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HomeMy WebLinkAboutCity Attorney - Standing MemoOVERVIEW OF CITY OF MIAMI'S LEGAL ARGUMENTS IN CASES INVOLVING CITIZEN STANDING The City of Miami Charter Review and Reform Committee has submitted a recommendation to the City Commission that the Charter be amended to confer standing upon citizens to challenge alleged Charter violations in a court of competent jurisdiction. A similar issue is currently pending before the Third District Court of Appeal in Herbits v. City of Miami, 3D15- 1039. The following provides an overview of the City's legal arguments concerning citizen standing during the course of that and similar litigation.' GENERAL STANDING PRINCIPLES In order to invoke the power of the court, a litigant must demonstrate that he or she has standing to maintain a cause of action. Vaughan v. First Union Nat. Bank of Florida, 740 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). "[S]tanding is a threshold issue which must be resolved before reaching the merits of a case. Before a court can consider whether an action is illegal, the court must be presented with a justiciable case or controversy between parties who have standing." Solares v. City of Miami, 166 So. 3d 887, 888 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015); Hayes v. Guardianship of Thompson, 952 So. 2d 498, 505 (Fla. 2006) (standing requires that a litigant demonstrate that he or she reasonably expects to be affected by the outcome of the proceedings, either directly or indirectly); Bouldry v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 909 F. Supp. 2d 1371 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (applying Florida law and concluding that an individual generally has standing to assert a claim if it has a sufficient a sufficient stake in a justiciable controversy; furthermore, the plaintiff must allege a palpable, distinct injury, economic or otherwise, that can be redressed by the relief sought); Peoples v. Sami II Trust 2006-AR6, 178 So. 3d 67 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (standing must exist at the time an action is filed; it cannot be later acquired). This requirement serves to: (1) prevent duplicative litigation; (2) "protect a defendant from facing a subsequent similar action brought by one not a party to the present proceeding;" and (3) "ensure that any action taken to judgment will have its proper effect as res judicata ..." Kumar Corp. v. Nopal Lines, Ltd., 462 So. 2d 1178, 1183 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). A MUNICIPAL CHARTER CANNOT CONFER STANDING It has been suggested that the City Charter can confer standing to challenge government conduct because the Charter is akin to the Constitution. That argument was rejected in Solares v. City of Miami, 166 So. 3d 887, 88-889 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015), where the Third District held that "a city charter does not rise to the level of the Florida Constitution for purposes of creating an exception to standing. Unlike the taxing and spending provisions of the Constitution, a city charter cannot expand or contract the principle of standing which ultimately sounds in the express separation of powers provision of Article II, Section 3 of the Florida Constitution." See also Winn - Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Ferris, 408 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) (holding that circuit court 1 The Charter Review and Reform Committee was provided a similar analysis which was discussed at its May 2, 2016 meeting. Page 2 of 4 jurisdiction cannot be created by ordinance). The Third District's Solares opinion is binding precedent in this District. Next, while the Miami -Dade County Citizen's Bill of Rights contains a provision that confers limited standing to sue municipal officials and employees for violations of the Miami - Dade County Citizen's Bill of Rights, we question whether a County Charter can confer standing at all, based on the recent Solares opinion. And we would note that even though the County Charter purports to confer standing, it is a limited standing to sue municipal officials and employees, and not the County itself. The type of standing that the Committee is presently recommending is broad and unfettered standing to sue the City for any Charter violation. We are concerned about opening the floodgates to such litigation. SPECIAL INJURY REQUIREMENT A citizen is not prohibited from challenging government conduct. Rather, Florida Supreme Court precedent holds that a litigant must demonstrate that he or she suffered a special injury different in kind from that of the general public in order to challenge government conduct. North Broward Hospital District v. Fornes, 476 So. 2d 154, 155 (Fla. 1985); City of Atlantic Beach v. Bull, 476 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 1985); see also Solares, 166 So. 3d at 887; Kneapler v. City of Miami, 173 So. 3d 1002 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015); Smith v. City of Fort Myers, 944 So. 2d 1092, 1094 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) ("Generally, a private citizen is precluded from filing a taxpayer complaint to challenge government action unless the private citizen alleges and proves a 'special injury,' which is an injury that is different in kind from that of the general public."). The special injury rule is consistent with general standing principles because it requires that a litigant suffer an actual, personal injury as opposed to one that is speculative or shared in common with the general public. However, even if a municipality could confer standing to challenge Charter violations, the Committee should be mindful of the policy underlying the special injury rule as explained by the Third District: This rule is based on the sound policy ground that without a special injury standing requirement, the courts would in all likelihood be faced with a great number of frivolous lawsuits filed by disgruntled taxpayers who, along with much of the taxpaying public these days, are not entirely pleased with certain of the taxing and spending decisions of their elective representatives. It is felt that absent some showing of special injury as thus defined, the taxpayer's remedy should be at the polls and not in the courts. We recognize that all these standing rules are based on highly debatable policy choices, but they represent, in our view, a reasonable effort to guarantee that the state and counties lawfully exercise their taxing and spending authority without Page 3 of 4 unduly hampering the normal operations of a representative democratic government. We adhere to these rules today because they are based on long-established precedent and seem both reasonable and fair. Paul v. Blake, 376 So. 2d 256, 259-260 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (emphasis added). As the courts have recognized, permitting every decision of the City Commission to be challenged in court by anyone who disagrees with them would have negative consequences for the City. First, it would require the City to expend valuable time and resources defending against a multitude of lawsuits and so-called "spite" suits. This would mean more delay and expense whenever the City wants to implement new projects aimed at improving the City. Moreover, it would provide a disincentive for businesses to deal with the City if they will be subjected to constant litigation. It may also promote gamesmanship between rival businesses which could file a lawsuit to stop a competitor's project merely because it does not want competition. Finally, many projects are approved by overwhelming majority of City of Miami voters. By conferring automatic standing upon everyone, the will of the voters would be thwarted by only a handful of individuals. A June 9, 2016 memorandum submitted by a Charter Review and Reform Committee member posits that granting Citizen standing will not open the floodgates to litigation. The memorandum supports its position by stating that "[t]he Citizens' Bill of Rights has granted Miami -Dade County citizens standing to enforce its provisions for upwards of 40-years and has resulted in precisely one reported decision in which it was used as a basis for standing." However, the City's litigation history contradicts the board member's assertion as three recent lawsuits demonstrate. First, on November 5, 2013, 61.26% of City voters approved a proposed lease between the City and Grove Bay Investor Group, LLC for the development of Grove Bay Marina. The proposed lease provided a minimum base rent to the City in the amount of $1.4 million per year. Two critics of the lease filed separate lawsuits seeking to void the lease based on Charter violations allegedly committed by the City Commission. The trial court granted summary judgment on the merits in each case. The trial court additionally found that both plaintiffs lacked standing to bring their claims. The Third District affirmed the trial courts' orders, and the Florida Supreme Court denied discretionary review on December 1, 2015, thus ending the litigation approximately 757 days after the referendum. Next, on August 26, 2014, 68.35% of City voters approved a lease extension between the City and Bayside Marketplace, LLC. The extended lease provided for an upfront payment of $10 million to the City and a minimum base rent of $3.5 million per year (subject to escalation). A single critic of the lease filed a lawsuit seeking to void the lease extension based on Charter violations allegedly committed by the City Commission. The trial court entered summary judgment for the City on the merits, and due to a lack of standing. The Third District affirmed the trial court's order, and the Florida Supreme Court denied discretionary review on September 15, 2015, thus ending the litigation approximately 386 days after the referendum. Page 4 of 4 Finally, the "Flagstone Project" was approved by almost 70% of City voters. In 2014, opponents of the project filed a lawsuit alleging that the lease agreement between the City and Flagstone violated the City Charter. Applying the above -mentioned Supreme Court case law, the trial court concluded that the plaintiffs lacked standing to file the lawsuit and dismissed the case with prejudice. That case is pending on appeal before the Third District. CONCLUSION The foregoing is submitted for the City Commission's consideration of this recommendation.