Loading...
HomeMy WebLinkAboutSubmittal-2Ied ►is- ng 1p- -th ta- id- en �e- on A. CD LLI le ~ at LU d-m r- ts �t. Id tg th rt n is a )f 0 PEACOCK v. CITY OF MIAMI Cite as 646 So.2d 291 (FIa.App. 3 Diet. 1994) lager v. Veal, 601 So.2d 274 (Fla. 1st DCA Eckert, Seamans, Cherin 1992); Neal v. Meek, 591 So.2d 1044 (Fla. 1st Stanley Price and Anthony J. DCA 1991); Levine v. Best, 595 So.2d 278 mi, for appellant. (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED and REMANDED in part. ZEHMER, C.J., and KAHN and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., concur. Richard PEACOCK, Appellant, v. CITY OF MIAMI and Coconut Grove Civic Club, Appellees. No. 94-2742. District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District. Dec. 5, 1994. Property owner who had been granted waiver of on -site parking requirement peti- tioned for writ of prohibition to prohibit city zoning board from entertaining appeal by a civic club. Petition was denied by the Circuit Court, Dade County, Maria Korvick, J., and owner appealed. The District Court of Ap- peal held that club, as representative associa- tion, lacked standing to challenge board's decision on any ground other than procedural irregularity. Reversed and remanded with instruc- tions. Zoning and Planning «571 Representative association, complaining of waiver of on -site parking requirements for certain property, lacked standing to chal- lenge decision of zoning board on any ground other than procedural irregularity, and ab- sent allegations of procedural irregularity, could not resort to administrative remedies. W. Tucker Gibbs, Coconut pellees. Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and BASKIN, JJ. PER CURIAM. Fla. 291 & Mellott and Carriuolo, Mia- Grove, for ap- and NESBITT Richard Peacock appeals an order denying his petition for a writ of prohibition. We reverse. Appellant received a waiver of on -site parking requirements for his Coconut Grove property from the City of Miami [City] Act- ing Zoning Administrator. The Coconut Grove Civic Club [Club] appealed the waiver to the City's Zoning Board [Board]. Peacock filed a petition for writ of prohibition in circuit court against the City seeking to pro- hibit the City from entertaining the Club's appeal. Peacock argued that the Board lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the Club lacked standing to challenge the Board's waiver. The Club filed a motion to intervene in the action; the court granted the motion. The court denied the petition for writ of prohibition finding that appellant had not exhausted his administrative reme- dies. "It is clear that a representative associa- tion, such as appellee, could not sue in state courts; it would have no standing, unless it, rather than its members, had suffered some special injury." Chabau v. Dade County, 385 So.2d 129, 130 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). The Club in this case, a representative associa- tion, lacks standing to challenge the Board's decision on any ground other than procedural irregularity. Miami Beach Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 579 So.2d 920 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); Save Brickell Ave., Inc. v. City of Miami, 395 So.2d 246 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Save Brickell Ave., Inc. v. City of Miami, 393 So.2d 1197 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). Because the Club makes no allegations of any procedural irregularity, the trial court erred in concluding that the Club could resort to administrative remedies. Ft�21lb. 6s,0105o 292 Fla. 646 SOUTHERN REPORTER, 2d SERIES Chabau. See Mandico v. Taos Constr., Inc., 605 So.2d 850 (F1a.1992). The trial court erred in denying the petition for writ of prohibition. For the reasons stated above, we reverse the order on appeal and remand with instruc- tions to grant appellant's petition. Reversed and remanded. Tzippora KALISCH, Appellant, v. Bernard KALISCH, Appellee. No. 94-31. District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District. Dec. 7, 1994. Wife brought negligence action against husband, seeking to recover damages for in- juries she suffered in boating accident. The Circuit Court, Dade County, Robert Kaye, J., dismissed action on grounds of interspousal immunity, and wife appealed. The District Court of Appeal, Baskin, J., held that Su- preme Court's decision in Waite, abrogating interspousal immunity doctrine, could apply to cause of action accruing before Waite de- cision. Reversed and remanded. Courts €a100(1) Supreme Court's decision in Waite, ab- rogating interspousal immunity doctrine, could apply to cause of action accruing before Waite decision. Beckham & Beckham and Pamela Beck- ham, North Miami Beach, James K. Beck- ham, Miami, for appellant. Hicks, Anderson & Blum and Mark Hicks, Keller, Houck & Shinkle, Miami, for appellee. Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and NESBITT and BASKIN, JJ. BASKIN, Judge. On September 2, 1993, Tzippora Kalisch filed a negligence action against Bernard Kalisch, her husband, to recover damages for injuries she suffered in a December 1991 boating accident in which her husband was driving the boat. He filed a dismissal motion based on the interspousal immunity doctrine. The court declined to apply Waite v. Waite, 618 So.2d 1360 (F1a.1993), which abrogated the doctrine, because Mrs. Kalisch's cause of action accrued before the May 27, 1993 Waite decision. The trial court ruled in favor of Mr. Kalisch. This appeal ensued. We re- verse. In Waite, 618 So.2d at 1361, the Florida Supreme Court overruled prior contrary case law and held that the doctrine was no longer a part of Florida's common law. "As a gen- eral rule, a decision of a court of last resort which overrules a prior decision is retrospec- tive as well as prospective in its application unless declared by the opinion to have pro- spective effect only." Melendez v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 515 So.2d 735, 736 (Fla. 1987). E.g., Ryter v. Brennan, 291 So.2d 55 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 297 So.2d 836 (F1a.1974); Ingerson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 272 So.2d 862 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973). A review of the Waite decision re- veals that the supreme court did not limit its application. Therefore, we hold that Mrs. Kalisch's action may proceed in accordance with the supreme court's abrogation of the interspousal immunity doctrine. Accord Sleeter v. Collins, 621 So.2d 1096 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). Accordingly, the order is re- versed and the cause remanded for further proceedings. Reversed and remanded. ubmitted Into the p i' c record in connection it'll item rz.to on iv - Priscilla A. Tho son Ierk C j Cot free L pell C Bog terse. PI miss: lee's direc ject appel In ot; admit and i error. lee's E limitat The render the sul GLI1 JJ., co