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HomeMy WebLinkAboutSubmittal-Samuel Dubbin-Opposition Letter Packet RE Ultra FestDUBBIN KRAVETZ VIA EMAIL Hon. Mayor Francis Suarez and City Commissioners Kean Hardemon, Ken Russell, Willy Gort, Joe Carollo, and Manolo Reyes 3500 Pan American Way Miami, Florida Submitted into the public record for item s) 4 � • ,� on September 12, 2018 SAMUEL J. DUBBIN, P.A. DIRECT (30S) 357-9004 sdubbinedubbinkravetz.com Re: Downtown Miami Residents' Opposition to Proposed Agreement by the City of Miami for Ultra Music Festival in Bayfront Park Dear All: This law firm represents the following residents of 50 Biscayne Boulevard and 200 Biscayne Boulevard Way in Downtown Miami: ltai Benosh, Joy Prevor, Ken Schwartz, Victor Gadino, Santiago Peredo, Carmine Sorrentino, Rebecca Yu, Barry Duceman, Arlene Ramsingh, Luz Saldarriaga, and Pete Ellis, as well as the 50 Biscayne Condominium Association, Inc. ("Association") (Collectively "Residents"). As documented in my June 20, 2018 letter to the City of Miami ("City") Mayor and Commissioners and the Bayfront Park Management Trust ("Trust"), extreme Mega -Events such as the Ultra Music Festival constitute legal nuisances, and the City and the Trust have a legal obligation not to allow such harmful activity in the middle of a heavily populated residential community. On behalf of the Residents, I am re -submitting the June 20, 2018 letter and attachments for the record in opposition to the Proposed Ultra Agreement at the September 13 meeting. In addition, the Proposed Ultra Agreement would violate Sections 29-A, 29-B, and 3(f)(iii) of the City of Miami Charter, which require competitive bidding, independent appraisals, and a return to the City of fair market value, as a precondition for the City to lease or convey any interest in Bayfront Park to a private entity. Unfortunately, in the past, the City has circumvented the Charter in to allow Ultra concerts in Bayfront Park, and proposes to do it again, using the legal fiction that the Ultra Agreement is a "license" instead of a lease or conveyance of an interest in land governed by the Charter. However, the Third District Court of Appeal, in Homestead -A' ianni Speedway, LLC v. City of Miami, 828 So.2d 411 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002), rejected this fiction and held an almost identical arrangement for motor racing over a three-day period in Bayfront Park was a lease and not a "license." The Court held that the City's attempt to enter into such an agreement without following the Charters competitive bidding, appraisal, and fair market rent requirements was void. 1200 ANASTASIA AVENUE • SUITE 300 • CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA 33134(.4 �Svorn c� � \F 371-4700 * Jk �' ] 41� ff Ci p a: `` 1141,24 1 ?S+ Mayor and City of Miami Commissioners September 12, 2018 Page 2 Submitted into the public record for item(s) . on 4 -ll 6 City Clerk After reviewing the relevant Charter provisions and case law, we believe you will understand clearly that any Commissioner who votes "yes" on the Proposed Ultra Agreement will be acting in violation of the Charter, and that any resulting `'agreement" would be void.' 1. Governing Charter Provisions. The following Charter provisions prohibit the Commission from voting in favor of the Proposed Ultra Agreement without first following these Charter requirements. Charter Section 29-A(b) provides: Sales and leases of real property; prohibition. Except as otherwise provided in this section, there shall he no sale, conveyance, or disposition of any interest, including any leasehold, in real property owned by the city, the department of off- street parking, or the downtown development authority, unless there has been prior public notice and a prior opportunity given to the public to compete for said real property or interest. Any such sale, conveyance, or disposition shall be conditioned upon compliance with this section.... Further, no right, title, or interest shall vest in the transferee of such property sinless the sale, conveyance, or disposition is made to the highest responsible bidder ... . Exhibit A, page 4 (Emphasis supplied). Charter Section 29-B of the Charter also requires competitive bidding, and imposes the additional requirement that any lease of public land return fair market value to the city. It is worded carefully to prohibit the Cotnnaission from '.favorably considering" any transaction that does not return fair market value to the city, and that does not result from competitive bidding: Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary contained in this Charter of the City Code, and except as provided below, the city commission is prohihited from _favorably considering any sale or lease of property owned by the city unless there is a return to the city of fair market value under such proposed sale or. lease. The city commission is also prohibited from favorably considering any sale or lease of city -owned property unless (a) there shall have been. prior to the date ° Under the November 2016 City of Miami Charter standing amendment approved by over 84% of the voters. Section 52. any City resident would have standing to challenge the City's violation of the Charter. In addition, the Residents would suffer a "special injury" from the City's violation of the Charter due to their close proximity to Bayfront Park and the illegal levels of noise and other damages that Ultra would inflict on the park, the residents, and local businesses. DUBBIN & KRAVETL, LLP 1200 ANASTASIA AVENUE • SUITE 300 • CORAL GABLES. FLORIDA 33134 • TELEPHONE i3051 371-4700 Mayor and City of Miami Commissioners September 12, 2018 Page 3 Submitted into the public record for items) DH • -1 an - City Clerk of the city commission's consideration of such sale or lease, an advertisement soliciting proposals for said sale or lease published in a daily newspaper of general paid circulation in the city, allowing not less than ninety (90) days for the city's receipt ofproposals prospective purchasers or lessees ... Exhibit A, page 6 (Emphasis supplied). In addition, Section 3(f)(iii) of the Charter governs disposition of the city's waterfront property, which obviously includes Bayfront Park. It requires observance of al] other Charter provisions, as well as "reasonable public access to the water and reasonable public use of the property," "a fair return to the city based on two independent appraisals," and observance of all Code procurement requirements.2 If these requirements are not satisfied, the agreement would have to be approved in a referendum. Section 3(f)(iii) provides: Sec. 3. Powers. The City of Miami shall have power to: (a)—(e) [Reserved] (f) Acquisition and disposition of property and services: (iii) To lease or contract with entities for the management of any of the city's waterfront property. but only in compliance with the other requirements of this charter and on the condition that: (A) the terms of `the contract allow reasonable public access to the water and reasonable public use of the property, and comply with the other charter waterfront setback and view -corridor requirements; and (B) the terms of the contract result in a firir return to the city based on two independent appraisals; and (C) the use is authorized under the then -existing master plan of the city; Section 30)(iii)(E) also limits any contract to five years and prohibits "an automatic renewal or termination penalty." which some versions of the draft Ultra agreements would have allowed. DUBBIN & KRAVETZ, LLP 1200ANASTASIA AVENUE • SUITE 300 • CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA 33E34 • TELEPHONE i3051 371-4700 Mayor and City of Miami Commissioners September 12, 2018 Page 4 Submitted into the public record for item(s) 0 1. 2 on -13- _ City Clerk (D) the procurement methods prescribed by ordinances are observed; (E) the contract does not exceed five years and does not contain an automatic renewal or termination penalty. Any such lease or management agreement or proposed extension of modification of an existing such lease or management agreement which does not comply with each of the above conditions shall not be valid unless it has first been approved by a majority of the voters of the city. Exhibit B, at 1-2 (Emphases supplied). 2. Legal Fiction that Proposed Ultra Agreement is a "License" and Not a Lease Subject to Charter Sections 29-A, 29-B, and 3(f)(iii). The Proposed Ultra Agreement is subject to these requirements of the Charter because it constitutes a lease of, or a conveyance of an interest in, public waterfront land. The City Attorney's Office has taken the position that under the authority of the Homestead Speedway case, the distinction between a "lease" and "license" allows the City to approve the Proposed Ultra Agreement without following the requirements of the Charter. However, the Third District Court of Appeal in the Homestead Speedway case held just the opposite of what the City has been doing with past Ultra agreements, and the Proposed Ultra Agreement would purport to do again. In Homestead Speedway, the Court invalidated an agreement between the City and Raceworks, LLC to allow auto racing in Bayfront Park for three days each year, because the City failed to follow the Charter requirements. It held: "We affirm the trial court's determination that the agreement was a lease, not a license, and as such should have been competitively bid as required by the City Charter.' 828 So.2d at 413. The Court elaborated: The original agreement between the City and Raceworks was not a license because a license is revocable al will and cannot be assigned. . . . The agreement at issue here was assignable and could not be revoked without notice of default and the opportunity to cure. Additionally. Raceworks was given the exclusive use of Bayfront Park for at least three days each year for fifteen years. Since the agreement between the City and Raceworks was a lease. it fell within the purview of section 3(f)(iii) and section 29-A(D) of the City Charter... . The agreement at issue here gave Raceworks in effect a sub -lease for Bayfront Park, part of the City's interest in waterfront property. Thus, the original DUBBIN & KRAVETZ, LLP 1200 ANASTASIA AVENUE • SUITE 300 • CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA 33134 • TELEPHONE (3051 371-4700 Mayor and City of Miami Commissioners September 12, 2018 Page 5 Submitted into the public record for item s) . 2 on J City Clerk agreement to hold races in Bayfront Park should have been the result of competitive bids. The trial court therefore correctly held that the city was required to follow competitive bid procedures and that any contract for the use of the City's waterfront property entered into without complying with those procedures was void. Homestead Speedway, 828 So.2d at 412-13 (Emphasis supplied), attached as Exhibit C.3 There is no credible argument that the Proposed Ultra Agreement is a "license" when the Third District held the agreement in Homestead Speedway was a lease, or a conveyance of the City's interest in Bayfront Park, nor is there any credible argument that Sections 29 and 3(f)(iii) of the Charter do not apply. • The lessee in Homestead Speedway had the right of exclusive use of the Park for three (3) days each year, Under Section 2.17 of the Proposed Ultra Agreement, Ultra has exclusive use of the Park for at least thirty (30) days each year. • The agreement in Homestead Speedway could not be revoked without notice of default and an opportunity to cure. Under Section 18 of the Proposed Ultra Agreement, the City must provide Ultra with written notice of any "material breach" and an opportunity over a thirty day period to cure the breach before it can terminate. • The agreement in Homestead Speedway was assignable. Under Section 29, the Proposed Ultra Agreement is also assignable under a multitude of scenarios, including many that do not require the City's consent, such as a merger or consolidation or asset sale to an entity with a net worth in excess of $5 million, or that has operated 5 live events over the past five years, and others. Under the Homestead Speedway case, the fact that Ultra would have the exclusive right to control a massive defined area in Bayfront Park for over thirty (30) days, the right to receive notice and a right to cure for any possible tcrmin.ation effort by the City, and broad assignment rights, makes any argument that the Proposed Ultra Agreement is a "terminable at will license'. and not a lease or interest in City property utterly specious. 4 The Charter provisions at issue in Homestead Speedway, Sections 29-A and 3(f)(iii). are materially identical to the Charter provisions applicable today. The Proposed Ultra Agreement also contains several of the elements the Third District held were characteristic of a lease, not a license, in Ryan €'. National Marine Mfrs, Assn, 103 So.3d 1001 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012), discussed infra at pages 7-8. DUBBIN & KRAVETZ, LLP i200 ANASTASIA AVENUE • SUITE 300 • CORAL GABLES. FLORIDA 33134 • TELEPHONE (305) 371-4700 Mayor and City of Miami Commissioners September 12, 2018 Page 6 Submitted into the pub record for items on City Clerk The Third District Court of Appeal in Homestead Speedway cited other Florida appellate decisions which held that agreements to allow the use of public property similar to the Proposed Ultra Agreement are considered "leases" of, or interests in public property, such that competitive bidding laws applied. See Outdoor Media of Pensacola, Inc. v. Santa Rosa County, 554 So.2d 613 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (county's granting exclusive right to use right of way was a lease subject to competitive bidding procedures); Randall Indus., Inc. v. Lee County, 307 So.2d 499 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975) (license agreement which gave taxi company exclusive use of airport. parking spaces was a lease which required competitive bidding).' In Outdoor Media, Santa Rosa County granted a sign company "an exclusive right to use county rights of way for placing signs paid for by" the company's customers which included a plate naming the sponsor. A competitor sued on the ground that state law required counties to hold competitive bidding before selling or leasing any real or personal property. The court cited Florida Supreme Court precedent that "defined a lease as 'a conveyance by the owner of an estate to another of a portion of his interest in the land for a term less than his own [which passes] a present interest in the land for the period specified.'" 554 So.2d at 615, quoting DeVore v. Lee, 158 Fla. 608, 30 So.2d 924, 925 (1947). The court in Outdoor Media also quoted Black's Law Dictionary, and found the billboard transaction met the traditional definition of a lease rather than a license: A lease is defined in Black's Law Dictionary § 829 (511 ed. 1979) as a Contract for exclusive possession of lands or tenements for determinate period. Contract for possession and profits of lands and tenements either for life, or for certain period of time, or during the pleasure of the parties... Conveyance of interest in real property for specified period or at will. Conveyance or grant of estate in real property for limited term with conditions attached. 554 So.2d at 615. In contrast. it cited Black's definition of "license:" "A license is not a contract between the state and the licensee, but is a mere personal permit. License, with respect to real property, is a privilege to go on premises for a certain purpose, but does not operate to confer on, or vest in, licensee any title, interest. or estate in such property Id., at 615. Based on these definitions, the court in Outdoor Media held that the County's grant of an exclusive right to the advertising company to place signs on county rights of way for a three year period, at a fixed price, and with the right to renew for an additional three year period. was a lease, not a license: ' These parenthetical quotes are directly from the third District's decision in Flornestead Speedway, 828 So.2d at 413. DUBBIN & KaAVETZ, LLP 1200 ANASTASIA AVENUE • SUITE 300 • CORAL GABLES. FLORIDA 33134 • TELEPHONE {305) 371-4700 Mayor and City of Miami Commissioners September 12, 2018 Page 7 Submitted into the pu . L reco item(s)` d for }• �+p on "1 -13C �� City Clerk This right under the agreement comports with the generally accepted definition of a lease as contemplated by the Supreme Court in DeVore, and by Black's Law Dictionary. That is, by agreement the county has passed a portion of its interest in the rights of way for a specified period, in that [the advertising company] is authorized to use county land for the placing of signs. In other words, [the company] has been granted more than a privilege to go on the land Instead, it has been granted use of a portion of the land for the duration of the agreement. Id., at 615 (Emphasis supplied). The Third District in Homestead Speedway, and the First District in Outdoor Media, also cited Randall Indus., Inc., v. Lee County, 307 So.2d 499, 501 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). In Randall, the Second DCA held the county's grant of an exclusive right to use certain parking areas at the airport for a taxicab and limousine stand, which was called a "license agreement and space lease," nevertheless constituted a lease of county property that was subject to the competitive bidding requirements of state law. In Ryan v. National Marine Mfrs. Ass 'n, 103 So.3d 1001 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012), the Third District analyzed an agreement by the City of Miami Beach allowing the national trade association for the recreational boating industry (NMMA) to use a City -owned, private parking lot to park several trailer tractors during the international boat show. It held the agreement conveyed a `'controlling interest in real property" for purposes of a state law providing that a person with such an interest is not liable for damages when a trespasser is injured on that property when under the influence of alcohol. In Ryan, even though the document was entitled "Temporary License and Use Agreement," the Third District held the following elements compelled the conclusion that the agreement fit the textbook definition of a "lease" rather than a "license." such that the grantee/lessee had "a controlling interest in real property." It cited the following factors: • The agreement describes a particular piece of property, which is identified by exact address and is described as "the Premises." • The agreement is for a set term beginning on a date certain and ending on a date certain, referred to as "the Term" of the Agreement. • The parties agreed "this agreement constitutes a month -to month agreement • NMMA was required to pay a "security deposit" at the time of execution of the agreement. • NMMA was required to "quit and deliver the Premises ... at the end of the term • NMMA agreed "that it will occupy and maintain the premises in a good condition - and "will not commit, or suffer to be committed, any waste of or on the Premises. - DUBBIN & KRAVETZ, 1200 ANASTASIA AVENUE • SUITE 300 • CORAL GAEILES, FLORIDA 33134 • TELEPHONE {3051 371-4700 Mayor and City of Miami Commissioners September 12, 2018 Page 8 Submitted into the public record for item(s) on � 3 �1 City Clerk • NMMA agreed that it "will not assign this Agreement, or any interest therein, and "may not sublease without the prior written agreement" of the City. • NMMA was required to "property maintain" and "be responsible" for all automobiles on the Premises at all times during the Agreement. • NMMA agreed that the City "shall have the right to enter upon the Premises at such times and at such places during reasonable business hours, for the purpose of inspecting the Premises, or for any reason whatsoever." • NMMA was required to provide a minimum of one million dollars in liability and personal property insurance coverage "related to NMMA's possession of the Premises." • In the event NMMA failed to perform any of the terms and conditions of the Agreement, the City was required to give NMMA a five-day written notice to cure a default. In light of these provisions, the Third DCA concluded that the grantee/lessee had a far more extensive interest than the Black's Law Dictionary definition of a license. "It is clear from these provisions that NMMA was given far more than a revocable permission or privilege to enter upon the property." The Court concluded: "The Agreement far more closely approaches the BIack's Law Dictionary definition of a "Iease," i.e. "[a] contract by which a rightful possessor of real property conveys the right to use and occupy the property in exchange for consideration." 103 So.3d at 1004-05. As the Commissioners can readily observe from the Agenda materials, virtually all of the elements cited by the Third District in Ryan to hold that the City of Miami Beach had conveyed a controlling interest in land. and not a mere license to NMMA, are found in the Proposed Ultra Agreement. See Sections 2.12, 2.15, 2.17, 3.1, 3.2, 4.1, 4.3, 5.1. 6.3, 7, 9.1. 9.4, 13. 15. 16. 17. and 18. There is simply no legal way for this Commission to approve the Proposed Ultra Agreement until the City conducts a proper competitive bidding process, obtains the necessary appraisals, ensures a return of fair market value to the City, and meets the other protections for the public set forth in the Charter. 3. Conclusion. As the Residents and others from the community will explain at the City Commission meeting on Thursday, there are abundant policy reasons for this Commission to reject the Proposed Ultra Agreement. There are also compelling legal reasons why this Commission must vote No. DUBBIN & KRAVETZ, LLP 1200 ANASTASIA AVENUE • SUITE 300 • CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA 33134 • TELEPHONE (305) 371-4700 Mayor and City of Miami Commissioners September 12, 2018 Page 9 Respectfully, Samuel J. Dubbin, P.A. Dubbin & Kravetz, LLP cc: Emilio Gonzalez, City Manager Victoria Mendez, City Attorney Todd. B. Hannon, City Clerk Jose Gell, Acting Executive Director, Bayfront Park Management Trust Submitted into the public record for itemLs) r)U 3 on Pa City Clerk DUBBIN & KRAVETZ, I.i.P 1200 ANASTASIA AVENUE • SUITE 300 • CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA 33134 TELEPHONE (305) 371.4700 Stubmitted into the public �} itiroki for itern(s) City Clerk EXHIBIT A Submitted into the public record for item(s) on 0jp13 City Clerk EXHIBIT B Submitted into the public record for item s) on 0 City Clerk EXHIBIT C Submitted into the publ'e record for item(s) ■ .� C ll'IL S--1q City Clerk EXHIBIT A Submitted into the public record for item s) _ 0.4.3 on l City Clerk Sec. 29-A. Contracts for, unified development projects, and real property; • safeguards. (a) Unified devefoprnent projects_ A unified development project shall mean a project where an interest in real property is owned or is to be acquired by the city, is to be used for the development of improvements, and as to which the city commission determines that for the development of said improvements it is most advantageous to the city to procure from a private person, as defined in the Cade of the City of Miami, one or more of the following integrated packages: fl) planning and design, construction, and leasing; or planning and design, leasing, and management; or planning and design, construction, and management; or planning and design, construction, leasing, and management. So long as the person from whore the city procures one of the above -mentioned integrated packages provides all of the functions listed for that package, such person need not provide each listed function for the entire unified development project nor for the same part of the unified development project. As many members of the public having expertise in the field of real estate development or in other relevant technical areas or who reside within the vicinity of a proposed unified development project site as deemed appropriate by the city manager shall be invited by the city manager to provide input during the preparation of documents for cornpetitive processes of the unified development project. If deemed appropriate by the city manager, the unified development project process shall include a request for qualifications process prior to the issuance of a request for proposals. Qualiticaiions shall be evaluated by the city manager or designee(s) and only those deemed qualified in accordance with the specified evaluation criteria shall be invited to participate in the subsequent request for proposal process for said unified development project. Requests for proposals for unified development projects shall generally define the nature of the uses the city is seeking for the unified development project and the estimated allocations of land for each use. They shall also state the following: (1) the specific parcel of land contemplated to be used or the geographic area the city desires to develop pursuant to the unified development project Submitted into the publi record for item() on (2) the specific evaluation criteria to be used by the below -mentioned certified public accounting firm; (3) the specific evaluation criteria to be used by the below -mentioned review committee;; (4) the extent of the city's proposed commitment of funds, property, and services; (5) the definitions of the terms "substantial increase'" and ""material alteration" that will apply to the project pursuant to subsection (e)(4) hereof; and (6) a reservation of the right to reject all proposals and of the right of termination referred to in subsection (e)(4), below. After public notice there shall be a public hearing at which the commission shall consider: (1) the contents of the request for proposals for the subject unified development project, (2) the selection of a certified public accounting firm, which shall include at least one member with previous experience in the type of development in question; and (3) the recommendations of the city manager for the appointment of persons to serve on the review committee. Said review committee shall consist of an appropriate number of city officials or employees and an equal number plus one of members of the public, whose names shall be submitted by the city manager rio fewer than five days prior to the above -mentioned public hearing. At the conclusion of the public hearing the city commission shall authorize the issuance of a request for proposals, select a certified public accounting firm, and appoint the members of the review committee only from among the persons recommended by the city manager_ Theprocedure for the selection of an integrated package proposals shall be as follows- (1) City Clerk Submitted into the public record for items) P ' ,) on O CI �j�},' City Clerk all proposals shall be analyzed by a certified public accounting firm appointed by the commission based only on the evaluation criteria applicable to said certified public accounting firm contained in the request for proposals. Said certified public accounting firm shall render a written report of its findings to the city manager. (2) the review committee shall evaluate each proposal based only on the evaluation criteria applicable to said review committee contained in the request for proposals. Said review committee shall render a written report to the city manager of its evaluation of each proposal, including any minority opinions. (3) taking into consideration the findings of the aforementioned certified pubic accounting firm and the evaluations of the aforementioned review committee, the city manager shall recommend one or more of the proposals for acceptance by the city commission, or alternatively, the city manager may recommend that all proposals be rejected. If there are three or more proposals and the city manager recommends only one, or if the city manager recommends rejection of all proposals, the city manager shall state in writing the reasons for such recommendation. In transmitting his or her recommendation or recommendations to the commission, the city manager shall include the written reports, including any minority opinions, rendered to by the aforementioned certified accounting firm and review committee_ (4) all contracts for unified development projects shall be awarded to the person whose proposal is most advantageous to the city, as determined by the city commission. The commission may accept any recommendation of the city manager by an affirmative vote of a majority of its members. In the event the commission does not accept a proposal recommended by the city manager or does not reject ail proposals, the commission shall seek recommendations directly from the aforementioned review committee, which shall make a recommendation or recommendations to the commission taking into account the report of the aforementioned certified public accounting firm and the evaluation criteria specified for the review committee in the request for proposals. After receiving the direct recommendations of the review committee, the commission shall, by an affirmative vote of a majority of its members' (1) accept any recommendation of the review committee; or (2) accept any previous recommendation of the city manager; or (3) Submitted into the pubii record for ite on 011'I S '] S) reject all proposals. All contracts for unified development projects shall be signed by the city manager or designee after approval thereof by the commission. The city manager or designee shall be responsible for developing a minority procurement program as may be prescribed by ordinance and permitted by law in conjunction with the award of contracts for unified development projects. The provisions of this charter section shall supersede any other charter or code provision to the contrary. (b) Sales and leases of real property; prohibition. Except as otherwise provided in this section, there shall be no safe, conveyance, or disposition of any interest, including any leasehold, in real property owned by the city, the department of off-street parking, or the downtown development authority, unless there has been prior public notice and a prior opportunity given to the public to compete for said real property or interest. Any such sale, conveyance, or disposition shall be conditioned upon compliance with: the provisions of this section; such procurement methods as rnay be prescribed by ordinance; and any restrictions that may be imposed by the city, the department of off-street parking, or the downtown development authority, as appropriate. Further, no right, title, or interest shall vest in the transferee of such property unless the sale, conveyance, or disposition is made to the highest responsible bidder, as is determined by the city commission, or the off-street parking board, or the downtown development authority board of directors. The city commission or the off-street parking board or the downtown development authority board of directors, as appropriate, may by resolution waive the requirement of sale, conveyance, or disposition to the highest responsible bidder by means of the following procedure: the city manager, the director of the off-street parking authority, or the director of the downtown development authority, as appropriate, must make a written finding that a valid emergency exists, which finding must be ratified by an affirmative vote of two-thirds of the city commission after a properly advertised public hearing. When the requirement of sale, conveyance, or disposition to the highest responsible bidder is waived, other procurement methods as may be prescribed by ordinance shall be followed. The city or the department of off-street parking or the downtown development authority shall have the power to reject all offers. All invitations for bids, requests for proposals, or other solicitations shall contain a reservation of the foregoing right to reject all offers. This section shall not apply to transfers to the United States or any department or agency thereof, to the State of Florida, or to any political subdivision or agency thereof_ (c) City Cleric Submitted into the publi reC0Td for item(s) on Cat Safeguards. (1) All persons contracting with the city under this section shall be required to certify their compliance with the antitrust laws of the United States and of the State of Florida and to hold harmless, defend, and indemnify the city for any noncompliance by said persons with the above laws. (2) All persons contracting with the city under this section shall be obligated to pay whichever is the greater of the following: (i) all applicable ad valorem taxes that are lawfully assessed against the property involved or (ii) an amount to be paid to the city equal to what the ad valorem taxes would be if the property were privately owned and used for a profit -making purpose. Such taxes shall not be credited against any revenues accruing to the city under any contract that may be awarded under this section_ (3) Any proposal by a potential bidder or contractor that contemplates more than the estimated extent of the city`s proposed commitment of funds, property, ar services shall be ineligible for acceptance by the city commission. (4) Any substantial increase in the city's commitment of funds, property, or services, or any material alteration of any contract awarded under subsection (c) of this section shall entitle the city commission to terminate the contract after a public hearing_ Prior to such public hearing, the city commission shall seek and obtain a report from the city manager and from the review committee that evaluated the proposals for the project, concerning the advisability of exercising that right. (Cher; Amend. No. 3, 11-6-79; Oirl. No. 9507, § 1. 10-28-62/11-2-82: Res. Na. 86-656, § 2.a, 7-24-86111- 4-888: r?es. lvc;. 87-678, § 21a). 7-9-87/11-3-87; Res. No. 01-841, § 2. 8-9-01; Res. No. 01-843, § 2, 8-9-01) Editor's note — Res. No. 01-843, § 2, adopted August 9, 2001, amended § 29-A in its entirety to read as herein set out. Formerly, § 29-A pertained to contracts for personal property, public works ar improvements, unified development projects, and real property: safeguards. The historical notation has been retained for reference purposes. Ord. No. 9489, adopted by the commission on Sept. 17, 1982, set forth Charter Amendment No. 1 for approvalirejection at election on Nov. 2, 1982. On Oct. 28, 1982, Ord. No. 9507 amended the language of subsections (a) and (c) of § 53 as proposed by Ord_ No. 9489. The election was to approve the language of Charter Amendment No. 1, as amended by Ord. No. 9507. subsequently, in light of Charter City Clerk Submitted into the publi recor for item s) on 0 City Clerk Amendment No. 2 of Nov. 3, 1987, the city attorney directed the codifier to delete paragraph (ii) of subsection (d) as superseded by § 29-B. Case Jaw reference —For case decided prior to enactment by Charter Amendment No. 3 of 1979 of a competitive -bidding requirement for disposition of city property, see Mahoney v Gh ens, 64 5o, 2d 926. Said case held that competitive bidding is not required to lease city neat estate_ Mated! variance between plans bid upon and plans submitted and adopted renders contract void, Glatstein v. City of Miami: 399 So, 2d 1005. Sec. 29-B. City -owned property sale or (ease —Generally. Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary contained in this Charter or the City Code, and except as provided below, the city commission is prohibited from favorably considering any sale or lease of property owned by the city unless there is a return to the city of fair market value under such proposed sale or lease. The city commission is also prohibited from favorably considering any sale or lease of city -owned property unless (a) there shall have been, prior to the date of the city commission's consideration of such sale or lease, an advertisement soliciting proposals for said sale or lease published in a daily newspaper of general paid circulation in the city, allowing not less then ninety (90) days for the city's receipt of proposals from prospective purchasers or lessees, said advertisement to be no less than one-fourth (Y4) page and the headline in the advertisement to be in a type no smaller than 18-point and, (b) except as provided below, there shall have been at least three (3) written proposals received from prospective purchasers or lessees: however, if there are less than three (3) such proposals received and if the guaranteed return under the proposal whose acceptance is being considered is equal to fair market value the city commission determines that the contemplated sale or tease will be in the city's best interest then, subject to the approval of a majority of the votes cast by the electorate at a referendum, the sale or lease may be consummated. ]n the case of city -owned property which is not waterfront, when the value of such property to be sold or leased (individual leaseholds within a single city -owned property shall not be considered as a single parcel of property for such valuation purposes) is five hundred thousand dollars ($540,000) or less, based on an appraisal performed by a state -certified appraiser, the city commission, by a 4/5ths affirmative vote, may sell or lease said city -owned property after compliance with the advertisement requirements set forth above but without the necessity of a referendum. The above provisions and any other city requirements for competitive bidding shall not apply when: (a) conveying property to implement housing programs or projects which are intended to benefit persons OF households with low and/or moderate income, Submitted into the public recur for item{s) 14. on O9•t't jf[ City Clerk the criteria of which to be provided for by federal andlor state law or by the city commission; (b) conveying property to implement projects authorized under the Florida Community Redevelopment Act of 1969, as amended; (c) conveying property to implement projects of any governmental agency or instrumentality; (d) disposing of property acquired as a result of foreclosure; (e) disposing of property acquired in connection with delinquent taxes which properties were conveyed to the city by the Miami -Dade board of county commissioners under the provisions of Section 197.592 Florida Statutes, as amended; and (f) disposing of non -waterfront property to the owner of an adjacent property when the subject property is 7,500 square feet or less or the subject non - waterfront property is non -buildable. Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, the city commission, by a 4/5ths affirmative vote, may: (a) (b) grant a lessee of city -owned property a one -tune extension during the last five years of its lease, without the necessity of a referendum, for the purpose of funding additional capital improvements. The extended term shall not exceed twenty-five percent of the original terra or ten years, whichever is less. The granting of such an extension is subject to the lessee paying fair market rent as determined by the city at the time of such extension and not being in default of its lease with the city nor in arrearage of any monies due the city; and amend the Lease Agreement between the City of Miami and Biscayne Bay Restaurant Corp., dibia Rusty Pelican, dated February 13, 1970, as amended, to (i) extend the lease for an additional term of fifteen (15) years, with the option to renew for two (2) additional five (5) year periods, (ii) increase the amount of the minimum guarantee to the City to at feast $360,000 per lease year effective upon execution of the lease amendment, and (iii) require Rusty Pelican to complete capital improvements to the Submitted into the public record for item(s) pon� l% City Clerk property, including a public baywaik, in the amount of not less than $3 Million, within twenty-four (24) months of the effective date of the lease amendment (Res. No. 87-678. § 2(a), 7-9-87/17-3-87• Res. Na. 01-841, § 2, 8-9-01: Res. Na 01-843_ fi 2, 8-9-01; Res. No. 03-655, § 2. 7-24-03) f�. Sec. 29-C. Same Watson island.`'u Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary contained in the Charter or Code of the City of Miami, no sale, conveyance, lease or management agreement may be entered into for the management, occupancy or use of the area known as Watson Island for periods greater than one year unless (1) there shall have been, prior to the date of the city commission's consideration of such sale, lease, management agreement, an advertisement soliciting proposals for said sale, lease or management agreement, published in a daily newspaper of general paid circulation in the city, allowing not less than ninety (90) days for the city's receipt of proposals from prospective purchasers or lessees, said advertisement to be no less than one-fourth page and the headline in the advertisement to be in a type no smaller than le -point: and, (2) the proposed transaction be approved by a majority of the votes cast by the electorate at a referendum_ The procedures for selection of proposals shall be those provided by Charter section 29-A(c) or (d) as appropriate and/or by applicable City Code provisions. Nothing herein shall affect the existing rights or privileges, if any, of any lessee, permittee, licensee or concessionaire currently situated in said area; however. any enlargement, amendment, transfer, or increase in those rights or privileges as may be in existence at the time this amendment is adopted shall require compliance with the provisions of this amendment. This Charter Amendment shall not affect the city's use or occupancy of the area, nor shall it apply to contracts for the construction of any city facilities or improvements in the area, further, nothing contained herein shall apply to projects of any governmental agency or instrumentality. The city commission, by a 4/5` ' affirmative vote, may authorize issuance of a license or concession agreement for a period not exceeding one (1) year, without the necessity of a - referendum, for the use of Watson Island. (Res. Na 87-677. § 2{6). 7-9-$7/11�67; Res. No. 01-84'!, § 2, 8-9-01; Res. No. 01-643, § 2 8-9-01) Sec, 29-a. City -owned waterfront property; leases with nonprofit organizations; authorization to waive cornpetitive bidding and referendum requirements; terms of lease-' - Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary contained in the Charter or Code of the City of Miami, the city commission is authorized to waive all competitive bidding and referendum requirements, if applicable, when entering into a lease or extending an existing lease with a nonprofit, noncommercial, water -dependent organization which provides or Submitted into the public record for items) p#5 O on 't '1 . City Clerk seeks to provide marine -recreational services andlor activities to the community at any city - owned waterfront property, provided all of the following conditions are met (A) The terms of the lease allow reasonable public access to the water and reasonable public use of the property, and complies with a4l waterfront setback and view -corridor requirements set forth in the Charter and Code; The use is authorized under the then existing comprehensive plan of the city, The terms of the lease require that the property be used for public purposes only: The terms of the lease result in a return to the city based on fair market value pursuant to two (2) independent appraisals, and The terms of the tease comply with all requirements pertaining to membership prescribed by ordinance for organizations using city facilities. (Res. No. 93-485, § 2. 7-22-93: Res. No, G1-e41, S 2, 8-9-01. Res. No. 01-843, § 2, 8-9-01) Submitted into the public record for items) on O°M ri . City Clerk EXHIBIT B CITY CHARTER: SUBPART A Sec.3. Powers. Submitted into the public record for i terry(s OR, on , 1 City Clerk The City of Miami shall have the governmental, corporate, and proprietary powers to enable it to conduct municipal government, perform municipal functions and render municipal services and may exercise any power for municipal purposes, except when expressly prohibited by law. The city shall have the extraterritorial powers granted to the city by general and special law and including Laws of Florida, ch. 10847 (1925), as amended. The City of Miami shall have power to: (a)—(e). [Reserved.] (f) (i) Acquisition and disposition of property and services: To acquire by purchase, gift, devise, condemnation or otherwise, real or personal property or any estate or interest therein, inside or outside the city, for any of the purposes of the city; and to improve, sell, lease, mortgage, pledge, or otherwise dispose of such property or any part thereof. (ii) To acquire or dispose of services inside or outside the city, by purchase, gift, or otherwise for any purposes of the city_ To lease to or contract with entities for the management of any of the city's waterfront property, but only in compliance with the other requirements of this charter and on condition that: (A) the terms of the contract allow reasonable public access to the water and reasonable public use of the property, and comply with other charter waterfront setback and view - corridor requirements; and (B) the terms of the contract result in a fair return to the city based on two independent appraisals; and Submitted into the publi +� rccor for it s} on �i City Clerk (C) the use is authorized under the then existing master plan of the city; (D) the procurement methods prescribed by ordinances are observed; (E) the contract does not exceed five years and does not contain an automatic renewal or termination penalty. Any such lease or management agreement or proposed extension or modification of an existing such lease or management agreement which does not comply with each of the above conditions shall not be valid unless it has first been approved by a majority of the voters of the city. Nothing herein contained shall in any manner affect or apply to any project the financing of which has been provided by the authorization of bonds to be issued by the city. (g)--(I). [Reserved.] (m) Harbor and shipping facilities: To establish, construct, maintain, and operate, both inside and outside the city, public landings, wharves, docks, and warehouses; to dredge or deepen harbors and rivers, or any branch or portion thereof; to install turning basins, build jetties, and otherwise improve the harbor and shipping facilities of the city, inside and outside the city and inside and outside harbor lines where such improvements outside of harbor lines are approved by the United States Government or its proper agencies; to acquire by condemnation or otherwise all lands, riparian, and other rights and easements [necessary for the purposes aforesaid; to lay and collect] reasonable duties or fees on vessels coming through or using said landings, wharves, docks or warehouses; to regulate the manner of using other landings, wharves, docks, and warehouses within the city; to prescribe and enforce reasonable rules and regulations for the protection and use of said property; to advance to the Government of the United States, with or without interest, funds to be expended in harbor improvements to be made by the government in or near the city, or directly affecting the city within Miami Harbor and the approaches thereto, if such work has been duly authorized by laws of the Submitted into the public record for item_CO on 9 411'i 3 City clerk United States; and to issue bonds or notes to obtain funds for such advances. (n)—(II). [Reserved.] (mm) Building and zoning: (I) To provide by ordinance building, planning, and zoning regulations and restrictions governing the height, number of stories, method of construction, type, and size of buildings and other structures; the percentage and portion of the lot or site that may be occupied; the size of the front, rear, and side yards, courts, and other open spaces; the location, use of buildings, structures, and land for trade, industry, residences, apartment houses, and other purposes; and the widening and future widening of streets in zoned street areas that the city may establish. Such regulations may provide that a board of appeals or the city commission may determine and vary the application of building, planning, or zoning ordinances in harmony with their general purpose and intent. (ii) In order to preserve the city`s natural scenic beauty, to guarantee open spaces, and to protect the waterfront, anything in this Charter or the ordinances of the city to the contrary notwithstanding, neither the city nor any of its agencies shall issue building permits for any surface parking or enclosed structures located on Biscayne Bay or the Miami River from its mouth to the N.W. 5th Street Bridge, (A) which are not set back at least 50 feet from the seawall (where the depth of the lot is less than 200 feet, the setback shall be at least 25 percent of the lot depth), and (B) which do not have average side yards equal in aggregate to at least 25 percent of the water frontage of each lot based on average lot width. The above setback and side -yard requirements may be modified by the city commission after design and site -plan review and public hearing only if the city commission determines that the modifications requested provide public benefits such as direct public access, public walkways, plaza dedications, covered parking up to the floodplain level, or comparable benefits which promote a Submitted into the public record for item(s) on �►j � 1 City CIerk better urban environment and public advantages, or which preserve natural features. Wherever setback, side -yard, or site -plan review requirements of zoning ordinances are greater than the foregoing requirements, such greater requirements shall govern. (iv) These requirements shall not apply to docks and appurtenant structures, single-family residences and appurtenant structures, and waterfront industrial uses along the Miami River and at the Port of Miami, Nothing herein contained shall in any manner affect or apply to: the City of Miami/University of Miami James L. Knight International Center and hotel facility, including all improvements thereon, or to lands and projects which the city commission has approved prior to September 18, 1979, by development order pursuant to F.S. ch. 380 of a planned area development pursuant to article XXI-1, City of Miami Comprehensive Zoning ordinance or which have received site and development plan approval, including Plaza Venetia, Phase II, Resolution No. 72-113, April 20, 1972; Resolution No. 72-114, April' 20, 1972; and Resolution No. 72-416, July 20, 1972. (Res. No. 01-841. § 2. 8-9 01; Res. No. 01-843 § 2. 8-9-01) Editors note -- The department of neighborhood rehabilitation of the city and all functions involved therein were abolished pursuant to Ord. No. 7576, § 1, adopted July 17, 1957, and effective on the date of transfer of said department to Dade County. At the direction of the city, § 3(vv), added to the charter by Char. Amend. No. 2, effective Jan. 1, 1963, is not set forth herein. Submitted into the public iecoroi for item(s) on O 1'-\ $ •r City Cleric EXHIBIT C Homestead -Miami Speedway, LLC v. City of Miami, 828 So.2d 411 (2002) 27 Fla. L. Weekly D2143 828So.2d411 District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District. HOMESTEAD —MIA -MI SPEEDWAY, LLC., Appellant, v. CITY OF MIAMI, etc., et al., Appellees. Nos. 3D4)2-1506, 3Do2--811, 8Do2--814. Sept. 30, 2002. Synopsis Competitor brought action against city, alleging city could not enter into agreement with company planning to build racetrack on waterfront property without following competitive bid procedures applicable to leases and alleging city violated the Sunshine Law. Company intervened. The Circuit Court, Miami —Dade County, Michael Ciendcn_ J., entered summary final _judgment in favor of competitor as to competitive bidding claim, but found city did not violate Sunshine Law. All parties appealed in consolidated appeal. 'Elie District Court of Appeal, Ramirez, J., held that: (I) agreement was lease, not license and city was obligated to follow competitive bid procedures applicable to leases. but (2) city complied with Sunshine Law. Affirmed in part and reversed in part. West I leadnotes (4) 1r1 Licenses _-• Lease. Municipal Corporations Requisites and validity of conveyance or disposition Agreement between city and company. allowing company to use waterfront property for motor car races_ was a lease. not a license_ as it was assignable and could not be revoked without notice ofdefault and the opportunity to cure. and gave company exclusive use of property for at least three Maws each year for 15 nears. and thus city was obligated to follow competitive bid P1 131 Submitted into the public record for item s) on U City Clerk procedures before conveying lease to company. 1 Cases that cite this headnote Licenses ,Transfer of rights Licenses •v l..icenses Revocable A license is revocable at will and cannot be assigned. I Cases that cite this headnote Injunction Issues_ proof and variance In competitor's action against city alleging city could not enter into agreement with company planning to build racetrack on waterfront properly without following competitive bid procedures applicable to leases. trial court could not order city to comply with all applicable competitive bid procedures and give competitor full and equal opportunity to submit competing bid, since such relief was neither pled nor requested by competitor. 2 Cases that cite this headnote Municipal Corporations ---Rules of procedure and conduct of business City did not violate Sunshine Law. requiring public meetings of any board or commission of any municipal corporation at which official acts were taken. when it negotiated contract to allow races at waterfront park, because there were several publicly -noticed meetings regarding proposed agreement in which there was public participation and debate: Sunshine Law did not require that all negotiations about contract be Homestead -Miami Speedway, LLC v. City of Miami, 828 So.2d 411 (2002) 27 Fla. L. Weekly D2143 open to the public. West's F.S.A. § 286.011(1). Cases that cite this headnote Attorneys and Law Firms *412 Kenny Naehwalter, and Kevin J. Murray, and Thomas 1-I. Seymour, and Robert D.W. Landon, III. Miami. for appellant. Alejandro Vilarello, City Attorney, and Henry Hunnefeld, Assistant City Attorney, and Myrna D. Bricker, Assistant City Attorney, and Erica Wright, Assistant City Attorney; and Lauri Waldman Ross, and 'Theresa L. Girten; Greenberg Traurig, and Alan T. Dimond, and Elliot 11. Scherkcr. and Paul C. Savage, Miami, for appellees. Before FLETCHER. and RAMIREZ, JJ., and NESBITT, Senior Judge. Opinion RAMIREZ, J. In this consolidated appeal. the City of Miami and intervenor Raceworks I.1.0 appeal the entry of summary final judgment in favor of Homestead —Miami Speedway LLC (-Speedway") in vwhich the trial court held that the original agreement between Raceworks and the City of Miami was void and issued an initinction prohibiting any races from going forward under that agreement.' Speedway appeals from a summary final judgment entered in the City's favor in which the trial court held that the City did not violate the Sunshine Law in its negotiations with Speedway. We affirm the trial court's determination that the agreement was a lease. not a license. and as such should have. been competitively bid as required by the City Charter. We also affirm the trial court's determination that there were no Sunshine Law violations. lit 121 The s riginal agreement between [he City and Raceworks was not a license *413 because a license is revocable at will and cannot be assigned. See Outdoor 1-Ieclirr nl I'cmcicofa. Inc. v. .tinnier Moser Conno,. 554 So.2d 613 (Fla. 1st DCA I989) (county s granting exclusive right to use right of way was a lease subject to competitive bidding procedures). See also !muter!! I+ulrr.s., Inc. v. I.ee County. 307 So.2d 499 (Fla. 2d I)CA 1975) Submitted into the public record for item(s) orpoovt l City Clerk (license agreement which gave taxi company exclusive use of airport parking spaces wvas a lease which required competitive bidding). The agreement at issue here was assignable and could not be revoked without notice of default and the opportunity to cure. Additionally, Raceworks was given the exclusive use of Bayfront Park for at least three days each year for fifteen years. Since the agreement between the City and Raceworks was a lease, it fell within the purview of section 3(f)(iii) and section 29—A(d) of the City Charter? The pre -amendment language of section 3(f)(iii) required competitive bidding for the commercial use of any of the City's waterfront property' Section 29—A(d) requires competitive bidding for any agreement which conveys any interest the City has in waterfront property. The City leases the waterfront from the federal government. The agreement at issue here gave Raceworks in effect a sub -lease for Bayfront Park. part oldie City's interest in waterfront property. Thus. the original agreement to hold races in Bayfront Park should have been the result of competitive bids. 131 The trial court therefore correctly held that the City was required to follow competitive bid procedures and that any contract for the use of the City's watertront property entered into without complying with those procedures was void. However, we agree with the City that paragraph 5 of the March 4. 2002 order must be deleted because it was neither pled nor requested by Speedway, See Cardinal Inv. Group, Inc. v. Giles, 8l3 So.2d 262, 263 (1 Ia. 4th DCA 2002) (--[C]ourts are not authorized to grant relief not requested in the pleadings.") tat Florida's Sunshine Law. section 286.01 1(1). Florida Statutes. provides that: All meetings of any board or commission of any ... municipal corporation. or political subdivision. except as otherwise provided in the Constitution. at which official acts are to be taken are declared to be public meetings open to the public at all times. and no resolution. rule, or formal action shall be considered binding except as taken or made at such meeting. The board or commission must provide reasonable notice of all such meet inas. Speedway argues that the City violated the Sunshine Laww because it held no public hearing on the final negotiated contract *4 1 4 before the City voted to approve the Homestead -Miami Speedway, LLC v. City of Miami, 828 So.2d 411 (2002) 27 Ha. L. Weekly D2143 proposed contract at the August 9, 2001 meeting, and there was no cure by the City of this violation. The record reflects, however, that there were meetings regarding the proposed agreement between the City Manager and Raceworks in which there was public participation and debate. The publicly noticed meetings were held on May 24, 2001, July 10, 2001, July 26, 2001, August 9, 2001 and September 25, 2001, and involved a discussion of the terms of the proposed agreement. At the July 10 and July 26 meetings, there was specific public comment regarding the proposed agreement. Furthermore, Speedway has not relied upon any case which requires that "all" such negotiations be open to the public so as not to violate the Sunshine Law. We thus find that the public was involved in the decision making process that resulted in the final negotiated contract of the parties and Speedway's argument lacks merit. Footnotes Submitted into the public record for item + s) on 3 City Clerk This appeal was further complicated by a subsequent agreement between the parties negotiated after the trial court had entered summary judgment. Despite this new agreement, the City and Raceworks continue to argue the validity of the old agreement. 13y our opinion today, we do not address whether the subsequent agreement between the City and Raceworks was also subject to competitive bidding because the trial court has never ruled on the legality of the new agreement. Affirmed in part, reversed in part. MI Citations 828 So.2d 411, 27 Fla. L. Weekly D2143 Order of March 4, 2002: 1. Speedway has standing to assert its claims and the contract is a lease. 2. Because the contract is a lease, the City was and is required to follow competitive bid procedures applicable to leases, and the City's failure to do so renders the contract void as a matter of law. 3. Alternatively, even if the contract were not a lease, the City was required to follow competitive bid procedures pursuant to the provision of City Charter § 3(f)(iii). The City's admitted failure to follow any competitive bid procedures renders the contract void as a matter of law. 4. The contract between the City and Raceworks, which is acknowledged to have been entered into without the City having complied with any of the applicable competitive bid procedures, is hereby declared null, void and of no further legal effect. 5. The City is hereby directed to comply with all applicable competitive bid procedures, and thereby to give Speedway a full and equal opportunity to submit a competing bid, and to have its bid fully and equally considered, before entering into any tease, or any contract for use of the City's waterfront property, for motor car races. 6. The City and Raceworks' cross -motions for summary judgment on Counts V and VI of the Second Amended Complaint are denied. 2 We do, however, reverse the language contained in paragraph 5 of the March 4, 2002 order as it exceeded the relief requested in the pleadings. 3 Section 29—A(d) of the City Charter states: °[s]ales and leases of real property; prohibition. Except as otherwise provided in this charter section, there shall be no sale, conveyance, or disposition of any interest, including any leasehold, in real property owned by the city ... unless there has been prior public notice and a prior opportunity given to the public to compete for said real property or interest." Section § 3(f)(iii) of the City Charter states: "[t]he City of Miami shall have power ... [t]o lease to or contract with private firms or persons for the commercial use or management of any of the city's waterfront property, but only in compliance with the other requirements of this charter and on condition that ... (D) the procurement methods prescribed by ordinances are observed. Any such lease or management agreement ... which does not comply with each of the above conditions shall not be valid unless it has first been approved by a majority of the voters of the city." 4 The City Charter was amended by referendum on November 6, 2001 to delete the words "commercial use" from section 3(f)(iii). Homestead -Miami Speedway, LLC v. City of Miami, 828 So.2d 411 (2002) 27 Fla. L. Weekly D2143 Submitted into the public recordfor ite s) an 01-13- City Clerk End of Oocurnant r4 2018 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.