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PICHETTE v. CITY
Cite as 642 So.2d 1165
where decedent was exposed to asbestos in
Massachusetts but moved to Florida long
before onset of his resulting illness and died
a citizen of Florida.
Daniel A. Brown and David M. Lipman,
Miami, for appellant.
Crosby, Saad, Beebe & Crump, Mobile,
AL, Berger & Chafetz and Steven R. Berger,
Miami, for appellee.
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and NESBITT
and LEVY, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Collins was exposed to asbestos in Massa-
chusetts, but moved to Florida long before
the onset of his resulting illness and died a
citizen of this state.1 We hold that the law of
Florida, rather than Massachusetts, was
properly applied below to determine the
measure of damages for his wrongful death.
See Bishop v. Florida Specialty Paint Co.,
389 So.2d 999 (F1a.1980); Proprietors Ins.
Co. v. Valsecchi, 435 So.2d 290 (Fla. 3d DCA
1983), pet. for review denied, 449 So.2d 265
(F1a.1984); Harris v. Berkowitz, 433 So.2d
613 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).
Affirmed.
Pierre PICHETTE, Alan Yarkin,
and Gaytan Mayrand Torres,
Appellants,
v.
CITY OF NORTH MIAMI and Perform-
ing Arts Management of North
Miami, Inc., Appellees.
No. 94-102.
District Court of Appeal of Florida,
Third District.
Sept. 28, 1994.
In challenge to zoning ordinance, final
summary judgment for defendants was
1. Collins died after recovering a personal injury
verdict and judgment but before they were re-
versed. See Owens—Corning Fiberglas v. Terwilli-
OF NORTH MIAMI Fla. 1165
(FIa.App. 3 Dist. 1994)
granted by the Circuit Court, Dade County,
Harold Solomon, J., and plaintiffs appealed.
The District Court of Appeal held that plain-
tiffs, none of whose land was within 2,800
feet of rezoned tract, lacked standing.
Affirmed.
Zoning and Planning C=571
Plaintiffs had no legally recognized in-
terest which would be adversely affected by
challenged zoning ordinance and thus lacked
standing to challenge the ordinance where
one lived in another city more than a mile
across a bay from the rezoned site and the
others were separated by 57—acre buffer area
from rezoned tract, at distances of 3,000 and
2,800 feet, and there was no genuine issue
raised by the record that any plaintiffs would
be affected by noise, traffic impact, land val-
ue diminution or in any other respect by the
subject zoning ordinance.
John G. Fletcher, South Miami, for appel-
lants.
Davis, Scott, Weber & Edwards and Laura
Besvinick, New York City; David M. Wolpin,
North Miami, for appellees.
Before HUBBART and BASKIN and
GREEN, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
The final summary judgment under review
is affirmed upon a holding that the appellants
herein have no legally recognized interest
which will be adversely affected by the zon-
ing ordinance of the City of North Miami
which appellants challenged below, and
therefore they lacked any standing to bring
the declaratory judgment action because (1)
the appellant Allan Yarkin lives in the City of
Bay Harbor Islands, more than a mile across
Biscayne Bay from the rezoned site under
ger, 599 So.2d 130 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), review
denied, 613 So.2d 9 (F1a.1992).
1166 Fla. 642 SOUTHERN REPORTER, 2d SERIES
attack, and there is no genuine issue raised
by this record that he would be affected by
noise, traffic impact, land value diminution,
or in any other respect by the subject zoning
ordinance; and (2) the appellants Pierre Pi-
chette and Gaytan Torres live in the City of
North Miami Beach, separated by a 57—acre
buffer area from the rezoned tract of land,
3,000 and 2,800 feet, respectively, away from
said tract, and there is no genuine issue
raised by this record that they would be
affected by noise, traffic impact, land value
diminution, or in any other respect by the
subject zoning ordinance, Renard v. Dade
County, 261 So.2d 832 (F1a.1972); see § 163.-
3215(2), F1a.Stat. (1993); Citizens Growth
Management Coalition of West Palm Beach,
Inc. v. City of West Palm Beach, Inc., 450
So.2d 204, 208 (F1a.1984); compare South-
west Ranches Homeowner's Ass'n v. Bro-
ward County, 502 So.2d 931 (Fla. 4th DCA)
(adjoining landowners with potential pollu-
tion, flood problems had standing), rev. de-
nied, 511 So.2d 999 (F1a.1987). This being
so, it was entirely proper for the trial court
to enter the summary judgment under re-
view on the basis that there was no genuine
issue of material fact and the defendants
were entitled to judgment as a matter of law,
given the appellants' lack of standing to chal-
lenge the subject zoning ordinance. See En-
nis v. Warm Mineral Springs, Inc., 203
So.2d 514, 517 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967), cert.
denied, 210 So.2d 870 (F1a.1968).
Affirmed.
Shawn INMON, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 94-1967.
District Court of Appeal of Florida,
Fourth District.
Sept. 28, 1994.
Defendant convicted of extortion and
tampering with evidence filed a motion to
correct illegal sentence. The Circuit Court,
Broward County, Richard D. Eade, J., de-
nied motion, and defendant appealed. The
District Court of Appeal, Stevenson, J., held
that remand was necessary for resentencing
to determine whether sentence would be
bumped up for violations of probation.
Reversed and remanded for resentenc-
ing.
1. Criminal Law ca982.9(7)
"Bump ups" of sentence for violation of
probation are not mandatory, but are discre-
tionary with judge.
2. Criminal Law a1181.5(8)
Remand was necessary for resentencing
to determine whether sentence would be
bumped up for violations of probation where
sentencing scoresheet was improperly calcu-
lated and error affected guidelines range.
Shawn Inmon, pro se.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Talla-
hassee, and Don M. Rogers, Asst. Atty. Gen.,
West Palm Beach, for appellee.
STEVENSON, Judge.
Appellant, Shawn Inmon, appeals the deni-
al of his motion to correct illegal sentence
pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 3.800(a) alleging that he was not sen-
tenced in accordance with sentencing guide-
lines because of a scoresheet error. We
reverse and remand for resentencing be-
cause, as the state concedes and we agree,
the sentencing scoresheet had been improp-
erly calculated and the error affected the
guidelines range.
Appellant was convicted in two separate
cases of extortion and tampering with evi-
dence and was sentenced to two years of
community control on each case to run con-
currently. He subsequently violated his
community control and was sentenced to new
community control terms. He then violated
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