalties for violation thereof. Cases that cite this headnote 1"1 Automobiles ,:—Municipal Corporations; Districts Municipality is liable for injuries to property by reckless and unreasonable operation of fire trucks on its streets. 6 Cases that cite this headnote 11�1 Automobiles 191 Constitutional Law Speed and Control Police Power; Public Safety and Welfare Constitutional Law Power of city of Miami, to prevent or abate .-Police Power, Relationship to Due Process nuisances and regulate speed at which automobiles and all vehicles may be driven In view of organic rights to acquire, possess, and through the streets, carries with it duty to protect property, and to due process and equal prevent or abate nuisances and to regulate speed protection of laws, the principles of nonliability at which all vehicles are driven through streets and damnum absque injuria are inapplicable, in interest of public safety. where, in exercise of municipal authority or WESTLAW © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2 Maxwell v. City of Miami, 87 Fla. 107 (1924) 100 So. 147, 33 A.L.R. 682 3 Cases that cite this headnote Syllabus by the Court Municipality operating fire department liable for injuries by negligent operations on streets amounting to nuisance. Whether the operation of a fire department by the city may be technically denominated a governmental or a corporate function, the rule in this state is that a municipality is liable for injuries caused by negligence in not keeping its streets in a reasonably safe condition for lawful uses, and for injuries caused by negligent operations or conditions upon the streets that amount to a nuisance. Operation of fire equipment on streets not governmental function exempting city from liability for injuries. The operation upon the public streets of an automobile as a part of the fire extinguishment equipment of a city, is not such an essentially or exclusively governmental function as to exempt the city from liability for injuries to persons lawfully using the streets, when such injuries are solely caused by the grossly negligent manner in which the automobile is driven at a high and dangerous rate of speed upon the streets on which persons are lawfully traveling on foot or in permissible vehicles. Municipality liable for reckless driving of fire equipment. While the right of way should be given to the passage of fire -fighting equipment when a destructive fire is or is supposed to be in progress, yet the rights of persons lawfully upon the streets may not be violated by the reckless driving of fire extinguishing equipment automobiles, thereby causing injuries to others who are in no way at fault in the premises. Public duties of municipalities must be performed without needless injury to private rights. The public duties of municipalities are by law required to be performed so as to do no injury to private rights that is not immediately essential to conserve the public peace, health, safety, morals, and general welfare. Municipal authority or police power subject to private rights. Any exertion of municipal authority or of the police power is subject to the provisions of organic law that are designed to conserve private rights. Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk -Individual rights may not be injured by exercise of police power. In the exercise of the police power, property and individual rights may be interfered with or injured or impaired only in the manner and to the extent that is reasonably necessary to conserve the public good. Unreasonable or unnecessary exertion of municipal authority or police power impairing private rights unconstitutional. An unreasonable or unnecessary exertion of municipal authority or of the police power in the manner or extent in which private personal or property rights are curtailed or impaired, violates organic law in that it deprives persons of liberty and property without authority or due process of law. Police power to conserve private rights; organic law limits police and municipal powers. Municipalities are given police powers to conserve, not to impair, private rights. The organic law contains limitations upon police and municipal powers that may be sought to be conferred by statute. When principles of nonliability and damnum absque injuria inapplicable. In view of the organic rights to acquire, possess, and protect property and to due process and equal protection of the laws, the principles of nonliability and damnum absque injuria are not applicable when, in the exercise of municipal authority or the police power, private, personal, and property rights are interfered with, injured, or impaired in a manner or by a means, or to an extent, that is not reasonably necessary to serve a public purpose for the general welfare. Operation of motor vehicles on public highways at reckless or unreasonable rate of speed denounced by statute. The state law forbids the operation of motor vehicles on the public highways of the state recklessly or at a greater rate of speed than is reasonable and proper, having due regard to the traffic and use of the highway so as to endanger the property or life or limb of any person, and provides penalties for violation of the law. Municipality liable for reckless operation of fire trucks. Reckless driving of fire trucks on the streets of a city is manifestly not essential to efficiency in fire fighting, and such conduct needlessly and unreasonably and consequently unlawfully impairs the private rights of those who are lawfully upon the streets with their property. Such conduct renders the streets unsafe, and when permitted by the city, liability of the city may arise therefrom if persons and property lawfully on the street are injured in consequence thereof. WESTLAW © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3 Maxwell v. City of Miami, 87 Fla. 107 (1924) 100 so. 147, 33 A.L.R. 682 Power to abate nuisances and to regulate speed of vehicles carries duty to exercise it. The city of Miami has `power to prevent or abate nuisances' to `to regulate the speed at which automobiles and all vehicles may be driven through the streets.' This power carries with it a duty to prevent or abate nuisances and to regulate the speed at which all vehicles are driven through the streets, in the interest of public safety. Attorneys and Law Firms **148 *109 A. B. & C. C. Small and J. H. Swink, all of Miami, for plaintiff in error. *110 A. J. Rose and J. W. Watson, Jr., both of Miami, for defendant in error. Opinion WHITFIELD, P. J. The amended declaration herein contained two counts. For the purpose of this case it will be necessary to state only the controverted portions of the second count, which are as follows: `(1) Plaintiff alleges that on or about September 10, 1921, the defendant was and still is a municipal corporation existing under the laws of Florida, and at the same time the defendant maintained a fire department consisting of the necessary organization and equipment for the quenching of fires within the said city, and that a part of said equipment the said defendant maintained a certain automobile, which was used by defendant as a part of the equipment of said fire department in the quenching of fires, and that said automobile was operated in the performance of such duties by officers, agents, employees, and members of such fire department, and was so used, among other purposes, to transport officers or members of such fire department to the scene of fires. `(2) Plaintiff avers that the said automobile hereinabove mentioned had for a long period of time, to wit, for many months before the date alleged above, been used as a vehicle for the purpose of transporting the chief of the fire department of the defendant or other directors of operation or members of the department to the scene of fires being attended by the fire department in its business of quenching fires, and that when the injury occurred said automobile of said fire department was driven by its driver in a grossly negligent and wanton and reckless manner and at a high and dangerous and grossly negligent rate of speed.' Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk *111 `(4) Plaintiff further avers that at the same time mentioned above plaintiff was driving an automobile along the streets of said city, and was driving the same in a prudent, careful, and reasonable manner, and that while so driving he had occasion to cross the street along which the automobile of the fire department mentioned hereinabove was proceeding, and that said automobile of said fire department was being driven in the negligent, wanton, and reckless manner, and at the reckless and dangerous rate of speed hereinabove set forth, and was negligently and carelessly driven into and against and upon the automobile being driven by plaintiff as aforesaid, to the great damage of plaintiff and plaintiff's automobile,' -the injuries being stated, damages claimed, and the prerequisite notice of claim being alleged. A demurrer to the second count contained the following grounds: `(1) It affirmatively appears from said count that there is no liability on the part of this defendant for the injuries complained of. `(2) It appears from said count that the injuries complained of were caused by a member of the fire department of the city of Miami in the performance of his duties, and there is not liability on the part of this defendant for the acts of its members of the fire department in the performance of their duties. `(3) The acts of a municipality connected with its fire department are public and sovereign in their nature, and the defendant corporation is not liable to be sued, either for failure to exercise them or for errors committed in their exercise. `(4) The members or employees of the fire department are, while acting in the line of duty prescribed for *112 them, not agents of the corporation in the sense which renders it liable for their acts. `(5) A city is not liable for negligent use or operation of its fire -fighting apparatus. `(6) The city is not liable for damages for the negligent driving of fire apparatus by firemen in going to a fire. `(7) A municipal corporation is not liable for damages for injuries to a traveler on the streets who is run down by the negligent driving of fire apparatus by an incompetent and reckless driver, selected and retained by the city officials, although by his selection and retention they are remiss in WESTLAW @2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4 Maxwell v. City of Miami, 87 Fla. 107 (1924) 100 So. 147, 33 A.L.R. 682 their official duties.' The demurrer was sustained, and, the plaintiff not amending his declaration, final judgment was rendered for the defendant city. The plaintiff took writ of error. 111 Whether the operation of a fire department by the city may be technically denominated a governmental or a corporate function, the rule in this state is that a municipality is liable for injuries caused by negligence in not keeping its streets in a reasonably safe condition for lawful uses, and for injuries caused by negligent operations or conditions upon the streets that amount to a nuisance. See City of Tallahassee v. Fortune, 3 Fla. 19, 52 Am. Dec. 358; Janes v. City of Tampa, 52 Fla. 292, 42 South. 729, 120 Am. St. Rep. 203, 11 Ann. Cas. 510; City of Tallahassee v. Hawes, 81 Fla. 123, 87 South. 765; Kaufman v. City of Tallahassee, 84 Fla. 634, 94 South. 697. See, also, Stallings v. City of Tampa, 78 Fla. 606, 83 South. 625; De Funiak Springs v. Perdue, 69 Fla. 326, 68 South. 234. See, also, Hesketh v. City of Toronto, 25 Ont. App. 449; **149 Workman v. City of New York, 179 U. S. 552, 21 Sup. Ct. 212, 45 L. Ed. 314; Kies v. City of Erie, 169 Pa. 598, 32 Atl. 621; Wagner v. Portland, 40 Or. 389, 60 Pac. 985, 67 Pac. 300. Liability of the city for fatal injury from a live electric wire in the *113 street was not questioned in Hadley v. City of Tallahassee, 67 Fla. 436, 65 South. 545, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 719. A city is not liable for torts committed by city officials when not acting within the municipal powers conferred. Scott v. City of Tampa, 62 Fla. 275, 55 South. 983, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 908. See, also, City v. Pragg, 31 Fla. 111, 12 South. 368, 19 L. R. A. 196, 34 Am. St. Rep. 17. 121 131 I41 The operation upon the public streets of an automobile as a part of the fire extinguishment equipment of a city, is not such an essentially or exclusively governmental function as to exempt the city from liability for injuries to persons lawfully using the streets, when such injuries are solely caused by the grossly negligent manner in which the automobile is driven at a high and dangerous rate of speed upon the streets on which persons are lawfully traveling on foot or in permissible vehicles. While the right of way should be given to the passage of firefighting equipment when a destructive fire is or is supposed to be in progress, yet the rights of persons lawfully upon the streets may not be violated by the reckless driving of fire -extinguishing equipment automobiles, thereby causing injuries to others who are in no way at fault in the premises. The public duties of municipalities are by law required to be performed so as to do no injury to private rights that is not immediately Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk essential to conserve the public peace, health, safety, morals, and general welfare. See Gonzalez v. City of Pensacola, 65 Fla. 241, 61 South. 503, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 1290. This is the limit of the police power. 151 161 hI 181 Any exertion of municipal authority or of the police power is subject to the provisions of organic law that are designed to conserve private rights. In the exercise of the police power, property and individual rights may be interfered with or injured or impaired only in the manner and to the extent that is reasonably necessary to conserve the public good. An unreasonable or unnecessary exertion of *114 municipal authority or of the police power in the manner or extent in which private personal or property rights are curtailed or impaired, violates organic law in that it deprives persons of liberty and property without authority or due process of law. Municipalities are given police powers to conserve, not to impair, private rights. The organic law contains limitations upon police and municipal powers that may be sought to be conferred by statute. 191 In view of the organic rights to acquire, possess, and protect property, and to due process and equal protection of the laws, the principles of nonliability and damnum absque injuria are not applicable when in the exercise of municipal authority or the police power, private, personal, and property rights are interfered with, injured, or impaired in a manner or by a means, or to an extent that is not reasonably necessary to serve a public purpose for the general welfare. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, text 413, 415, 43 Sup. Ct. 158, 67 L. Ed. 322. 1101 The state law forbids the operation of motor vehicles on the public highways of the state, recklessly or at a greater rate of speed than is reasonable and proper, having due regard to the traffic and use of the highway so as to endanger the property or life or limb of any person, and provides penalties for violation of the law. Sections 18 and 26, c. 7275, Acts of 1917; sections 1023, 5605, Rev. Gen. Stats. 1920; sections 11, 14, c. 8410, Acts of 1921. See L. R. A. 1917E, p. 1170. I��l Reckless driving of fire trucks on the streets of a city is manifestly not essential to efficiency in fire fighting, and such conduct needlessly and unreasonably and consequently unlawfully impairs the private rights of those who are lawfully upon the streets with their property. Such conduct renders the streets unsafe, and, when permitted by the city, liability of the city may arise therefrom if persons *115 and property lawfully on the street are injured in consequence thereof. WESTLAW © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 5 Maxwell v. City of Miami, 87 Fla. 107 (1924) 100 So. 147, 33 A.L.R. 682 IIZI The city of Miami has `power to * * * prevent or abate nuisances' and `to regulate the speed at which ' automobiles and all vehicles `may be driven through the streets.' Section 25, c. 7196, Acts of 1915. This power carries with it a duty to prevent or abate nuisances and to regulate the speed at which all vehicles are driven through the streets, in the interest of public safety. See City of Tallahassee v. Kaufman, 100 South. 150, this day filed. See, also, L. R. A. 191713, p. 548. The declaration in this case alleges: `That for a long period of time it has been the persistent habit and habitual custom of those driving the said machine on their way to fires to drive the same at a high and dangerous and grossly negligent rate of speed, many times driving the said car through the narrow streets of said city at a rate of 50 or 60 miles per hour; and plaintiff avers that the said custom and habit of driving at such high and dangerous rates of speed through the streets was generally and well known to the inhabitants of said city, and was so patently and obviously dangerous to other persons using the streets of said city as to be a menace to the public and to constitute a nuisance; and plaintiff avers that driving of the said automobile as aforesaid was known, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence could have been known, to the administrative and legislative officers of the city government of defendant, and that such driving as aforesaid was and is contrary to the laws of reason, and was and is contrary to the rights of people **150 lawfully using said streets as pedestrians or riders in vehicles and dangerous to their life and safety, but that notwithstanding such fact the defendant, its officers, and agents, for a long time prior to the injury hereafter mentioned, negligently failed to prevent *116 the driving End of Document Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 -on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk of the said automobile over the streets of said city in the aforesaid dangerous and negligent rate of speed;' and that when the injury occurred `said automobile of said fire department was driven by its driver in a grossly negligent and wanton and reckless manner and at a high and dangerous and grossly negligent rate of speed.' These allegations state a course of conduct that the city should have remedied to avoid a nuisance that endangered the lives and property of persons lawfully using the streets, and liability of the city may result therefrom if duly established. See Opocensky v. City of South Omaha, 101 Neb. 336, 163 N. W. 325, L. R. A. 1917E, 1170; Hillstrom v. City of St. Paul, 134 Minn. 451, 159 N. W. 1076, L. R. A. 191713, 548; Creps v. City of Columbia, 104 S. C. 371, 89 S. E. 316. See, also, Walters v. City of Carthage, 36 S. D. 11, 153 N. W. 881. Reversed. WEST and TERRELL, JJ., concur. TAYLOR, C. J., and ELLIS and BROWNE, JJ., concur in the opinion. All Citations 87 Fla. 107, 100 So. 147, 33 A.L.R. 682 © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claire to original U.S. Government Works. WESTLAW c0 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 6 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 City Com'n of City of Miami v. Woodlawn Park Cemetery Co., 553 So.2d 1227 (1989) on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk 14 Fla. L. Weekly 1799 zoned property into property "surrounded" by its 553 So.2d 1227 own property. District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District. CITY COMMISSION OF the CITY OF MIAMI, et al., Petitioners, V. WOODLAWN PARK CEMETERY COMPANY, Respondent. No. 86-2376. 1 Aug. 1, 1989. 1 Rehearing Denied Dec. 6, 1989. Synopsis Landowner sought certiorari review of city commission's denial of requested rezoning. The Circuit Court, Dade County, Robert H. Newman, J., granted requested review, quashed city's zoning decision, and entered injunction against city. City petitioned for writ of certiorari. The District Court of Appeal, Hubbart, J., held that city's refusal to rezone was unlawful as discriminatory reverse spot zoning. Petition denied. Ferguson, J., dissented and filed opinion. West Headnotes (2) Zoning and Planning Spot zoning Zoning and Planning Change from residential use to business, commercial, or industrial use Denial of landowner's request to rezone small portion of its property from residential to commercial was unlawful as discriminatory reverse spot zoning, since landowner was denied precisely same commercial zoning as that of its surrounding commercial neighbors on purely arbitrary basis; fact that landowner sought only to rezone small portion of its property did not convert its "zoning peninsula" of residentially 2 Cases that cite this headnote 121 Zoning and Planning Change from residential use to business, commercial, or industrial use Evidence did not support finding that increased traffic which would allegedly be caused by rezoning of landowner's property from residential to commercial would destroy integrity of residential neighborhood, as would have rendered city's refusal to rezone sustainable as being "fairly debatable" use of city's police power; character of area which would allegedly have been affected by increased traffic had already been changed through widespread commercial rezonings such that it was no longer residential neighborhood, but mixed commercial -residential development which landowner's rezoning request would in no way alter. 2 Cases that cite this headnote Attorneys and Law Firms *1227 Lucia A. Dougherty, City Atty., and Joel E. Maxwell, Asst. City Atty., for petitioners. Mershon, Sawyer, Johnston, Dunwody & Cole, and William J. Dunaj and Philip A. Allen, III and Teresa Ragatz, Miami, for respondent. Robert D. Korner, Miami, for intervenors. Before HUBBART, FERGUSON and JORGENSON, JJ. Opinion HUBBART, Judge. WESTLAW © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. City Com'n of City of Miami v. Woodlawn Park Cemetery Co., 553 So.2d 1227 (1989) 14 Fla. L. Weekly 1799 This is a petition for a writ of certiorari fled by the City of Miami and certain intervenors which seeks review of a final order of the circuit court sitting in its appellate review capacity in a zoning matter. The circuit court order under review requires, in effect, the City of Miami to rezone from residential to commercial a small parcel of a large historic cemetery in Miami. We find no legal basis to upset this order and, accordingly, deny the petition for a writ of certiorari. The relevant facts of this case are, for the most part, entirely undisputed. As revealed by the record, they are as follows. n. Woodlawn Park Cemetery [Woodlawn] is an historic sixty -eight -acre cemetery located within the City of Miami. It was chartered in 1913 and is the burial place of over 60,000 persons, including many of Miami's most prominent pioneer families; there are also countless other persons of national and international renown buried there. It contains the oldest Jewish cemetery in *1228 Dade County, as well as the county's oldest Greek, Chinese, Cuban, Roman Catholic and Masonic burial sections. It currently serves all sectors of the ethnically diverse Miami community and is the only cemetery in Miami with available burial space. Moreover, the cemetery is a bird sanctuary and is considered by many to be a beautiful, serene place. Since at least the 1930's, the subject property has been zoned residential, currently RS z/, (general residential), which permits its present and long-standing use as a cemetery. The sixty -eight -acre, entirely fenced cemetery fronts to the north on S.W. 8th Street for approximately Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk of continuous commercial development with abutting residential communities located to the immediate rear of such development. Indeed, with the sole exception of Woodlawn's 900–foot cemetery frontage, virtually every parcel of property bordering S.W. 8th Street in Miami, with abutting single-family residences to the rear, has been rezoned from residential to commercial use. In the immediate area itself, across S.W. 8th Street from Woodlawn's property to the north and extending for over a city block on either side, is a wide variety of commercial establishments, including: a motel, a restaurant, a travel agency, a dental lab, a print shop, a shopping center, a gas station, a car stereo shop, a garage, an auto rental business, a flower shop, an antique shop, a used car lot, and a donut shop. To the immediate east and west of Woodlawn's cemetery on the south side of S.W. 8th Street where the cemetery is located are similar -type commercial establishments, including: a used car lot, a restaurant, a tire store, and, most significantly, the Rivero Funeral Home, which is located in the adjoining block to the west, approximately 600 feet from Woodlawn Cemetery. Moreover, up and down S.W. 8th Street for miles in either direction of the cemetery is heavy commercial development of the same general nature as that in the immediate vicinity of the cemetery. The rest of the Woodlawn cemetery, like much of the commercially zoned property along S.W. 8th Street, largely abuts single-family homes which are zoned residential. The cemetery extends eight blocks deep on either side of its frontage in a southerly direction from S.W. 8th Street to S.W. 16th Street, forming a large, slightly misshapen, rectangular parcel of land. It is bordered on the east by S.W. 32nd Avenue which intersects S.W. 8th Street, the west by S.W. 33rd and 34th Avenues which also intersect S.W. 8th Street, and the south by S.W. 16th Street—all noncommercial streets largely bordering single-family residences. The cemetery has a main entrance and exit on S.W. 8th Street; it also has its own internal road system which provides additional ingress and egress at S.W. 16th Street and S.W. 34th Avenue, both streets with single-family residences thereon. In this respect, the cemetery is no different from virtually all the commercial properties along S.W. 8th Street which also abut single family residences to their immediate rear and are connected thereto by an extensive public road system.' 900 feet. Along 229 feet of this frontage is the cemetery entrance, a parking lot, and an office building from which the Woodlawn personnel have conducted the business of the cemetery for over fifty years. S.W. 8th Street—although once a sleepy, residentially zoned country road which was commercially undeveloped on either side—is now a busy, rezoned, four -lane major B thoroughfare in Miami which passes through many miles WESTLAW O 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 City Com'n of City of Miami v. Woodlawn Park Cemetery Co., 553 So.2d 1227 (1989) on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk 14 Fla. L. Weekly 1799 On April 12, 1985, Woodlawn Park Cemetery Company filed an application with the City of Miami seeking to rezone a portion *1229 of its cemetery from a residential to a commercial classification. The requested rezoning sought to change only a 1.3–acre parcel of its sixty -eight -acre cemetery in order to build a 14,000 square foot funeral home thereon with eighty-one, on-site parking places—far more than the available parking spaces for other funeral homes in the area. The subject 1.3–acre parcel fronts on S.W. 8th Street along 229 feet of the cemetery's 900–foot frontage and is otherwise completely surrounded by cemetery property. It is located 285 feet to the east and 393 feet to the west of the nearest adjoining property, and it is eight blocks north of the residential area located to the immediate rear of the cemetery.' Woodlawn's administrative office building and parking lot are currently located on the subject parcel and have been for the last fifty years. The City of Miami Zoning Board held a public hearing on the proposed zoning change. Mr. Richard Whipple of the City of Miami Zoning Department reported that his department recommended approval of the rezoning based on the department's study that the rezoning would not have an adverse effect on the surrounding area. Woodlawn then called a number of witnesses who explained the details of the proposed funeral home, the projected number of funerals at the proposed home over a five-year period, and two surveys prepared by Woodlawn's experts concerning the traffic and noise impact these funerals would have on the surrounding area. It was shown that (a) for the past year there were approximately four internments per day at Woodlawn with an average of fifteen vehicles per procession;' (b) if the proposed funeral home were built, after a five-year period, the average number of funeral processions would, at most, be increased by one procession of fifteen additional vehicles° per day—most of which vehicles, based on past experience, would not use the residential exits to the cemetery but, instead, would enter and exit from and onto S.W. 8th Street; and (c) the noise impact of these additional funerals would be negligible. The only opposition to the rezoning request consisted of representatives from four nearby funeral homes which would compete with Woodlawn, several local residents, and an attorney for the competing funeral home directors. These witnesses expressed generalized concerns about the possible traffic impact of the proposed funeral home, but presented no studies or other empirical data in opposition to Woodlawn's traffic and noise studies. The funeral home witnesses also expressed other concerns about alleged decreased burial *1230 sites, and "breaking faith" with present grave owners. At the end of the hearing, the Zoning Board voted six to two to override the zoning department's recommendation and recommended to the City Commission that the rezoning application be denied. The City Commission, based on much the same showing as was made before the Zoning Board, approved this recommendation by a vote of three to zero and denied the requested rezoning.' Woodlawn then sought certiorari review of the City Commission's action in the circuit court. The circuit court granted the requested review, quashed the city's zoning decision, and enjoined the city from enacting, maintaining, or enforcing any zoning classification on the subject parcel more restrictive than CR -2/4 [commercial]. The circuit court held, in effect, that the city abused its discretion by arbitrarily and capriciously denying Woodlawn its constitutionally guaranteed right to make reasonable use of its property in accord with the character of the adjacent area. The court concluded that the refusal to grant the requested rezoning constituted "reverse spot zoning" because all property fronting S.W. 8th Street for miles in either direction is currently zoned for commercial purposes, except for the subject Woodlawn property. This petition for a writ of certiorari follows. II It is well settled in Florida that a zoning restriction must meet the constitutional test of being within the police power of the governing authority to enact or enforce, i.e., the restriction must bear a substantial relationship to the public health, welfare, safety, and morals of the community.6 This police power is admittedly a very broad power entrusted to legislative bodies to exercise, and the courts have traditionally given great deference to legislative decisions in this area. So long as it is "fairly debatable," i.e., open to dispute or controversy on grounds that make sense, whether the zoning restriction advances the public health, welfare, safety, or morals of the community, the subject restriction is considered to be constitutional.' Moreover, the burden is not on the governmental authority to establish that the zoning regulation or classification is reasonable or is in furtherance of its police power;" the very adoption of the regulation or classification creates a presumption of its validity.9 Instead, the burden rests on the party challenging the zoning restriction to establish that the subject restriction is arbitrary, unreasonable, or confiscatory and thus not "fairly debatable."10 *1231 Notwithstanding the above rules of law which are WESTLAW © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3 City Com'n of City of Miami v. Woodlawn Park Cemetery Co., 553 So.2d 1227 (1989) 14 Fla. L. Weekly 1799 weighted heavily in favor of sustaining the validity of zoning restrictions, it is clear that the police power to enact or enforce such restrictions is not unlimited. Occasionally, and under very limited circumstances, the Florida courts have intervened and struck down zoning restrictions as being outside the police power of the governing authority to enact or enforce. As the Florida Supreme Court has stated: "The constitutional right of the owner of property to make legitimate use of his lands may not be curtailed by unreasonable restrictions under the guise of police power. The owner will not be required to sacrifice his rights absent a substantial need for restrictions in the interest of public health, morals, safety or welfare. If the zoning restriction exceeds the bounds of necessity for the public welfare, as, in our opinion, do the restrictions controverted here, they must be stricken as an unconstitutional invasion of property rights." Burritt v. Harris, 172 So.2d 820, 823 (Fla.1965) (footnotes omitted). One of the very limited circumstances where the Florida courts have intervened and struck down zoning restrictions as not being a "fairly debatable" use of the police power is represented by a class of cases, often referred to as "reverse spot zoning" cases, where the governing authority persists in enforcing a long -ago imposed zoning restriction against a property owner—although it has since rezoned most of the adjoining area and relieved virtually all property owners therein of the same zoning restriction, thereby resulting in a transformation in the character of the subject area. For example, in the leading case of Tollius v. City of Miami, 96 So.2d 122 (Fla. 1957), the appellant owned several lots on S.W. 25th Road and U.S. 1 near the Rickenbacker Causeway in Miami. In 1936, the property was zoned for single-family residences. Since then, however, over a period of twenty years, the zoning in the neighboring area was changed from residential to commercial, the streets in the area were widened, the traffic thereon became quite heavy, and the area was built up commercially. Appellant sought to rezone his property, like the neighboring Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk properties, from residential to commercial so as to build an apartment -motel thereon. The rezoning request was denied by the City of Miami, and the circuit court denied relief upon review. The Florida Supreme Court reversed and stated: "The block in which appellant's property lies is a `veritable island,' to borrow a term from appellant's brief. It is surrounded by highways or streets of four or more lanes in width. The south half of the block is owned by the county while that part of the north half lying west of the property in question is also owned by the appellant. Aside from the characteristics of the land, and the land around it, apparent from the sketch, there was abundant testimony that the property in litigation no longer retained the features which at the time of passage of the zoning ordinance justified classifying it as a site usable only for one purpose. There must be a substantial and reasonable relationship between the need for zoning restrictions and the public health, morals, safety or welfare to justify interference, by exercise of the police power, with an owner's right to the enjoyment of his property. Only in the presence of such necessity will he be required to make a personal sacrifice for the good of the people. City of Miami Beach v. Lachman, Fla., 71 So.2d 148. It may be that when the zoning ordinance was passed this need existed and the legislative act could not have been defeated or thwarted because then it could have been fairly debated. But the need twenty years later seems to have been so dissipated by the intervening phenomenalgrowth of the City of Miami *1232 that it is now so out of proportion to the interference with the use of the appellant's property that the exercise of the police power cannot be upheld." Id. at 125, 125-26. Similarly, in Kugel v. City of Miami Beach, 206 So.2d 282 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 212 So.2d 877 (F1a.1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1021, 89 S.Ct. 629, 21 L.Ed.2d 565 (1969), the appellant owned a lot at the corner of 17th Street and Meridian Avenue in Miami Beach. In 1952, the property was zoned residential for multifamily residences at a time when "the 17th Street neighborhood was quiet and relatively secluded." Id. at 284. Since then, however, over a period of fifteen years, the zoning in the neighboring area was changed from residential to commercial, the area became built up WESTLAW @2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 City Com'n of City of Miami v. Woodlawn Park Cemetery Co., 553 So.2d 1227 (1989) on 06-27-2019 _ City Clerk 14 Fla. L. Weekly 1799 commercially, and the traffic flow in the vicinity increased considerably; 17th Street became a major thoroughfare and the City of Miami Beach built a convention complex on the adjoining property. Appellant sought to rezone his property from residential to commercial, like all the neighboring property in the area. The City of Miami Beach denied this application, and the circuit court denied relief upon review. This court reversed and stated: "Appellants' property has a 62 '/z foot frontage on the west side of Meridian Avenue and 150 feet on the north side of 17th Street, Miami Beach, Florida. When the present zoning classification was changed from single family to multiple family residence in 1952, the 17th Street neighborhood was quiet and relatively secluded. Since that time the City of Miami Beach has built a large auditorium and convention facility upon a neighboring land which is zoned for residential use. This complex is just east of appellants' property. In addition, the City has closed Lincoln Road (16th Street), which was a main thoroughfare. The result is that 17th Street has become one of the main east -west thoroughfares in the City. Further, by a change in the zoning laws, the City has allowed a federal savings and loan association to build an office building on the corner immediately across Meridian Avenue from appellants' property. The office building is on property zoned residential but is used for business. The changes in the area have resulted in a large concentration of non-residential activity in a residential area. Where changed conditions create a situation where the zoning of appellants' property is so unreasonable as to constitute a taking of his property, then the courts are justified in striking down the arbitrary zoning classification. We hold that the zoning of appellants' property is arbitrary and unreasonable and the same amounts to confiscatory regulation of appellants' property." Id. at 284. Further, in Manilow v. City of Miami Beach, 213 So.2d 589 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968), cert. discharged, 226 So.2d 805 (F1a.1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 972, 90 S.Ct. 1088, 25 L.Ed.2d 266 (1970), appellant owned several lots on the corner of Arthur Godfrey Road and Pine Tree Drive in Miami Beach. In 1930, the property was zoned for single-family residences. Since then, however, over a period of thirty-six years, the zoning in the neighboring area was changed from residential to commercial, the area was transformed into a commercial area, and the traffic in the vicinity greatly increased due to a widening of the nearby streets and the opening of the Julia Tuttle Causeway. The appellant sought to rezone his property from residential to commercial, like the neighboring property. The City of Miami Beach denied this request and the circuit court denied relief upon review. This court reversed and stated: "The property is then, except for the northernmost part, similar to the `veritable island' with which the Supreme Court of Florida was faced in Tollius v. City of Miami. The factual situation herein is quite similar to that of Kugel v. City of Miami Beach, where this court stated that `the changes in the area have resulted in a large concentration of non-residential activity *1233 in a residential area' and `that the character of the property has already been changed by other actions of a municipality.' The rationale applied in Kugel, supra, appears to be appropriate here. To deny the relief sought herein, as in Kugel, would constitute spot zoning in reverse." Id. at 592-93 (citations omitted). Finally, in Olive v. City of Jacksonville, 328 So.2d 854 (Fla. I st DCA 1976), the appellant owned a single-family residence on a lot in Jacksonville. In 1948, when the house was built, his lot was zoned residential; since then, however, over a period of twenty-five years, the character of the adjoining area changed and appellant's property became surrounded on three sides by commercially rezoned property. The appellant sought to rezone his property to a commercial use, and the City of Jacksonville denied this rezoning request. The circuit court granted relief in part, and the First District, on appeal, reversed and granted complete relief to a commercial classification. The court stated: "While imposition of CPO zoning classification upon appellants' property does not render it a `veritable island' as described in Tollius v. City of Miami, Sup.Ct.Fla.1957, 96 So.2d 122, it does render the subject property a literal peninsula. To deny appellants the zoning classification sought (which is more restrictive and permits a less intensive use than that to which they are entitled but did not request) would constitute spot zoning in reverse (Kugel V. tty of iamt eac , supra). WESTLAW © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 5 City Com'n of City of Miami v. Woodlawn Park Cemetery Co., 553 So.2d 1227 (1989) 14 Fla. L. Weekly 1799 — - — -- ------ - — 328 So.2d at 856. Running through all of these cases is the court's determination that it is entirely arbitrary and not at all "fairly debatable" on grounds that make sense for the governing authority to allow for an entire transformation of the character of an area through extensive rezoning of all nearby properties—and then to deny the subject property owner equal treatment, although similarly situated. It is thought to be confiscatory of a person's property in such cases to prevent a property owner from utilizing his property in a certain way, when virtually all of his adjoining neighbors are not subject to such a restriction. Often, as previously noted, the courts refer to such arbitrary refusals to rezone as "reverse spot zoning" because the refusal to rezone the subject property creates, in effect, a veritable zoning island [as in Tollius ], or a zoning peninsula [as in Manilow and Olive ], in a surrounding sea of contrary zoning classification. In these cases, the courts have reasoned that a governing authority, although having large discretionary zoning power, may not, under the guise of its police power, discriminate in such a blatant fashion against a property owner—as such arbitrary governmental action violates the property owner's constitutional right to make legitimate use of his land. III Turning to the instant case we have no trouble in Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk The petitioners contend, however, that the circuit court, in effect, misapplied the correct zoning law to reach its result below because it misunderstood the nature of this law, particularly as it relates to the "fairly debatable" rule and the legal concept of *1234 "reverse spot zoning"; Judge Ferguson, in dissent, makes much the same argument. We seriously doubt that we have the authority to review whether the circuit court mistakenly applied established zoning principles to the facts of the instant case [thereby demonstrating a judicial misunderstanding of these principles], as this comes dangerously close to a full plenary appeal of the circuit court's administrative review decision below—a plenary appeal which the Florida Supreme Court has held we have no jurisdiction to entertain. City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant. On the off chance, however, that we somehow have the authority to decide on this certiorari petition whether the circuit court "misunderstood" or "misapplied" the established zoning law below, we turn now to a consideration of this issue. M We have no trouble in concluding that the circuit court correctly understood and correctly applied the above -stated zoning law when it struck down the City of Miami's refusal to rezone the 1.3—acre parcel of Woodlawn's sixty -six -acre cemetery. This is so because the result of the City's refusal to rezone, as the circuit court properly held, constitutes a classic case of "reverse spot zoning" within the meaning of the Tollius—Kugel—Manilow—Olive line of cases—which, as these cases hold, is an arbitrary and not a "fairly debatable" use of the City's police power, concluding that the circuit court afforded the petitioners procedural due process and applied the correct law, as stated above, in striking down the City of Miami's refusal to rezone the 1.3—acre parcel of Woodlawn's sixty-eight acre cemetery; indeed, the petitioners make no serious contention to the contrary. Due process requirements were scrupulously afforded to all parties below, and the circuit court correctly stated in its decision the controlling principles of zoning law applicable to this case. This being so, it is plain that there is no legal basis whatever to upset the circuit court's decision below under our admittedly narrow scope of certiorari review. Educational Dev. Center, Inc. v. West Palm Beach Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 541 So.2d 106 (Fla. 1989); City of Deerfield Beach v Vailln t 419 S 2 ( d 624 Fl 1982 In the 1930's, when the subject 1.3—acre parcel was first zoned residential, S.W. 8th Street on which the parcel fronts was a sleepy, commercially undeveloped country road in what was then a very small town of Miami. Since then, over the intervening fifty years, the character of the neighboring area on S.W. 8th Street has been totally transformed into a commercial area due to the phenomenal intervening development of Miami. Now the subject Woodlawn parcel is the only property in the adjoining area facing S.W. 8th Street which is currently zoned residential; all else has been rezoned from residential to commercial and is heavily built up on the north, east and west of the property with a variety of businesses, including a funeral home one block to the WESTLAW © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 6 City Com'n of City of Miami v. Woodlawn Park Cemetery Co., 553 So.2d 1227 (1989) 14 Fla. L. Weekly 1799 west. As a result, this property now stands out in stark contrast as a "literal zoning peninsula," Olive, Manilow, not only to the rest of the immediate area, but to the entire commercial character of S.W. 8th Street. Moreover, S.W. 8th Street, Tamiami Trail, is currently a heavily traveled, four -lane, major thoroughfare in Miami which is commercially developed on both sides of the street for miles in either direction of the Woodlawn parcel. One can scarcely imagine a more striking parallel with the above "reverse spot zoning" cases. First, the instant case and the above line of cases all involve a transformation, over a relatively long period of time, in the character of the area surrounding the subject parcel caused by extensive intervening rezonings, commercial development, and traffic build up—so that the area is no longer purely residential in nature, but is now largely commercial. Such dramatic changes in the area result "in a large concentration of nonresidential activity in a residential area." Kugel, 206 So.2d at 284. Second, the instant case and the above line of cases all involve adjoining property rezonings of such a nature that the subject parcel becomes, in effect, a "veritable island," as in Tollius, or a "literal peninsula," as in Olive, Manilow and here, of residential zoning in a surrounding sea of otherwise commercial rezonings. Moreover, the fact that Woodlawn in the instant case seeks only to rezone a small portion of its sixty -eight -acre cemetery does not, contrary to the petitioner's arguments, convert its "literal zoning peninsula" of residentially zoned property—surrounded to the north, east, and west of it on S.W. 8th Street with commercially rezoned property—into property "surrounded" by its own property. It is clear that in the instant case, as in the above cases, the aforesaid "changed conditions create a situation where the zoning of [the Landowner's] property is so unreasonable as to constitute a taking of his property,"—"a confiscatory regulation of [his] property,"—so that "the courts are justified in striking down the arbitrary zoning *1235 classification." Kugel, 206 So.2d at 284. To paraphrase what the Florida Supreme Court stated in Tollius, "[i]t may be that when the zoning ordinance was passed" creating the residential zoning on Woodlawn's parcel that such zoning "could not have been defeated or thwarted because then it could have been fairly debated. But the need [fifty] years later [for such zoning] seems to have been so dissipated by the intervening phenomenal growth of the City of Miami that it is now so out of proportion to the interference with the use of [Woodlawn's] property that the exercise of the police power cannot be upheld." 96 So.2d at 126 (citation omitted). Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk Central to the analysis of a reverse spot zoning case, as previously noted, is that the land of the complaining landowner must be treated unjustifiably different for zoning purposes than that of the land which surrounds it. In the instant case, there was no competent, substantial evidence adduced before the Zoning Board or City Commission establishing a justifiable reason as to why the Woodlawn parcel was treated differently for zoning purposes from all its similarly situated, commercial neighbors on S.W. 8th Street. Plainly, as the circuit court correctly concluded, Woodlawn was denied precisely the same commercial zoning as that of its surrounding commercial neighbors on a purely arbitrary basis, and consequently, the subject denial was unlawful as discriminatory reverse spot zoning. Woodlawn's complaint, then, is not that the present residential zoning "denies it the right to make maximum profitable use of [its] land," at 1241, as the dissent suggests. Its complaint is that it has been arbitrarily discriminated against by the City of Miami so that it cannot make use of its land for the same commercial purposes as that enjoyed by its adjoining commercial neighbors. Such rank discrimination constitutes, in effect, an unreasonable restriction on Woodlawn's use of its property, thereby amounting to a partial taking thereof—and, therefore, falls squarely within the holdings and rationale of the Tollius–Kugel–Manilow–Olive line of reverse spot zoning cases. M To avoid, however, this inevitable result, the petitioners make one central argument. It is urged that substantial competent evidence was adduced before the Zoning Board and City Commission to support a finding that the requested rezoning with its proposed funeral home would have an adverse traffic impact on the homes located to the immediate south of Woodlawn's rezoning parcel on S.W. 8th Street. From this, the petitioners reason that the city's refusal to rezone the Woodlawn parcel is sustainable as being a "fairly debatable" use of the city's police power to protect the integrity of a residential neighborhood. This court, however, has persuasively rejected this argument in Kugel v. City of Miami Beach, 206 So.2d 282 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 212 So.2d 877 (F1a.1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1021, 89 S.Ct. 629, 21 L.Ed.2d 565 (1969), a reverse spot zoning case, in which we held that a property owner was constitutionally entitled to have the WESTLAVV © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 7 City Com'n of City of Miami v. Woodlawn Park Cemetery Co., 553 So.2d 1227 (1989) 14 Fla. L. Weekly 1799 zoning on his property changed from residential to commercial, given the long-term commercial rezoning of the surrounding properties in the area, notwithstanding a traffic impact which the rezoning would have on nearby homes. This court stated: "Appellee also suggests that this Court should treat the residential zoning of appellants' property as an exercise of the legislative authority of the city council, and that as such, it falls under the fairly debatable rule adhered to by this Court in the City of Miami v. Zorovich, F1a.App.1967, 195 So.2d 31. In that case, we held that zoning regulations which promote the integrity of a neighborhood and preserve its residential character are related to general welfare of the community and are a valid exercise of the legislative power. The present case does not come within the bounds of this rule because the record clearly reveals that to change the residential zoning of appellants' property will in no way act to destroy the integrity of a neighborhood. The character of the property has already been changed by other actions of the municipality. The zoning regulation *1236 in question, as applied to appellants' property, is arbitrary and unreasonable and cannot be characterized as `fairly debatable.' Id. at 285 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Similarly, the fatal flaw in the traffic impact argument advanced in this case is that the increased traffic caused by Woodlawn's rezoning request would not, as urged, destroy the integrity of a residential neighborhood. This is so because, as in Kugel, the character of the area in which homes are located to the south of S.W. 8th Street, including Woodlawn's proposed rezoning parcel, has already been changed by the City of Miami through widespread commercial rezonings on S.W. 8th Street over the past fifty years. Clearly, this area is no longer a pristine residential neighborhood; it is now a mixed Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk commercial -residential development which Woodlawn's rezoning request would in no way alter. Indeed, the entire commercial development along S.W. 8th Street, the widening of S.W. 8th Street with a consequent traffic buildup thereon, and the entire transformation of most of the area from residential to commercial over the past fifty years—has had a devastating traffic impact on the homes in this mixed area, all of which have direct street access to the rezoned commercial properties on S.W. 8th Street." This being so, it is no longer a "fairly debatable" use of its police power for the city to deny Woodlawn's rezoning request on the ground that it must protect the integrity of a residential neighborhood from an adverse traffic impact—when its pervasive commercial rezonings along S.W. 8th Street have already destroyed the integrity of this former neighborhood, so that it is now a mixed commercial -residential area. In this connection, we agree entirely with the circuit court's reasoning in the order under review: "It is conceded that Southwest Eighth Street is already heavily commercial in nature and no evidence was offered to show that the requested rezoning would contribute any greater or different kind of noise or traffic than the existing businesses and funeral homes on Eighth Street, including the existing funeral home on the same block. The testimony relied on by the [c]ity and [i]ntervenors, even if it is accepted as authoritative and reliable, establishes only that Woodlawn will contribute incrementally to the commercial activity that already exists in this commercial area. A zoning authority may not deny rezoning on traffic and related grounds when its zoning scheme already permits other area land owners to make comparable contributions to the area's traffic environment through commercial use of the land. City of Clearwater v. College Properties, Inc., supra [239 So.2d 515] at 517. (1970) While a reviewing [c]ourt is not entitled to substitute its judgment for that of the zoning authority, a zoning restriction must be set aside when it deprives a property owner of his constitutional right to use his property. On the record before this [c]ourt it is clear that the parcel faces a busy commercial thoroughfare already bristling with commercial activity. While the [c]ity may enact zoning restrictions to create and preserve residential zones free from commercial activity, it may not constitutionally refuse to permit a commercial use of land in an area permeated by commercial activity. The instant zoning restriction constitutes reverse spot zoning." WESTLAW © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 8 City Com'n of City of Miami v. Woodlawn Park Cemetery Co., 553 So.2d 1227 (1989) 14 Fla. L. Weekly 1799 2 Secondarily, the petitioners argue, in effect, that there is an aesthetic reason for denying Woodlawn's rezoning request, namely, that to introduce a funeral home into Woodlawn Park Cemetery would be detrimental to the pristine quality of this historic cemetery; it is further urged that building a funeral home on the subject parcel would deprive the City of Miami of *1237 needed burial sites. Neither argument has any merit. It is, of course, true that Woodlawn is an historic cemetery founded in 1913 which, to this day, serves well the burial needs of Miami's multi-ethnic community; that it is a bird sanctuary in a sea of commercial development; and that it is considered by many to be a beautiful and serene place. Woodlawn's zoning request, however, threatens none of these practical and aesthetic values. The request involves only a 1.3–acre parcel of this sixty -eight -acre cemetery, which parcel has never been dedicated for burial sites; indeed, the subject parcel has housed Woodlawn's administrative offices for the last fifty years. It therefore cannot be said that the zoning request will deprive the Miami community of needed burial sites. Moreover, the proposal to build a quiet funeral home on the subject parcel hardly compromises the beauty and serenity of the cemetery—anymore than does the funeral home located in the adjoining block. A funeral home is fully in keeping with the sacred nature of the cemetery, and its placement on a 1.3–acre parcel presently housing administrative offices obviously leaves the 66.7–acre balance of the existing cemetery entirely intact. If anything, allowing Woodlawn to make a modest additional economic use of its property may increase, not diminish the prospects that it will continue to maintain the cemetery as the serene and beautiful place which it is to many. Obviously, a different issue would be presented if Woodlawn had sought to rezone the entire cemetery or a significant part thereof; no such request, however, has been made in this case. For the above -stated reasons, the petition for a writ of certiorari is Denied. JORGENSON, J., concurs. Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk FERGUSON, Judge (dissenting). Judge Hubbart's opinion for the majority is characteristically thorough on the facts. There is no disagreement on the relevant facts which I will briefly restate. I respectfully dissent because the majority has misapplied the law. RELEVANT FACTS The zoning authority, in denying Woodlawn's application for rezoning, found that the proposed funeral home would increase traffic flow through the surrounding residential community. Woodlawn's plan, reproduced below, reflects the size of the proposed building in comparison to adjacent buildings, and that it will be necessary to route traffic through neighboring communities several blocks south and west of its premises for funeral services. *1238 W►ESTLAW @2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 9 City Com'n of City of Miami v. Woodlawn Park Cemetery Co., 553 So.2d 1227 (1989) 14 Fla. L. Weekly 1799 ", 0 s: ® taNNERC1a �p raaLs-to nc:a�,r+c a vaRMs ,.fir---..__.... -•--•-- A$OYE AAP 300$$1 1. RE100 PAACU 2. SUR40UN01" MU4N1ORR006 ICAEYO f. CEMETERY TAArFEC FLOWS 4. $. M. SIR AFRI,: CWOIOr1i ". $.r. YTFO AYEMAL f0 S.Y. 3T IR ArI MUC S.W. a SI SOUMCEr COMPOS"t OP MICOm "1119 I1 5 MID CITY Or MIAMI PLARNIMo AYPAMTREMr PUBLIC RCCOROS *1239 Although there was disagreement before the zoning body concerning the extent of an increased traffic flow and the degree of detrimental impact, the finding that funeral services at Woodlawn would, over the years, substantially increase the flow of vehicular traffic through residential neighborhoods south of the commercial strip is supported by competent and substantial evidence, presented by experts, and is not disputed here. On a related question, there is no contention or showing that Woodlawn no longer makes profitable commercial use of its land as it has done for over fifty years. STANDARD OF REVIEW There are three components to a circuit court's certiorari review of a zoning decision: whether procedural due process was accorded, whether the essential requirements of the law have been observed, and whether the administrative findings and judgment are supported by competent substantial evidence. In the course of that review the circuit court is not permitted to reweigh the d t b +,4,,+ t d t f h f h Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk zoning body. Education Dev. Center, Inc. v. City of West Palm Beach Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 541 So.2d 106 (F1a.1989). In review of a zoning decision the circuit court must accord it presumptive validity and not interfere with the legislative action if it is fairly debatable. Dade County v. United Resources, Inc., 374 So.2d 1046 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). An ordinance is fairly debatable when for any reason it is open to dispute or controversy on grounds that make sense or point to a logical deduction that in no way involves its constitutional validity. City of Miami Beach v. Lachman, 71 So.2d 148, 152 (Fla. 1953), appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 906, 75 S.Ct. 292, 99 L.Ed. 711 (1955). LEGAL ISSUES Our single inquiry on this point is, thus, only legal in nature: Whether the basis for denying the zoning action bears a substantial relation to the public safety, health, morals, or general welfare. We answered that question in Town of Bay Harbor Islands v. Driggs, 522 So.2d 912 (Fla. 3d DCA) rev. denied, 531 So.2d 1352 (F1a.1988), holding that a municipality properly exercises its police powers in promoting the safety, health, and welfare of its citizens when it controls vehicular traffic in certain areas to prevent congestion. See also City of Tampa v. Seth, 517 So.2d 786 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (city did not act arbitrarily in denying a zoning change out of consideration for the character of the surrounding neighborhood and the adverse impact to be caused it by increased traffic). In Town of Bay Harbor Islands, we also answered a separate issue raised in this appeal, holding, on well-settled principles, that "a zoning ordinance which denies an owner maximum profitable use of his land is not unconstitutionally confiscatory."' Zoning is an exercise of legislative power to which a reviewing court applies a deferential "fairly debatable" test, Machado v. Musgrove, 519 So.2d 629, 632 (Fla. 3d DCA) (en banc), rev. denied, 529 So.2d 694 (F1a.1988), meaning that a zoning ordinance will be upheld unless the party challenging the zoning action shows that the ordinance is clearly arbitrary, unreasonable and without substantial relation to the public safety, health, morals or general welfare. Dade County v. Inversions Rafamar, S.A., 360 So.2d 1130 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). The circuit court may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its evi . nor o su s i e i s �u gmen or t at o t e judgment for that of the local zoning authority where the WESTLAW @2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Worlcs. 10 City Com'n of City of Miami v. Woodlawn Park Cemetery Co., 553 So.2d 1227 (1989) 14 Fla. L. Weekly 1799 evidence before the zoning body supports its legislative decision. Skaggs Albertson's v. ABC Liquors, Inc., 363 So.2d 1082 (F1a.1978). In another landmark case, Schauer v. City of Miami Beach, 112 So.2d 838, 840 (F1a.1959), the Florida supreme court, approving the language of this court in a zoning case, wrote: [W]henever an act of the legislature is challenged in court the inquiry is limited to the question of power, and does not extend to the matter of expediency, the *1240 motives of the legislators, or the reasons which were spread before them to induce the passage of the act. Lawmakers' motives--e.g., whether their decision served personal purposes—are beyond the subject of judicial inquiry in an administrative challenge to the exercise of legislative power. Id. at 840. Significantly, there is no finding by the circuit court of an absence of competent substantial evidence to support the zoning restriction—which is necessary to overturn a decision of a zoning tribunal. City of West Palm Beach Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. Education Dev. Center, Inc., 504 So.2d 1385 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987), cited with approval in Education Dev. Center, Inc. v. City of West Palm Beach Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 541 So.2d 106 (Fla. 1989). The majority's exhaustive examination into the degree of traffic impact is precisely the kind of evidence reweighing by the courts that is prohibited. Skaggs Albertson's, 363 So.2d at 1091. REVERSE SPOT ZONING A theory of illegal "reverse spot zoning" is not applicable to the facts of this case. No Florida court has held that refusal to grant a zoning application for a specific commercial use of a parcel of land, consistent with uses of parcels on three sides, is intrinsically illegal spot zoning. The validity of carving out one or more properties in a given use district and classifying them for a different use depends on the particular facts. For example, a Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk rezoning which creates a small island of property with restrictions on its use different from that of surrounding properties—solely for the benefit of a particular property owner—constitutes illegal spot zoning. On the other hand, singling out a small tract of land for a use restriction different from that of surrounding properties may be upheld where the legislative action is properly related to the public health, safety, morals and general welfare. 101A C.J.S. Zoning & Land Planning, § 44 (1979). See generally 1 R. Anderson, American Law of Zoning §§ 5.12-5.15 (3d ed. 1986). Central to the analysis of a spot zoning question is whether the land is being treated unjustifiably different from similar surrounding land. Schubach v. Silver, 461 Pa. 366, 336 A.2d 328 (1975), cited in 1 R. Anderson, supra, at 361. Florida cases are in accord. See Miles v. Dade County, 260 So.2d 553 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972) (validity of amendatory zoning legislation, in face of spot zoning claim, depends on facts and circumstances of the case). Critical to the holdings in Tollius v. City of Miami, 96 So.2d 122 (Fla. 1957), Kugel v. City of Miami Beach, 206 So.2d 282 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 212 So.2d 877 (F1a.1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1021, 89 S.Ct. 629, 21 L.Ed.2d 565 (1969), and Manilow v. City of Miami Beach, 213 So.2d 589 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968), cert. discharged 226 So.2d 805 (F1a.1969), cert. denied, 397, U.S. 972, 90 S.Ct. 1088, 25 L.Ed.2d 266 (1970), relied on by the majority, were findings that the applicant's land was "no longer suitable" for the permitted use, or that "changed conditions [had] create[d] a situation where the zoning of appellant's property [was] so unreasonable as to constitute a taking of his property." In Olive v. City of Jacksonville, 328 So.2d 854 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), also cited by the majority, the subject land was a vacant lot in a changed area no longer suitable for residential use., The Tollius—Kugel—Manilow—Olive rationale does not fit the facts of this case.' Woodlawn's complaint, stripped to the core, is *1241 simply that the zoning restriction denies it the right to make maximum profitable use of the land. In conclusion: (1) Woodlawn has not been deprived of the right to make reasonable commercial use of its land; (2) denial of the zoning request was not for the benefit of a particular landowner; and (3) denial of Woodlawn's application for a funeral business use was justified out of concern for the public safety and general welfare. For these reasons the claim of reverse spot zoning fails. The circuit court opinion should be quashed as departure from the essential requirements of the law. All Citations WESTLAW © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 11 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ.13 City Com'n of City of Miami v. Woodlawn Park Cemetery Co., 553 So.2d 1227 (1989) on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk 14 Fla. L. Weekly 1799 553 So.2d 1227, 14 Fla. L. Weekly 1799 Footnotes North -south avenues and east -west streets directly connect the single-family residences in the area with all the commercial properties on S.W. 8th Street. Traffic to and from such businesses can flow past these homes, and undoubtedly much of it does. Indeed, S.W. 32nd Avenue, which runs north and south to the immediate east of Woodlawn Cemetery, and S.W. 33rd and 34th Avenues, which run north and south to the immediate west of Woodlawn Cemetery -all intersect S.W. 8th Street and the extensive commercial development located thereon, and all lead directly past the subject homes. As a result, the proposed funeral home is located much further from the residential homes in the area than any of the commercial businesses on S.W. 8th Street because it is entirely buffered by the surrounding fenced cemetery. The circuit court stated below: "[E]xisting cemetery property buffers the [proposed funeral home] from the nearest homes by more than 285 feet to the west, more than 385 feet to the east, and by more than 8 city blocks to the south. By contrast, other commercially zoned parcels along this stretch of Southwest Eighth Street, including the nearby Rivero Funeral Home, are physically adjacent to area residences." (emphasis added). The Rivero Funeral Home, mentioned by the court, is located in the block adjoining Woodlawn Park Cemetery, approximately 600 feet to the west of the Woodlawn parcel, on the corner of S.W. 34th Avenue and S.W. 8th Street. Directly abutting the rear of this funeral home are single family residences. 3 Woodlawn's traffic survey indicates that in 1984 there were 1,280 interments at Woodlawn Cemetery in the 300 days the cemetery was open for interments (R.80); there being no interments on Sundays (R.78). This averages, according to the survey, to four internments per working day -with a maximum of seven such interments per day and a minimum of two. (R.80). The average number of vehicles in each procession, according to the survey, was fifteen -with the largest procession being ninety-six and the smallest being two. (R.80). 4 The Woodlawn traffic survey estimates that there will be 300 funerals per year at the proposed funeral home after five years of operation -which on a 300 -day working year amounts to an average of one funeral a day (R.81); the survey further states that there are fifteen vehicles in the average funeral procession at Woodlawn (R.80). As a consequence, Mr. Kahart Pinder, who prepared Woodlawn's traffic survey, testified before the zoning board that "we will be putting fifteen vehicles [per day] into the cemetery as a result of the funeral home," (App. A-2 at R.342). 5 Two commissioners recused themselves from this case because they have interests in funeral homes whose businesses would potentially be hurt if the rezoning request were approved. 6 Ellison v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 183 So.2d 193, 195 (Fla.1966); State ex rel. S.A. Lynch Corp. v. Danner, 159 Fla. 874, 33 So.2d 45, 47 (1947); Marell v. Hardy, 450 So.2d 1207, 1211 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). 7 City of Miami Beach v. Lachman, 71 So.2d 148, 152 (Fla.1953), appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 906, 75 S.Ct. 292, 99 L.Ed. 711 (1955); Hillsborough County v. Westshore Realty, Inc., 444 So.2d 25 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Dade County v. Yumbo, S.A., 348 So.2d 392 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 354 So.2d 988 (Fla.1977); City of Miami v. Schutte, 262 So.2d 14 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972); Larkins v. Metropolitan Dade County, 237 So.2d 343 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970); Metropolitan Dade County v. Greenlee, 224 So.2d 781 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969); Smith v. City of Miami Beach, 213 So.2d 281 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968), writ discharged, 220 So.2d 624 (Fla. 1969). 8 Lambros, Inc. v. Town of Ocean Ridge, Fla., 392 So.2d 993, 994 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); Rural New Town, Inc. v. Palm Beach County, 315 So.2d 478, 480 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). 9 Harrell's Candy Kitchen, Inc. v. Sarasota -Manatee Airport Auth., 111 So.2d 439, 443 (Fla. 1959); City of Miami Beach v. Silver, 67 So.2d 646 (Fla. 1953); Dade County v. Inversiones Rafamar, S.A., 360 So.2d 1130, 1132 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Rural New Town, Inc. v. Palm Beach County, 315 So.2d 478, 480 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); County of Brevard v. Woodham, 223 So.2d 344, 348 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 229 So.2d 872 (Fla. 1969); see also Lambros, Inc. v. Town of Ocean Ridge, Fla., 392 So.2d 993 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). 10 Rural New Town, Inc. v. Palm Beach County, 315 So.2d at 480; City of Miami Beach v. Silver, 67 So.2d at 647; Metropolitan Dade County v. Kanter, 200 So.2d 624, 626 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 204 So.2d 329 (Fla.1967); see City of St. Petersburg v. Aikin, 217 So.2d 315 (Fla. 1968); Dade County v. Beauchamp, 348 So.2d 53, 55 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), cert. denied, 355 So.2d 512 (Fla. 1978); Neubauer v. Town of Surfside, 181 So.2d 707, 709 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. VUFSI't AW O 7.019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 12 Submitted into the public record for item(s) PZ. 13 , City Com'n of City of Miami v. Woodlawn Park Cemetery Co., 553 So.2d 1227 (1989) on 06-27-2019 . City Clerk 14 Fla. L. Weekly 1799 denied, 192 So.2d 488 (Fla. 1966); see also Larkins v. Metropolitan Dade County, 237 So.2d 343 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970). 11 One of the local residents who testified below complained about the amount of traffic impact in the area caused by the nearby Rivero Funeral Home on S.W. 8th Street, and stated "we're not living in a residential zone anymore." 1 The constitutional challenge to the ordinance, as it affected the plaintiffs individual property rights, was by a suit instituted in the circuit court for declaratory relief. 2 Another factor which materially distinguishes this case is that, notwithstanding the zoning restriction, Woodlawn is already making commercial use of its property. Unlike the Tollius–Kugel–Manilow cases, there is no suggestion here that a rezoning for any commercial use would have been denied. What was denied in this case was an application for a funeral home use—because of its plan to channel commercial traffic through residential zones. 3 Olive was not a certiorari review of a legislative action; that case was an appeal from a judgment entered in the landowner's action for injunctive relief challenging a zoning decision as it affected his individual property rights. The trial court held the ordinance discriminatory and confiscatory. The rationale of the appellate court in upholding that finding—consistent with Tollius and Kugel which it cites—is that the restriction on the appellant's property, under the circumstances, was unreasonable. End of Document © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. WESTLAW @2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 13