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HomeMy WebLinkAboutM-78-0657tot A STUDY OF TRANSIT ALTERATIVE ALIGNMENTS AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE GOVERNMENT CENTER AREA OFFICE OF TRANSPORTATION ADMINISTRATION August 14, 1978 r78-657 r 11) \\ \\., LJ I —11 1 , „ 2r771C.... i=I a-7 ' �;L _- • • ;15 r Fr- L777.- L___1 - • :." ' 1! t • - 000o 4.• L IL _ L_i__ pi-is-siblejtvice _," II iLss,,,,- •..._J:, 11 JLL_, I\.,,,... connections i r -",:\ \ •,.. , ‘,*q I ,... 't 7 washingto i _i_ghts_ it lir IF-1_f. ,11 li.1-1. T_I I ----I r-- E-ii i Til il i ... 1, ; _• ., . .: . . .. .:. . f 11---j;; ...;'lL---o—.;; /,, L—P-PI. "LP kli:Ir li_iiitil—T is;;; • Olt - ,::..•*:?•:`, •-•...•:•• %..k i 1 '40 rt) -.::-...1.:.i. ' .,id 1! • Z7 ;;;•- 1LL::•;.: 11 ' -n-4,0?---- cu II it ative ao_ jb •tri " 7:1 r • 11 till II l' 7) 000eLOW . r13 I , . I ; 12=1, j 17-j iLH I' J. government center • 000 000 • NY\ I • ric? • • .. ..i ',_____J t __ _ .... 17: : --.- --4------ -H--,---lur .'• ._."---: -- - \ \:•'','. b ` - - '113 .r.4--" -77-- --- --4- •-•%.--7 • g-71.6V. • ,40,i1.1 11 ,,,' .,:' iLi„ , ---.---.. 7.-r..,;:„.--,..----„---.7 .•,•// l'\ 11 Ctg iL,,,,_-_;.-- -,..,7„.:' f- :1 1 F ',11;7A \ H .0 il CZ t • Poin ar • 0. I 71/1. 1[,7‘Li oVA f" 1111111111111111111111111111111111111EMMEmiumm TO. Mayor and Members of City Commission Joseph Re Grassier City Manager r•( ^r MIAMI. '-..<?aIDA rliSry.,}"-{C _ Ni5MORANOUM ,..T' OCT 2 1g78 r [FiEricLg; rlicLcsunts: Attached for your review is a recent Dade County report entitled "A Study of Transit Alternative Alignments and their Impacts on the Government Center Area". The proposed east -west phase II of the Rapid Transit System will cross the presently designed phase I alignment at the Government Center Station. Tit:_' design of the Government Center Station that is now underway must incorporate the best alternative crossing. A presentation to the Commission on these alternatives will be made by Dade County at the October 24th Commission meeting. The county report favors alternative No. 3 which has a diagonal alignment through the Govern�Center forand thearo�teection north tos163rdof tStreeternment Center to the FEC ailroad It should be noted that Mr. Geddes October 17th report to the County Commission on the master plan for the Government Center recommended a straight Phase II crossing of the Government Center along NW 2nd Street which implies that alternative No. 2 may be the most compatible with the objectives of the Government Center plan. r • ME MM 011 COURTHOUSE MIAMI, FLORIDA 33130 TEL: 579-5311 6FFICE OF COUNTY MANAGER Richard Fosmoen Assistant City Manager City of Miami Planning Department' 3500 Pan American Drive Miami, Florida 33131 CEP 2 8 i278 Dear Mr. Fosmoen: Attached for your review and comment is a recently completed report entitled "A Study of Transit Alternative Alignments and their Impact on the Government Center Area". This report was needed to facilitate un- interrupted progress in the design of the Government Center complex. Since the design of the remaining buildings in the Government Center complex is underway, space allocations for all transit related facili- ties must be made as quickly as possible. Therefore, this report was designed to promote suggested alternatives and elicit comments from interested groups. The report recommends that alternative alignment concept No. 3 be adopted for future planning. This alternative causes the least disruption through the Miami CBD, and also provides a service connection between the Stage 1 rapid transit system and future rail extensions. This makes a second multi -million dollar maintenance yard and shop site unnecessary, and would reduce future costs and speed-up development of new extensions. It also provides for transfers among Stage 1, future rail extensions, and the DPI system at one central location. If you have any comments with regard to this report, please contact Fred Silverman at 579-5672 or myself. ncerely, John A. Dy Transport. ion Coordinator f • ;:!'? OF *•iIA► I. �'LO ztr n i`a I !!!R•OFFICZ: I TO' Mayor and Members of the ,Ikr City Commission :,unJccr - Pc,m. Joseph R. Grassie ,. , ~ tm.perEt,cts m City Manager t t \.I\ 1 OCT 20 in C.f;cLZ;U Z=: The Planning Department, has been under contract to Dade County, for the past several months to plan the areas around Miami's ten transit stations, a process known as Station Area Design and de- velopment (SADD). To date planning staff have completed a de- scription of existing conditions around these stations and are publishing the findings in brief reports for each station area. Copies of the first three reports issued in the City of Miami for the Douglas Road, Coconut Grove and Vizcaya Stations are attached. The reports provide the basis for initiating the SADD citizen participation planning program that is scheduled to begin November. In addition these documents will provide advance information for property owners, developers and investors who will be seeking opportunities for development near transit stations. The next step in the process will be public hearings before the Commission this spring on SADD phase II during which alternative concepts for development in transit station areas will be proposed. This will result in a refinement of alternatives in a final recom- mended concept plan (Phase III) in late 1979. These final phase III plans, if adopted by the City Commission after public hearings, would govern all public and private development actions in transit station areas. This three phase process is described in the Regional Profile (also attached), which gives a system -wide overview of the SADD program. m -f: 1 fl 7 Li _Lir-77; Ili Li! II I Fr r—P I JJLJLs".1\ \\\ \• (t/ I \"\ • \\\ \ Its ot 1 L_ ,r- , _ 1! 17;fit. n I -;.'-\\k L • ; tip ; ;1 s',‘, • \ ; j • I; t ir washingto i—IL--heights_ 1).L rvice *oonnec ions '` 1 1H: L._ I -7 I i _, ,,----1 • , II 7------------T-- '• 1 ; ••-.., ! awe •I\\ =ke Pa ses 4,01, •••••--, \ lt - G 1 s eMS3_ • 0-1_ cl, , ! • m . c.0 0 •_.01,, CO : L i L 1 4.4 - • 777--; c„ r c•-• .ct I 11 1;( /, /\\, (r) MM iv Of CONIttetS 1 NTKOiJtC T IONi Y i k a, 1 1 i$ i 1► s Y 1 t'i ►, $$ 1 1 4 1 CIE THODOLOGY .. , 1, 1 1 a i i i a►, a i a a a i i a$ a 1 1 1 1 4 1 1$ 1'a 14 1 1 1 INITIAL SCREENING: THE REFINEMENT OF ALTERNATIVES ,,,,,,,,,,,,,, a APPLICATIO.: OF EVALUATION CRITERIA i , a a i a i,, 1: 1 i1►4 % ► , 0 y p LEVEL TWO SCREENING OF DESIGN APFPOACHES, CONCLUSIONS ,..,, 1,., 1. 1,., a.., a 1 i►. a a 61, i 1, The preparation of this report has been financed in part through a grant from the U.S. Department of Transportation, Urban Mass Transportation Administration, under the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, as amended. The opinions, findings, conclusions expressed in this report are not necessarily those of the Urban Mass Transportation Administration. ii EE ME mm 1 • tigT OP ?iGURES tieditotth CoVetnment Centex..,,,.......►►rs.t Current Alignment of the Stage 1 Rabid transit System and the Downtown People Mo'Vet.s 8, The Four Basic Alternatives .1.-rt 4. Alternative 1 - East-West Line stub-End......�.+'r`w' 5. Alternative 2 - East-West Line at Right: Angle,Separated Platforms 6. Alternative 2A - East-West Line at Right Angle, Connected Platforms , 4 4 7. Alternative 3 - East-West Line at Angle SW to NE, Separated Platforms . , ► 6 6 6 8. Alternative 3A - East-West Line at Angle SW to NE,Connected Platforms +6a"' 9. Alternative 4 - East-West Line Turning in Government Center, Parallel Platforms 10. Alternative 5 - East-West Line Outside Government Center 11. Alternative 6 - East-West Line through CBD, Northeast Connection Via NE 2nd Avenue 12. Alternative 7 - East-West Line through CBD, Northeast Connection Via Washington Heights 13. Summary of Impacts on the Government Center 14. Alternative Design 1 - East-West Line Stub -End 15. Alternative Design 2 - East-West Line at Right Angle in Government Center 16. Alternative Design 3 - East-West Line at Angle SW to NE in Government Center 17. Alternative Design 4 - East-West Line Outside Government Center 18. The Four Alternative Designs: Summary of Characteristics 1s INTRODUCTION perhaps the most significant long-term public policy decision the Board of County Commissioners will make during the next few months is how it decides to fit its fixed guide- way public transportation facilities with the public buildings planned for the area generally defined as the Government Center. The Government Center area consists of more than 33 acres located on the western boundary of the Central Bus- iness District (CBD). The reason for the timing of the decisions is that the fixed guideway transit system is to be built in three or more stages with the first stage of some 20.5 miles from Dadeland on the south to Hialeah on the west being under final design at the present time. Construction on the first stage is to begin in 1979 with operations to begin in 1983. The designs of buildingsand the first stage of the transit system are to the point that the cross or "X" in the system must be defined in absolute terms and the design frozen so that architects and engineers of the building facilities and the transit sta- tion at the Government Center can proceed to complete their tasks on a timely basis. The basic rail transit system as either committed or planned for Metropolitan Dade County consists of at least three major elements, all of which interface at or near Government Center in the Miami CBD. These are: (1) Stage 1 -- Hialeah-Dadeland; (2) East -west line from Little Havana to Northeast Dade; and (3) Downtown People Mover (DPM) within the Miami CBD. The focal point of the entire system is the Government Center, a new complex of County, City, State, and Federal buildings on the west side of Miami's CBD. The Stage 1 rapid transit line runs along the east side of the complex over the Florida East Coast Railroad (FEC) right-of-way. Several buildings have already been completed, others are under design and still others are in planning. The original plan for the Government Center was completed in 1975. The 2000 Site Plan which emerged from the study in 1975 is shown in Figure 1. To avoid future design conflicts, the 1975 master plan for the Government Center is being re-examined and brought up to date. Completion of this study is proposed for September or October, 1978. Simultaneously, investigation of the interface between Stage 1 of the rapid transit system and future extensions has been initiated to allow Government Center design decisions to accommodate these extensions and to modify original Preliminary Engineering concepts regarding future rapid transit service impacts within the CBD and the FIGURE 1 bbt4W Ot3N COVE1INMENT CENTER tf 1 \ 1 ,\ . 1 1 I,. ..,.>- -------), I. �. F r ✓ l 1 . , \ \. t V. ' �,` ��, ,� , �� _ CD ,v;�i !, ❑❑ — — r :• \— '_:\ , r• V,-.. ILLUSTRATIVE SITE PLAN 11111 I I I I year 2000 ° �'�"°�°"° tvi4z; 'Ell 11 v •. .'• s• JE SM w V14Er IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIuIIIIIIIIuII II • toVeththent Center. A toajot change is the Downtown People 'diver (DPM) and its interface with operating rapid transit lines which was not considered during Preliminary Engineering of the original Government Center planning. Compounding these elements are design considerations that require the Stage 1 transit line to accommodate the following.' (1) Adequate vertical clearance over the Miami River and 1-95; (2) Harmonious connections to the Government Center complex, older parts of the CBD, and the DPM; (3) Adequate vertical and horizontal spacing to allow for locating the Washington Heights station; (4) Allowance for maintaining a viable Florida East Coast rail operation; (5) The operation of north -south and east -west line rail services; and (6) Passenger transfer between lines. This report examines the problems and issues regarding future rail extensions and presents information concerning options for these extensions, with varying impacts to design standards, disruption to existing and planned land uses, and service con- siderations, and relates them to the development of the ekGGovern- ment Center and adjacent areas. Finally,report s a recommendation on the most advantageous alternative. Some of the technical problems which have to be considered are described in the Kaiser Transit Group's final report, "Definitive Engineering Study, Line Section 4 Transit Facil- ities," addressing the question of the Miami River crossing of Stage 1, and its impact resultthe fromGovernment KTGCenter study;station. Two fundamental problems 1. The lack of service connection between the Stage 1 and future lines could adversely affect system oper- ations by precluding vehicle transfer from one line to the other to balance operations, making it necessary to build a second heavy -maintenance facility serving only the east -west line (or, alternatively, hauling vehicles "off-line" to the Hialeah yard for mainten- ance) . Lack of revenue connection between the east -west line and the northeast Dade line would result in a system consisting of three lines, two of them ter- minating at or near Government Center, exacerbating problems of passenger transfers, station design, and system operation. In summary, a number of unresolved issues were felt to need examination before finalizing the location and design of Stage 1 facilities in the Government Center area and accept- ing the mentioned line Section 4 study by the County's Office of Transportation Administration (OTA). IIIIIIIII.IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII■III ■1n"i '. 1 METHODOLOGY tegitning with the basic premise that given the current Stage 1/DPM plans, the question of interface between Stage i and Stage 2 rapid transit lines is of critical importance. The current Stage 1/DPM plans are shown in Figure 2 on the following page. The methodology employed in this study was to develop all reasonable alternatives and to describe their potential impacts. The review process began with a set of concept type scenarios, each depicting generalized approaches to the problem and briefly discussing impacts on land use, design, operations, and the like. A two-step screening process was developed to evaluate the alternatives. The first step began with a review of the scenarios. They were refined into a set of nine "centerline" plans, using a variety of rail engineering design standards. A set of evaluation criteria was developed to evaluate alter- natives. The criteria were weighted by professionals in various disciplines. The application of the evaluation cri- teria to the nine alternatives concluded the first level screening. The second level screening began with the four alternatives which were reduced to a set of four different design approaches, each of which is described in detail. The approaches were then tested against the original evaluation criteria. The application of the criteria to the four design approaches constitutes the second level screening and the completion of this study. All of the scenarios reviewed had the following evaluation criteria applied as the basis for determining their impacts. The results are reported as the basis for recommending the most advantageous plan. The evaluation criteria are: 1 Land Use Impacts 2 Stage 1 Profile Impacts 3 Stage 2 Profile Impacts 4 Government Center Station Design 5 Washington Heights Station Design 6 DPM Interface 7 Passenger Transfers 8 Future Rail Operations 9 Equipment Movements 10 FEC Railroad Impacts 11 Costs To initiate the study and begin the analysis process out- lined in 2.0, the staff developed four scenarios intended FIGURE 2 CIAtIaNT ALIGNMENT OF THE STAGE 1 RAPID TRANSIT ,MSTEM4 ANt) THE DOWNTOWN PEOPLE HOVER • • I. • I i r - t\ 1. tT h r• -.-1 _ _ - 11 viz • - - • - • -).... __ — - - - __ ,..r 11 • II —' —.VI r - :_ =1''z I a. T a =\� . r tvIkkIni .r.t..a U. .5•1•••• •••41) <••rtr. 4Tr r,.t••.t nit Dawrwtt ..rMr WOW IDPMI • WY Corm due. Rend %ran l.• 2 • 3 to stimulate discussion and resolution of the various issues teisted to rapid transit facilities in the Government Center Atea. 0f primary importance was future rail line interface Uith Stage 1 and long-range operations considerations. Other issues such as impacts on land use, potential problems of vertical and horizontal alignment, interface with the Downtown People Mover, rider transfer connections, rail equipment move - tent, and the like were also raised in comments on each scenario. The purpose of the scenarios was not to atemptdfifsy stem solutions, but rather to identify basic principles location, design, and operations that needed to be addressed before further decisions were made on precise engineering and architectural det 11 of Stage 1 so it could accommodate nt future rail extensions. The scenarios were a beginning p oi for the establishment of basic principles to govern final system design in the Government Center area. 2.1 Scenario 1 The original alignments and station locations were pre- sented in the Preliminary Engineering Report of Kaiser Engineers' "Milestone 8, Final System Design,"(MaY, 1975). Modifications to the original Preliminary Engineering discussed in Section 1.0 required terminating the east - west line at the Government Center station. With the addition of the DPM, this scenario provided the basis for all subsequent design studies of this area, most recently detailed in the"Final Report, Definitive Engin- eering Study of Line Section 4 Transit Facilities," Kaiser Transit Group, (April, 1978). 2.2 Scenario 2 In this concept,the future northeast rail line and the east -west line connect,paralleling the Stage 1 north - south line, and following the FEC right-of-way to become the proposed Stage 2 line. A station location is shown about 11 blocks west of the proposed Stage 1 Government Center station, although the station platform siting is flexible within certain constraints. 2.3 Scenario 3 This is similar to 2, but locates a station just north of the proposed Stage 1 Government Center station para- llel to the Stage 1 Government Center station and could allow for a single station to accommodate both rail lines. 2.4 Scenario 4 This shows the east -west line joining Stage 1 trackage and right-of-way north of the proposed Government Center sta- tion, and departing north of the Washington Heights station to become the proposed northeast line. i ■ ■ ■ t'N TTAL SCREENING: THE REFINEMENT OF ALTERNATIVES tkathination of the original alternatives and their options gave rise to three basic issues which needed further clari- fication. These include: (1) Ridership levels and transfer problems; (2) Service connections between the rapid transit lines; and (3) Stage 2 physical impacts on the Government Center, adjacent parts of the CBD, and the Washington Heights station. These issues are detailed below as follows: 3.1 Ridership and Transfers The proposed year 2000 rail transit system will have over 300,000 daily riders. During the morning rush- hour nearly 40Z of all riders will get on and off the system before it gets to the CBD, 35% will have CBD destinations, 12 will transfer from one line to another, and the balance will start their trips from the CBD. Of the over 100,000 users getting off rapid transit lines in the CBD, 30% will stay in the Government Center area, 5% in the Washington Heights area, and the balance will go to other parts ofve the system andthelargenumber•This eores h im- portance of the people of people it will have to move. In addition, the number of system transfersbetween lines is not overly large. The largest group will want to go from the east -west line to the northeast line (5.); next is movements from the Stage 1 south line to the Stage 1 Hialeah line (4.5%); and the third is from the east -west line to Stage 1 south line. Other smaller transfer movements are anticipated. The two largest interline movements follow the basic operations concept developed for system planning, so riders actually do not have to get off the trains. Only 15-20,000 per- sons daily would switch trains, which is a relatively small rush hour volume of people. Therefore, addition- al interline service connections and special additional transfer stations do not appear to be necessary based upon ridership. However, the impact on transfer move- ments and rider access to the rest of the CBD became significant elements for transfer analysis. 3.2 Service Connections With a large yard and shop facility being built in the unincorporated area adjacent to Hialeah as part of Stage 1, the need to phase in several future transit lines and the necessity to accommodate interline rail movements, the question of service connections is a serious concern. IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII i u■ I■II. it equipment alone could be moved from Stage 1 lines Mite) future extensions, future yard costs could be re, diced and new lines phased in more easily than operating independent lines each with their own yards and shops. Attempts to see how various alternatives could accommo- date primarily a non-revenue" service connection, and secondly an interline service connection were initiated as part of the alternative analysis. ,3 Land Use Impacts While it is presumed that the Stage 2 line would be accommodated within the Government Center, the position of the platform, the impact of the Stage 2 line on Lummus Park, the areas east of the FEC railroad,and im- pacts of varying levels in the Washington Heights area all became vital issues requiring further analysis. Opportunities to allow private development near the Stage 2 station, bring riders closer to the CBD core, and minimize land acquisition or displacement to residen- tial areas, all required further analysis as well. 3.4 The Detailed Alternatives After review by various agencies, refinements to the four original alternative concepts were produced by staff. These so-called "centerline" alternatives gave more careful attention to engineering details as well as architectural, land use, and operational elements. The nine alternatives fall into four basic groups. Three of the four groups were first covered in the ori- ginal scenarios. The fourth is a resurrection of the original preliminary engineering scheme whereby direct rail service is carried toward Biscayne Boulevard and other parts of the downtown area. The four basic groups are: .1 Stub -End Service at Government Center A future east -west line would stub -end at the Stage 1 Government Center station, and a northeast line would stub -end at the Washington Heights or Govern- ment Center station. .2 East-West/Northeast Line Connection via Government Center Five different design concepts were developed which would allow a single, through service rail line to connect east -west and northeast lines into a single rail line. The placement of the Government Center platform on this line, its impact on the Stage 1 line and impacts to the Government Center or areas just east of the CBD differ among the five alignments. • _tistimWeet/Northeast title Connected Via Washington 'Heights An east west line would follow a N.W. 7th Street alignment into a refined Stage 1 Washington Heights alignment, with service continuing into a northeast line. txtended East-West/Northeast Line Connection Two alternatives propose to carry the east -west line through Government Center eastward to the Biscayne $oulevard corridor, then northward to make a north- east line connection and/or loop back to the west to tie into the Hialeah portion of Stage 1. Each of these alternatives assumes the preliminary engin- eering alignment of the east -west line crossing of I-95 from the west. Figure 3 on the following page is a matrix which summarizes the impacts of these alternatives. The specific alignments of the nine alternatives are shown in Figures 4 through 12 on the following pages. • i FIGURE 3 THE FOUR RASTC ALTERNATIVES 111111111111 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3' Scenario 4. Land Use Impact Minimum Require additional ROW for curve west or east of Govern- ment Center. Curve could require addi- tional ROW within Govern- ment (:enter. -_. Curve would require additional' ROW within Government Center Stage 1 Profile No change Possible shifting of horizon- tat profile to accommodate Stage 2 tracks. Government Center station relocated further north. Possible shifting of hori- zontal profile to accommo- date Stage 2 tracks. No vertical or horizontal problems. Stage 2 Profile Possible vertical profile problem Station platform of EW line location affect vertical profile, curve passes through Government Center complex. Stage 2 profile dependent on I-95 and passage beneath Stage 1. No vertical or horizontal: problems. 2. Government Center Station 2 level platforms. Major transfer point. Station platforms would be separated or "L" shaped. Stage 1 platform moved Slightly northward. Station located further to the north. 2 parallel platforms required. This station could be defer- red to Stage 2. No direct access to Stage Transfer to Washington- Heights required. Washington Heights Station No impact Provision of Stage 2 tracks at this station. Possible transfer point. This station could he deferred to Stage 2. Relocation of Government Center station could elimi- nate need for this station. Would have to accommodate 4 tracks. Primary transfer station between Stages 1 and 2. Stage 2 transfer to Government Center. DPM Interface No problem Stage 2 platform would not he directly served by DPM without some walking distance. Government Center DPM stop moved further north, possibly combining the 2 proposed stops. DPM would have to be extended to Washington Heights to directly serve Stage 2. Transfers Concentrated at Government Center. No through EW to WE connection. A short walk would be re- quired for Stage 1 and Stage 2 transfers at the Government Center. Through EW to NE movement possible. All transfers at Government Center or Washington Heights. Through EW to NE movement possible. Washington Heights the only transfer point. Must be des! d for transfer load. Stage 2 Operations g p No through NE to EW service. No NE provision. EW trains reverse a[ Government Center. No service connection provided. Uninterrupted EW to NE Line connection without interference with Stage 1e The fe connection could be deferred depending on phasing. Service connection would be provided at Washington Heights. Uninterrupted EW to NE line connection without interference with Stage 1. NE connection could be deferred depending on phasing. Service connection would he provided at Washington Heights. All [ripe to Government Center must transfer. Swtcching required on shared trackage. Headway problems would occur. Service connection on shared trackage. RailvEquipment Movement i i i MEM i ■ 11111110111111111111111111 1111 11 11 11 FIGURE 4 ALTERNATIVE 1 EAST -WEST LINE STUB -END: i 111111111111 ■ i I 111 JJ I .006 4 el__ ""‘tirt MIN 1!)1 111111111 FIGURE 5 ALTERNATIVE 7 EAST —WEST LINE AT RIGHT ANFLF_- SEPARATED PLATFORMS IIIIII IIIII ■ iLhL_ DouL, all Ft] LEICEDEJ 11111111111 ri7I1L1 YIL etSCmNf eoulfvllao _ _. ,. �L_ snit i 1 ■ NMI ■ i ■ 3- t%°' LJ FIGURE 6 ALTERNATIVE 2A EAST -WEST LINE AT RIGHT ANGLE: CONNECTED PLATFORMS '/ a run-tr-q- III III II 1 IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII iIIIIII-IIIIIII OI 111111111 1] I' IlL13 -SISCAymf BOUIIVARO - - CD 1 i 111 1 1111101 ■ ■ 111111111 i IIIIIIIIIIIII II II IIIIIIIIII IIIIIIIIIIII II III 1111•11111111•II FIGURE 7 ALTERNATIVE 3 EAST -WEST LINE AT ANGLE SW TO NE SEPARATED PLATFORMS n i i fat 0 o i i i i i i i i 1■III.IIIIII111111■ii.iiiiiiuiiIIIIIi■unuiun i FIGURE 8 ALTERNATIVE 3A EAST -WEST LINE AT ANGLE SW TONF CONNECTED PLATFORMS VE n ;[1][1:ir BISCAYNE BOULEVARD 1F _ e i. L -1-1 1-11: 7 [-1 U (-1 E f o a 3—IL - lin= 1.F. 1 i i ■ i i 1111 ■ III II1111 11 I111111 ■IIIIII .1 111111111111111 FIGURE 9 ALTERNATIVE 4 EAST -WEST LINE TURNING, IN GOVERNMENT CENTER PARALLEL PLATFORMS U*-4 Up SISCAYNE eouItvARo i i i i I MCI INE 11 111 11111 11 1111 11 1111 11 11111 11 FIGURE 10 ALTERNATIVE 5 EAST -WEST LINE OUTSIDE GOVERNMENT 1 i i ■ i i 11111111111111 II II 11 i 111 111 1■ r - 11E■II FIGURE 1I 11111■1111111111 ALTERNATIVE 6 EAST -WEST LINF THROUCH CRD NORTHEAST CONNECTION VIA NE 2 AVE de L M �w • � 1 �� qv!j 11 i1 !ii il k. v :L 1 11 -V ir N _ , _ - 11 Cr- L 11 II II■IIIIIIII 11111111111111 Jt eOULVVARO J III 11111 1111111111111111 11 11111111E1M FIGURE 12 ALTERNATIVE 7 EAST -WEST LINE THROUGH C-RD` NORTHEAST CONNECTION VIA WASHINGTONHEIGHT'S i ■ •• • 17 4i VAPPLICATION OF EVALUATION CRITERIA In order to provide a basis for judging the relative merits of each of the alternatives chosen for detailed study, staff prepared a set of evaluation criteria against which each alternative could be measured. The criteria began with a statement of the problem and the goal being sought, and follow- ed with a set of objectives to be achieved in design and opera ation of Stage 1, particularly in the Government Center area. Following is the statement of objectives which comprise the evaluation criteria. 4.1 Ridership To provide efficient and convenient movement of pass- engers throughout the transit system. . 1 Passenger travel on the rapid transit system to both the Government Center and downtown destination (particularly as this travel relates to the DPN) should be efficient and convenient. . 2 Rapid transit stations should be located and designed to minimize passenger inconvenience and total travel time to these destinations. . 3 Stage 1 and future transit lines should be con- figured so as to minimize transfer movements. .4 Walking distances between transfer points should, be minimized. .5 Where practical, more than one transfer location. between rail lines should be provided. 4.2 System Operations and Service Connections Rapid transit design and configuration should provide for reliable, efficient, and flexible system operation. . 1 Non -revenue service connections between all lines should be provided to allow efficient and balanced operations and maintenance. . 2 Where practical, line extensions should be connected with each other to allow through train movements, reducing possible turnaround activity in the Govern- ment Center area. . 3 Design standards should be adhered to while taking into account line -segment and/or site -specific characteristics. 11111111111111111111 11111111111111111111111111111111111 18 t4 be -Sigh for future extensions should allow fot the possibility that any or all proposed lines may not be built, and that future extensions may be subject to changes in proposed alignments. tapid transit design and configuration should harmonize With existing and planned land uses in the Government Center and adjacent areas to the fullest extent possible. .1 Disruptive land acquisition should be avoided, such as public amenities (parks, historic sites, etc.) expensive structures, or acquisition requiring re- location of residents and/or businesses. . 2 Rapid transit design and configuration must not adversely impact existing or committed components of the Government Center plan. . 3 Adverse visual and noise impact associated with transit design should be minimized. . 4 Encroachment of the system into adjacent parts of CBD and residential areas should be minimized. .5 Washington Heights station location should be acceptible to the community and harmonize with CBD development programs. Following further discussion and evaluation of the nine alternatives, four concepts were chosen for detailed study. These criteria form the basis for the first level of screening of alternatives. The screening process amounted to a detailed application of one criterion to each alter- native, weighting ridership at 50%, operations at 35%, and land use at 15%. The application of these criteria to the nine alternatives is shown in Figure 13 on the following page. Essentially, Figure 13 demonstrates the primary reasons for the selection of the four alternatives identified for final evaluation. Alternative 1 was selected because it is the base alternative; that which presently exists. Alternative 3A was selected because it permits a continuous east -west to northeast connection, and interfaces well with Stage 1 and the DPM. Alternative 5 was selected because its impact on Government Center would be minimal. Alternative 6 was selected because it permits a continuous east -west to northeast connection through the Miami CBD, complementing the DPM. II II 1 III 11111111111 III II 11 IIIIIII II IIIII IIII 1111 IIIIII1111IIII1 IIII IIIIII 1 II IIII III IIIIIIII III II II II 1 III IIIIII I■ IIII IIII IIIuIIIIIIIIII■II■II 1111 IIIIIII 11 IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII IIIIIIII IIIIIIII II I IN miiiiiiimmumumi assommorn 111111, ill11111I1111911„ FIGURE 13 SUMMARY OF IMPACTS ON THE GOVERNMENT CENTER Alternative 2 Direct Dlatfo Platform Connection Possible EW-NE 2 NE Ehrou Through Service Possible without Transfers Stage 2 Service Connection to Stage 1 Possible Stagee2 Revenue Connection to Stage 1 Possible flcatMajor Mns flcatione to Stage 1 Line Required to Accommodate Stage 2 Line No No No No No Yes _.. - No., - Na Stage 2 R Impact on Government Center Minimal Minimal Minimal Modest Minimal Modest Minimal Minimal Minimal Future Extensions Impact on other Adiacent Areas A Land Use Plan Stage 2' AccommodatEo�r of Transfers Stage z Accommod"at`kion'.p of CeDtRfd'era-- Substantial2 Substantial Substantial Minimal Substantial Minimal Substantial Very Substantial Very Substantial Poor Fair Good Fair Good! Good Poor Good Goof Goods Poor Good Poor Good Fair Very Poor Very Good Very Good 14 2 2A 3 3A4 4 54 64 7 Yes No Yes No Yes Yee Yes Yee Yes No No Yes No Yes Yea Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yesl 1 Yea 1 Yes Yes 1,Yes Yes 1 Yes No Yes III II Would require more detailed analysis to determine feasibility. Anticipates 1000' tail track (standard system requirement 3 Assumes completion of DPM system. 1 Selected for final analysis. II 91 II Ili for overshoot) I A I A A iIIMaiii iii$iiiiiiiiiiiiii 111 iu i 20 LEVER NO SCREENING OF DESIGN APPROACHES 1 Alternative Design No. 1 This alternative is based on the stubs -end tettitiatioii of the east -west and northeast Stage 2 rail line at the Government Center. There is no connection between the east -west and northeast line or the east -west with the Stage 1 rail line. A service connection is provided between the northeast line and the Stage 1 line. The east -west line follows the Preliminary Engineering alignment into the Government Center, but terminates at a right angle to the Stage 1 Government Center station platform and at the same elevation as the Stage 1 platform. There is no provision for a tail track. Trains would be reversed in the station and return via crossover tracks. Elevation of the top of the rail at this station is 59 feet. The gradient over 1-95 is 3.0% and all curves are within a 1,000' radius. The northeast line enters the study area via the FEC rail line running immediately adjacent and parallel to the Stage 1 alignment from Washington Heights terminating at the Government Center. A service connection is pro- vided at Washington Heights. The Government Center platform is staggered approximately 100' north of the Stage 1 platform at the same 59' elevation, requiring a 3.n grade to reach the platform at which point the line is terminated with no tail track. Reverse move- ments are made via crossovers north of the platform. There are no curves required for this portion of the north- east line. This alternative requires an extended platform for the east -west line through the Government Center, provisions in the Stage 1 Government Center station for extended mezzanines and platforms, and provisions in the Washing- ton Heights station for a service connection crossover and adjacent parallel tracks. This plan does not pro- vide through east -west to northeast revenue or non -revenue operation nor does it allow a service connection for the east -west line to Stage 1. The system would be operated as three separate lines, two terminating at the Govern- ment Center. All transfers between Stage 1, the east - west line, and the northeast line would necessarily take place at the Government Center station. 5.2 Alternative Design No. 2 This alternative provides a through connection of the east -west line with the northeast line via Downtown Miami, with transfers between Stage 1 and Stage 2 occurring at the Government Center station. • — \ �,, .� t, t _ ii I' jV[ • i 0 Atli . t tAl f t s ---, a I :Art C I 4. • I1, t. � ArF' .1F ty Yuw APt 1 _' 3 $OUTM - 'ti)a - ♦ r1bil1 _._.� •. V , 1.� bti 3 J. t .i " • ._i a. r.. '= + t r w■■ *tt °Wait. pttl ••c C.•I n ♦l. •talks$ �MIAMt RIVER • • a a f, , 1 t a a r f / '� 1 r E/N CORRIDOR AN. EN CENTER SYATION CORRIDOR ' ..s..d•\ . y El[v+ND0 22 %. • �• M• - 1I • - i ' • Y• J• L A- - ►vt ;• •• • ;• •.. -w• - :: . = _ • ^t ' �. •.•}, A14 GCaN,Q!W . .. lyAg�ij-4--Q T Oyc ELN;M,FNT _ENTrp,ia ;v rtG�hf•!.ld:NT CENTER Sil1Y�N .- : _ 1 • IIII■ •"- - -34p -a • • N• . A•L,4 ; e car. roIa • et Nam 4T . • 0I *0'TT, : ♦ • , 7 • 11 .. o • ; . V �..—�. _1": ` .ter ,14 34$ YIAYI • IV I.. Y♦ 1 ct rtiOsit1 STAL N _ • Y tii • • • Pi.. �. __ 'oil./' t.•-tli_A11. .Q ._.: - - - . .-_ ll r. AK f • YORI} �.. r. -: 1 ' � I •-� ..Dili __.-,H �- ' _ . I. _; I; - 1 : f 1 C rg 1 1'� I' , t J ! --A • .. _ • • - • • .. .. t' I '711t7 - �• .. _•1. '_1. ♦-- • • • : 4 • rI C ! I a „ IA+ _! 'F "i V+ Lip '29' _ ! _ W qi e, w • I n o ri I £I _ _, ..i .4_ . • • It _ '1 . �g w 1 ,w• u j-'8 t%o ..I ; ! W • g WS tOG irE,RMdENT o e l. yid N^T.,, ' Gm Z. t' s rWrIOPT- 1•)3E% ,I AC» IR • EMS MG EpOLNJ _ __ - �_` ____ 1-9SRAMPS I _-_ �APPRptWATI } on• m a .. , �fW O! I I o '-' ♦ w Y i._, ♦ ...... 1 1 S I 1 , •-R • 100 I0 ransportation Improvement Program 120 THE KAISER TRANSIT GROUP 'Joint venture KAISER ENGINEERS POST SUCKLE SC wUw AJ[R/RCdK NC - poet,. r.'♦lw1 •A'y• [(M= CAPP $M*w ANC ASSOCIA !IS NC HARPY rl1tSt A ASSOCIATES LTD SCH14,661,fP CUPPApNC +•SSOCMTES .P.•Kh1 C 130 ALTERNATIVE DESIGN 2 EAST -WEST LINE AT RIGHT ANGLE IN GOVERNMENT CENTER STAGE II TRANSIT STUDY INTERFACE WITH LINE SECTION 4 FACILITIES ALTERNATIVE CONCEPT 2 /u,E VE NT 1.. 400'. N : •..�' SKC-189 + 120 + 60 +40 0 — 40 Mgte LIMB mem MM MM MN 23 this alternative follows the PE alignment from the Vest, crossing 1-95 and passing through the Government Center at a 3% downgrade to an elevation of 39 feet, at which point it levels off at the Government Center station. This station platform is at a right angle to the Stage 1 platform forming a "T" shaped station. East of Stage 1, the Stage 2 alignment follows Second Street east several blocks and then turns north within the Bis- cayne Boulevard corridor to become the northeast line. All grades are within the 3.0% standard. There are no curves within the Government Center; however, a turn would be required within the downtown to the northeast. Dis- ruption in the Government Center is minimal. However, passage directly through the downtown would require special treatment to streets and some land area. While providing a direct east -west to northeast connection and direct downtown accessibility, this plan does not provide a service connection between Stage 1 and Stage 2 and would require careful consideration of downtown impact, particularly with respect to the proposed Downtown People Mover system. 5.3 Alternative Design No. 3 This alternative provides a through connection of the east -west line with the northeast line. Stage 2 inter- sects Stage 1 at an angle at the Government Center station with a curve located west of Miami Avenue. A service connection is provided between Stage 1 and Stage 2 lines. The east -west line follows the PE alignment into the Government Center following a slight southeastward alignment before curving to a northeastward alignment with a 750' radius curve. Between I-95 and immediately west of Stage 1 this line descends at a 3.0% grade to an elevation of 39.0 feet, at which point the Stage 2 Govern- ment Center station platform is situated at an angle be- neath the north end of the Stage 1 platform. A slight 0.3% downgrade is retained through this station. The Stage 2 platform is located primarily east of the Govern- ment Center boundary extending to the northeast across N.W. 1st Avenue and N.W. 3rd Street. The line then curves through four blocks of low rise or vacant commercial devel- opment, extending as far east as the immediate east side of North Miami Avenue. At this point, it turns northwest over the FEC Dodge Island spur to enter the main FEC right-of-way immediately north of the Stage 1 Washington Heights station. A service connection located on the curve at Washington Heights would be made between the Stage 1 and Stage 2 lines. The Stage 2 line continues north leaving Stage 1 right-of-way passing beneath the East/West Expressway and the northeast in the FEC right- of-way. Egg 1 + 120 +80 + + 40 — 40 111 \ a we t.I1 l Ci •5NC i Art /53S 540 ' 6,. it•�,..•' : —AP ,. 1 -� 4i - i%"~—A.TEANATE , / _ ... may{ . _ _... _ M: `...� , t.. ... Gam. PWTE7 ' / kE J J ,(1/ h y / .� - *,IJyAW .AIR-.J = tit . .�ikik .. .- + 40 0 40 A A a ' ( i �Yl,lyl ,�� ri... . • 1 • .__,.RNCE „' CLEALaI� S R ST►DNj aEOPE--J-^Z..7 I'r IF-5. --- t 1; -1 cLR ta+ 1• 1 I I: I lir ��1(� - 1 �M W Ej" -- - ._ i" (I-95 _ -- - -- _ -, T`_ _-7 i IMIAMI, RIVER j I C.W0I.0 MT• 480 . •..i$..u: . !A IYC- ..�-i_ ._.—it 1 II11.� • Ivy NI fi • z t I z1 w W, ! i I II WASHINGTON MET1 NTS I N E.CORRIDOR STATION ►�� Golooa 105 115 e,'. LAPPPOxIMATE EXISTING GPOUN FIGURE 161125 ALTERNATIVE DESIGN 3 EAST -WEST LINE AT ANGLE SW TO NE IN GOVERNmENT CENTER STAGE II TRANSIT STUDY INTERFACE WITH LINE SECTION 4 FACILITIES ALTERNATIVE CONCEPT 3 su1• I'•AO' • vERT I"•404'•a. "'� 1 °"•W"' SKC-190 fl ME ws fir ivc — - ii _ '__ Z _::i y1y .a . . A.- . ti r.y 1(' it j \ - ii wi 11i -, } -14 i ��� r- , ill -A-- r;� : -. hel,,,..:tal .:::...;." /ild 1 is ,r iit_i. L1 i ma —�_. ..ii t' ivL� _�� 'k t •+ I 7.7,r, �I ��� > 1.- � I r - �- j_._i�. i : i� ._ . tvi a ..L. 1 J •D1 �k _ Yr yt•.J/. •--,.-1:-..i l £if 11 - i H e _ rI. z —t N 1 Art CG I '(( f t • / .-.._.- '3 . t - r ♦ I' -I 1 }ty Ipf 1 sou t NAM E � � ' � ' -� • --- `' iir� _,�� rt . - 1 1 A,„ I - e Nlf f at til.` II N f 40 f L -^ t e n' �� ; I H/5 CORRIDOR GOVIRNIANT_UNTER 3 = STATION ICJ _ of u t z, c, ;�0 3 r.z z W W y �y i ,�..� 777763% 1«-- � IE •Ail EARAAtE i I F E I HNi ELOPE �...) "'..' .ri , I• I 0r' -{Or;SRW.---4 E-.1C3OS-_.�--A• I 1:.`1 } POINT �._� 14 I I 1 •.-..-TiR 1 11i' (1-9! ELEVI• 4390 i 1 �I (i Nw F1aV�IL - - —' '7 —�— _��« - - �'J - ___-� - _ �APPRO%MATE E%ISTINO GNOu T'=--a-1i �_ / j MIAMI RIVE 0I NE C IRRI.OR z GOVERNMENT CEN-ii-STATgN o o �o •+ n:� o I I 11 ,NE iWR oeRR19OR,! 1 t 1 r_nr. Kin 520 Dade County T Et - MI 111:: __ • ri • :� »-� 7-7 • ■ • : - ter--:._ 4nt h�1 Ci - Mi I K t' • ..1 r.. t��=.. .: WASIINGTON HEIGHTS• . STATION ri '•.••_Ci. _ f �CVFR..;-�h:. CEtiTE4_STATION ' - 1 i I'•' . - SF RIiE r� 7 AvE Ayt r. .A al n d I ':h .DONNECTIUN ;'� sm. / 3S IIS 1. Alp ET 1 .. ■ .305/EFMAENT CENTER STATION ■ ■ fin• ` • E AVE -1:_. L_.._ i "-1 C'tr. , 7/P x n ELEV•D•• TI a.--.. • •• rILU( - . 520 • • •. .:. I' a12 • .. ` w _®RTE--: r_rIAtff_-4- _ _1_. • •515^ I_ AVm _. • ■ 1 A :: ■ A: 530 5iC A, • CONTROL _PC4NT r J>. cot •ie_CLR •-- - eQ.L_.—_»--•-- .I_ :1I EAST/WEST DPRESSW*Y I Bpi iE_Q 4 -ff 1--- POTENTIAL % /A,___. ... � /''zr 14POU REjN7ATE / tra �T . -`•• 7_ 1i , _ • , . /sI_YAW-ALJ — /�/ : - -- •.. [ ....I......__^ .. : ."•I1JAI.. / .. • .RS. - -I - war. i- IwM 20 till I i-1 l' I F I a 2' wi o tl•' . i 3 M z GOVERNMENT CENTER STAT/ON I o . --1 --"- �-!'T -"i —�� n; L..APPROxIMATE EXISTWG GhOUN) 1. NE.CORRIDOR STATION 105 ansportation Improvement Program ■ ■ THE KAISER TRANSIT GROUP • pint venture RAISER EN,dkf EPS OV.ISRM LA W •P.. Iu su. cow,. HARR', NE ESE 4 ASSOCIATES co POST BUCRLET SCHUH A JERNIGAN. NG- CARP SMITH WO A55CCIAT ES INC SCHINPELEII COPRADINO ASSOCIATES d N.4 COF tIoo _ 115 FIGURE 161125 ALTERNATIVE DESIGN 3 EAST -WEST LINE AT ANGLE SW TO NE IN GOVERNMENT CENTER +120 +BO + 40 -40 1,14CA II STAGE II TRANSIT STUDY INTERFACE WITH LINE SECTION 4 FACILITIES ALTERNATIVE CONCEPT 3 KAII•40'• VERT 1.• 400•10.`R2 SKC—I90 INEW- mink • • • 25 the gtage 2 alignment between 1-95 and the East/West tkpressway requires 3 curves separated by tangents, ttio of which (on each side of the Government Center platform) have a 750'radius; the third has a 1,000' radius. All grades are within the 3.0% standard. The service connection requires a crossover on a curve: however, the direction of normal revenue operation is "with" rather than "against" turnout points, reducing any potential safety hazard. This plan requires acqui- sition of right-of-way between N.W. 1st Avenue and North Miami Avenue and N.W. 3rd Street and N.W. 8th Street. A curved alignment is required through the Government Center, but the Stage 2 platform will lie primarily outside the Government Center with street access in addition to access from the Government Center. This alternative provides an east -west to northeast revenue connection and a Stage 1 to Stage 2 service connection. It does not provide for direct Stage 2 access to the Washington Heights station and all Stage 1 to Stage 2 transfers would necessarily take place at the Government Center station. Land impact on the Government Center is minimal, but right-of-way would have to be taken east of Stage 1. The Stage 2 alignment could affect DPM routes through this area. 5.4 Alternative Design No. 4 This alternative represents a departure from the others in that it assumes an alignment for the east -west line along N.W. 7th Street and intersects Stage 1 at Washington Heights rather than the Government Center. It provides a through east -west to northeast line connection, but does not include a service connection between Stage 1 and Stage 2 (although one could be accommodated). There is no direct Stage 2 connection with the Government Center. The east -west line crosses I-95 from N.W. 7th Street on a 3.0% grade west of 1-95 and a 1.0% grade east of 1-95 at which point it remains at an elevation of 59', curv- ing northeast to pass over Stage 1 at Washington Heights. At this point of intersection the Washington Heights sta- tion forms an "x" arrangement requiring right-of-way acquisition around both platforms. This station is the only Stage 1 to Stage 2 transfer point. The Stage 2 alignment joins the FEC northeast right-of-way at N.W. llth Street passing below the East/West Expressway forming the northeast line. This alternative has no impact on the Government Center with respect to future rail extensions. The Washington Heights station becomes a major transfer location. It is important to note that this plan requires a relocation of the Washington Heights station and is not feasible if the station remains in the approved Stage 1 alignment. . . . . . ..... 4. 4. • 4 - • . . ----'---* '-- - •-• t - — -- -' •-v-T4-7, ili - • . • 41i . 1 • . • I* . . . _ .._____L...... .._...._1:. _ :J.._ _...__ __,. ,..0- MIME I • ..; • • 4 ,.- - . ........ .. . ... . : ,:,. ...r. -- ......... • - ••• .,--. ----$._ ....- '• -_, ...... .J. ........ -• • ... ...--....# . : ...... .... . ._ ,,...,......._..................... ... ....1„. ...-.....".. . ... ,..0.1,..„..„....0: .... * . .,........ . ®r . . # ,stte .' . . ,._ .: . . • ! . 741-4•.•,-,:: .6. .'14 ..... . ° 1..,_ .,. I, $1, • , •. , • . , t , . ' t .• , , . . 3 . • miz- - , \ „ • 1 e • • _•• ) .. , 4.. : , ' ' ' - ' ' ' ' • • • -•••••i•-•-• [ • - • - • - • . f -- 44 . — —,., ,........ , ... -; .-- L . $ : It._-_:_-__* ' ' " . ' , v i.. ..... -A. _'•;,..-..,, • . . . 4 _.., _ .... . :-...: ", ',.* " ;),C" '` ; - ' '‘ * - - ' ''s _IA ' \ 0 ',. • '''' ._ " ' I °° 1 i Z * - '-'" - - • , t \ k• .- N., ' ,,.. .• L - ,r , ;,........ 1..$ r- • . • = • i 1 -- - - ; r-7-7-- . . 'T • 0 -4,.. ----.• i . 4 01 t 1... 4.,‘,.., .. N, iv s• ..... • -.1 ! t---. 2. I • ' t ' c i .' I ' • • 0 • 4$• • ' 4 110- • • i Art : ; ' to' • $ t . .... 1 : S• • • 4 • :20 + 80 • 40 0 - 40 , 0:,s, 4.• - •.-: - : AA . .. : ,: /•. ., '1, dA. • . ..v.i, , .... . • • • .i.i: . • at IOU,. 1" \ ' , - - •'''. wk.., 't. ____. j I • AYE 1pt 4 6 " • j 1 ' I % . M # 1 t I-1 l _ , .. • 1 , , , ' A 6. . • • - .1 ' 1 : ..; • -• 1114 --• M• . = • • L 4 .• $4 IL d t4.1 I I( > 4.. 414 .a • . • i I. Mt•I ' . 4 , t --........, : ... . li _-_: •, =, ... 1 t . i.._i io vet?, , . •• : ., _ . / i ; . .., _ $ e ' X .,,.. ......__..1, .,,i, ; i=MIE- ! i•18 ... zl ., al 1 :1 z z ✓ E/W AUGtIMENT t a 1.1 \ a/ ••• +$. .., ; 4 .. ,... . ..------ .---a,... 16 S.CLA i 0 , T, a ', " i '' "' :;•.00.......'.1..'...4. k . !iz. A js NmPn. L ....._Le ;Ltc$4reol. LL I-9S i . PT I. — I _i_ rfi w EXPRESSNIGY _ _ .,_ -- A,- __ ..-4114.-- --.- --. ....., - , .— _ •--.1.4 T-.-... — — I j--2-'.6.-- — I 'ftr APPROXIINATE EXISTING GROUND ‘• a!e„ 1,7,2 8 ••• ...; 0 a ! Ali IP .1.7i 40 i . ,74 + ? sTA"ric,_ a 490 IE/W CORRIDOR 500 •IM ritirMi 510 520 100 MI=.; • . • y: ' : 1 /` 11ce" AlTiT ”1 - , ,1.05 ✓iiiiii /. `:l`•RETAINED Ps /jY FILL . e la 13# i .- .•MA �. i \It--1 /. 0RRIan 'S _-1* cT • t...: _ ._. _ I _ _ svt is,_----._ _ i .- ... 7 i -.l __ . . . .I . 21 . -.II' r� K t tORkIDOR I T, ...5.*.... 34 R (_ GOVERNMENT, CENTER STATIONi 1;.�: L :ra•,_ _ 1c O� — .r...—• 0 7 VY 1111 !. , 11it _-- L-ii/Ss' RI0OR 1< WASNINGTON NEIGNTS STAT10% Mr YI•rICT -.. .. ..__ a. .. ..• - .-. . _ f r_.._ ♦ +.. _.. ". • • �. as , /MCIj111Y1_,PT`. r - •! ` : •. -� r " -- _a*rYI411 iK Ilfl^�.i _ 't L, 1 a __ . ror TN limit ` _ *it 'I. roam ',IA YI-' {. _pj' /J_ J _�.I --2r . -a -/- dlit.. _ JWI • "•w .n:I / 4. _ ..^_ mac• w y• j_- I , t • - ,I s i -- rt.- :'•!.._.._._ .X.__ -` ..t' .II ' I: Fir_- __..1_.- "ei wE_— `.[ i_ Art. .�. • sit '�t MI ri , 26 Ai 4 1 kit • } . . ... . —1 i i 't ri � ... I 1rodk • I I ti .J t.a....•lL. I . JAI , � W NI it N y .. W �I 1 `T W a ill I _$ T ir- �I t 6; ,i { i1 {•�1 i Via ill J T { �rN ' Z P I �. r'�• v+ I - s r •q h { r •9 1 II{ UP W Jul Y' N Y� n n_j - 1 I _ . 1 >! 1 I —. I. y44r ,1�jEtr AL.INT• iLl1iLLTh . r . _♦._ )Oh '__ 1 I APPR 1XINATI: Et,STIN.. iihay.`NL r ruiFTi o \t Ak,•1! - .. .•T�• RETAIrLD ...c 51AT .;.'1, ii_ :.h Fi�+ �' 1.o._ I/1FT«W 4 --11W 1 1 I 1 j N/$ CQRRIQOR :$ I 110 20 • •ansportation Improvement Program FIGURE 17 ALTERNATIVE DESIGN 4 EA ' MES1 L11( OUTSIDE GOVERNMENT CENTER + 120 + 80 + 40 0 — 40 THE KAISER TRANSIT GROUP .punt venture KAISER ENGINEERS DoRAKIN Co W NN, J ausem COWPDX, HARRY WEESE A ASSOCIATES LTD POST BUrKLET SCHUNA JERNIGAN. INC CARR SMITH AND ASSOCIATES. NC SCINANI LER CORRAOXNO ASSOCIATES aHNl0.1 ° STAGE II TRANSIT STUDY INTERFACE WITH LINE SECTION 4 FACILITIES ALTERNATIVE CONCEPT 4 scut Ia•40'• VEFT °"""" S K C —191 .ti IBmwo flA which 27 'Whit this plan elihinates the need fot ptovision of future facilities at the Government Centeti it does requite the relocation of the Washington Heights Station and provision for the Stage 2 platform and right-of-way. All Stage 2 riders destined for the Government Center or the Miami CBD would be required to transfer to Stage 1 trains to get to the Government Center station. 5,5 Analysis of Final Alternative Designs The four final design alternatives developed have had their various features summarized in Figure 18 to facil- itate comparison. Figure 18 is a matrix highlighting the different impacts of each alternative, and thus summarizes detailed analysis of the different schemes. The alternatives were evaluated against the criteria listed in Section 4.0 of this report. Based upon the criteria, the four alternative designs fell into two categories: Acceptable and Unacceptable. A discussion of these rankings is as follows. .1 Unacceptable Alternative Designs Based upon the criteria discussed earlier in this report, design concepts No. 1 and No. 4 have major deficiencies which make them unacceptable design alternatives for future planning. Their shortcomings result in their elimination from further con- sideration are as follows: Alternative Design No. 1 Summary of deficiencies IIIK • Poor rail operating conditions • Inadequate rail passenger transfer conditions mmmim • Lack of service connection • Substantial land use impacts in the Govern - went Center itself to accommodate additional platforms Cost: $29.350 million The very poor transit operations environment and passenger accommodations created by placing two or three stub -ended lines in the Government Center, makes this design concept undesirable. Storage and cross- over space in the Government Center would be needed to make stub -ended configurations work. A relatively high price would be required for this concept. 28 Alt .native_ Design No. _4. Stith -Mary of deficiencies • Poor service connections • Inconvenient passenger tnovetnetts • Substantial land use impacts in Washington Heights area counter to approved Stage 1 plans • No DPM interface Cost: $13.750 million The major disruption this concept causes in the Washington Heights area is counter to approved neigh- borhood plans and citizens' desires. While this is the least expensive scheme, it would cause many addition- al passenger transfers as riders try to get to the Government Center from the east -west lines. Finally, the lack of interface with the DPM system is contrary to public policies. . 2 Acceptable Alternative Designs Both alternatives No. 2 and No. 3 were judged to be acceptable for future planning purposes even though they are substantially different from each other. Both schemes avoid operational problems, unacceptable land use, or ridership problems encountered in the other two alternatives previously discussed. However, alternatives No. 2 and No. 3 have both positive and negative facets which need to be brought forward and analyzed. Alternative Design No. 2 • Rail operating conditions are good • Rail service connections are poor • Optimal transit rider accommodations and travel time savings • Very substantial land use impacts in the CBD • Conflicts with DPM policies Cost: $31.775 million This concept, which is similar to many early pre- liminary engineering proposals, runs the east -west line across the CBD around 3rd Street. While this provides the highest level of transit rider service, it also produces the highest level of land use impacts (including disruption to Southern Bell operations), will have negative impacts on DPM usage, and would be the most difficult and costly to build. 29 Rite nAt_i_Ve besign F2o._ 3 i tail operating conditions are good i Only alternative providing a service connection i Good rider transfer and destination accommodations i Substantial land use impacts east of the Government Center i Good DPM interface. Cost: $20.750 million This concept has the rail operating characteristics of through line service, and allows inter -line service connections, DPM interface, and good rider movements between lines and to their final destina- tion. There will be major land use impacts just east of the Government Center. There is also the possi- bility of modifying the northern line to parallel Miami Avenue into the Buena Victa yardo and realign- ment of the line section through the Government Center adjacent to N.W. 2nd Street. The cost is the second lowest of the four design alternatives. i 1111111111 1 I I IIII IIII 111111 ■1 Alternative D►Rign t Line Characteristics Fir:IMF 1R r'w frog AtTFRNATIVF. IFSTC.NS SIReOIRY nF CItARA rFRISTTCS Three line*: 1. Ntaieuh- Dadeland. 2. Little Nevins - Cnvernment Center. 3. north- east Dade-Govern*ent Center. Alternative Design 2 Tan lines: 1. Nlaieah-Dsde- land. 2. Little Havana-Nnrth- east Dade via Miami CND. Alternative Denlen 1 Alternative Denten, ti• Tvo linen: 1. H1uleah-Dade- 1and. 2. Little Navnnn- Nnrthenet Dade. Tto lines: 1. Hialeah - Dadeland. 2. Little- Novena. Nnrthenat Dade vt* Wnnhing- ton Height'. Station Configuration Government Center: two parallel pintfnrmn and a third at right angle to went, all at *arm (59') el- evation. Washington Weight's' two parallel platform' at same (37') elevation. Government Center: Line 2 p under Line 1 at right angle. Washington Heights: 'tame nn Stnge 1. Government Center: Line 2 C order nnrth end of Line 1 platform at angle of spprnrtantely 6S". WnahingtonHeights: name aN Stage 1. Government Center: Not affected. Washington Hdabt_: Line 2 p'tnn.A over north end, of Line 1 platformnt rouRhlp rtaht angle. Operational Characteristics a. Tail tracks b. Service Connection* C. DRt interface Line 1: N/A. Line 2: none Line 3: none. Line 1 to Line 2: no. Line 2 to Line l: no. Line 3 to Line 1: yew. Difficult tas..nter SertiST a. cnnlcnvernmmt Center destination b. Clete Center destination t. Little Novena - Northeest Dade Service Line 1 from north L south: good. Line 2:gnod. Linn 3: good. Line 1 from north 1; south: good. Line 2:trenefer re- lated. Line 3: transfer re- quired. Transfer required Line 1: N/A. Line 2: N/A No Good Line 1 from north I. Routh: good. Line 2 from east i meat: good. Line 1 from north i Routh: Rood. Line 2 from east 6 rest: transfer required. Through service Line 1: N/A. Line 2: N/A Tea Good Line 1 from north A south: gond. Line 2 from emit 6 west: good Line 1 from north 6 Routh: good. Line 2 from emit 6 went: transfer required. Through service Line 1: N/A. tine 2: RIM No No Line 1 from north & .outfit good. Line 2 from -*mat S. meat: transfer required'. Line t tram north i mouth: good. Line 2 from egret S- weat: transfer required`. through Nervtre Land Use topic[ a. Within Government Center b. Adjoining green M1nimm1 Minimal Mfntmml Very mubRtsnttal Minimal SnhRtantial Cetimeted Cost (1976 dolllre) S29.350,000 Comments Government Center mtetinn is cnmpltceted. Lick of tail trarkn not rofNi@stent with oyster, @safety specifics - flows. No ',termite rnnnectlon between l.tn• 2 and rent of .,)stem. Stage 2 ennetruc- tlnn disruptive to Stage 1 operation*. S31.215.000 No service connection between lines. Provtdea additional downtown nervtre. S20.250,000 Only mlternattve providing nervtre connection. Require' additional right-of-way en+t of Government Center. None Substantial! ST1150-.000 Require* relecnttntr off Wnehtngtnn ileightw 'tatton from approved' location on Stage 1. IAA 0 31 tit) tONCLtSIbNS While none of the alternative design concepts offer an ideal situation, the immediate differences between the un= acceptability of alternatives No. 1 and No. 4, vs. accept- able designs No. 2 and No. 3 are evident from land use, set= vice, and ridership viewpoints. Thus the rationale behind the initial rejection of alternatives No. 1 and No. 4 is clear. The differences between No. 2 and No. 3 are in many ways also decisive. Alternative No. 3 is less disruptive, both within the Government Center and in the CBD;is less costly, has better coordination with and does not compete with the DPM, and allows inter -line service connections and good transit rider accommodations. Alternative No. 2 suffers by compar- ison on these issues and is therefore less satisfactory. Alternative No. 2 has a singular advantage in its ability to carry transit riders directly into the heart of the CBD and allow possible private redevelopment adjacent to the right-of-way. While this is desirable,based on ridership demands and the heavy loads that the DPM might be burdened a witlt,Alternative No. 2 represents a major departure from MEE currently adopted policy, is far more expensive, and has operational drawbacks which negate its ridership advantages. Therefore Alternative No. 3 and its possible modification represents the clearest choice for future Stage 1/Stage 2 interface at this time. Future investigation could modify Alternative No. 3 into a scheme that offers better CBD pen- etration or replaces the DPM in certain areas dependent upon the final design concepts advanced for the DPM and CBD development schemes. The flexibility of Alternative No. 3 is therefore unique in that no other alternative design could allow as much future modification potential. The choice of Alternative No. 3,with slight profile and alignment changes to make it fit into the Government Center as easily as possible, appears by all evaluation standards to be the optimal choice for future planning efforts. • ■ 0 A STUDY OF TRANSIT ALTERNATIVE ALIGNMENTS AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE GOVERNMENT CENTER AREA OFFICE OF TRANSPORTATION ADMINISTRATION August 14, 1978 J 1 1 H Li 1L1 PIC' 7 li, I f _ ; LALi_J i-- lI -,_-,--_-•-, '-\,s\t,,ilr'\ '\7-,t\ -'. \ „,A-,\\\, -\ . --A --.:-. \-. -\ \ \71!llI1 L-:.:,.;J•,-‘.,...-L-1-1 -7-, 1iL7_ 7-111--,''- _.-,,.2 L17„L__ ..t.,.,-...A.^....• , \k: \ \\,,, 11 , A\t,,,, , \\\ \;\(--- c- if . ' ,--J L__—A 1—_. I-. \ \ \ , I! _ I !I 1! e00%,• E21J, La_ I r----1! •r. 1! oonnectons 'LL_, washingto _ heights A°01%elle .40 - ••• phaser mit‘• 11 It ifent center • : • c-.--\-.\------11--------7! • - -Noe • I I • • wm-Ir•••• tr_ \k\ -TT1OV - I 78-657. `N. To: • ruoM: Joseph R: Grassie. • City Manager Mayor and Members City Commission CITY OF MIAMI. :"'..''RtoA !.'ltER-07FIC7. MEMORANDUM DAY'OCT 20 197 orfrEttUtCr3: Attached for your review is a recent Dade County report entitled "A Study of Transit Alternative Alignments and their Impacts on the Government Center Area". The proposed east -west phase II of the Rapid Transit System will cross the presently designed phase I alignment at the Government Center Station. Th.2 design of the Governre nt Center Station that is now underway must incorporate the best alternative crossing. A presentation to the Commission on these alternatives will be made by Dade County at the October 24th Commission meeting. The county report favors alternative No. 3 which has a diagonal alignment through the Government Center and a connection east of the Government Center to the FEC railroad for the route north to 163rd Street. It should be noted that Mr. Geddes October 17th report to the County Commission on the master plan for the Government Center recommended a straight Phase II crossing of the Government Center along NW 2nd Street which implies that alternative No. 2 may be the most compatible with the objectives of the Government Center plan. ■• 1 -+1 ' eo ► N'"'N "'� '7 nay a . ? Z = ! y -+ti 0.M r DA 911 COURTHOUSE MIAMI, FLORIDA 33130 TEL: 579-5311 OEEiCE OF COUNT`` MANAGER tinhard Fosmoen Assistant City Manager City of Miami Planning Department 3500 Pan American Drive Miami, Florida 33131 Dear Mr, Fosmoen: SEP 2 8 1278 Attached for your review and comment is a recently completed report entitled "A Study of Transit Alternative Alignments and their Impact on the Government Center Area". This report was needed to facilitate un- interrupted progress in the design of the Government Center complex. Since the design of the remaining buildings in the Government Center complex is underway, space allocations for all transit related facili- ties must be made as quickly as possible. Therefore, this report was designed to promote suggested alternatives and elicit comments from interested groups. The report recommends that alternative alignment concept No. 3 be adopted for future planning. This alternative causes the least disruption through the Miami CBD, and also provides a service connection between the Stage 1 rapid transit system and future rail extensions. This makes a second multi -million dollar maintenance yard and shop site unnecessary, and would reduce future costs and speed-up development of new extensions. It also provides for transfers among Stage 1, future rail extensions, and the DPM system at one central location. If you have any comments with regard to this report, please contact Fred Silverman at 579-5672 or myself. ncerely. 1f John A. Dy Transport. ion Coordinator Ca,• C, !.7 CITY OF `t1AMI. iN i t R-:iFFIC:= ;�iE",10i2 a �1D1�P11 TO: Mayor and Members of the -,iz�. OCT 0 1978 City Commission S :,l,ttJECT i 1 ; vc...t. Joseph R. Grassie "` rtf1.1 EFIENCt:i: ICity Manager 1 1 The Planning Department, has been under contract to Dade County, for the past several months to plan the areas around Miami's ten transit stations, a process known as Station Area Design and de- mm velopment (SADD). To date planning staff have completed a de - MO scription of existing conditions around these stations and are MM_ publishing the findings in brief reports for each station area. MI Copies of the firstthree reports issued in the City of Miami for the Douglas Road, Coconut Grove and Vizcaya Stations are attached. The reports provide the basis for initiating the SADD citizen participation planning program that is scheduled to begin November. In addition these documents will provide advance information for property owners, developers and investors who will be seeking opportunities for development near transit stations. The next step in the process will be public hearings before the Commission this spring on SADD phase II during which alternative concepts for development in transit station areas will be proposed. This will result in a refinement of alternatives in a final recom- mended concept plan (Phase III) in late 1979. These final phase III plans, if adopted by the City Commission after public hearings, would govern all public and private development actions in transit station areas. This three phase process is described in the Regional Profile (also attached), which gives a system -wide overview of the SADD program. 1 p• _ !'s.....42L..A ! . . — —1', \ 71 \.\!\, \ /I, i 11 1 T Li fl 11 I -<*- 1 riTI r---- i J. L_J_J L__. li 11 I .J r I ,i / ,___J t __JL!! 1 I -'-li--Z-T_T-711 1 T !!!-,-!:- :. . 11:1 I 117111 1 1 i L__11 ',L. . i.I!, 0--7 11— 1 1.--.-.11.--j l_-. -..I :L... .....-. r• :-.."'-...,' . • -.• . _. _ _____. 8 ___:c7f, ._ -, ..,. ....i. 11 - ..... /, i1._____1 \'‘\\\N ,..— JL i L i___ ill v - . Obstibleittrvice !'s! V oimnections e000 L-I - ji I L_ 1ii 1 \\V,!!!!,\.•!,. _,..,_, -.. 11 ir -‘\t'.,','',i'l , , washingto ), II -'' !-1! ---L_heights___. L Ai II [ 1T r---.---111 p L_____., 11 TI 1, 1______J _.1 li ------i • - . !,: . li!••:!...! t— _.—...i. ; . ••••• fro °13000 _ rfhiS 11 1$ tl ; r- • ! •!va.!**, km" • ' e • 039 41416 12=4 • • • 0 ! • J ' 7:71 r-- .. fetrirent center •" • .•.„ • • , • - \:,•••• \- ;.•+ r_ • " - 1;;-- cn co O. 1 kat ;VI'ItO bt.tti0N 1 1 / 1 1 1 1 .1 1 1 1 1 t t t 1 1 t 1 1, '► 1t 1 Mt t H OD 0160 G Y 4 c 4 4 i+ 1 4 1 1 1. 4 1 4 4 1 4 4 4$ 1 4 4 4 4 4 1 1 1 t,t1 1 1 V 1 t 1 t INITIAL SCREENING: THE REFINEMENT OF ALTERNATIVES i i 4 i i 1 1+• 4• 4 1 1 1 i 4 i f• l l 4 4 1 1 1 1 A10 zb LEVEL TWO SCREENING OF DESIGN APPROACHES 6 b APPLICATION OF EVALUATION CRITERIA 4/+1444411 CONCLUSIONS 4 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 1 4 1 4 4 4 i 8 4•• l* i 1={ i i l 4 The preparation of this report has been financed in part through a grant from the U.S. Department of Transportation, Urban Mass Transportation Administration, under the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, as amended. The opinions, findings, conclusions expressed in this report are not necessarily those of the Urban Mass Transportation Administration. ii ■ 1 • ■ • L1§T 0t fiGURES Witi5W1 Go'tetntnent Centet..:............: r �. is Current Alignment of the Stage 1 Rapid 'ttansit System and the Downtown People :covet...... The Four Basic Alternatives . . . . . . . 4. Alternative 1 - East-West Line Stub-End......ti.. 5. Alternative 2 - East-West Line at Right Angle,Separated Platforms 6. Alternative 2A - East-West Line at Right Angle,Connected Platforms 7. Alternative 3 - East-West Line at Angle SW to NE, Separated Platforms 8. Alternative 3A - East-West Line at Angle SW to NE, Connected Platforms 9. Alternative 4 - East-West Line Turning in Government Center,Parallel Platforms 10. Alternative 5 - East-West Line Outside Government Center . . 11. Alternative 6 - East-West Line through CBD, Northeast Connection Via NE 2nc; Avenue 12. Alternative 7 - East-West Line through CBD, Northeast Connection Via Washington Heights 13. Summary of Impacts on the Government Center 14. Alternative Design 1 - East-West Line Stub -End -6 t 15. Alternative Design 2 - East-West Line at Right Angle in Government Center 16. Alternative Design 3 - East-West Line at Angle SW to NE in Government Center.........:.., 17. Alternative Design 4 - East-West Line Outside Government Center 18. The Four Alternative Designs: Summary of Characteristics 16' 19 MM Perhaps the most significant long. -term public policy decision the Board of County Commissioners will make during the next few months is how it decides to fit its fixed guide- way public transportation facilities with the public buildings planned for the area generally defined as the Government Center. The Government Center area consists of more than 33 acres located on the western boundary of the Central Bus- iness District (CBD). The reason for the timing of the decisions is that the fixed guideway transit system is to be built in three or more stages with the first stage of some 20.5 miles from Dadeland on the south to Hialeah on the west being under final design at the present time. Construction on the first stage is to begin in 1979 with operations to begin in 1983. The designs of buildingsand the first stage of the transit system are to the point that the cross or "X" in the system must be defined in absolute terms and the design frozen so that architects and engineers of the building facilities and the transit sta- tion at the Government Center can proceed to complete their tasks on a timely basis. The basic rail transit system as either committed or planned for Metropolitan Dade County consists of at least three major elements, all of which interface at or near Government Center in the Miami CBD. These are: (1) Stage 1 -- Hialeah-Dadeland; (2) East -west line from Little Havana to Northeast Dade; and (3) Downtown People Mover (DPM) within the Miami CBD. The focal point of the entire system is the Government Center, a new complex of County, City, State, and Federal buildings on the west side of Miami's CBD. The Stage 1 rapid transit line runs along the east side of the complex over the Florida East Coast Railroad (FEC) right-of-way. Several buildings have already been completed, others are under design and still others are in planning. The original plan for the Government Center was completed in 1975. The 2000 Site Plan which emerged from the study in 1975 is shown in Figure 1. To avoid future design conflicts, the 1975 master plan for the Government Center is being re-examined and brought up to date. Completion of this study is proposed for September or October, 1978. Simultaneously, investigation of the interface between Stage 1 of the rapid transit system and future extensions has been initiated to allow Government Center design decisions to accommodate these extensions and to modify original Preliminary Engineering concepts regarding future rapid transit service impacts within the CBD and the FIGURE 1 bOt3N1OWN GOVERNMENT CENTER WM ■ 11111 ■ 111111111I1111111 a 4rh� C.L►jj .111.00 OOP • ILLUSTRATIVE SITE PLAN year 2000 MM • NN . 44 ¢4 • Maftm C so. w S'REr IIIIIIII0I� 11110•1■1111111■ ■Iniiuiiiiiieiiiiiiiii ii tea_ GoVernment Center. A major change is the Downtown People Mover (DPM) and its interface with operating rapid transit lines which was not considered during Preliminary Engineering of the original Government Center planning. Compounding these elements are design considerations that require the Stage 1 transit line to accommodate the following: (1) Adequate vertical clearance over the Miami River and I-95; (2) Harmonious connections to the Government Center complex, older parts of the CBD, and the DPM; (3) Adequate vertical and horizontal spacing to allow for locating the Washington Heights station; (4) Allowance for maintaining a viable Florida East Coast rail operation; (5) The operation of north -south and east -west line rail services; and (6) Passenger transfer between lines. This report examines the problems and issues regarding future rail extensions and presents information concerning options for these extensions, with varying impacts to design standards, disruption to existing and planned land uses, and service con- siderations, and relates them to the development of the Govern- ment Center and adjacent areas. Finally, the report makes a recommendation on the most advantageous alternative. Some of the technical problems which have to be considered are described in the Kaiser Transit Group's final report, "Definitive Engineering Study, Line Section 4 Transit Facil- ities," addressing the question of the Miami River crossing of Stage 1, and its impact on the Government Center station. Two fundamental problems result from this KTG study: 1. The lack of service connection between the Stage 1 and future lines could adversely affect system oper- ations by precluding vehicle transfer from one line to the other to balance operations, making it necessary to build a second heavy -maintenance facility serving only the east -west line (or, alternatively, hauling vehicles "off-line" to the Hialeah yard for mainten- ance). Lack of revenue connection between the east -west line and the northeast Dade line would result in a system consisting of three lines, two of them ter- minating at or near Government Center, exacerbating problems of passenger transfers, station design, and system operation. In summary, a number of unresolved issues were felt to need examination before finalizing the location and design of Stage 1 facilities in the Government Center area and accept- ing the mentioned line Section 4 study by the County's Office of Transportation Administration (OTA). 2 METHODOLOGY $eginning with the basic premise that given the current Stage 1/DPM plans, the question of interface between Stage 1 and Stage 2 rapid transit lines is of critical importance, The current Stage 1/DPM plans are shown in Figure 2 on the following page. The methodology employed in this study was to develop all reasonable alternatives and to describe their potential impacts. The review process began with a set of concept type scenarios, each depicting generalized approaches to the problem and briefly discussing impacts on land use, design, operations, and the like. A two-step screening process was developed to evaluate the alternatives. The first step began with a review of the scenarios. They were refined into a set of nine "centerline" plans, using a variety of rail engineering design standards. A set of evaluation criteria was developed to evaluate alter- natives. The criteria were weighted by professionals in various disciplines. The application of the evaluation cri- teria to the nine alternatives concluded the first level screening. The second level screening began with the four alternatives which were reduced to a set of four different design approaches each of which is described in detail. The approaches were then tested against the original evaluation criteria. The application of the criteria to the four design approaches constitutes the second level screening and the completion of this study. A11 of the scenarios reviewed had the following evaluation criteria applied as the basis for determining their impacts. The results are reported as the basis for recommending the most advantageous plan. The evaluation criteria are: 1 Land Use Impacts 2 Stage 1 Profile Impacts 3 Stage 2 Profile Impacts 4 Government Center Station Design 5 Washington Heights Station Design 6 DPM Interface 7 Passenger Transfers 8 Future Rail Operations 9 Equipment Movements 10 FEC Railroad Impacts 11 Costs To initiate the study and begin the analysis process out- lined in 2.0, the staff developed four scenarios intended MOs FIGURE 2 CUArttNt MA NttEnT OF THE STAGE 1 RAPID TRANSIT nn'tt.1 AND THE DOWNTOWN PEOPLE HOVER tt b nit , - _ _ • t • -r__r • I - • I41 0 vs. i.. lY —_--..Jx.1.r-.".I'•;.' 1r .. .W.,... 1--I0 • - t: -.. -e:— ' r; -l\\1 le,riIr-l. - , • "1•., .I•..6'„I— '•, • t.t•: — 1,.. 3.........___ .... ............ ,,,.... \ :. ' ,,, ..,...". .•- ... , i i ...,, \:,:. .::: • 1 • % • ' -`•::•,,..,,,, i . I i • t ' N _ •Ps 4-4' . _ . . .':.;....--'•• ,1•___•;..... • a a s• :-...-i,,..........,.... •. ' ,, \ . ail _ ____ T.--„_. ',.......,--,4_c..- — ..:-.._:. al • II __ ....::: • — -0. ir I r - \-1\ %. -- - - --4 -_ _-__ _,..-. _ -,-__ -- _-- •.7 ,I r , • 6.9 • ' - - - - _ -__-_1...;• m 1 i• • 'I . . ----._.., i. \....... -"---. • rtt_-. - 7— ! ! - — .-- -- -. = I a a V - • . -..-:..- - --. ''-=.----- . . , . luta 1-•4- : -- . -4i \i I • 66.111 St • •• •-• 4. t ,:. _•;.:, st.i It. ' - V ' --7-1 101 ' 11111mmommmiinvir11111111111 hobt 6.61 10, • 2 4.4 p.itb x- udi _ _ ta. " 1 r , •••• ....•• 41. 1K-77 3 to stimulate discussion and resolution of the various issues related to rapid transit facilities in the Government Center area. Of primary importance was future rail line interface With Stage 1 and long-range operations considerations. Other issues such as impacts on land use, potential problems of vertical and horizontal alignment, interface with the Downtown People Mover, rider transfer connections, rail equipment move. - tent, and the like were also raised in comments on each scenario. The purpose of the scenarios was not to attempt definitive solutions, but rather to identify basic principles of system location, design, and operations that needed to be addressed before further decisions were made on precise engineering and architectural det 11 of Stage 1 so it could accommodate future rail extensions. The scenarios were a beginning point for the establishment of basic principles to govern final system design in the Government Center area. 2.1 Scenario 1 The original alignments and station locations were pre- sented in the Preliminary Engineering Report of Kaiser Engineers' "Milestone 8, Final System Design,"(May, 1975). Modifications to the original Preliminary Engineering discussed in Section 1.0 required terminating the east - west line at the Government Center station. With the addition of the DPM, this scenario provided the basis for all subsequent design studies of this area, most recently detailed in the"Final Report, Definitive Engin- eering Study of Line Section 4 Transit Facilities," Kaiser Transit Group, (April, 1978). 2.2 Scenario 2 In this concept,the future northeast rail line and the east -west line connect,paralleling the Stage 1 north - south line, and following the FEC right-of-way to become the proposed Stage 2 line. A station location is shown about 11 blocks west of the proposed Stage 1 Government Center station, although the station platform siting is flexible within certain constraints. 2.3 Scenario 3 This is similar to 2, but locates a station just north of the proposed Stage 1 Government Center station para- llel to the Stage 1 Government Center station and could allow for a single station to accommodate both rail lines. 2.4 Scenario 4 This shows the east -west line joining Stage 1 trackage and right-of-way north of the proposed Government Center sta- tion, and departing north of the Washington Heights station to become the proposed northeast line. _• • 1:0 INITIAL SCREENING: THE REFINEMENT OF ALTERNATIVES Ecamination of the original alternatives and their options gave rise to three basic issues which needed further clari- fication. These include: (1) Ridership levels and transfer problems; (2) Service connections between the rapid transit lines; and (3) Stage 2 physical impacts on the Government Center, adjacent parts of the CBD, and the Washington Heights station. These issues are detailed below as follows: 3.1 Ridership and Transfers The proposed year 2000 rail transit system will have over 300,000 daily riders. During the morning rush- hour nearly 40% of all riders will get on and off the system before it gets to the CBD, 35% will have CBD destinations, 12% will transfer from one line to another, and the balance will start their trips from the CBD. Of the over 100,000 users getting off rapid transit lines in the CBD, 30% will stay in the Government Center area, 5% in the Washington Heights area, and the balance will go to other parts of the CBD. This underscores the im- portance of the people mover system and the large number of people it will have to move. In addition, the number of system transfers between lines is not overly large. The largest group will want to go from the east -west line to the northeast line (5%); next is movements from the Stage 1 south line to the Stage 1 Hialeah line (4.5%); and the third is from the east -west line to Stage 1 south line. Other smaller transfer movements are anticipated. The two largest interline movements follow the basic operations concept developed for system planning, so riders actually do not have to get off the trains. Only 15-20,000 per- sons daily would switch trains, which is a relatively small rush hour volume of people. Therefore, addition- al interline service connections and special additional transfer stations do not appear to be necessary based upon ridership. However, the impact on transfer move- ments and rider access to the rest of the CBD became significant elements for transfer analysis. 3.2 Service Connections With a large yard and shop facility being built in the unincorporated area adjacent to Hialeah as part of Stage 1, the need to phase in several future transit lines and the necessity to accommodate interline rail movements, the question of service connections is a serious concern. • t .11i11111111u1■11uIII IIu■IIII■■ E �• MM ME if equipment alone could be moved from Stage 1 lines onto future extensions, future yard costs could be re= duced and new lines phased in more easily than operating independent lines each with their own yards and shops. Attempts to see how various alternatives could accommo- date primarily a "non -revenue" service connection, and secondly an interline service connection were initiated as part of the alternative analysis. 3,3 Land Use Impacts While it is presumed that the Stage 2 line would be accommodated within the Government Center, the position of the platform, the impact of the Stage 2 line on Lummus Park, the areas east of the FEC railroad,and im- pacts of varying levels in the Washington Heights area all became vital issues requiring further analysis. Opportunities to allow private development near the Stage 2 station, bring riders closer to the CBD core, and minimize land acquisition or displacement to residen- tial areas, all required further analysis as well. 3,4 The Detailed Alternatives After review by various agencies, refinements to the four original alternative concepts were produced by staff. These so-called "centerline" alternatives gave more careful attention to engineering details as well as architectural, land use, and operational elements. The nine alternatives fall into four basic groups. Three of the four groups were first covered in the ori- ginal scenarios. The fourth is a resurrection of the original preliminary engineering scheme whereby direct rail service is carried toward Biscayne Boulevard and other parts of the downtown area. The four basic groups are: . 1 Stub -End Service at Government Center A future east -west line would stub -end at the Stage 1 Government Center station, and a northeast line would stub -end at the Washington Heights or Govern- ment Center station. . 2 East-West/Northeast Line Connection via Government Center Five different design concepts were developed which would allow a single, through service rail line to connect east -west and northeast lines into a single rail line. The placement of the Government Center platform on this line, its impact on the Stage 1 line and impacts to the Government Center or areas just east of the CBD differ among the five alignments. 1 6 ■IIIIIIIIIII_II IIIII■IIuuuIIiII IIIi a iIuI■■n■■ • 1 „5 y s_t 4est/Nottheast,. title Coniie,cted__Via Washington eights An east -west line would follow a N.W. 7th Street alignment into a refined Stage 1 Washington Heights alignment, with service continuing into a northeast line. .4 Extended East-West/Northeast Line Connection Two alternatives propose to carry the east -west line through Government Center eastward to the Biscayne Boulevard corridor, then northward to make a north- east line connection and/or loop back to the west to tie into the Hialeah portion of Stage 1. Each of these alternatives assumes the preliminary engin- eering alignment of the east -west line crossing of I-95 from the west. Figure 3 on the following page is a matrix which summarizes the impacts of these alternatives. The specific alignments of the nine alternatives are shown in Figures 4 through 12 on the following pages. 6 ■I■..■uiiuiii.I 1111111111 IIIIIIIuu i111111iiiiimimiiwm y' sta'West/Northeast tine Connected via Washington tt,ights An east -west line would follow a N.W. ith Street alignment into a refined Stage 1 Washington Heights alignment, with service continuing into a northeast line. Extended East-West/Northeast Line Connection Two alternatives propose to carry the east -west line through Government Center eastward to the Biscayne Boulevard corridor, then northward to make a north- east line connection and/or loop back to the west to tie into the Hialeah portion of Stage 1. Each of these alternatives assumes the preliminary engin- eering alignment of the east -west line crossing of I-95 from the west. Figure 3 on the following page is a matrix which summarizes the impacts of these alternatives. The specific alignments of the nine alternatives are shown in Figures 4 through 12 on the following pages. IIIIIIII 111111111111111111111111111111 FTGlJRE 3 THE FOUR BASIC ALTERNATIVES II111111I IIII 11111111" Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario, 6 Land Use Impact Minimum Require additional ROW for curve west or east of Govern- ment Center. Curve could require addi- tional ROW within Govern- ment Center. Curve would- require addttionoI1 ROW within Government Center Stage 1 Profile No change Possible shifting of horizon- tal profile to accommodate Stage 2 tracks. Government Center station relocated further north. Possible shifting of hori- zontal profile to accommo- date Stage 2 tracks. No vertical or hortzontal problems. Stage 2 Profile Possible vertical profile problem Station platform of EW line location affect vertical profile, curve passes through Government Center complex. Stage 2 profile dependent on 1-95 and passage beneath Stage 1. No vertical or horizontals problems. Government Center Station 2 level platforms. Major transfer point. Station platforms would be separated or "L" shaped. Stage 1 platform moved Slightly northward. Station located further to the north. 2 parallel platforms required. This station could be defer- red to Stage 2. No direct access to Stage 2`.. Transfer to Washington Heights, required. Washington Heights Station No impact Provision of Stage 2 tracks at this station. Possible transfer point. This station could be deferred to Stage 2. Relocation of Government Center station could elimi- nate need for this station. Would have to accommodate 4 tracks. Primary transfer station between Stages 1 and 2. Stage 2 transfer to Government Center. DPM Interface No problem Stage 2 platform would not he directly served by DPM without some walking distance. Government Center DPM stop moved further north, possibly combining the 2 proposed stops. DPM would have to be extended to Washington Heights to directly serve Stage 2. Transfers Concentrated at Government Center. No through EW to WE connection. A short walk would be re- quired for Stage 1 and Stage 2 transfers at the Government Center. Through EW to NE movement possible. All transfers at Government Center or Washington Heights. Through EW to NE movement possible. Washington Heights the only transfer point. Must be des! A for transfer load. Stage 2 Operations through NE to EW service. No NE service. provision. EW trains reverse at Government Center. Uninterrupted EW to NE Line connection without interference with Stage 1 The NF. connection could he deferred depending on phasing. Uninterrupted EW to NE line connection without interference with Stage 1. The NE connection could be deferred depending on phasing. All trips to Government Center must transfer. Switching required on sharedS` trackage. Headway problems would occur. Rail Equipment Movement No service connection provided. Service connection would be provided at Washington Heights. Service connection would he provided at Washington Heights. Service connection on shared trackage. 11111111111 i i 1111 ■IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII FIGURE 4 ALTERNATIVE I EAST -WEST LINE STUB -END II II 1101 lull 11 111111111111111111 11 11 HI 111111 11 lull 11 11 11111 hill I_ Pa J LJ 711 ir- ( _ 11 1 Li FIGURE 5 ALTERNATIVE 2 EAST -WEST LINE AT RIGHT ANGLE SEPARATED PLATFORMS AVE c-• Fgi 4 4[ 1-BISCAYNE SOWVARO Ns ••• i i i 1 i i 1 ■ i 11111111111 i i II■ ON1111111111111111111111 FIGURE 6 ALTERNATIVE 2A EAST -WEST LINE AT RIGHT AN(:L.E : CONNECTED PLATFORMS L. nL [Foul IL RISCAYNI ROUtFVARO 1 _Lif MI IOuI FIGI►RE 7 ALTERNATIVE 3 EAST -WEST LINE AT ANGLE SW TO NE SEPARATED PLATFORMS uII II 1 11111111111111 1 111111111 I 1 I 1111111 11 ■III 111111111111 BISCAYNE BOULEVARD i■■iiiiiiuiiiiiii FIGURE 8 ALTERNATIVE 3A EAST —WEST LINE AT ANGLE SW TO NE CONNECTED PLATFORMS —1{1...----- e1sGYNE sou«YARD IIIIII111111IIIII■11 ••11 111 1111111 1111111111 i11 111 1I1l 111IlU1uiiii iiiiiiii ■ �-1 NE ALTERNATIVE 4 EAST -WEST LINE TURNING: IN GOVERNMENT CENTER PARALLEL PLATFORMS S ._� AVTY , RISCAYME SOUIIVARO ■ 11 ■ i i i i 1 111111111 1 'ID" 1111 1 I■IiI' i IIII I i 11 i.ui. FIGURE 10 ALTERNATIVE 5 EAST=WEST LINE OUTSIDE GOVERNMENT -GE 11111 II 11111 11 111111111111 1111 111111111111111111111111111 i i i i i I I i I i ■ 111 IIII 1111 1 1111 I i 1=111111111 11 11 1111111 11 111111 FIGURE 11 ALTERNATIVE 6 EAST -WEST LINF THROUGH CRD NORTHEAST CONNECTION VIA NE 2 AVE a C• iAn - �--- L ❑ 1111 I I_ ❑- WA- Fij ! war- MEM L l i 1 .01 d l� �y 01sc ABM[ sOUIEVAAO 1•1111111111111 IIIIIIIIIII III NI 11111110111111111111111111111111111 FIGURE 12 ALTERNATIVE 7 EAST -WEST LINE THROUGH GREY NORTHEAST CONNECTION VIA WASHINGTON H'E!GWTS• 17 4it APPLICATION OF EVALUATION CRITERIA in order to provide a basis for judging the relative merits Of each of the alternatives chosen for detailed study, staff prepared a set of evaluation criteria against which each alternative could be measured. The criteria began with a statement of the problem and the goal being sought, and follow- ed with a set of objectives to be achieved in design and oper- ation of Stage 1, particularly in the Government Center area. Following is the statement of objectives which comprise the evaluation criteria. 4.1 Ridership To provide efficient and convenient movement of pass- engers throughout the transit system. . 1 Passenger travel on the rapid transit system to both the Government Center and downtown destination (particularly as this travel relates to the DPM) should be efficient and convenient. . 2 Rapid transit stations should be located and designed to minimize passenger inconvenience and total travel time to these destinations. . 3 Stage 1 and future transit lines should be con- figured so as to minimize transfer movements. • Walking distances between transfer points should be minimized. .5 Where practical, more than one transfer location between rail lines should be provided. 4.2 System Operations and Service Connections Rapid transit design and configuration should provide for reliable, efficient, and flexible system operation. .1 Non -revenue service connections between all lines should be provided to allow efficient and balanced operations and maintenance. .2 Where practical, line extensions should be connected with each other to allow through train movements, reducing possible turnaround activity in the Govern- ment Center area. . 3 Design standards should be adhered to while taking into account line -segment and/or site -specific characteristics. • • 1 S benign fot futute extensions should allow fot the possibility that any ot all ptoposed lines may not be built, and that future extensions may be subject to changes in proposed alignments. 1, Rapid transit design and configuration should harmonize tith existing and planned land uses in the Government Center and adjacent areas to the fullest extent possible, .1 Disruptive land acquisition should be avoided, such as public amenities (parks, historic sites, etc.) expensive structures, or acquisition requiring re- location of residents and/or businesses. 62 Rapid transit design and configuration must not adversely impact existing or committed components of the Government Center plan. 63 Adverse visual and noise impact associated with transit design should be minimized. 64 Encroachment of the system into adjacent parts of CBD and residential areas should be minimized. .5 Washington Heights station location should be acceptible to the community and harmonize with CBD development programs. Following further discussion and evaluation of the nine alternatives, four concepts were chosen for detailed study. These criteria form the basis for the first level of screening of alternatives. The screening process amounted to a detailed application of one criterion to each alter- native, weighting ridership at 50%, operations at 35%, and land use at 15%. The application of these criteria to the nine alternatives is shown in Figure 13 on the following page. Essentially, Figure 13 demonstrates the primary reasons for the selection of the four alternatives identified for final evaluation. Alternative 1 was selected because it is the base alternative; that which presently exists. Alternative 3A was selected because it permits a continuous east -west to northeast connection, and interfaces well with Stage 1 and the DPM. Alternative 5 was selected because its impact on Government Center would be minimal. Alternative 6 was selected because it permits a continuous east -west to northeast connection through the Miami CBD, complementing the DPM. 1111111111 111111II III 1 11111111111 INI111111111111111111 IIIIIIIIIIII 1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111IIIIIIIIMIlliiiiiiimm FIGURE 13 SUMMARY OF IMPACTS ON THE GOVERNMENT CENTER Alternative Stage 2 Direct Platform Connection Possible Stage 2 EW-NE Through Service Possible without Transfers Stage 2 Service Connection to Stage 1 Possible Stage 2 Revenue Connection to Stage 1 Possible Major Modi- fications to Stage 1 Line Required to Accommodate Stage 2 Line Stage 2 Impact on Covernment Center Future Extensions Impact on other Adjacent Areas & Land Use Plan i Stage 2 Accommodation' of Transfers . Stage 2' Accommodation , of CBD Riders 14 2 2A 3 3A4- 4 4 64 7 Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes Yee Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yea No Yea' Yes' 1 Yes Yes Yes1 Yes1 No Yea No No go No No Yes Yes No No Minimal Minimal Minimal Modest Minimal Modest Minimal Minimal Minimal Substantial2 Substantial Substantial Minimal Substantial Minimal Substantial Very Substantial Very Substantial Poor Fair Good' Fair Goods Good) Poor Good! Goodf Good? Poor Good! Poor Good Fair Very Poor Very Good' Very Good' I Would require more detailed analysis to determine feasibility. Anticipates 1000' tail track (standard system requirement for overshoot). 3 Assumes completion of DPM system. Selected for final analysis. 1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 20 SA LEVEL 1W0 SCREENING OF DESIGN APPROACHES t:l Alternative Design No. 1 This alternative is based on the stub. -end tetfiinatioh of the east -west and northeast Stage 2 rail line at the Government Center. There is no connection between the east -west and northeast line or the east -west with the Stage 1 rail line. A service connection is provided between the northeast line and the Stage 1 line. The east -west line follows the Preliminary Engineering dlignment into the Government Center, but terminates at a right angle to the Stage 1 Government Center station platform and at the same elevation as the Stage 1 platform. There is no provision for a tail track. Trains would be reversed in the station and return via crossover tracks. Elevation of the top of the rail at this station is 59 feet. The gradient over I-95 is 3.0% and all curves are within a 1,000' radius. The northeast line enters the study area via the FEC rail line running immediately adjacent and parallel to the Stage 1 alignment from Washington Heights terminating at the Government Center. A service connection is pro- vided at Washington Heights. The Government Center platform is staggered approximately 100' north of the Stage 1 platform at the same 59' elevation, requiring a 3.0% grade to reach the platform at which point the line is terminated with no tail track. Reverse move- ments are made via crossovers north of the platform. There are no curves required for this portion of the north- east line. This alternative requires an extended platform for the east -west line through the Government Center, provisions in the Stage 1 Government Center station for extended mezzanines and platforms, and provisions in the Washing- ton Heights station for a service connection crossover and adjacent parallel tracks. This plan does not pro- vide through east -west to northeast revenue or non -revenue operation nor does it allow a service connection for the east -west line to Stage 1. The system would be operated as three separate lines, two terminating at the Govern- ment Center. All transfers between Stage 1, the east - west line, and the northeast line would necessarily take place at the Government Center station. 5.2 Alternative Design No. 2 This alternative provides a through connection of the east -west line with the northeast line via Downtown Miami, with transfers between Stage 1 and Stage 2 occurring at the Government Center station. . . \ . .. .. 4. • --:---7 - -1-... --14-7-, • ' . 4. • 1,-- - -. • ' - • . • .. ...- - • .1, 1 • , i - ' .1* a . - a - - - .....--- ...---- -. ... -• • . . • ... -• - - 1 - '• - -. II • • • . -... 4 i • -''' ' • 4 '- • . . _4 • , t4 \ .. \ - "'C,, ' '' 1 - ' t- 4 t ' . ' • . -4--• . - • - . . • IN ' f.; • - . t ' ' . ; .. II, • . *.k ' . 3 , !wit , "--.• 7.-- .14 — 11 ea go:, •7--,---..,..-- ..4......1.----":--•_.4. _ ' `1-...2:..........._'- ....>-• •••• 't , ..-- k, • , 4,,, . --;--•.. _ _ .„ ,,--_-..•••.....- -. , ...,,,...-......._,.., •••• ' # • ) • -G• 1---- .._ .1_ , ,.. . . : : : -"t. .; _1 - '. 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Transportation Improvement Program STAGE II TRANSIT STUDY INTERFACE WITH LINE SECTION 4 FACILITIES ALTERN)okTIVE CONCEPT 1 THE KAISER TRANSIT GROUP a pint ventur• A A:SER ENG.NE EPS POST TAXA I. t T SCHUH & JERNIGAN. RC 1:1••,$.0.: ($1 PO 0:11T , FAISO• COMIPM, CAPR SU: T n MO ASSOCIATE S. INC mAFIPT WEISE li ASSOCIATES LTD SCtrIAPEL ER CORRACNNO kssocuirEs API.C.VIC lt,••I i.C61.1 1..40r. 'IT Fl 1 t.”."44 SKC -I 88 ,••4:::•.,... •,... J ,f•••1• ••••r•ci-,..,:•,.•••••.•.?•••• •-••:'• 4 ,7 •„•:. • • .20 ♦ 60 • 40 0 — 40 • i. ' 4 . g 4 f • • 1./. 1 • ■ s A • l :Aft r t y+l & 16 k ►f II i UMW I . {OYTM ,��t AMIAYI .-.. y� I ..... : .:.• N. \ • i • •off 1 1. ;1 '. at ,► ''l.. .: 8 W v. i a P1 ; EPA CORRIDOR CFY GOl1:41 E lCENTER' '• y.•,� --+A_ GOGEN�E DRR STLTi N �.� J uo;Tia ) EIEV •INO ti 'S �LEp°LNCE EHff' i `• . . ti ,� YJT, I.O". bTZEp 4�.'...y..V ox I c^ J �r• .pp. -� _L_ r; M.ami RIVER ' 4 n"I _ L., , 1 1 IE FW C.ORWIDOS' : LL , . , 1 t 1 • I. II 1' • •M •Ivt4j1 320 330 340 350 Dade County T W_a .� ' Y • . AJt • r Aft • ;ye_ t . - Ili' ' -. J. • 1-- i : .-__...4* ..-..". ,I' ; _ l._..._ ff5" M.J y.- i f.!M•r,(44144!W.• _.1c CT-.ivASI{INGQ E4}$41r_ - ..�..1-.._« I`. ...-- -�_ ..-_�.. IT- M. - r, ,4 d id. :• - t•- O, I • • RI MIAMI • _- I: :-••.� I •OII T71 3Er,' MAIO Avt I ■ III .. --. - 1 1 _ �vt 1 t- • • 1 AVE .I, •_ t� A*: 1.. .I: --. t-,r- _: i :I• X.. 4* lit' 1,1 . Ave. .. .i .:ilt._- -__ 3 -..� t- .-: .%- .i .-. :II.: a `-•I . . 1 .- " l I t• .w .r 1 :-) P/. 0. ! .. - _ - - -- ----:' i' • 1 . 1 � • 1 t- 1//�.. ' _ . . _ •T•. . UI.Yi M�! lwItt iHr • -..-s«•i...:. -. _ r_•_t 4. • lI• I, I u•_ �-- i pAvt VI 51 YI . r r r W �1 E t 1 } 1 i j i N a Y1 ,1 �( .JW _1 a: re, NI ; W tr , E.WW_ NI �+ a 11.'! v1 ill YII1 1, _I O N 1 M, _, •1� LI alai : � I I< � ,I- zi z . z1 Z� A • .- +4. W - t �/ £ ; 2 1 1 f 1 ; I. • = W 1� 1 �� • -8 a, } Jg i , �� p1 , I W h 1 i+ Nl5 CCVERM.IENT 0 r}"+ ��tt .. } MCc•}tia o~55n �� i I l r-�- 7-'1- L 'a ce r--- ; M,TT; + •o C 1- 00.4^' T14'-1� ` 7 :1 1 �; I i F I 1 «I II I I yIIr AR •_ 1'••u (16 `'ClE4R1 r: R C.[v•ii - +1- �� •.►" `!.. �� I� I I -- _ _t - 1 L_ -- _A.. _ i.. __=--- „,--'- _. _. -..L.- I-95 RAMPS 1—_APPp*40ATC ExI$ ING fi�JUMD S 1 J ILp 0_ 1 j ,t: dW • 1 1 • I 1 I 1 1 1 1 ! N/S CO)RIDCR I 1 100 I0 j ransportation Improvement Program I THE KAISER TRANSIT GROUP a plot venture ENGINEIPS D.IIM"M t• •l M. 4 RAMP C011M• MARRY WI ESE S ASSOCIATES LTD _ •►••cote b. POST Sl1CRLEv SCHUH 3110.1GAN.•EG CARP SMt6 AND 116SSOC1t ES.■rC SCwMPEL FP CC41RA0N0 ASSOCIATES IO••• 120 130 FIGURE 15 ALTERNATIVE DESIGN 2 EAST -WEST LINE AT RIGHT ANGLE GifVEn'i''',ENT CENTER STAGE II TRANSIT STUDY INTERFACE WITH LINE_SECTION 4 FACILITIES ALTERNATIVE CONCEPT 2 •c. , i••40'• VEHT 1•. 400•n SKC—I89 :.Ater.,:.:;, cvewn.>wrtac•,.u>xnalnw:-stunr.••a + 120 + 80 +40 0 - 40 23 5.3 Alternative Design No. 3 This alternative provides a through connection of the east -west line with the northeast line. Stage 2 inter- sects Stage 1 at an angle at the Government Center station with a curve located west of Miami Avenue. A service connection is provided between Stage 1 and Stage 2 lines. The east -west line follows the PE alignment into the Government Center following a slight southeastward alignment before curving to a northeastward alignment with a 750' radius curve. Between I-95 and immediately west of Stage 1 this line descends at a 3.0% grade to an elevation of 39.0 feet, at which point the Stage 2 Govern- ment Center station platform is situated at an angle be- neath the north end of the Stage 1 platform. A slight 0.3% downgrade is retained through this station. The Stage 2 platform is located primarily east of the Govern- ment Center boundary extending to the northeast across N.W. 1st Avenue and N.W. 3rd Street. The line then curves through four blocks of low rise or vacant commercial devel- opment, extending as far east as the immediate east side of North Miami Avenue. At this point, it turns northwest over the FEC Dodge Island spur to enter the main FEC right-of-way immediately north of the Stage 1 Washington Heights station. A service connection located on the curve at Washington Heights would be made between the Stage 1 and Stage 2 lines. The Stage 2 line continues north leaving Stage 1 right-of-way passing beneath the East/West Expressway and the northeast in the FEC right- of-way. • All grades are within the 3.0% standard. There are no curves within the Government Center; however, a turn would be This alternative follows the PE alignment from the tieSti crossing I-95 and passing through the Government Center at a 3% downgrade to an elevation of 39 feet, at which point it levels off at the Government Center station. This station platform is at a right angle to the Stage 1 platform forming a "T" shaped station. East of Stage 1, the Stage 2 alignment follows Second Street east several blocks and then turns north within the Bis- cayne Boulevard corridor to become the northeast line. required within the downtown to the northeast. Dis- ruption in the Government Center is minimal. However, passage directly through the downtown would require special treatment to streets and some land area. While mm providing a direct east -west to northeast connection mm and direct downtown accessibility, this plan does not provide a service connection between Stage 1 and Stage 2 and would require careful consideration of downtown impact, particularly with respect to the proposed Downtown People Mover system. • ME ME • • C 1 • • • 4 - - -- 1 4__ r' • • . • - - - - . avt — • • • ; • • ; , „„„.. $1* \ • T r . • • C °. ° • AD, _ . i 6t • , . __- \ - • ' •• ..‘‘' ' `..;;. • ' t ' • . I'd = , . _ - • -1--...: : , : :•:- : -• : : - ,• . ''.. •-•-',,t..„...., --__ . . ... . . • . .... A•, • \\* . * . si. '. ' '''. -• - 4: -:- 177; ......:...: ! ! 1.•. . : . ' ' ' ::::_-- . ...._ : ...-. • . *. . • • 1 • . - • kl...p' 0. A . t t ..._ .- _..1 • , \ ..;, i ' • ' • : Wif - '''' " • • tie .1 - . ...... I t... ' _14 A.: t....i. „ , - .. ....I , : ) . •,,,,,3i .4-- ..„,.ii i I, i - • - - iii . , . 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Hi . 1 ;..;..4iiitei-"-5 ; - : L ---- ', '..- pijSC�QPIDOR STAI ION VC; gt•-• lir I LI' 95 1 _ t m-- tritiv#12. I r • 0 p R N MEV Criettin TOT ION \ MIAMI NIV 41 enG • 01 1.1.•••S - ...,••••11.141P11 A/P*001 D + 120 + 80 + 40 —40 . :--,"'—.-47'S ..... -..-... _ r .. • • • i : / N 4_.;. J. . . -. / ►• J NY • Eat -�a5 K •▪ W4 E 3. . J `N1tT k iE .J -: 7 ) :. ": h., a j a� \\ 4 tt 'A♦ 1'GT ct . j• TI' 'J •- WAWINGTON HEIGHTS , 1 AI •1'//' ...�-"s,-:eei_:r..:::-i+-: • Li... t . t .S'UV�,FNME N?. GE•'•r?Ea STLTION STLTtpN • t:.1.1. - !'I r A,T vW A. � 1: YJ..:_*.a `[* / .. 13 17. (� Nn O O FV;iT l AY[ _ _ - A ▪ O • •r " f •I--=-- r SELEV•JB •• [ z ,G NNEG �LrN ,�- i . 3 53(T ,-O" /, 15 540 •A • 4S — • ��•.r - = }- _ _ _ _ ��� POTENTUIL v / _ - _ _ t / , ._ . ... •" /" -J ..• N•I �'PWTgNATE• / h�__."- `Yi • WI- CO;AIDGE! / r ROVEFNMENT CENTER STATION _ •7 `! b 13 ' —, R • ___ /'.�. a ... '; • r:. . .. // 4 y `- - -:.4 _n_ • `MOAtM r . w. YIAYI r _ _�_�L :' L_�___�r ., :i • r. 'Y AVF-�� .-I�=�RDRTL�'=______wrA__ ='av[: _�/ • . ▪ . ,. __ i ......_{...._. t rn. .: n, ! _ _n ... "Grt; ! .YWyT' ._ _ .. .. _ _. :� arm::•. "'▪ i — AK.. ' i t." �— • i - VE 'i1 1R �" I f .. wT< t N IIi '(' 2,z ems•_ s�. 1 -I pA J C 24 Ili: 1 rc,-;.-.:.. t:• • e 530 CONTROL PC•IN?� T N/S_GDR RID GOVFRNAILNT CENTER STATION EAST/WEST EXPRESSWAY WASHINGTON HEIGHTS 5T 2N1 I VOK j .n LAPPROtIMATE 'ExISThNG GPOUN N E.CORRIQOR STATION N. COF IDOtt 550 105 115 FIGURE 161125 ALTERNATIVE DESIGN 3 EAST -WEST LINE AT ANGLE SW TO NE !N GO'.EP.N ENT CENTER ■•ansportation Improvement Program ■ THE KAISER TRANSIT GROUP a pint wntur• RAISER ENGINEERS &Y.*LU. V M►•, . ■A,!!. COWAM. HARRY WEESE E ASSOCIATES LTD APIaoVTc POST BUCKS ET SCHUH A JERNIGAN. NC. CARA SMITH AND ASSOCIATES INC SCHIMPEI.ER CORRADINO ASSOCIATES STAGE II TRANSIT STUDY INTERFACE WITH LINE SECTION 4 FACILITIES ALTERNATIVE CONCEPT 3 lc.sE l'•40'• VERT wAw•A SKC-190 I MM MM • MM MM MMMM MM 25 the Stage 2 alignment between I-95 and the East/West Expressway requires 3 curves separated by tangents; two of which (on each side of the Government Center platform) have a 750'radius; the third has a 1,000' radius. All grades are within the 3.0% standard. The service connection requires a crossover on a curve: however, the direction of normal revenue operation is "with" rather than "against" turnout points, reducing any potential safety hazard. This plan requires acqui- sition of right-of-way between N.W. 1st Avenue and North Miami Avenue and N.W. 3rd Street and N.W. 8th Street. A curved alignment is required through the Government Center, but the Stage 2 platform will lie primarily outside the Government Center with street access in addition to access from the Government Center. This alternative provides an east -west to northeast revenue connection and a Stage 1 to Stage 2 service connection. It does not provide for direct Stage 2 access to the Washington Heights station and all Stage 1 to Stage 2 transfers would necessarily take place at the Government Center station. Land impact on the Government Center is minimal, but right-of-way would have to be taken east of Stage 1. The Stage 2 alignment could affect DPM routes through this area. 5.4 Alternative Design No. 4 This alternative represents a departure from the others in that it assumes an alignment for the east -west line along N.W. 7th Street and intersects Stage 1 at Washington Heights rather than the Government Center. It provides a through east -west to northeast line connection, but does not include a service connection between Stage 1 and Stage 2 (although one could be accommodated). There is no direct Stage 2 connection with the Government Center. The east -west line crosses I-95 from N.W. 7th Street on a 3.0% grade west of I-95 and a 1.0% grade east of I-95 at which point it remains at an elevation of 59', curv- ing northeast to pass over Stage 1 at Washington Heights. At this point of intersection the Washington Heights sta- tion forms an "x" arrangement requiring right-of-way acquisition around both platforms. This station is the only Stage 1 to Stage 2 transfer point. The Stage 2 alignment joins the FEC northeast right-of-way at N.W. llth Street passing below the East/West Expressway forming the northeast line. This alternative has no impact on the Government Center with respect to future rail extensions. The Washington Heights station becomes a major transfer location. It is important to note that this plan requires a relocation of the Washington Heights station and is not feasible if the station remains in the approved Stage 1 alignment. .•, r t r, 1 • ' -- • • I :.14A '6 -7 • • : • - • _• 4 - 1 miff . _ , . . \-• .t. . 1 . •"' • "- t7-7T. • • • 4 L 4 • 6 • k4 1 44 -6 • c. • •••••••,,,,,...•"' • " • I. • AVt • , • * " a 0 i tot 4 • -1 4 , • • •,14, •°• . . - _ 1 . : 6,4„, jlt =. i t6e . :6 : I—.t • • t4. • 40 1PAl,jcr..,...\.,_.- • —.. .t• • .• .. 11/ i AVI_•iOurm MAUI / .•• l•a ., 1W4C•et••• -6 ' • • ' : 1°646.'•' it_ i '.; ' 1.: . . __t, et _ ,* , . : • / •• .. i - ,t1 tr' eir • 1, lt) dr • te (WI t••• I • 4 .P4,,Oot . • - • • Oas ( . • fez , • ,f •pir Ce. * —APPROXIMATE EXISTING I0ROUNO 41616•Crot 411111.1111111111111Miligen00811000000400rnimemem.-.— •c • •• • tip - •� JJ f� :.' -1 J 7r-.�1i• . .i F_ --Lii �t�.1 A.t .�SY •r ,n __ •.__. __.___ _Y1 J _CT �A�K iMr_=1 'ti/6 CORRIDOR Y• i_ : � +.e,r.• -.-. _--46: -e . tiOVEgNMEN7 CENTER STATION J ?p rL/-JJ ri-- - J S°\ 129CT- : s. et..- .._i.u-. . A,,mo r-- .cf1__ . --GCAs..; _#4-_,k_4_JI } _.--_�I � n `RM. ! kit • -- --%• lLIn .%-�_ _ ▪ _ �R ..- . '_ •a - 1.'. !- _ ._ .. .I / 'M��_' S,/,_< ..1_0.._.. _...._. • ` AY r;AYttE ..... .�tFOLASEO Rk / A. MASHINGT1N HE STATI0' or,T.:Xi+sI - - — 77-7" • 1 m.,. .1; .. • _ 1!.,`-� �':7 I I -I~ .. -'.;r•. (`nA• rl-:I1. _._'d. %/! ,1,�;// .i-�`-w.. . moirimtrAVtL .!k.N!irl_e?__ , Nolen , "._. Ail M • : . 1 . . -: 1 j ' .•w ^ _: tit . —M, . .. ~. • .w -. j =INj :mutt•_ tt,- ...__:LWmt::-�. .4-L 1r .I _ MA` I. • t t4. _- t_ .- _ i ; __2 _ irk _ _ - , _ - - • = — — i L tt 1 AVER IIt t Fr` 1_ ivi 1 at _ i pwi - i , r I r.^' 'x •.• rI mo' yS— .__I ., t▪ 'J '_ _ iv.., { - it • e IR-- t .�-1 t • s14' R FT`LNED - y `: 311 r 4ti0 --� �' a b11� ,v9si , YF I� 1 � 1 ` �� 1 41 11 e-: ' W f ! u1-! I �yyt Fl y.� WI 1.11I u W1 N Nf.i y! ,W,� to ..Wrf^Y I .r s r It ! , _ N 7t: P _ ugy iyz •'w ,a ,'I r0 VI1* ' N , Y I< �o z • t7_ �: =uzs I �`•' II I � s ,')1' Ent A.L,Et Nt NT i - • Off• „. ! . '. N/S ALfWNF.•T . n .'5 AIN �1 . _ 4_ / �. —— — - A°PROA'NATE Er.ST'N. TRXIND� , j r ' fOJ`-aUt O. :HtN�Ta�• nE GNTS ! RETA»E_o �,, -. 510T _tif•CFNTTk �!i 4 w11- e W l ! STA .! t 1 : •14. :i oa sle U 1 I N/S CQRRIOOR I 1,4 I1 1 I - ' - der. m 100 110 unty Transportation Improvement Program THE KAISER TRANSIT GROUP a pint venture AAISER ENGINEERS POST Bur.ALET SCHUN A JERNIGAN. INC pvrlKl. O• W..• J •ufi. COtl•Arr CARR SYh'N AND ASSOCIATES INC HARRY WEESE A ASSOCIATES LTD SCHairt:EN CCARAD.NO ASSOCIATES FIGURE 17 ALTERNATIVE DESIGN 4 EAS'-'WEST LINE OUTSIDE GOVERNMENT CENTER STAGE II TRANSIT STUDY INTERFACE WITH LINE SECTION 4 FACILITIES ALTERNATIVE CONCEPT 4 ACA.E I . 40/ •b' • °AA"'" S K C - I9 I + 120 + 80 + 40 0 — 40 MM 1 EE mm EE mm mm mm mm ilL MEE 27 While this plan eliitinates the need for provision of future facilities at the Govetnment Center, it does fequire the relocation of the Washington Heights station and provision for the Stage 2 platform and tight -of -way. All Stage 2 riders destined for the Government Center or the Miami CBD would be required to transfer to Stage 1 trains to get to the Government Center station. 5,5 Analysis of Final Alternative Designs The four final design alternatives developed have had their various features summarized in Figure 18 to facil- itate comparison. Figure 18 is a matrix highlighting the different impacts of each alternative, and thus summarizes detailed analysis of the different schemes. The alternatives were evaluated against the criteria listed in Section 4.0 of this report. Based upon the criteria, the four alternative designs fell into two categories: Acceptable and Unacceptable. A discussion of these rankings is as follows. .1 Unacceptable Alternative Designs Based upon the criteria discussed earlier in this report, design concepts No. 1 and No. 4 have major deficiencies which make them unacceptable design alternatives for future planning. Their shortcomings which result in their elimination from further con- sideration are as follows: Alternative Design No. 1 Summary of deficiencies • Poor rail operating conditions • Inadequate rail passenger transfer conditions • Lack of service connection • Substantial land use impacts in the Govern- ment Center itself to accommodate additional platforms Cost: $29.350 million The very poor transit operations environment and passenger accommodations created by placing two or three stub -ended lines in the Government Center, makes this design concept undesirable. Storage and cross- over space in the Government Center would be needed to make stub -ended configurations work. A relatively high price would be required for this concept. aMg 28 A1tetilatiVe benign Nos 4... guTfaty of deficiencies i Poor service connections i Inconvenient passenger thovetnetits i Substantial land use impacts iti Washingtoh Heights area counter to apptoved Stage l plans i No DPM interface Cost: $13.750 million The major disruption this concept causes in the Washington Heights area is counter to approved neigh- borhood plans and citizens' desires. While this is the least expensive scheme, it would cause many addition- al passenger transfers as riders try to get to the Government Center from the east -west lines. Finally, the lack of interface with the DPM system is contrary to public policies. .2 Acceptable Alternative Designs Both alternatives No. 2 and No. 3 were judged to be acceptable for future planning purposes even though they are substantially different from each other. Both schemes avoid operational problems, unacceptable land use, or ridership problems encountered in the other two alternatives previously discussed. However, alternatives No. 2 and No. 3 have both positive and negative facets which need to be brought forward and analyzed. Alternative Design No. 2 • Rail operating conditions are good • Rail service connections are poor • Optimal transit rider accommodations and travel time savings • Very substantial land use impacts in the CBD • Conflicts with DPM policies Cost: $31.775 million This concept, which is similar to many early pre- liminary engineering proposals, runs the east -west line across the CBD around 3rd Street. While this provides the highest level of transit rider service, it also produces the highest level of land use impacts (including disruption to Southern Bell operations), will have negative impacts on DPM usage, and would be the most difficult and costly to build. 29 ■ • MM ■ 1 l .fi.&t_ive_. Design No_, ,3 Rail operating conditions are good i Only alternative providing a service connection i Good rider and destination transfer accommodations Substantial land Government Center Good DPM interface. use Cost: $20.750 million impacts east of the This concept has the rail operating characteristics of through line service, and allows inter -line service connections, DPM interface, and good rider movements between lines and to their final destina- tion. There will be major land use impacts just east of the Government Center. There is also the possi- bility of modifying the northern line to parallel Miami Avenue into the Buena Victa _yards and realign- ment of the line section through the Government Center adjacent to N.W. 2nd Street. The cost is the second lowest of the four design alternatives. 29 IIIIIIIII IIIIIIIIIII III■1111111111 • • t0X0.ti,te Design No..3 i Mail operating conditions ate good i Only alternative providing a service connection to Good rider transfer and destination accommodations to Substantial land use impacts east of tht,' Government Center i Good DPM interface. Cost: S20.750 million This concept has the rail operating characteristics of through line service, and allows inter -line service connections, DPM interface, and good rider movements between lines and to their final destina- tion. There will be major land use impacts just east of the Government Center. There is also the possi- bility of modifying the northern line to parallel Miami Avenue into the Buena Vista yards and realign- ment of the line section through the Government Center adjacent to N.W. 2nd Street. The cost is the second lowest of the four design alternatives. 11111111 i i I 11111111 i iiritir IN Tv: FTLR AI TFRVATIVF. HfciC.NS St3QtARY of t,IARAf:rFRTSTIrS Alternative Dentin 1 Alternative Pest 2 .iuiuiiuuiiiiui Alternative Demlan 3 11 11 11 11 Alternative Vestatr 6< Line charmctert•tics Three linen: 1. Rtaleah- Dedelend. 2. Little Havana- Government Center. 1. North- emit Ded►-Government Center. Two linen: I. Rlaleah-Dade- land. 2. Little Havana -North- rant Dade via Miami CPO. Two linen: I. Rteleah -Dade - lend. 2. Little Novotny- Northeast Dade. Two tines: I. Hialeah - Dadeland. 2. Little Navanm- Northeast Dade vts Wanhtna- ton Neightn. Station Configuration Government Center: two parallel plwt(nr.w end • third at right angle to went. all at wean (Se') el- evattrm. Manhington RelghtAl two parallel platforms st tame (37') elevation. Government Center: Line 2 p - ender Line I at right angle. WoshinAion Goverment Center: Line 2 p -_— _ .mder north end of Line 1 platform at angle of approximately iS". Washington Height.: name en Stoop 1. Government Center: Noe affected, 4wwhtn&ton Hetahtmt Line 2 pssnes over north epee of Line 1 platform at rnlahle rtaht natl... NeiRhta: none nw [rage 1. Operational Characteristic, Line 1: N/A. Line 2: none Line 3: none. Line I to Line 2: no. Line 2 to Line 1: no. Line 3 to Line 1: yea. Difficult Line 1: N/A. Line 2: N/A No Good Line 1: N/A. Line 2: N/A Tea Good Line 1: N/A. Line Z: ION No No •. Tall tracks b. Service Connections c. DP( interface Passenger Service a. CAD/Government Center destination b. Civic Center destination e. Little Savona - Northeast Dade Service Line 1 from north i south: good. Line 2:Rnod. Line 3: good. Lino 1 from north i south: Rood. Line 2:tranafer re- utred. Line 3: fer re- gutted. Transfer required Line 1 from north i south: gond. Line 2 from east & teat: good. Line I from north & south: (!nod. Line 2 from pent i went: transfer regnlred. Through service Line 1 from north i south: good. Line 2 from pant I. teat: good Line 1 from north i month: Rood. Line 2 from cent i vest: transfer remitted. Through service Line 1 from north C mouth: Rood. Line 2 frommaat a vent: trnnafer reeulred'. Line t from north & south: gond. Lin, 2 from ewer S. ..eat: transfer required: Thrnuah 'service Lend Dee Impact a. Within Government Center b. Adjoining Mtniaml Minimal Minimal Very suhstantlal Minimal Sob lel Nnne Suhetantisir totimated Coat (197A dollars') S29.150.000 S31.775.000 S20,250.000 $I3.750',D00 Commtents - - rotation Gnvertlment Center s fe rnnpllrnted. Lark of tail treat,' not ronntntent with •)stem safety 'specifics- firma. No nervier rnnnectlnn between fine 2 and rent of ovate'. Stage 2 rnnatnrr- tlnn dlaro'tive to Stage 1 operatlong . No service connection between lines'. Provides' additional downtown servtee. Only alternative providing nervier connection. Requires additionai right-of-vnv vest of Cov►rnnent Center. - Requirerelocation oft s ttnchinRton Height.. ',tenon from approved' location on Stage [- 11 IIIIII III 0 i_ • 1 mMikW 31 6 CONCLUSIONS While none of the altetnative design concepts offer ati ideal situation, the immediate differences between the tiny acceptability of alternatives No. 1 and No. 4, vs. accept- able designs No. 2 and No. 3 are evident from land use, set vice, and ridership viewpoints. Thus the rationale behind the initial rejection of alternatives No. 1 and No. 4 is clear. The differences between No. 2 and No. 3 are in many ways also decisive. Alternative No. 3 is less disruptive, both within the Government Center and in the CBD;is less costly, has better coordination with and does not compete with the DPM, and allows inter -line service connections and good transit rider accommodations. Alternative No. 2 suffers by compar- ison on these issues and is therefore less satisfactory. Alternative No. 2 has a singular advantage in its ability to carry transit riders directly into the heart of the CBD and allow possible private redevelopment adjacent to the right-of-way. While this is desirable,based on ridership demands and the heavy loads that the DPM might be burdened with,Alternative No. 2 represents a major departure from currently adopted policy, is far more expensive, and has operational drawbacks which negate its ridership advantages. Therefore Alternative No. 3 and its possible modification represents the clearest choice for future Stage 1/Stage 2 interface at this time. Future investigation could modify Alternative No. 3 into a scheme that offers better CBD pen- etration or replaces the DPM in certain areas dependent upon the final design concepts advanced for the DPM and CBD development schemes. The flexibility of Alternative No. 3 is therefore unique in that no other alternative design could allow as much future modification potential. The choice of Alternative No. 3,with slight profile and alignment changes to make it fit into the Government Center as easily as possible, appears by all evaluation standards to be the optimal choice for future planning efforts. • • • t`I1 6F`' M1AHl, a Platicta :1 t hidipal borpbratieh, Petitioner, S'Pti JOE PAPER COMPANY, etd. , • et al„ Respondents: .Mt COtPt 6P LO bA Et Not si,37� PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR. RE- HEARING AND FOR CONSIDERATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND A POINT OF LAW NOT DEALT WITH BY COURT'S OCTCBER 5, 1978 RULING Petitioner, City of Miami ("City"), respectfully mo'fes this Honorable Court to rehear and reconsider its order and opinion in part affirming and in part discharging certiorari in this cause, and for the Court to consider and rule upon constitutional bases and a point of law not addressed by this Court's October 5, 1978 decision. As grounds therefor, the City would show unto the Court as follows: 1. This cause is before the Court on "questions of great public interest" jurisdiction, not upon "direct conflict" jurisdiction. See Florida Constitution, Article V, Section 3(b)3.1 2. The question certified is whether Florida Statutes Chapter 712 can constitutionally be applied to divest the City of a grant deed to state soverignty land. 3. This Court has properly approved the City's contention `that respondent's putative root of title is a wild deed. 4. But this Court has rejected the City's challenge to •Chapter 712's constitutionality if it is held to apply to a wild deed. 5. The Court has indicated that other states have approved the constitutionality of marketable title acts, but has over - :looked the fact that such approvals of constitutionality came only by construing such statutes as not according validity to wild 'The propriety of a partial affirmance and a partial discharge of certiorari is therefore unclear. BAILCT i OAwES.A PROFESSIONAL ASSOCI•TaON SUITE IO2O,ONE BISCAYN[ TOWER, TWO SOUTH BISCATNE BOULEVARO.MiAMI,, LORIOA 33131 TELEPHONE 130E. 3'4-6!OS I uIiii innIit ■ iim • • Si See tkehanae'.r,E11, Bank V, tawndale, Bang, 2 3 01B42d 191 (1t1. 1968); 4?ichel^an v, Messner, 33 N,W,2(1 800 (`Minn. 1951). 6, The Court has misperceived the thrust of the City's arciuinent as being a blanket attack on all retroactive statutes, Without conceding the point, but accepting for argument's sake that retroactive legislation may be constitutional, the point here is that the City needed two kinds of notice to be constitu- tionally deprived of its vested rights. One, it had: notice of passage of Chapter 712 in 1963. The second, it did not have: 'notice that there was an adverse claim to its property. This Court's opinion deals only (and at length) with the first kind of notice. But the Court fails to deal with the second. 7. Until this opinion, the law of Florida has always been that a wild deed does not affect property or constitute valid notice. That law was plainly part of the statute. See U.S. Trust Co. v. N.J., 97 S.Ct, 1505, 1515 Note 14 (1977) and 'authority cited. 8. Until this Court's opinion, no statute, rule, principle or case law held that Chapter 712 (or any statute like it) became .-operative by virtue of a void instrument. 9. Unless Chapter 712 is now construed to require that all vested property right owners must re-record all deeds to protect their property, it must be recognized that the 1944 wild deed did not trigger Chapter 712 as to the City. 10. Therefore, the Court's discussion,as to retroactivity of the statute cenerally,misses the mark. Florida constitutional decisions have always before recognized that void instruments do not accord the notice required by due process. This Court's opinion fails to address or to acknowledge that issue; yet the issue is critical to the Act's constitutionality. 11. This Court acknowledges that the City claims to be an agency of the state and therefore excepted from the Act's purview. But the Court fails to address the decisions holding cities to be agencies. Instead it points to the language of Florida Statute OAILEY b DAWES,A PFCrESSIONAL ASSOCIATION SUITE ,82O.ONE HISCATNE TOWEH,TWO SOUTH SISCATNE BOULEVAFD, MiA 1, CLOAIDA 33,31 • TELEPHONE ,a ns•3T. S• O! • iii IIIIiuuuiiuiiuiii.iii • • A'e1• 1i,Ydt'(1) x gut that reference has no bearing on the envy cquestion. Admittedly the City is "singular" "governmental" 'vnd."dorporation" and therefore a "person" within Chapter t so is the "state"and so is "any political subdivision egeney thereof." Florida Statutes Chapter 712.01(1). If Court reads Chapter 712.01(1) as determinative; then it must read out of the Chapter the prevision simply incorrect to hold that Chapter 12. But accepting the Court's clear 712: or the of Chapter 712.04. It is 712.01(1) is determinative. holding that the City is, for purposes of the Act, just like a private corporation, the Court's opinion fails to deal ,`ith the necessarily con- comitant result -- the state has deprived the Cit.: of a vested property right and,/or a constitutionally protected contract ri=yht2 without compensation. 13, For this Court has failed to address two ether constitu- tional attacks on this application of Chapter 712: even when a "taking" is accomplished with due process, and even when a contract right is validly impaired under the police power, the person losing the property or contract right must be fairly compensated. See, e.g., C.S. Trust Co. v. N.J., supra, 1515 at Note 16. See also Contributors to the Pennsylvania Hosc:ital v. City of Philadelphia, 38 S.Ct. 35 (1917) . 14. Indeed the construction placed by this Court upon Chapter 712 and its application here is inescapably an inverse condemnation of the City's land. That the City's grant is full and ce.^.:plete was recognized by this Court in TIFF v. Clauahton, 86 So.2d 775, 785 (Fla. 1956). That its ownership is proprietary and non - .governmental has now been declared by this Court's October 5, 1973 ruling. That it has been divested by operation of Chapter 712 has .also now been made clear. And that it has not been compensated is obvious. The result of the Court's decision, therefore, is that a private owner has been permitted, for reasons of Florida public policy, to divest a city of land owned in its proprietary -See U.S. Trust Co. v. N.J., supra, 1315 at 'Tote 14. -3- BAI♦..EY & OAWES A PNCJESSIONAL ASSOCkAT,ON SUITE ,B&O.ONE BISCAYNE TOMCH, TWO SOUT., BISCAYNE BOUIEVARO,MIAMI, ELOPIOA 33131 • TE..EP..!}NE ,30b 374-51,: t mOk II 1111IIIIIIIIIIIIIIII IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIulIl • • 4t,fanle, V. Heim, 106 kali Rptr, 823 (Call \pp, 1973); People F�_Y Oker+ 4 Cal, rptr: 334, 341 (Cal, 1960); People v, PoverOM0, J59 N:Y.S,2d 343 (1973); In Re East River Drive, 289 N,Y,S, 433, 439 (1936), aff'd., 21 :; Y.S,2d 507 (1937); and Twombley v. City of tong Beach, 333 F.2d 685 (9th Cir: 1964), cert, denied, 85 SiCt, 195 (1964). 19: The Court's discharge of certiorari is therefore predicated 4-o known statute, rule or precedent, The discharge of certiorari is simply an ad hoc refusal to deal with a question of great public interest, WHEREFORE, the City respectfully requests this Honorable Court to rehear its October 5, 1973 decision, to reconsider its discharge of certiorari and to reverse the decision below, Respectfully submitted, BAILEY & DAWES, a professional association Attorneys for City of Miami 1820 One Biscayne Tower Miami, Florida 33131 (305) 374-5505 By �/ailcy, Jr. WE•HEREBY CERTIFY that a true cop;' of the foregoing was mailed, is 23rd day of October, A. D., 1978, to each of the following: I. SHCTTS & BOWEN, 1000 Southeast First .rational Bark Bldg., Miami, Florida 33131. 2. SIBLE'i , GIBLI.I, LEVENSON & WARD, 1301 Dade Boulevard, Miami, Florida 33139. 3. STLEL, RECTOR & DAVIS, 1400 Southeast First :rational Bark . Bldg. , Miami, Florida 33131. 4. RUSSO, VAN DOREN & ALLEN, P.A., 4685 Ponca do Leon Blvd., Coral Gables, Florida 33146. OrCour,sc.1 64.14EY & CAr,ES.o PRO, ESSiONA4 ASSCC.ATioN SU17[ ,b20.Ot4E L CAYNE, TOY.ER.TKO SOUTH b,6CAYNE 13C,:,LCVARO,Alif-!.!!, r. O,:'DA 3313! • TE LrP,.01,4!' ICS 3,1 E MM MM • p Ci.Eya Honoring such a publid policy', hoWevers tenders the ate liable to pa.: the city fair Value for the land the State has allowed the private owner to take from the city. 15, Put another way, the Court's October 3, 1973 decision fails to deal with the issues of (a) "taking" (just compensation) and (b) impairment of contract. in the latter regard, the United `States Supreme Court has, in two recent decision, made it abun- dantly clear that either course requires just compensation. The discussion in C.S. Trust Co. v, N.J., supra, at 97 S.Ct. 1515 through 1521, including the footnotes (14 through 27), and especially footnotes 14,16, 17 and'27, plainly delineates the constitutional proscription against Chapter 712's application to these facts. See also Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannsus, 98 S.Ct. 2716 (1978). 16, This Court's opinion, as are all of the briefs opposing. the City, are silent on this point. Surely this Court does not mean silently to vitiate the t':o concepts from Florida's own Constitution as well as to ignore the clearly reiterated mandate of the Unites States Constitution. 17. Finally, and of critical necessity to the result reached by the Court's October 5, 1973 decision, the Court silently • accepts the state's unsupported position that the subject land .•is not soverignt.: land. The state took this gratuitous position in its anicus brief. The City sought leave to brief a response. The Court never ruled upon it, "carrying it with the case." Out of an abundance of caution, the City filed a proposed responsiu brief en September 12. The Court's unexplained discharge of certiorari and its declining even to accept the briefs appears to indicate that the Court has never examined the law on what is and what is not soverignty land. 18. As pointed out in the City's September 12th brief, evert_ discovered decision on the point indicates that the 1919 transfer to the City did not and could not destroy the soverian nature of the property in question. Ste U.S. .. State of California. 3> S.Ct. 1401 (1965); 7nt' 1. Paper r- Co. v. ??is... St. Hwy. Ceet. , 271 So.2d 395 (Miss. 1973), ccrt. duniod 414 U.S. 827; Cc_:rnt ,moo -4- BAILEY & UAWES.A PPC,'ESSIONAL ASSOCIATION SUITE I820.ONE BISCAYNC TOWCP, TWO SOUTH BISCAYNE BOJLEVAPA.M.A,MI,RO41EA 33,31 • T CLEPHONL'•f G`. ]: ^`Of MM MEM MEM • • dhge V, Reit, 106'tat, ?tptr, 825 (Cal, App, 1973); People T;_: ker, 4 Cat, Rptr, 334i 333 (Cal, 1960)t People V, Poverote, .359 .•i,Y,S,2d 343 (1973) ; In Re East River Drive, 289 'I,Y,S, 433, 439 (1936) , of 'd. , 21 :.Y.S,2d 507 (1937) ; and Twombley •i, City Of Long Beach, 333 F,2d 685 (9th Cir. 1964), cert., denied, 85 S,Ct, 195 (1964). 19, The Court's discharge of certiorari is therefore predicated on no known statute, rule or precedent, The discharge of certiorari is simply an ad hoc refusal to deal with a question of great public interest. WHEREFORE, the City respectfully requests this Honorable Court to rehear its October 5, 1979 decision, to reconsider its discharge bf certiorari and to reverse the decision below. Respectfully submitted, BAILEY & DAS•iES, a professional association Attorneys for City of Miami 1820 One Biscayne Tower Miami, Florida 33131 (305) 374-5505 By Gu.. B. bailey , Jr. TE:HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing was .mailed, is 23rd day of October, A. D., 1973, to each of the following: 1. SHUTTS & BO EN, 1000 Southeast First National Bank Bldg., Florida 33131. 2. SIBLEY, GIBLI::, LEVENSON & WARD, 1301 Dade Boulevard, -Miami, Florida 33139. 3. STEEL, HECTOR & DAVIS, 1400 Southeast First :rational Bank .Bldg., Miami, Florida 33131. 4. RUSSO, VAN DOREN & ALLEN, P.A., 4685 Ponce do Leon Blvd., Cord Gables, Florida 33146. O Counsol BAILEY 75, CANES,A PRO, ES91O!At. A„SCCIAT.O!+ rUITE 1820.Or,E BISCAYNE TONER,THO SOUTH b 5CArtlE (,C.,,,.EVA„E.,M.AMI, r,Of.OA 33131 • TCLFP•,(T,,r 3:.. 3,4.. 11111111111111■1111111111111111111111111111111IOO11IIIIIIIIIIIIII IIU ilmiliIUIIIMIIII Iiimnn ui• NCT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOT/ON AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED, IN THE SUPREME COURT CF FLORIDA 3b1.Y TERM, A. D. 1918 ' iii a MIAMI, a Florida cofPd:ationi Petitioner, Si. JOE PAPER CCMPANY, a Florida corporation; SOUTHEAST PROPERTIES, INC., a Florida corporation; HUGH E. MATHESON, JR., • individually; and SALLY S bOMMERICH, formerly SALLY S. MATHESON, individually, Respondents. Opinion filed October 5, 1978 Writ of Certiorari to the District Court of Appeal, Third District Guy 3. Bailey, Jr. and Jesse C. Jcnes of Bailey and Dawes, Miami, Florida,. for Petitioner Wm. P. Simmons, Jr. of Shutts and 3owen, Miami; and Marion E. Sibley and Eric 3 Mey ers cf Sibley, G_ Levenson and Glaser, Miami Beach, for St.Jce Paper Company;�JcsephLP. :Clock, Jr. of Steel, Hector and Davis, Miami, for Southeast ?r per__es, Inc.; and Edmund P. Russo of Russo, Van Ccren and Allen, Ccrai Gables, fcr Hugh E. Matheson, Jr., Respondents Nancy G. Linnan,ASS:Ste. General Counsel; and J.Kendrick Tucker, Assistant Attcrney jeneral, Tallahassee, fcr Reu:in C'C. Askew, as Governor cf the State cf r fcr ..a, and Reber_ L. Shevin, as Genera_ cf the ._.._c s Curiae Julian C. _lar :Son , John R. LawSCn, Jr., Hume F. Coleman and Ches`.,Meld Smith cf Holland and Knight, Tallahassee, for ?micas Curiae J. Richard Harris of Scott, Burk, Royce, Harris and Loucks, Palm Beach, fcr The Florida Bar, Amicus Curiae DKIN9-, J. This cause is here on petition for writ of certiorari upported by certificate of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, that its decision reported :n 347 Sc.2d 622 is one which involves a ?uesticn of great public interest. We have - jurisdiction. See Florida Constitution, Article V., Section 3(b)(3`. I■ IIIIIIIIIIiiii■IIm111■1 • Petitioner has attacked the ccnstitutiOnalitY of ofide Statutes, Chapter 712, the Marketable Record Title ? t. Also ihvOl.ed in this case is the question of whether an interloping of wild deed could constitute a root of title. Petitioner, hereinafter referred to as the city, filed a complaint to quiet its title to a tract of land on the north side of the Miami River at or near the river's entrance into Biscayne Bay. Upon motion, the amended complaint was dismissed on the ground that it appeared upon the face of the complaint that the city's claim was barred by the Marketable Record Title Act. The District Court of appeal, in its opinion, recited the following history of the title, as described in the city's complaint: .1- In 1243, the State of Florida acquired from the United States the lands under navi- gable waters. "2, By Warranty Deed recorded December 15, 1892, Henry M. Flagler conveyed to the Florida East Coast Hotel Corporation, portions of the mainland north of the Miami Ri•:er and adjacent tc Biscayne Bay: 'containing fourteen acres, :sere or less, together with all and singular the riparian rights and submerged lands appertaining thereto.' "3.By a special act cf the Florida Legislature cnJune 2, 1913, the State of Florida Granted tc the City of Miami'`c municipal purposes only, all its rights, title andinterest . to all submergedlands, including waterfront and riparian rights' to an area which included the mouth cf the Miami River. The >tat.:to . grant included the following sect -on: * "'Sec. 2. That this grant sha1l not affect any other grant heretofore made to any individual or corporation and nothing herein shall be con- strued as depriving any riparian owner or proprietor of an, rights under the laws of this State.' "4. Beginning in 1920, the Florida East Coast Hotel Corporation bulkheaded and filled a portion of the property in question but left a yacht basin. "5. On January 10, 1944, the St. Joe Paper Company (cre of the defendants) recorded a warranty deed from the Florida East Coast Hotel Corporation which conveyed to it all of the lands with which we are here concerned including the yacht basin which was then in existence. Some time after 1944, St. Joe filled and bulkheaded the yacht basin. 2 • - O. -°61 ail the defendant3 other than St. Joe claim tinder tecorded deeds froth St, Joe Paper CoMpahy Subsecueht to the 1944 deed to St. Joe Paper '-ti hpan[. °7. On February 3, 1949, St. Joe recorded a plat (attached to the complaint) of the lands involved. This plat was approved by the City of Miami prior to recordation." 347 So.2d at 523 (Fla. 1977). The Marketable Record Title Act is a comprehensive plan refor:it in ccnveyahcing procedures. It is a curative act in that it may operate to correct certain defects which have ariser. the1 i execution of instruments in the chain of title. Curative _ive statutes reach back on past events to correct errors or irregu- larities and to render valid and effective attempted acts which would be otherwise ineffective for the purpose the parties intended. They operate to complete a transaction which the parties intended to accomplish but carried cut imperfectly. The Marketable Record Title Act is also a statute of limitations in that it requires Stale demands to be asserted within a reasonable time after a cause of action has accrued. It prescribes a per_ad within whir a right may be enforced. The Marketable Record Title Act is also a recording act in that it provides for a simple and easy .method by which the owner cf an existing old interest may _reserve it. If he falls to take the step cf filing the notice as provided, he has on. y himself to blame if his interest is extinguished. The legislature di- net intend to arbitrarily wipe out old claims and interests a me -f preserving them and giving a reasonable without a- ,.. -_ _ means ., pr er -- period o: time within which to take the necessary steps to accom- plish that purpose. This court in .`.ahccd v. Bessemer Properties, Inc., 18 So.2d 775 (Fla. 1944), held that the legislature may legiti- mately use a recording statute as a :weans of getting rid of stale claims. Florida Statutes 695.20, enacted in 1941, voided contracts for the purchase of lands which were left by the collapse of the Florida Real Estate boom of the 1920's. Under the terms of the statute, persons who had contracted to purchase .lard prior to a certain date but had not placed a deed en record cr obtained a decree and were not in possession, were declared 3 • • • 41- 316 ifitereSt in the land unless they had given notice of their,dlaims by recordation in one of several ways specified and Within six Months frcm the adcpticn of the statute, Catsman, the Marketable Record Title Act and CnifotM Title Standards, Volume 3, Florida Real Property Practice (1965) Section 6,2 describes the nature of the act as follows: "The chief pur cse the act is tc extinguish _r of '' stale claims and ancient defects against the title to real Jper__•, and, accordingly, limit the pericdof sear:h. The act is different from a statute of limitations. In a statute oflimitations a claimof a vested, present interest is cut off because of the claimant's failure to sue. If suit is not filed, the clam is lost. By the Marketable Record Title Act, any claim or interest, vested cr cc..__. -_.._, present or future, is cut off unless the claimant preserves his f claim by filing .. s notice within a 30-year period. See 56.5. If a notice is not filed, the clam is lost The act alsr gces beyond a curative act. Curative legislation o.r,i•: corrects Certain ^...r or technical defects thrcugh passage of time, whereas under the Reccrd Title Act, most defects or clouds cn title beyond the period of 30 years are removed and the purchaseris made secure in his transaction." This court has acrncwledged the pen-- ' 'enality of the act in }Marshall v. Hollywccd, Inc., 236 Sc.2d 114 (Fla. 1970), and Cdcn v. Cel__na Ccrperation, 341 So.2d 977 (Fla. 1976). We nc:o spe'-' `• "a; 1, hcld that the :Marketable Reccrd Title Act is constitutional. Courts of other states have ruled that similar marketable '• "e 'cts are CcnstitutiCnal. See Wicheiman v. Messner, 33 NW2d 300 (Minn. 1957) (in depth discussion of the r+Ct' fi CCriSt+• tuticnal_ty) Te=Cell .. Hanes, 32 rW2d 119, 123 (Iowa 1957) ("We are satisfied the legislature had ample authority to make a limitation. . .sub:ect tc a ccndition that a reasonable time must elapse befcre it beccmes effective."); Lang .. Traveler's Insurance Con^.in;', 299 :74 553, 555 (Icwa 1941) ("1' `•t' doubt cf the desirability of statutes giving greater effect and stability to reccrd titles.") See also discussion in rore, Cons..-_UtiCn3li . of Market Title :ecislati:n, 47 Icwa L.P..ev. 413, 42S-29 (1962) . Cther decisi.:r.s by this court upholding the ccnstitu- tioralit; of similar legislative enactments make it clear that 4 • 1 the ?,ct can onstitutionally be applied to bat the diet 3 claim, 3:t Mahood V. Bessemer Properties, Inc., supra, this Court upheld tutio +•of the application, to a purchaser under the Constitutionality •. A 1925 contract, of a 1941 act which removed from titles to fealty the clouds of unperformed Contracts of record unless suit within months. In P.e Estateof Frown. 111 Sc.2d be brought wi _ �n six ^•• 473 (Fla. 1960) , this court held constitutional t e to a claim arising before its passage, of a 1953 statute which barred lairs against an. estate af`er three years. In H. F. L. .. - -- Realty on •J. 7.irtlev 74 Sc.2d 175 (Fla. 1954) , this -e application cf a twenty- year upheld the constitutionality .._ .... -� after mortgages on a given data a er year statute of limitations -� - - one year f_-..• such :en date on the ground that a reasonable time is provided for the en'^--ement of a cause of action before the restriction becomes effective. See Suck 7. Triplett, 32 Sc.2d 753, 754-55 (Fla. 134 were the court said: "We are committedrule the that statutes of this nature :statute ofy limitation] are good where _ reasonable time is allowed to prosecute an asserted right." and Cam=bell v. Horne, 3 Sc.2d 125. 126 (Fla. 1941) where the court said: "The law is well settled by decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States and in other =ur_sdi._-cis, that statutes of limitation a--'• existing_ rights are not unconstitutional if a reasonable time is given for t.-.e en__ oe-•.ent of the right be' --- she bar takes e". The city contends that the application cf the Act to bar its claim violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth :Az;ettdmeat to the Consti`.•-' .. of the United States. Although it is a most important limitation on state .action, due process has never been an absolute prohibition g property rights. against state legislation adversely _.l 3L:dCtln It has been. held over and over again that genera: limitations on state action do not extinguish the state ' s police pcwcr to enact legislation "reasonably necessary to secure the health, safet y, good order, comfort cr general welfare of the community." Sr_r Atlantic Coast Line Railroad •i. Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 543, 5=3 (1914), 5 • ;s'f'.5 - �_4w::fit u:% - •zL:t,i�:4- • i�,'i;:;', '. h;t;,i:'S, �.a. '�i:"� =,:zkv's- ur .c ri"°`sue' "..}:..;i:�;:.=N'II in deterfiAinc wh_toef state action Violated due ue tiidedd prinCipled, a .curt must choose y. protectin m. g the — welfare of _ :'<1�✓;_gi;;;,:�4�,,.y;_,�u� {,:• - I a e rights one hand and the °r-�.:,Fya,�•-,:,.::�r;;it=%�',.,.r�`�r�:;,�:;.;r�' : "dual a guaranteed ri, _� on ��1�Ltt�` '+�' �!li i:?3i:• M This me �. yy.cd cf determining ma the general public en the other. -'..1'::.ac,, j� r)?a"-i •c';" 2'iwai:;" Whether a state meets etS the requirements of due process is mm called o the "balancing ,.. interest" terest " test.,^,, See S1es 7 : lcr, The ME nImerevement of envevanc:.by .c _s's. •I = The Marketable Record Title Act, designed red to simplify a .. a. er stabilize titles and live certainty flt,;x,.f�,z COnVeYanCeS of real property, � 1-' ,C: to land ownership, is certainly legislation coteerning the wel- fare .-, QuincyRailroad "r',,.;9`�rtf,;: ti_it�;_ _ .•,.`.iPs,c. �-if% - the public. Cps Chicace ... L:.. _i. ..:1 Y o� .,a_C C592 19 5) . � J 2 .J'l l:. r. 551, _ mmm i�i�i �•`ti% :..fit.-::j'`1i�1�,:i'.N _ __ Company .. �i__.::ei I 0 The eity contends, hcwever, that the retroactive nature of the Act makes it an a-'^: `..any and unreasonable exercise of police power. But ret_Cact_:e statutes have been almost univer- sally declared cons` ""y ^sal when a reasonable time was given to protect property interests by c='pl: ng with the new requirements. Atchafalaya Land Co. v. F. B. Williams Cypress Co., 258 U.S. 284 (1922); Wheeler •7. Jac::3cn, 137 G.S. 245 (1890); Vance .. Vance, 108 J.S. 514 (1383). Thus, the ccr.anal cb=e^"-n that retroactive application of a statute results in a depri'7at-cn of due process is cb:'sated where the statute gives owners of old_ claims Still enforceable at the time of the statutory enactment a reascnable time to take certain steps tr. preserve their interests. E'er example, in Vance v. Vance, supra, the ccnstitl:ticn of Louisiana was amended in April, 1858, to provide that "the tacit mertgaces and privileges new existing in _rue state shall .cease to have effect against third persons after the first of January, 1873, unless duly recorded." Despite the retractive effect of the statute in barring property rights conveyed prior to the enactment of the statute, the court held that the statute • limataticn affecting these existing rights was ccr.stitut-anal. The court reasoned that such retroactive application was not prohibited by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 6 iiiiuiii ■ii.i. 0 • because areaschable Lire °nag given for the enforceent Of the 'dtion before the bar took place. Indeed, in Wicheltan v. Messner, supra, the Minnesota Marketable Record Title Act was attacked on the fiery ground that its retroactive features violated due process of lbw: In upholding the Minnesota Act as a proper retroactive recording act the Supreme Court of Minnesota held: "The recordation provisions of the act provide for a simple and easy method by which the owner f an ex . existing „_ interest preserve presere it. If he fails to take the step of filing the notice as provided, he has himself to blame if his interest is extinguished. The cons"---4onality duty of have would seem to imposing _n�� been settled pe•.tnd question by the _C decisions sustaining retroactive recur±- yn statutes. Scurlock, Retroactive is Affecting Interest In :.and, Mich. :.ecai Studies, ✓i- taas:.. .. ho `• on, su a 33 :1.:1.:.dam 517. have similar upheld tha validity of the Iowa ':'so Iowa cases _ � ' Marketable Record Title ,act as against the same _round of attack. 1..Y LaneTraveler's IIns . C.o. , sutra. T�sdel .. Hanes,tea.. s:.__ V. We are ••---• .. not confronted with the question of whether the Marketable Record Title Act can be u~. , "'' `o divest the .i.can , people of the State cf Florida of sovereign lands held in public trust for them. This case is not similar to Cd-m ':. Cel__na Co -oration, 241 41 Sc.21 977 (:la. 1977), where the Trustees of theInternal Improvement Fund without any notice to the :u✓1ic conveyed certain properties. In the case sub -e, the Legislature :id -.ct lcse control rol of lands "irrevocably • ested" in the trustees, :es Internal ' prc•: e:^cn _ Fund v. Root, 59 Fla. 648, 51 So. 535 (1910), so the grant to - he city was effective. The validity of Chapter 8205, Special Acts �- 1919, hasbeen reccgn_:ed by the Trustees of the Internal Improvemen t Fund. Trustees �: -.:rcvement Fund v. Clauahtcn, 96 • Sc.''d 775, 7E5 (1956) . MIME MM ■ the Spediai ?dt q anted to the City "for ;tunidiPai rui' Poses ofily" all of the state's "tight, title and interest insofar as the same can be granted, to all submerged lands including waterfront and riparian rights." The prevision that the grant was "for municipal purposes only" was not a reservation or exception, as nothing was severed prom that which was granted. See City cf Jacksonville v. Shaffer, 107 Fla. 567, 144 So. 888 (1932) . This .. , �visi-is a restriction cn the use of the prcperty and ..ces not fall within the categcrl cf true ease — ;tents. See Mccre .. Stevens, 90 Fla. 979, 106 Sc. 901, 43 Ai.R 1127 (1925). We next consider the cuestisn of whether the Marketable ReccrdTitleAct applies so as to bar claims of title in the e 'subject property where it was previously held in public trust by the state, but later conveyed to the city. The city contends ahat certain e:+:e_t .cns _n _ lcrida Statutes, Section 7 -2 • `994 , prevent the applicaticr. cf the Marketable Reccrd Title Act to the city's claim. This statute reads as fcl_cw's: "Subject to the matters stated in 5712:03, such marketable reccrd� title be fee tite s- r and clear of all estates, interests, Claims or charges what3Ce:'er, the existence of which depends pcn any act,'title t_ansacticn, event or smissisn that occurred prior ts the effective date _f the rcct cf title. Ali such estates, interests, claims sr charges, hcwever dencninated.whether such estates, interests, claims sr :charges are sr appear to be held cr asserted by a perscr, sui j'.:ris or under a disability, whether such person is within or withcut the state, whether such perscn is natural cr ccrcorate, cr is private or gc•:er... ental are hereby declared to be null and void, -:;cert that this chatter shall not he deemed tC a: sect a. " - • .- -r _n e .n: _-.. 'States , Flc.._.:a cr env of _ s r._.___s, ocar:S ccr.,..,_sZ_.ns or stner acenc:es __ser':ea in the catent cr geed tv .:n:-.. tne ..allot States, . icr_da cr _ .. - its ace__es parted witn title. (emphasis supplied). •iii■uii11i111ii1iii iuiiiiiiiimmii • • The city says that it is an agency of the State of EI'orida ehd thereby stands in the place of the state. The anguage of this section discloses a sharp distinction between the 'rights of the state and those of municipalities. under this Section a reservation of an "interest in the state" is protected when expressly set forth in a conveyance from the state. The interest of a municipality is the same as that of any ether extinguished by peration of the Act. The person and may be e.; - term agency (as contained in this section) does not include Municipalities for Section 712.01(1) Florida Statutes, defining terms used in the act, contains the following: "The term 'person' as used herein denotes singular cr plural, natural cr corporate_, private or governmental, including the state and any political subdivision or agency thereof as the context for the use thereof requires sr denotes. The city argues that its claim was not barred by the Title Act because the root of title relied on Marketable Recb�..Joe (i.e.,the deedcm Florida East Coast Hotel by St.�., it -- Corporation) is a wild deed. St. Joe counters with the argument crat_cr. acquired " - p that Florida East ..cast Hotel Corer; the-^.-e, St. Jce's _ of conveyance o__ =:�Henry M F 1ac'- •' title was not a wild deed. St. :ce __-_es u;en Marsha__ ,. i?cl'dcod., where Atlantic Beach Corporation, with : , Inc., sutra, � .,._.. Marshall as majority - stockholder, acquired title to the real proper...-.�_..�:ers; in 1913. in 1924 a forged deed -ported property In conveythe same proper to defendant's predecessors. The to con•. -- claimed under a 1931 feed. The defendant, Hollywood,�Inc., had remained wild, unimproved, and vacant. -- was disputed -a^.� .. re.T,3:... '�tl .., _.._ - _,. held that the trial court properly dismissed the complaint. Although the deed initiating the chain of title under which defendant claimed was forged and void, this deed formed but one link in the chain predating the effective rcot of title. The Appeal •.'. HC . vwcCd. Inc., sL ra, ) District Court of (:'!3r5h31. - - "• affirmed the judgment dismissing the complaint with prejudice and f tothis court as being one which passed certified its decis�cr. _s 9 II 1I Iiiiii niiiimiiiuuImI■ ffi MM MM MM MM MM • • ::f 6nA duestioh of great public inteiest. We app£oVed the addition the distfidt Court of Appeal, saying: ":,.Claims arising cut of transactions, Whether based upon forgeries cr not, pre= title are dating the effective roots � ^f extinguished by operation of the Act unless claimants can come in under any Of the specified exceptions to the Act. In this case, petitioner fails.to_ qualify under any of the exceptions to the Act, and, therefore, petitioner's claims are barred. "4. The certified question involved in this was, in effect, whether the eMarketable Record Titles to Real Property Act, Ch. 712, F.S. confers marketability to�a chain of title _tle arising out or a forged or wilddeed, sc long as the strict requirements of the Act are met. This question is answered in the affirmative." Mar_==::all .. Hollywood, Inc., 236 Sc2d 114, 120. In Whalev v. Wotring, 220 So.2d 177 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969), ,plaintiff's chain of title was based on his predecessor's 1908 deed, while defendant's _cot of title was a land patent issued in 1397. The court ap^"he Marketable Record Title Act and held that the patentee's heirs were precluded from asserting whatever claim, if any, they had under the 1397 land patent, since the 1903 deed in plaintiff's chain of title had been cn record for more than thirty years. The court in its opinicn said: t "The purpose of Chapter 71Florida Statutes, .,S.A., the Marketable Record Tile Act, is to marketable eestate in land recorded � for thirty•'earsormore and to make same free and clear of any interest transaction, arising from a titleact, event, .c she e emission date which ^occurred oftherootcofrior title. the effective of Title' is defined as the last title transaction recorded at least thirty years. All interest arising prior to root of title is declared null and void unless such interest falls witnin r_n' of _hose classes specifically excepted.By legislative declaration, thisact is to be literally construed to effect the purpose of simpli- fying and facilitating land title trans- actionsfacilitating by allowing persons to rely upon a deed recorded for a period of thirty years or more. The Act contains a provision for protecting these claims which it would extinguish." 220 Sc.2d at 191. In Wilson v. Kelley, 226 So.2d 123 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969), the plaintiffs contended that an instrument could not qualify as a scot of title within the contemplation of the Act unless it constitutes part of the chain of title emanating from the p 'sovereign. In rejecting this contention the court said: In 11111111I1IIII111111IIIIIIIIIIIIII■IIIIIIIIIIIIII■11 i • °+,,:To hold as suggested by plaintiffs would fust±ate the Act's intended beneficial a€facts; and the Act's utility Mould largely be Confined to the elimination of ancient use restrictions and to the curing of formal irregularities,function already performed a by other statutes and usually more quickly title than the marketable -le act. uThe 4 as a marketable ...table title act, is not Concerned with the :ualit; of the title Conveyed by the _act of title so long as the root purports to convey the estate Claimed. Thiscan be :O even though a deed is not cart of the chain of emanating from the sovereign and is -:ere=tree often called a.n 'interloping' cr'wild deed.It can, uncle,. the marketable title acts, form a root of title which may eventually cut off the interest of a terscn who might otherwise have a :lain. Therefore, a .. Marketable title act Can re a _n the chain cf "_• if the break is suffi- ciently old." 226 So.2d at 127. Unquestionably the deed _....m Flagier tc Florida oast Hotel Corporation was a wild deed. The effective root titledeed- Floridaast Coast Hotel Corporation was the da Paper Company cr..:anuary 10, 1344, and the wild deed St. Joe nk hairs commencing before the effective was merely a link =a 3 c - "` title. The claim the citywould be barre d under the root of �_ v:. Hcl1 :wood°, Inc., supra. reasoning in Marshall . Howe•: er , the city says that Florida East Coast Hotel Corporation did net have title to the submerged -ands. The city argues that the conveyance n:eya nce of 14 acres "together with all and singular, the _-rarer..•, rights and submerged _ands appertaining thereto" was ineffective sc than nothing more the i.."-'• '4 acres. lion held reecrd tit__ to - ' To say ctherh_se, the city contends, would result in Florida East Hot ' per3-ien holding tie by a wild deed to the Coast__ C:,_, �-• Atlantic Ocean ~bottom. St. JCe contends that this is immaterial, for the deed from Florida East Coast Hotel Corporation to St. .:ce :t the _cot title even on January 10, 1944, could constitute �- -� though this conveyance may be classified as a wild deed. Florida East Coast Hotel Corporation bulaheaded and filled a portion cf the property in question in 1320, but left a yacht basin. The conveyed all cf the lands involved and, after deed to 3t. Joe co.^.•:e; _ _.. 1944, St. Joe :i11ed and bu::headed the yacht basin. We are East of to that Florida 11 East Coast Hotel pera- MM ■ ■ • .irt.'��t' ':ice:'L•t:S.»^�`Ltt.��.r�. ked td hold; without equivocation, that A wild deed stay dohstie $iti a toot of title. We so hold: the city argues that a wild deed is void and passes ho interest whatsoever in the land. This being so, the city Contends that a wild deed cannot be the Foundation for a vested estate that would fall under the protection of the Act. The ere be a "root of title" : t city states that the Act recuir=_s that t which involves a "title transaction." A "title transaction" is defined by Flcrida Statutes, Section 712.01(3) as one which Affects title. The city contends that a wild deed does not affect title. This court, as well as the First, Second and Fourth District Courts of Appeal have made it clear that the Marketable Reccrd Title Act deviates from common law and prier statutes and, by dicta, have said that a wild deed, properly executed and recorded, may establish a new and valid ._.le after 30 years. Marshall v. Ecile wood, supra: Whale, 7. ,•ior___. supra, Wilson. v. Kelley, su This court in I' _ Ra';cnie , Inc., v. ,:adswcrt:'., 346 So.2d 1004 (Fla. 1977) rejected the argument that only a valid deed could act as a root of title. In this decision the terms "n.cot of title" and 'title transaction" were ccnstrued as follows: "...:tthedeed'purports' should be cb<:ices that purper to create or transfer an estate. Purport is defined in Webster's 3d New International Dic- tionary unabridged (1962,?as'profess outwardly: have the often specious appearance of being. Certainly the Lecisloture intended the word 'purport' to have its accepted meaning. The 1937 deed meets that meaninc. "The deed 'a "e s title' and, in turn, is a title transaction as _hose terms have been con- struedMarshall Hollywood,str::e�di:: Florida.: Ci In .:r _ •: He • _ Inc. 224 So.2d 743 (Fla. 4th -CA 9' ), the Fourth Di- r -- Court, speaking throuch Judge Reed, stated at =ace 749: 'The word "affecting' as it is used in the second sentence of Section 712.02 in the clause "aff acting the title to the lend" :Cris not carry the narrow mean_nc of "changing =r altering". The word is used in the hrsader sense meaning "concerning" or "producing an effect upon". In this bread sense, even a void instrement of reccrd "affects" land titles by casting a cloud or doubt thereon. Clements v. 12 MM MI Imo • Ie^3ersoii, ].315, 70 1a• i60, 70 4o: 439. aroWn,.v_: Salary, 1396, 37 -la, 102, 19 So, 161',' 346 So.2d at 1010. th this case it appeared that Wadsworth, Sr,, died h 120,16 possessed of homestead property and survived by his '.'Widcw and four children. The statute Governing the descent of homestead provided that the surviving spouse wculd receive a life estate in the hcmestead - seer_- subject to tested re- _ nainders in any children. In 1937 s. :Zadswcrth , the survivingldr•'o'r conveying the entire fee simple her.. spouse, executed a deed .. _ _ __ .. - ln 1942 Mrs. Wadsworth Selz. and her son as tenants _.,.._..^n. In and her scn conveyed the pert- - to Raycr,ier. Rat •,_er claimed _: _ a Marketable Reccrd Title free and clear of the children's vested remainder since that interest arose prior to the 1?37 mot of title. The children argued that Florida Statutes, Section 712.02(1) preserves estates, interests, easements, and use restrictions _ _ and defects inherent in the muniments of title cn which the estate is based, beginning with the root cf ''''' The children said that this statute preserved their interest hecause the 1927 deed had twc inherent defects: 1) +•e•-�G�property __ �... •,:n�:eC the:_ remainder1.• a: , ^-1 .... .�� _•e.yed from Mrs. Wadsworth c These arguments were :ejected because ^� term inherent in the muniments of title" do not -n= _ to defects cr failures in the transmission of title, but refer to defects in the makeup or co.•____ •• .,f -he trans . ission cf title depends. The the doe,? or. which_ G.' t •..-an Sarg=ents were geared tc def''r-= 4n the __ _••Z..._saicn and there was netting on the face of the deed to indicate that it ccn. dye d the ch__dren's remainder interest, were nct saved from extinguishment. The 1944 deed to St. Jce purported so those interests tc create an estate and •°'ed as a "rcot of title." The city gains no help from the , _pyiaiCh3 OfFlorida ` FlorStatutes, Section 712.03(1) because _her_ was nothing er• the face sf the deed indicate _cat. `;$ye'". a..,. -pot Of the city. This ccurt made it clear 13 EIN11111111111111111111111 1111111111111NUN Iiniiii ii Immo 0 0 flficia Statute„ section 12:03(1) refers only to defects makeup Of the deed when we said: "Section 712.03, Florida Statutes, provides that marketable record title will not ex- tinguish six categories of rights that pre- date the root of title. The first of them, four in subsection (1), is 'estates or int-:rests, easements and use restrictions tie, d -es s inherent in the disclosed a.^.� seer Muniments of title cn which said estate is based beginning :with the root fir title.' The children argue that in-e`.=` are within the - first cateccr•. because the 1917 .heed hastwoInherent defects: (1; itc :eyed their remainder interests and (2)vit conveyed property from .,,eta to her_se.f. The phrasing of their argument shows a misunderstanding f ^e statute. As the Fourth District C Court _f Appeal - Appeal stated in Marshall: h- terms �- the_-en'defects tsof'c_t_e' do'not refer n .,r s the trans- mission Defects or f - i•• cn of t_ as the plaintiffs m 1 J J i title, _ I argument suggest -a, tut refer to defects in the make up cr consti- tutionment-oc- _ ,,e` deed which suchr Tuni- trans- cn depends." 224 5o•2d at 751. trans- mission "The __ r the deed ces not reflect the dThectyof a conveyance from Lotto to herself." ITT ve , .. adsworth, supra at 1010. The ??r.t deed to St. .,ce does net reflect that it was wild deed ncr ..ces it appear that _here is any cef ect in the the de- This deed may properly cons`. " a makeup of ,. _... _ properly of `'-' s iies that the Marketable Record The city 3150 ••�+ Title not operates rates as a means whereby peep' - a can steal land. Florida Statutes, Section 2.01(6) excepts the rights cE any person in whose ....me the la nd !'as beer. assessed cr. count: tax - This section of the statute :Dies _,._ a :er_cd __ three years. requires that owners of land pay their taxes and by doing so, would stop any party frsm pirating their land. Moreover, an :. interest in land can be , reset Jed by any party by riling withinnotice the 30-year period subsequent to the root of title in accord ance with Section 712.05, Florida Statutes. The coert in ,ailson v. al y, supra, also noted the �- prevent an int_rlcpi - deed from -"t` ng safe^:...rd� wni_.. would - •_ - 14 aneith?r ?erso n't deter-:inci interest ih td1J5 'of a utideter'Ji c A,schf in this as the court said: "For those who are concerned with the ii:elihtod that the Act will allow an interloping deed to cut off another perscn's deserving interest in favor of an undeser•._ho person, there are safe, - guards in the Act to prevent this from happening. A claimant will not be cut off if he has been a patty to any `; ' transaction ro---ded with_., a period of not less than thirty Mars cr if he files a simple notice rescr hed by the Act during the time allowed for this purpose. e will not be cut _f if he remains in possession or if the lens is assessed to him on the tax roll. given if it Is no _pager assessed to him he is prVtom- .,= if it was assessed to him at any time� during the precedingthree ;ears. But if he has beena car to notitle transaction recorder for at least thirty years durin g which time he has also f-___d tc file the notice, and if for more than three :ears he has allowed the be assessed _:_ taxation someone else, land to - - under andif neither he noranyperson _aims. _nd possession ofthe land, it wouldnet him is in i seem un:ust that his claim should he subordinate tc anotherperson's claim that is based upon a chain of title going back to an instrument or court proceeding has been recorded at least thirtyears, and that epur7orts to create or transfer th e estate' claimed _ the second person. ' Inthe public into -opt cfsimplifying and facil- itating land title nsact_ons, it does not seen unreasonable for the legislature to .. presumption one who is negligent in claiming his land has abandoned his claim. 225 Sc.2d at 127. +.e poi cut that the -.:es: of whether In summary .._ question the M rketable Record .___e Act ca.. he utilised to divest the a _ State cf sovereignlan d is not considered,considered,as it is not an issue in the case. By this opi.._.... we Rol... 1) The Marketable Record Title Act is ccns• ""` enal; 2) The city is not an agency of the stare and does ace of the statethe application of the .act stand in theplace in - provisions of the Marketable Record Title act; title. 3) A wild or interloping deed may const""•'e a root The decision of the District Court of Appeal, as well .as the opinion expressing the views of the court, are approved. The writ of certiorari is discharged. ��. BERG MATCF:E_. and AL:E . ..N, ,;.; . , ::G:.A::D, C.J. , EOYD, 0� Ca, i.:iC , Coheir h3 1 IH1IIII 1 111111111111 111 1111 in the 3upreme Qltrnrt of ±Rtotila CASE NO.51 ,775 CITY OF MIAMI, a Florida municipal corporation.. Petitioner, Us. ST. JOE PAPER COMPANY, a Florida corporation; SOUTHEAST PROPERTIES, INC., a Florida corpora- tion, HUGH E. MATHESON, JR., individually; and SALLY S. DOMMERICH, formerly Sally S. Matheson, individually, Respondents. PETITIONER'S BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO AMICI CURIAE 1111111111 1111 BAILEY & DAWES, a professional association Attorneys for Petitioner Suite 1820, One Biscayne Tower Two South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 331:31 0 1 A II ii11111IIII!!IlI111 IIIIII IIII 1 l0 111111•11111111 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ii INTRODUCTION QUESTION PRESENTED.. ....... 4 ARGUMENT _.._.._..._. 5. THE LAND IN DISPUTE IS SOVEREIGNTY LAND 5- A. Sovereignty Land Is Held in Trust For The People B. Illegally Filled Land Retains its Nature Sovereignty N C. Sovereignty Land Conveyed To The City Retains Its Sovereignty Nature - 9 D. Sovereignty Lands Cannot Be Divested By A Wild Deecl 12 CONCLUSION CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 18 111pl'IIIII 11111111 111 li, l l II 11111P u 111111 I I1 I 1111,I 11ljll l I ! 111 11 1 111 'IIIIII' 111 (!1( 111 1111111111111111 1111111111111 i 1111 ■ INDEX OF AUTHORITIES Case Page Allied Structural Steel Co. c. Spannaus, 98S.Ct .2716(1978) 13. W. County of Orange c. Heim, 106 Cal. Rptr. 825.30 Cal.App.:3d - 894 (197:3) Haves c. Bowman. 91 So.2d 795 ( Fla. 1957) ............. In Re East Ricer Drice, Borough of Manhattan 289 N.Y.S. 4:3:1 (19:3E3). aff"d. 21 N.Y.S.2d 507 (1937 ) International Paper Co. c. Miss. St. Hwy. Dept., 271 Sn.2d :395 (Miss. 1973). cert denied. 114 U.S. 827 Martin L. Busch. 9:3 Fla. 5:15. 112 So. 27.1(19271 Odom c. lleltona Corp.. :141 S►.2d 977 (Fla. 1977) Pembroke r. Peninsular Terminal 108 Fla. -}Ei. 146 S1. 249 (19:33) .. People c. Hecker. 1 Cal. Rptr. 334 (1960) 1111111111111 11[ 111111111111 111111111111111111 Case 1111 1111 III I 11111111 414 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES (Continued) People c. Poceromo, :159N.Y.S.2d8-18(197:bi .........._ People. Town of Smithtown u: Iliwerarnm 3:36 N. V.S.2d 764 (197D, ... State ex rel. Ellis c. Gerbing. 5E; Fla. 60:3. 47 So.:353 (1908) _. Thiesen t'. Gulf F&A Ry. 75 Fla. 28, 78 So. 491 (19IS)= ... Twomhley c. City of Long Bead :33:3 F.2d 685 (9th Cir. 1964), cert.. denied. 85 S.Ct. 195 ( 19E3•1) ............ United States c. 2,899.17 Acres of Land,. Etc., 269 F.Supp. 90:3 ( N1.D. Fla. 1967) United States c. State of California, 381 U.S. 139. 85 S.Ct. 1401, 14 L.Ed.2d 260 (1965) United States Trust Co. of New York srt New Jersey. 97 S.Ct. 1505 (1977) _.. to II li 12 6 114 ■ INDEX OF AUTHORITIES (Continued) Case Other Authorities Butler Act Florida Statutes Chapter 712, United States Constitution, Contracts Clause. Article I, Section 10. Clause 1 ..... Page 11111011011111 111111111 11111111 1111111 11 1111 11 111111111111111111 in the §upreinr 1tnurt of floribn CASE NO. 51,775 CITY OF MIIANII, a Florida municipal corporation.. Petitioner. c' 5. ST. -JOE PAPER COMPANY. a Florida corporation: SOUTHEAST PROPERTIES. INC., a Florida corpora- tion. HUGH E. NIA'I'HESON. •JR.. individually: and SALLY S. I)OMI\IERICH. formerly Sally S. Matheson. in(livido�illy. Respondents. PETITIONER'S BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO AMICI CURIAE INTRODUCTION Months after oral argument in this cause, two, amicus briefs have been tiled — one by the Governor and the Attorney General of Florida, another by the phosphate industry. IIIII 111111111 Bath ague this Court's holding in Odorn v. I)eltona Corp.. :311 S0.2(1 977 ( Fla. 1977). and the effect of the 197S amendment to Chapter 712 (the Marketable Record Titles Act ). The State argues that Odom was in- correctly decided. and. alternatively. that the 1978 amendment changes the result reached in Odour. The phosphate industry predictably disagrees. But the argument as to Odom ;s continuing validity is not relevant to this appeal. For the Odom opinion makes clear its inapplicability to this rase. Odom holds that. when the State conveys land which is not noticeably naci:;able to private citizens without reserva- tion of public rights. Chapter 712 applies. Mr. Justice Boyd, writing for the Court. noted that the result would 1)e different "in the case of a large lake. such as Lake Okeechobee." Odom )hakes clear that government ownership of such land is not extinguished by Chapter 712. Respondents have continually urged this Court to misread its own holding in Odom. arguing that because the State conveyed the land to the City in 1919 and St. Joe then took a wild. void deed to the same land in 1944. the City in 1975 could not quiet title. Odom does not support this. Odom would he apt here only if the City ow the State) had purported to convey this property in 1944 to private grantees. Had that happened (and. of course. it did not ) Odom 's gloss on Chapter 712 might preclude this suit. But even this rule would he subject to the critical exception of notice of nauigohilitY. studiously ignored by the Respondents. and apparently not even perceived by the writers of the amicus briefs. 410 Odom makes clear that Chapter 712 dos not apply to this action. There has been no conveyance to private grantees of this property, and the Respondents are charged with notice of the obvious navigability of Biscayne Bay and the Atlantic Ocean. The State, properly concerned about Chapter i 12 s applicability to sovereignty lands. and not aware that Odom compellingly supports the City's appeal. bases its eat ire brief on the unsupported and in fact insupport- able statement that the land in dispute in this case is not sovereignty land. This attempt to whistle past the graveyard is completely contrary to all applicable law. ■ HEI E I1l!IIIII IIIII 111IIIIu■I■I -I QUESTION PRESENTED WHETHER TI-IE LAND IN DISPUTE IS SOVEREIGNTY LAND 41,0 ARGUMENT THE LAND IN DISPUTE IS SOVEREIGNTY LAND A. Sovereignty Land Is Held In Trust For The People B. Illegally Filled Land Retains Its Sovereignty Nature C. Sovereignty Land Conveyed To> The City Retains Its Sovereignty Nature D. Sovereignty Land Cannot Be Divested By, A Wild Deed The Land In Dispute Is Sovereignty Land A. Sovereignty Land 1s Held In Trust For The People The (public trust doctrine «'a!, created not for the Protect um of the State, but for t ile protection of the peo- ple. Accordingly. the courts have refused to allow the State to abdicate its deities as trustee. In Florida. this has meant that the State can convey the waters. shores. and beds of navigable waters to private grantees only after statutory notice and public hearing and a studied conclusion by the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund that a grant of a limited portion of sovereignty lands will not harm the people of Florida. And even then. the State retains the right and duty of control and regulation. A putative conveyance of I,1I1III I Ip I 111 i i i ■ sovereign'' lands not meeting these stringent require- ments will he held void by the courts. unites' States v. 2.899.17 :Acres of Land, Etc., 269 I:.Supp. 9ft . 908 ( I.D. Fla. 1967) ("If. by mistake or otherwise. sales or con- veyances are made by the 'Trustees of the Internal Im- provement Fund of sovereignty lands . . . such sales and ('nnveyall('t's are ineffectual. . . I. See generally Haves t'. Bol(•rnan. 91 Sn.2d 795 ( Fla. 195 ): Pembroke u. Peninsular Terminal Co., 1(18 Fla. .16. 1.1(i So. 2.19 ( 19:;3)::llnrtin r. Busch. 9:; Fla.:t:;5. 112 So. 27-1 (192'i ): Thiesen t'. Gulf F&A Rv. C'o., 5 Fla. 2S, S So. 491 ( 1:r1,`;►: State ex rel. Ellis t'. (1erbinti, :16 Fla. 603. 47 So. :;:,:i ( 19(1,S). In Odom, this Court considered the effect of Chap- ter 712 on this established case law. Noting the frequent difficulty of determining factually what is or is not navigable water and sovereignty land. the Court held that where the State had conveyed land, thereby mak- ing a contemporaneous factual finding that the land was not sorererj.,,rl, and the surface water on the land was in fact not noticeably navigable. Chapter 712 precluded the Mate from later asserting that the land was sovereign and its conveyance invalid. The Attorney General's assumption that the land in the instant case has somehow ..lost.. its sovereignty is an unwarranted andication of the public trust and contrary to all applicable judicial authority. The land is sovereignty land. vested in the City. and Chapter 712 does not and cannot apply. 11111111111111111111 II 1111111111111 II 11111111 B. Illegally Filled Land Retains Its Sovereignty Nature The land in dispute was illegally filled — this fact has never even been disputed in this appeal. As any good faith title searcher would have found, in 1944 (the date of St. •Joe's wild deed). the grantor had no title, nor even a colorable title, to the City's land. In 1919. the date t he conveyance to t he City, the riparian rights act nt 185(; did give rights to certain riparian landowners to dredge, fill. and bulkhead, and thereby to acquire title -- but only to owners of land to the lots Crater mark. Hayes C. Bowman. 91 So.2d 195( Fla. 195 i l : Thiesen r. Gulf F&A Rv. Co.. 75 Fla. 2S, 78 So. 491 ( 1918). St. -Joe's putative predecessors in title owned only to the high water mark. In 1919, the submerged lands were vested in the City. Any tilling subsequent to this was totally devoid of legal authority. Moreover. even it' FEC had owned title to the low water mark. the riparian rights act itself would have authorized filling only to the channel. And all of the disputed property is nut side of t he channel. Therefore. the land in dispute did not lose its sovereignty nature by the unlawful filling. A public trust cannot he divested by sheer theft. According to time- honored property law, artificial fill belongs to the owner of the stihmerged lands — in this case, the City. in trust for the people. In United States v. State of California, :381 U.S. 139. 85 S.Ct. 1401, 14 L.Ed.2d 260 (1965), the federal government challenged California's claim to certain submerged lands contiguous to islands off the coast. The ■ Supreme ''Court held. that artificially filled land belonged to the State — in its sovereignty capacity: "IW1hen a state extends its laird domain by pushing hack the tied . . . its sovel'('igllty should extend to the new land.. . l:181 U.S. at 1771 This same principal was followed in International - Paper Co. v. Miss. St. Hwy. Dept.. 271 S().'_)d :195 (Miss. 197:11, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827. The plaintiff in that case challenged the state's ownership of tilled land. Emphasizing the special characteristics of sovereignty title. the court o►ncluded: "ITIhese changing characteristics of the land did not displace the trust imposed upon the state for the public.'• 1271 So.'_)d 3991 In County of Orange c. Heim, MG Cal. Rptr. 82 .:1t1•`. Cal.App.:1d 04 (197:1). the court held invalid a grant to a private owner of artificially filled lands. The court; reasoned that to held otherwise would impede the county from tilling land to henetit the public. The same conclusion was reached in People v., Hecker. 4 Cal. Rptr. :1:1.1.:14:1 (19011: "IAIccretions . . . caused entirely by artificial means . . . such as . . . the dumping of material into the ocean — belong to the state. or its grantee. and do not belong to the upland owner... 8 411111.111111 II I II 111111111111111111111111111111111111111=0 The State suggests that the applicahiti2-v of Chapter 112 to illegally tilled land should turn on the grantee's notice of the illegality of the fill. Such an approach might well be valid in cases such as Odom_ involving land adjacent to N.vater which is not noticeably navigable. Hut it is inapt to the facts of this appeal. Fur when St. Joe took its wild deed in 19.4. it had before it a deed purporting to grant lt0i9 acres more than the grantor awned of record. The City has been precluded by dismissal on the pleadings from engaging in discovery to prove St. •Iue's actual notice. But St. Joe is clearly charged with legal notice — of navigability. of the sovereign nature ut the land, of the City's title, and of the illegality ut the fill. Any good faith title searcher would have discovered these facts. The land in dispute therefore did not lose its sovereignty nature by being illegally filled. C . Sovereignty Land Conveyed To The City Retains Its Sovereignty Nature In 1815, by act of Congress admitting Florida to the Union. the United States conveyed to the State all right. title, and interest in lands under navigable waters. and within or about its shores. "in trust for the benefit of the people of Florida.•• On June 2, 1919, by special act, Florida's Legislature conveyed submerged lands to the City of Miami, reserving its interest in having the sovereignty lands remain public by imposing upon it the require- ment that it he used, in perpetuity, for "municipal pur- poses only... 9f 111 11111111111111 i ■ The : orney General. in his brief, assumes. without either authority or analysis. that when the State conveyed the property in dispute to the City. the property "lost- its sovereignty nature. All the judicial authority on this newly -raised point is directly contrary. Sovereignty land conveyed to a municipality. as an agent of the state. plainly retains its sovereignty nature. The public interest in sovereignty land can he alienated only when the State. expressly intending to do so. con- cludes. after statutory notice and public hearing, that a lilllited portion of sovereignty lands may he alienated without harming the public interest. Otherwise. the land retains its sovereignty — particularly where. as here. the land is conveyed to the States agent. the City. for municipal purposes only. In the instant case, t he 1919 conveyance to t he City. even had it not been expressed 1n the grant. carried with it the limitation that the land was sovereign — imposed with a trust for the benefit of the people of Florida. In other words. the State could and did convey to the City only what it had - sovereignty land indelibly imprinted as "public. The applicability of the public trust doctrine to sovereignty lands conveyed by a state to a municipality has been most recently clarified in a well -reasoned New York decision. People, Town of Smithtown v. Poveromo. :3:36 N.Y.S.2d 764, 769 (1972). aff •d on point cited but remanded on other grounds sub nom People v. Poveronto, 359 N.Y.S.2d 8481197:0: i 111111i "It therefore becomes apparent that no person can become invested with absolute ownership II,I 91 10 11111111111111iiiminum 11 111111111111111111111 of these lands.. . . Whoever succeeds to the sovereignty succeeds to that right of property and holds it in trust for the nation. . . . .Onl the 1Sth day of June, . . . the people of the State of New York granted the land under the \issectuogue to the Town of Sillithtown. The rxtent of the conveyance was necessarily, limited by the trust in favor of the people. the dus Puhlicum. just as it affected the proprietary ownership of the grantor state. The people of t he State of New York clearly have an interest in the enforcement of the trust in their favor that is ingralted upon the ownership of the Nissegiin ue. . . . The state can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are interested, like navigable waters and soils under them, so as to leave them entirely under the use and control of private parties, except in the instance of par- cels mentioned for the improvement of the navigation and use of the waters, or when par- cels can he disposed of without 1i11ptirment of the public interest in what rcinains. than it can abdicate its police powers in the administra- tion of government and the preservation of the peace.. . l emphasis supplied l Accord: In Re East River Drive, Borough of Manhattan, 289 N.Y.S. 4:33, 4:39 11936). aff •d, 21 N.Y.S.2d- 507 (19371: "The courts have held time and again that the title such as the city holds is in its sovereign capacity,. and not in any proprietary capacity.- 11 i l"7■ i II 7 II 1!I1INP'1!'111111i111 II ppII 11111111111 uIIuIO i i 1111111111 See also (. ntv of Oran, ' t•. Heim, 1(Hi Cal. Rptr. 82:1. :;t► Cal.App.:3d 691 t 1S)7al ►sovereignty land conveyed to county subject to public trust►. The i'nitt•(t States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has also held t hat sovereignty land conveyed to a municipality retains its sovereignty nature. iu )rnhhy t'. (it\ of Long Beach, :3:3:3 I:.2(1 N':) 19th ('ir. 196.1►. cert. di'1►ir(i. ti:) S.t't . 1:). i l91i.1). In that case. a citizen and taxpayer sued to enjoin the city from sharingu reve'iities produced from submerged lands with t he state. The state had conveyed the land to the city. viih a use resiric'tl(tt1 to -establishment. improvement and con- duct hal'1N,1' The trial court dismissed the com- plaint. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. holding that the land remained subject to the public trust. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. The State cannot, by legislation. inadvertence. or otherwise. alienate sovereignty land in a manner incon- sistent with the public trust. The 1919 conveyance by the State to t he City of t he land in dispute. "for municipal purposes only.- cannot be construed as a divestiture 01 the public trust -- the State conveyed only «hat it had sovereignty t it le. The land is sovereignty land. the land belongs to t he City. and ('harrier 712 does not and cannot extinguish the City s ownership. D. Sovereignty Land Cannot Be Divested By A tVi1d D('t'd The Attorney General. in his attempt to whistle'. past the gni\ eyard and avoid the public trust doctrine of sovereignty lands. does correctly point out that other 12 1■1111 .■II. issues of great public importance are presented by the City's appeal. Each of those issues compel a reversal of the courts below. Chapter 712 does not. and cannot constitutionally. validate St..1oe's wild deed. And Chapter 712 does not apply to the Citv's title as an agency of the State. As the City has previously argued, under the Federal Contracts Clause. Article I, Section lu, Clause 1. of the United States Constitution. a state may not retrospectively exercise the police power to extinguish vested rights which in no way conflict with the public interest. When this argument was first presented. St. Joe responded by saying that the Contracts Clause was rarley invoked by Federal courts in limiting the powers of the States. The [united States Supreme Court then issued its opinion in United State, Trust Co. of Nett, York c. New Jersey, 97 S.Ct. 1505(1977). making abun- dantly clear that the Contracts Clause is far from a "dead letter.'' That opinion is discussed in the ('ity's Reply Brief. The United States Supreme Court has subse- quently struck another state statute as an un- c oast ittitiotlal impairment of contract. Allied Structural Steel Co. t'. Spannauti. 98 S.Ct. 2 i 11i (1978). The statute challenged subjected certain private employers with pension plans to a "pension funding charge" it' the plan was terminated. The effect was a statutorily imposed vesting requirement. The Court. in an opinion by Mr. Justice Stewart. held that the statute failed con- i 1:1 IU I ■ • 111111 ■ MI -1110 stitiitional r•utiny. The opinion is fatal to the lower court's application of Chapter 712. "In applying; these principles to the present case. the first inquiry mist he whether the state law has. in fact, operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship. The severity t)t t he impairment Ineasur•es the height of t he hurdle the state legislation must clear. Severe i►npairment . . . will push the inquiry to a careful examination of the mature and pur- pose of the state legislation." 1 J S.Ct. at 272:11 Here. Chapt er 712 as int erpreted below ex- tinguishes vested property rights in favor of a wild deed. T1he statute in question here nullifies ex- press terms of the company's contractual t)hll:.'atit)ns and imposes a completely unex- pected liability in potentially disabling amounts. . . . Yet there is no showing in the record before us that this severe disruption of cont ral•lllal expect at ions was necessary to meet an important general Social problem. The presumption favoring 'legislative Judgment as to the necessity and reasonableness of a par- ticular measure. L'ntted .States Trust Co., -131 U.S.. at 23. `); S.Ct., at 1.)1S, simply cannot stand in this case.• 1!),ti S.Ct. 2724, emphasis supplied, The specialized and limited problems of title • searches clearly do not warrant the "severe disruption" 1.1 II 1111111111111111111 INi 1111111111MINI of divestiture of property. Chapter 712 as applied below unconstitutionally impairs contractual rights.' !Moreover. application of the Contracts Clause as required by Allied might satisfy the State's apparently obsessive concern with the validity of prier State transfers of submerged lands to private parties under the Butler Act — those transfers as contracts by the State ias well as the deeds in Odonm► might he protected by the Contracts Clause. Respondents in this case. of course. have no such protection, claiming title to the City's land by virtue of a wild. void deed from a private grantor who had no colorable title. 15 Ummulig677-0111I I�IP .� I 11 1!1'11111u111111 p 11! 11 i 1111111111 CONCLUSION In 1919 Tlie Statf' of Florida conveyed to the ('ity of `Iiaini the disputed land. as sovereignty land. The land NVas then. and is now. held in trust for the people of Florida. The City as trustee cannot he and is not divested of this land by Chapter 712. The courts below have held this public land divested on the basis of a void deed which was illegally eXecuted by persons who were on legal as well as. in all probability. actual) notice ul' the public trusteeship of that land. In so doing, the courts below have ignored Florida case law. have ignored the public trust. and have imposed upon Chapter 712 an unconstitutionality so pervasive 1 hat it runs afoul of almost every con- stitutional protection accorded vested property rights. Chapter 712 should he held inapplicable. and the opinion below quashed. igql,qI Respectfully submitted. BAILEY .l• DAWES, a professional association Attorneys for Petitioner Suite 1820. One Biscayne Tower - Two South Biscayne Boulevard Nliaini, Florida :331:11 (:3O5) :37•1-5505 By: Guy B. Bailey, Jr. • to ■uIiuIIIuI■II1uII IIIII 11 I IIIII and III IIII IIIIIIIII.■I Ii,li gl�11 ICI 11 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE WE HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing Petitioner's Brief in Response to Atnici Curiae .vas mailed to Shutts &. Bowen. ltltlt) Southeast First National Hank Building. Miami. Florida :131:U: Sibley, Gihlin & Levenson. l:1t)1 Dade Boulevard. ? iiatni Beach. Florida :3:31:39: Steel. Hector & Davis. 14b0 Southeast First National Bank Building. Miami. Florida :331:31: and Russo. Van Doren & Allen. P.A.. 4685 Ponce de Leon Boulevard, Coral Gables. Florida 3'3146. this 12t h day of September, 1978. OF COUNSEL u 11111111011111111111 III 111111 1 l III II I111■IIl■s■ I 4 1111111111111 1111111E11 1111111111111111111110111ME 1 14 .4 « ! , .-,1:.; ; i • • t• rf ' ' : • .'* t ; '-'. 1 i , . ' • ,I • , ,.. t t . . . . . . . . ..• , 1. 1 ' C. it.%4,%-.44..e.P614.ktittitir..,;;;.. ita,Zit. e. 4.,ar,I..;too.tt .r..ri.....tt.4--4‘.;it .i.,itTair.. ;Irk' t,;;:t.tr:...;it:ta,... ,it; - in die 4 c (gaud of Martha CASE NO. 5t,775 CITY OF MIAMI a Florida municipal corporation,. Petitioner. VS. ST. JOE PAPER COMPANY. a Florida corporation: SOUTHEAST PROPERTIES. INC., a Florida corporation: IIUGH E. MATHESON, JR.. individually: and SALLY S. DOMMERICH. formerly Sally S. Matheson. individually. Respondents. PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF LAW OFFICES GUY B. BAILEY..111. Attorneys for Petitioner Suite 1820. One Biscayne Tower Two South Biscayne Bouioard Miami, Florida 3313 i 1 1111111111111111111011111110 CITATIONS OF AUTHORITIES Case Judicial Decisions Honda fllhury v. Central and Southern Florida Hoot! Control District 99 So.2d 24 (3d Fla. DCA 1%5 Biltmore Pillage v. Royal 71 So.2d 727 (Fla. 1954) Bradd t' ci Hale Fishery Co. v. Thomas 93 Fla. 326, 112 So. 55 (1927) ., ...... City of iami v. Benson 63 So.2d 916 ( Fla. 1953) ..... City of Miami v. St. Joe Paper Co: 1 347 So.2d 622 (3d Fla. DCA 19977) _ ..... . Page Geary v. Estate of Creary - 17 33S So.2d 26 (1st Fla. DCA 19j7Ca . - . Ellis r. Brown 77 So.2d 845 (Fla. 1955) . . Emhart Corporation v. Brantley 257 So.2d 273 (3d Fla. DCA. 1972 Gonzales v. City of Belle Glade 287 So.2d 669 (Fla. 1973):. q u'I1I'!"II''I II 1Il E1I'111!!p11.1t111! P�! 111 11111,11111,1,1 1'1 11' 1 1,1111111 II 1,1111 h,!1II;1 ■ i, CITATIONS OF Al;TIIORITIES ;Continued) Case Haves v. Bowman 91 So.2d 795 (Fla. 1957) ITT Ravonier. Inc. t'. Wadsworth _ 346 So.2d 1004 (Fla. 1977) . . In re Estate o/ .leffott 186 So.2d 80 (2d Fla. DCA 1966) Je1lerson National Bank at Sunny Isles v. Metro Dade County 271 So.2d 207 (3d Fla. DCA 1972) .. . Johnson t'. State 178 So.2d 724 (2d Fla. DCA 1965) ...... Marshall v. Hollywood. Inc. 224 So. 2d 743 (4th Fla. DCA 1969), aft'd, 236 So.2d 114 (Fla. 1970) McCord v. Smith 43 So.2d 704 (Fla. 1950) Odom v. Deltona Corporation 341 So.2d 977 (Fla. 1977) ..... Overstreet v. Bishop 343 So.2d 958 (1st Fla. DCA 1977) Pembroke v. Peninsular Terminal Co. 108 Fla. 46. 146 So. 249 (1933) ..... • Page MI • CITATIONS OF AUTHORITIES (CAnued) Case Page Poladran v. Johnson 85 So.2d 140 (Fla. 1956) ....._ ED_ 15,. 16 Price v. Stratton 45 Fla. 535. 33 So. 644 (19013). 28 Reed v. Fain 145 So.2d 858 (Fla. 1962), M. Sawyer v. itlodra!! 286 So.2d 610 (4th Fla. DCA t9i73)), cut_ denied,: 297 So.2d 562 (Fla. 1974) _ . 2C,.. 25° Shelter v. C'itt' of Pensacola 112 Fla. 584, 151 So. 53 (1933). ... ..... 18' Smith Bros. v. Williams 100 Fla. 667, 131 So. 335 (1930) .... t6, 17 . 22 State ex rel. Ellis v. Gerhing 56 FIa. 603, 47 So. 353 (1908) ... State v. Mitchel! 188 So.2d 684 (4th Fla. DCA. 11966)t _ _ _ _ ., .... 10 Stone v. Town of ;Mexico Beach 348 So.2d 40. 43 (1st Fla. DCA. 19,77):. < 10s, 17 Thiesen v. Gulf F .t , l R r. Co. 75 Fta. 28. 78 So. 491 (1918) ... _ . _ .. _ .. ... 16 , 1 , 11, Mill,111111 A 1 '''1 ' 11' II 1,;I'� 11111' ■ 1111 i CITAi IONS OF AUTHORITIES (Continued) .Case Trustees of Tufts College r. Triple R. Ranch. Inc. 275 So.2d 521 (Fla. 1973) ll'ernle v. Bellcntead Der. Corp. 308 So.2d 97 (Fla. 1975) Wright v. Blocker 144 Fla. 428, 198 So. 88 (1940) . Federal City of El Paso r. Sinttnons 379 U.S. 497. 85 S.Ct. 577, 13 L.Ed.2d 446 (1965), rehearing denied, 380 U.S. 926 (1965) . Page. Curtis v. Loether 415 U.S. 189, 94 S.Ct. 1005, 39 L.Ed.2d 260 (1974) Er:no:nik v. City of Jacksonville 422 U.S. 205, 95 S.Ct. 2268, 45 L.Ed.2d 125 (1975) .............. Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell 290 U.S. 398, 54 S.Ct. 231, 78 L.Ed. 413 (1934) Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950) iv 1 I'' I • I■1■1111 11 IIIIIIII■IIIII IIIIIIiiiiuiIi■uI CITATIONS OF AUTHORITIES Case Shaw v. ;North Pe>utsylrania Ry. Co. 101 U.S. 557. 25 L.Ed. 892 (187% .....- L1 age 1!0f United States v. State of California 381 U.S. 139, 85 S.Ct. 1401. 85 L.Edi_ 140111' (1965), rehearing denied. 382 U.S. 8891(1965)1.,.. 1141 U.S. Civil Service Commission v. ;National Ass'n of Letter Carriers 413 U.S. 548. 93 S.Ct. 2880, 37 L.Ed.2d 796 (1973)............ : 118 United States Trust Co. of 4Vew• York v e:*':-:11efsey" U.S. , 97 S.Ct. l Ed.2d (1977) ......... _ ... ...... C49+ Twolithlet' r. City of Long Beach 333 F.2d 685 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 85 S.Ct. 195 (1965) McKnight ''. Broedell 212 F.Supp. 45 (E.D. Mich. 196&2) C4 2T, 24 United States v. 2.899.17 Acres of Land. Etc_ 269 F.Supp. 903 (M.D. Fla. 1967) :._. 21.24 Other Jurisdictions State v. Zimring 566 P.2d 725 (Hawaii I977' ill!11!IIIIU,UIVl�I7II�,�.!';;1�1,,.�,��1 1111 Pll1111llu,l 11111111111 i i ('17.'tIONS OF .\U 1'IIORITIFS (Continued) I'agc Case 1111101,1 Statutes Florida Efficient L. A Handbook for More Simes. .:... .:4-3'1 cin 1961)1 ..... ... ... . s Chapter-7=12;;=� Conveyancing ( Florida Statute Case CITATIONS OF AUTHORITIES (Conti! d) (~'age 21, 23, T4�. Fla. Stat. §712.04 � :,: r:,:�:; i:- • ' -' • 26, 30 - Federal Title 43 United States Code § § 1301 et `s Title 43 United States Code § 1311 Textual Authorities American Law of Property §17.17 Barnett. Marketable Title Acts — Panacea or Pandemonium, 53 Cornell L.Rcv. 45 (1967) Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951) 1 Boyer, Florida Real Estate Transactions (1976) 92 C.J.S. 1024 (1955) Dickerson, The Interpretation and Application of Statutes (1975) Johnson, Purpose and Scope of Recording Statutes, 47 lowa L.Rev. 231 (1962) vi 'I I Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction (4th ed. 1973) 01,,r767.111;' 1191"I J lf� 1111.1111 111 iuiiuiiui TABLE OF CONTENTS Page STATEMENT OF THE CAST: STATEMENT OF THE FACTS QUESTION PRESENTED . it ARGUMENT THE CITY'S OWNERSHiP OF THE SUB- JECT LAND IS NOT EXTiNGUISH BY' 1 HI: MARKETABLE RECORD TITLES'. ACT. 1. Respondent's "Title.' Derives From a R'ild Deed Which Is Therefore Void. 2. Chapter 712 Does Not A ppl y To Wild Deeds. 6_ 1 (a) A Void Instrument Cannot Be Validated By The Passage of Time. (b) The Concerns Expressed By Mr. Harris Do Not Support The Applicability of Chapter) I-E 3 712. (c) The inapplicability of The Act To Wild Deeds Is Supported By Textual Authorities. ... 13, (d) Even If The Act Applied to Void instru- ments, The City's Ownership Would Not Be Ex 3-1 tinguished. viii ,I1 II TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)' 3. . is Interpreted Below. The .act F. Urrcotr,- r 201 stitntionctl. (a) The Act As Interpreted Below Con- stitutes A Deprivation of Property Without Due L°-t=-iC6 Process (h) Retroactive Application Of The Act l'6- Violates Due Process 17 (c) The Act Should Be Construed To Avoid 17_18 Unconstitutionality. (d) Chapter 712 As interpreted Below Results In An Unconstitutional Taking of 1$ Property Without Just Compensation. (e) The Act As Interpreted Below Is An Unconstitutional impairment of Contract. 1.4 20 4. Respondents Cite Nothing To Support The Holdings of the Courts Below That Chapter 712 Extinguishes The C'itr'.s Ownership. As .`I'n Agency of The State, of This Sovereignty Lund. 20-26 5. The Trial Court Improperly Made a Factual 1 7-1 9 Determinutiun of Estoppel. ` � Ri a,ul ,�i,j !II! i 11 111 1111111111111111111 11 111 11111111 1111111111 111111 111 11111111111111 CONCLUSION OF ('ONTEN"I'S (Continued) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ., Page in the %yreme Court of 3fturiba CASE NO. 51,775 CITY OF MIAML a Florida municipal corporation„ Petitioner. Vs. ST. JOE PAPER COMPANY,. a Florida corporation: SOUTHEAST PROPERTIES, INC., a Florida corporation; EIUGH E. MATHESON, JR., individually; and SALLY S. DOMMERICEI, formerly Sally S. Matheson, individually, Respondents. PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF STATEMENT OF THE CASE' • The decision of the court below has now been reported. City of Miami v. St. Joe Paper Co.. 347 So.2d 622 (3d Fla. DCA 1977). 'The abbreviations used in Petitioner's Main Brief will be continued herein. f9 STATEMENT OF THE FACTS Petitioner agrees with Respondents Southeast Proper- ties. Inc.. and Sall}' S. Dommerich. that the facts with respect to all Respondents are the same as those with respect to St. Joe. cwccpt that the Respondents other than St..loc claim by deeds from St. Joe subsequent to 1944. and that the "yacht basin" is claimed only by St. Joe. See Amended Complaint. ' ' 14. 15. App. 78-79. u 1I1 lb IIIIIU■U QUESTION PRESENTED ' ► WHETHER IT \VAS ERROR TO DIVEST THE CITY OF ITS SBIDRANT RETROS OF SOVEREIGNTY EC- TIVI: VALIDATION OF a WILD DEED. A 1„,„,01, ,,,,,,.,,,,,,4,,,„,„„ h ININ,1,,, rl ■ 11IIIIIIIIIII III i 1111 1 • i ARGUMENT NT THE C'ITY'S OWNERSHIP 01- THE SUB- JECT LAND 1S NOT 1.XTINGUiSHED BY THE MARKETABLE RECORD TiTLES ACT. 1. Respondent's "Title" Derives From a Wild Deed Which i.s Therefore Void. 2. Chapter 712 Does Not Apply To 11'ild Deeds. (a) .\ Void instrument Cannot Be :- Validated By The Passage of Time. (b) The Concerns Expressed by Mr. Harris Do Not Support The Applicability of Chapter 712. (c) The inapplicability Of The Act To Wild Deeds is Supported 13 Textual Authorities. (d) Even if The Act Applied to Void instru- ments, The City's Ownership Would Not Be Ex- tinguished. 3. ;1s Interpreted Below. The ,•let Is Uncon- stitutional. (a) The Act As interpreted Below Con-. stitutes A Deprivation of Property Without Due Process. (b) Retroactive Application Of The Act Violates Due Process. 4 iii uu■iiiii■■i11■1 1 'I I I II II II, (c) The Act Should Be Construed To Sioid Unconstitutionality. (d) Chapter 712 As Interpreted Below Results In An Unconstitutional Taking of Property Without .lust Compensation. (e) The Act As Interpreted Below is An Unconstitutional Impairment of Contract. 4. Respondents Cite Nothing to Support The Holdings of the Courts Below That Chapter 71: Extinguishc'.c The ('ity'.s Ownership, .'ls :In Agency of The State, o/ This Sovereignty Land. 5. The Trial Court Improperly Made a Factual 1)eter►nination of Estoppel. Marealtil I IIUI�I I!IIII I iI,'1!lpIII ICI111 �!� f lil1111111 , 1 hI II ARGUMENT THE CITY'S OWNERSHIP OF TIIE SUB- JECT LAND iS NOT EXTINGUISHED BY - THE MARKETABLE RECORD TiTLES ACT. 1. Respondents' '.Title.. Derives Froin .-1 INN Deed Which Is Therefore I'oid Respondents base their claim to the land in question on a 1944 deed from EEC to St. Joe. FEC did not have record title to the land. When it purported to convey that land in 1944. the deed was wild and therefore void. St. Joe states that the 1944 deed is not wild because EEC held record title to the initial 14 acres "together with all and singular the riparian rights and submerged lands ap- pertaining thereto." If St. Joe's contention were correct. FEC would have. held record title by a wild deed to the Atlantic Ocean bot- tom. In fact and in law, the boilerplate language notwithstanding. EEC held record title to nothing more than the initial 14 acres. Land does not pass appurtenant to - land. Because Hagler owned only to the high water mark, there were no "submerged lands appertaining thereto." The boilerplate phrase is meaningless. 2. Chapter 712 Does Not Apply To Wild Deeds (a) A Void Instrument Cannot Be Validated By The Passage of Time •ii■ii■iui ■.1Il St. Joe in its brief distorts the City's argient, the law of property, and this Court's holdings in iTT Rayonier. Inc. v. Wadsworth. 346 So.2d 1004 (Fla. 1977), and ;tlarshall v. Hollywood. Inc.. 236 So.2d 114 (Fla. 1970), in trying to defend the alchemy performed by the courts below in breathing life into a wild deed. The courts below have held that St. Joe's wild deed has ripened into good title by the mere passage of time. St. Joe argues that this result is supported by atarshall and iTT R'ayonier. `either case is on point. ;A wild deed is one purporting to convey land to which the grantor did not have title. Because the grantor did not have tide. the deed does not appear in the "chain of title" — i.e.. the true owner of the land cannot discover the deed: by searching the grantor/grantee indices. Thus the deed does not convey notice to the true owner. and is void.= St. Joe and Nir. Harris' argue that the basis for divesting a feeholder is the feehoider's "neglect" in failing to protect his ownership from competing claims. But a fee - holder cannot he negligent in failing to protect his ownership from a claim of which he had no notice. Such "neglect" cannot form the basis for title in a void ..competing claim." See. e.g.. City of Miami v. Benson, 63 So.2d 916, 923 (Fla. 1953): 'Reed v. Fain, 145 So.2d 858 (Fla. 1962); Poladian v. Johnson, 85 So.2d 140 (Ha. 1956); Wright v. Blocker. 144 Fla. 428. 198 So. 88 (1940); Braddy & Ilale Fishery Co. v. Thomas. 93 Fla. 326. 112-So. 55 (1927): American Law of Property § 17.17. 'See n. i 1, infra. 7 11111101,11,111111111111,1.111111 11' hill i IIu ■ "Life - nnot be breathed into a void contract [merelylhecause the completion of the void con- tract would render a useful purpose in ac- complishing desired ends or because it is ex- pedient.' `either Marshall nor ITT Raronier involved a wild• deed. Marshall held that the Act could extinguish ownership in favor of a root of title arising out of a forged - deed — in such a case the forgery appears. albeit • fraudulently, within the same record chain of title by which the true owner claims. ITT Ravonier held that the Act could extinguish the remaindermen's interest in favor of a root of title whereby the life tenant purported to convey fee simple to herself and another as tenants in common. Again. the root of title appears in the same record chain. in both cases. the plaintiffs had notice of the competing claims, by virtue of the fact that the claims appeared in their respective chains of title — i.e.. they were discoverable by a search of the grantor/grantee indices. No Florida case holds that Chapter 712 can extinguish property ownership in favor of a stranger to the title. The City in its main brief argued that the Act should not apply to wild deeds, that the Act could not con- stitutionally apply to wild deeds. and that the Act by its terms did not apply to wild deeds. Although ITT Rayonier does use language which appears to be contrary to the statutory construction arguments advanced by the City in 'See also Smith Bros. v. Williams. 100 Fla. 667. 131 So. 335. 337 (1930) (subsequent legislation cannot validate an act void ab initio: legislation cannot "breathe life into a corpse."). 8 I_I MIN its main brief.` the controversy there was of su Ott nature as not to he preclusive of a clarification of that case's actual holding. This Court should now hold that a deed which is "void" in the strict sense, i.e., outside the record chain of title, does not "affect title" and cannot he validated by Chapter 712. A void instrument is "nugatory and ineffec- tual so that nothing can cure it.' Black's Law Dictionary. p. 1745 (4th ed. 195 l ). A void deed is not a recorded instru- ment affecting title.' Recording statutes themselves drastically depart from the common law rule that even a bona fide purchaser takes no better title than his transferor had.' A purported con- veyance of more than the transferor had may in certain cir- cumstances create good title. if the instrument is recorded within the chain of title; the true owner has notice of this competing claim, and he may be precluded from successful challenge by his own inaction in the face of notice. Thus the improper conveyance is merely "voidable" and may be cured. The same is not true of a deed outside the chain of title. which imports no notice and is therefore not merely voidable but void. 'The court in ITT Rcn•unier quoted with approval he �13 urth th FlaD.istrict DC Courts opinion in Marshall v. Hollywood. Inc.. 224. A 1969): "'In this broad sense. even a void instrument of record' affects' land titles by casting a cloud or a doubt thereon.' 224 So.2d at 1010. ^See n. 2, supra. 'See generally. Johnson, Purpose and Scope of Recording Statutes, 47 Iowa L.Rev. 231 (1962). i 1111 92 C.,r:` 1024-1025 (1955) states the distinction as fol- lows: "[T]he word `void' implies an act utterly of no ef- fect, and, in its most unlimited sense, implies an act of no effect at all, and a nullity ab initio.. . . On the other hand. a `voidable' act may be cured by passivity, ratification. or acquiescence.' This Court has held that a voidable deed (a forged deed in Marshall: a deed purporting to enlarge the grantor's es- tate from a life estate to a fee simple in ITT Ravonlier) may be cured by Chapter 712. The plaintiffs in those cases had legal notice of the adverse claims recorded within their respective chains of title. A wild deed, on the other hand, "hung out in the air like Mahomet's coffin,' cannot be validated by Chapter 712. Such a retroactive validation would be inconsistent with the basic principles of property law" and with the constitutional protections of vested property rights.'' "Poladian v. Johnson. 85 So.2d 140. 141 (Fla. 1956). "See Stone v. Town of Mexico Beach, 348 So.2d 40 (4th Fla. DCA 1977): Ellis v. Brown. 77 So.2d 845. 847 (Fla. 1955) ("statutes are to he construed in reference to the principles of the common law: fo, it is not to be presumed that the legislature intended to make any innovation upon the common law further than the case absolutely required."). Gonzales v. City of Belle Glade. 287 So.2d 669. 670 (Fla. 1973): State v. Nlitchell. 188 So.2d 684, 688 n.11 (4th Fla. DCA 1966); Johnson v. State, 178 So.2d 724, 728 (2d Fla. DCA 1965): see also Shaw v. North Pennsylvania R. Co.. 101 U.S. 557. 565. 25 L.Ed. 892 (1879). "See n. 17. infra. 10 111111111111111111 (h) The Concerns Expressed By Mr. Hat. Do Not Support The Applicability Of Chapter 712" Mr. Harris's expressions concerning the history of Chapter 712. though somewhat tinged with hyperbole,' may he essentially correct, hut are totally irrelevant to this case. The City does not quarrel with the fact that the Act is an attempt to deal with a legitimate prohlem. Bura more accurate description of the problem would he "pesky,' rather than "fundamental." The problem of technical er- rors and "stale claims" can hardly serve as a basis for dis- regarding constitutional protections of property rights, which are. by definition, fundamental. 'The brief is self-styled a "Brief of Amici Curiae for and' on behalf of the Florida Bar." The "Florida Bar" in this case is the executive council of one sec- tion. energized by the written suggestions of St. Joe's counsel that St. Joe's position should be supported. The brief is nor filed "for and on behalf of the Florida Bar." It is subject to some question that the pre-I963 life of Florida citizens or even "title lawyers" 'whatever they may bet was really the "intolerable burden" of one conveyancing after another "fraught with danger." as Mr. Harris sug- gests. 1111 II 11 i 1 Mr. I...iris. s "history" of Chapter 712 accurately omits any legislative intent to resolve conflicts between two separate chains of title to the same property, one traceable to the sovereign and one traceable only to a wild deed." The Act's purpose is to remove clouds on title from fees simple. The purpose is not to extinguish fees simple. A fee simple does not cloud a non-existent title." �n authority heavily relied upon both by Mr. Harris and by St. Joe ac- curately expresses the real purpose of curative legislation. "It is inevitable that minor errors appear in recorded instruments. for human nature is not infallible. Thus there may he variations in the names of parties, failure to indicate the marital status of gran- tors. failure to comply with the precise requirements of the statute concerning the form of acknowledgements, and many other devia- tions from a standard of absolute perfection.. . . There are also many facts necessary to a marketable title which are essentially ex- trinsic. but which are commonly only recited on the record. Thus if the recorded deed recites that the grantor is a single man. or that his wife is W. who joins in the conveyance. these recitals are not conclusive. Vet the title examiner. as a practical matter must rely on them, and • will rarely investigate the actual facts. The great need is for some legislative device to reduce the namb.r of extrinsic facts which must be considered by the title examiner.. . .Asa practical matter. the only property interests sshich are generally marketable are fees sim- ple absolute. leases for years. and fees simple subject to such leases. An future interest which is to take effect in possession at an uncer- taro time. whether it be technically vested or not. is not readily marketable. Nor is the present interest subject to such future in- terests marketable. L. Simes. a tlandhook for More Efficient Conveyancing. 33-36 (1961). See also Barnett. Marketable Title Acts — Panacea or Pandemonium. 53 Cornell L.Rev. 45 (1967). "Before Chapter 712 was conceived, principles of law were developed to prevent a lax or negligent feeholder from inequitably restricting the free alienability of realty — e.g., adverse possession and title by tax deeds. Chapter 712 was not enacted to extend such doctrines. The Act expressly exempts owners in possession and those on the tax rolls. If upheld. the decisions below would mean that a record feeholder not in possession. but against whom a successful claim of adverse possession cannot be made, is nevertheless subject to divestiture on the basis of a wild deed. 12 III A statute enacted in the interests of ..1.11 security should not be construed to divest a feeholder in favor of a wild deed. (c) The Inapplicability Of The Act To Wild Deeds Is Supported By Textual Authority Making the accusation of misuse of 1 Boyer, Florida Real Estate Transactions. r 14.14-11 (1976), "[A]ny interest reflected in the root or in the recorded chain in that time, will have to be checked out hack to its source." St. Joe asserts this "clearly" only refers to those interests enumerated in y7I2.03. St. Joe offers no support for this. position. In fact, the December, 1976 supplement to this text states, citing Marshall v. Hollywood. that "a root of title may arise out ()la forged or a wild deed, but apparently a forged deed itself cannot serve as a root of title" (At 78, emphasis supplied). The conclusion is clear: a title searcher finding a root of title at least 30 years old, wanting to assure the marketability of any interests, must determine that the grantor of that interest himself had title. The root must he "checked out back to its source.' (d) Even If The Act Applied To Void Instru- ments, The City's Ownership Would Not Be Extinguished The City has contended throughout this litigation that a void deed has no legal effect, even under Chapter 712. If this position were rejected, however, the City's ownership has been reaffirmed, as a matter of law, by a "title transac- tion" (as Respondents would have the Court define them) 13 I !1 i ■ i 11111111011111111 — for in 19.1 the United States quit -claimed its interests in this property to the City of Miami.'` 3. .•is Interpreted Below. Thc' Act Is Uneon- • Stitutiuncll (a) The Act As Interpreted Below Constitutes A • Deprivation Of Property Without Duc • Process Respondents assert that the constitutionality of: - Chapter 712 must be decided on the basis of a "balancing of - interests." St. Joe portrays those interests to he balanced as (a► the States interest in title security, and (h) the burden of re -recordation. in fact, the interests "to he weighed" against title security would not he the burden of re - recordation, but would he the resulting divestiture of vested property interests. -13 Hinted States Code j131I, 67 Stat. 30 (stay 22. 1953): 'la) It is determined and declared to he in the public interest that tl► title to and ownership of the lands beneath navigable waters %%Ain the boundaries of the respective states. and the natural resources within such (ands and waters. and (2) the right and power to manage. administer, lease. develop, and use the said lands and natural resources all in accordance with applicable state law he. and they are, subject to the provisions hereof, recognt ed, confirmed. es- ruhlohed, tested in and assigned to the respective states or the persons who were on June 5. 1950. entitled thereto under the law of the respectne states in which the land is located, and the respective grantees . . or successors in interest theren/.'• (emphasis supplied( See United States %. State of California, 381 U.S. 139, 85 S. Ct. 14(11. 85 L.Fd.:' 1401 (1965). holding that the Submerged Lands Act. 43 United States Code 1301. et seq., is in effect a quit -claim deed from the United States of sub- merged coastal lands. Twombley %.City of Long Beach. 333 F.2d 685 (9th Cir. 1964), holds thata City to which the State conveyed submerged lands subject to a public trust did not acquire such lands free of the trust. 14 St. Joe argues that this possibility of c,stiture is rendered irrelevant by the notion that all persons having record title to real estate in 1963 had "constructive notice" that they had to file a notice of their ownership or be sub- jected to divestiture within two years. This legal fiction of constructive notice has no talismanic quality. Due process requires notice "such as one desirous of actually informing. . .might reasonably adopt to accomplish it." Mullane v. Central !Hanover Bank Trust Co.. 339 U.S. 306, 315, 70 S.Ct. 652. 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950). Due process is not satisfied by presuming that the enactment of Chapter 712 gave notice to property owners that they must re-record their ownership or have it divested in favor of a wild deed, of which — as a matter of Florida law — they did not have notice. Properly applying the Act only to deeds other than wild deeds, holders of property interests could be deemed to have notice of conflicting claims duly recorded. Here, however. the courts below would extinguish the City's es- tate before it had notice of the conflicting claim: "The recordation of void . . . deeds is legally in- sufficient to convey notice and affords no protec- tion to the claimant thereunder." Wright v. Blocker, 144 Fla. 428, 198 So. 88, 90 (1940). This Court holds that recording of a wild deed is not notice of a claim to property., a wild deed is one executed by a stranger to the record ia�rly. Johnson, gSout tn So.hd 140,e air 1ike 141 Mahomet's coffin.- (Fla. 1956). is 1I' 111 • 11E0111 The '4 conveyance was a wild deed in 1944, and can- not be made valid by subsequent legislation. An act cannot "breathe life into a corpse." Smith Bros. v. Williams. 100 Fla. 667. 131 So. 335. 337 (1930). St. Joe argues that the City in fact had notice of St. Joe's claim." This argument is both incorrect factually and irrelevant. The question is not whether the City in fact had notice. The question is whether the ;Net as construed below provides the notice required by due process. (h) Retroactive Application Of The Act Violates Due Process St. Joe and Mr. Harris respond to the City's argument that the retroactive application of the Act renders it uncon- stitutional by citing cases upholding retroactive application of statutes of limitation. The distinction between Chapter 712 and statutes of limitation. which St. Joe and Mr. Harris emphasize in the introductory portions of their briefs. is crucial. Retrospective legislation is invalid " . . . when a new obligation or duty is imposed or an additional disability is established in con- nection with previous transactions." 'Hut nothing has been alleged which would charge the City with such' notice. The recordation of a wild deed did not charge the City. The filing and - acceptance of a plat did not charge the City. The payment of taxes did not, charge the City. See Poladian v. Johnson. h5 So.2d 140 (Fla. 1956). w'ernle v. Hellcmead Dev. Corp., 308 So.2d 97 (Fla. 1975): Thiescn v. Gulf h&A Ry. Co.. 75 Fla. 28, 7ti So. 491 (1917). In this regard, see also the Amended Complaint. subparagraph f of the Prayer for Relief. App. 88. Furthermore, the event relied upon by St. Joe as importing notice to the City, i.e., the acceptance of a plat, did not occur until 1949, less than 30 years before the City's Complaint. See Amended Complaint *16, App. 79. 16 Stone v. Town o/. rttexieo Beach. 348 So.2d 40;(I st Fla. DCA 1977), citing McCord v. Smith. 43 So.2d 704, 709 (Fla. 19501 (emphasis supplied).' Retroactive application of statutes of limitation do not impose a new hurden—all claimants were already required to file suit to enforce their claims. However, prior to the enactment of Chapter 712, landowners were not required to re-record their interest to preserve their ownership. Now, according to the Third District's interpretation of Chapter 712, they are so re- quired. If landowners are unaware of this new retroactive requirement, they are subject to divestiture. This result can- not he constitutional.'' (c) The Act Should Be Construed To Avoid Un- constitutionality Mr. Harris argues that the City is not a "person' within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. and thus cannot assert the unconstitutionality of Chapter 712 as applied. The argument is irrelevant to this case. 'McCord is followed in Trustees of Tufts College v. Triple R. Ranch, Inc.. 275 So.2d 521, 525 (Fla. 1973) ("a statute should not he given retrospective ef- fect when it jeopardties the validity of the statute.") See also Creary v. Estate of Cream. 33h So.2d 26 (1st Fla. DCA 1976): In re Estate of Jeffcott, 186 So.2d 80 (2d Fla. DCA 1966). Cf. Smith Brothers v. Williams, 100 Fla. 667, 131 So. 335, 337 (193() (void legislation cannot he validated by subsequent legislation: legislation cannot, by subsequent act. "breathe life into a corpse."). "In Biltmore Village v. Royal. 71 So.2d 727 (Fla. 1954). a statute cancel- ling all reverter provisions in plats or deeds which had been in effect more than 21 years was held unconstitutional as an impairment of contract. Mr. Harris seeks to distinguish this by saying that commencing a lawsuit is an intolerable hurden. while filing a notice under Chapter 712 is not. This distinction finds no support in Biltnwre. The case is more properly explainable by reference to Mc- Cord. Retrospective legislation imposing a new obligation or duty to preserve a vested right is unconstitutional. I!7 Iq'.!III�IIIIII11AlIi! i "i'his i.. A a case where the City has brought suit to en- join state action. Unlike She/by v. ('itt• of Pensacola. 112 Fla. 584. 151 So. 53 (1933). the City is not challenging a statute dealing specifically with the City. The City is saying simpIN that Chapter 712 cannot he construed to mean what the trial court and the Third District held it to mean —if the Act did mean that, it would he unconstitutional. It is elementary that statutes should be construed to ,Void un- constitutionality.'" Surely Respondents do not suggest a double -standard of the Act: it means one thing as to cities and another as to private parties. (d) Chapter 712 As Interpreted Below Results In :\n Unconstitutional Taking of Property Without .lust Compensation St. Joe and Mr. Harris fail to respond in any way to the City's argument that the decisions below are an uncon• - stitutional "taking" of property. This failure is not inadver- tent. It is a necessary concession of the point by silence. •1 mhart Corporation Brantley, 257 So.2d 273, 275 (3d Fla. DCA 1972) ('"courts gill eserct.e judicial restraint to avoid declaring a statute uncon- stitutional, and gill give it a construction, if reasonable, tthich would preserve the statute...): 2.\ Sand., Sutherland Statutory Construction §45.1 I (4th F.d. 197 3)1-the fact that one among alternative constructions could involve serious constitutional difficulties is reason to reject that interpretation in favor of another."). see also I1rrnornik v. City of Jacksonville. 422 U.S. 205. 95 S.Ct. 2268, 45 1..I:d.2d 12_5 (1975): Curtis v. Loethor, 415 U.S. I fi9.94 S.Ct. 1005, 39 L1:d.2d 2o0 (1974). 1..S. Civil Service Commission v. National ,\s n of 1 etter Carriers. 413 1--S. 5-0s, 93 S.Ct. 2850, 37 1..1'd.2d 796 (1973). .1 he result urged by Mr. I Iarris is that even if Chapter 712 as interpreted helo s is unconstitutional as applied to "persons." it is not unconstitutional as applied to the City — leaving a general act applicable only to cities. Such a position is untenable. The fact that Mr. Ilarris resorts to this argument betrays the impossibility of reconciling the interpretation of Chapter 712 rendered by the courts below with cnrstitutional protections of vested property rights. 18 1 1111 111111I11.II11IIIIII IIIu■1 .uII (e) The Act As Interpreted Below Is An Uri;.t- stitutional impairment Of Contract St. Joe and Nlr. Harris cite C'itr n/ El Paso v. Sint- mon.t.. 379 11.S. 497, 85 S.Ct. 577. 13 L.Ed?d 446 (1965) and Home Building & Loan ."l.ss n v. Blaisdell. 290 U.S>. 398. 54 S.Ct. 231, 78 L.Ed. 413 (1934). as supporting their argument that Chapter 712 is a reasonable exercise of the police power and thus not violative of the contracts clauses of the federal and Horida Constitutions. Both of these cases. and the Contracts Clause in general. were discussed extensively by the United States Supreme Court in United States Trust Co. of Nov York v. tie►t•Jersey. 97 S.Ct. 1505 (1977). The plaintiffs in that case challenged a New Jersey statute repealing a statutory cove- nant made in 1962 that had limited the ability of the New York and New Jersey Port Authority to subsidize rail pas- senger transportation from revenues and reserves. The court held that this repeal was prohibited by the Contracts Clause. In discussing Simmons and Blaisdell, the court stated: "Both of these cases eschewed a rigid application of the Contracts Clause to invalidate state legisla- tion. Yet neither indicated that the Contracts Clause was without meaning in modern con- stitutional jurisprudence. or that its limitation on state power was illusory. Whether or not the protection u/ contract rights comports with cur- rent views ul wise public policy, the Contracts Clause remains a part of our written con- stitution." 97 S.Ct. at 1515 (emphasis supplied). t9 pll 111 111'11 111111 i 1I!II 1 i 11111111 1111 The urt responded to the argument that the repeal was a valid exercise of the police power in the interest of mass transportation, energy conservation, and environmen- tal protection: "Vet the Contracts Clause limits otherwise legitimate exercises of state legislative authority, • and the existence of an important interest is not always sufficient to overcome that limitation.. . Moreover. the scope of the state's reserved power - depends on the nature of the contractual relationship with which the challenged law con- flicts. 97 S.Ct. at 1517. The Court concluded that the statute could not stand if there were available less drastic alternatives: ". . . it cannot he said that total repeal of the covenant was essential: a less drastic modification would have permitted the contemplated plan without entirely removing the covenant's. limitations. . . 97 S.Ct. at 1522. The interpretation of Chapter 712 rendered by the courts below is clearly not necessary to achieve title. security. 4. Respondents Cite Nothing To Support The Holdings Of. The Courts Below That Chapter 712 Extinguishes The City's Ownership, As 20 n 11111111 ■■111IIIIII1 II IIIIII III i 1111111 1111 IIII■IIIIuI 1,M11IuI■■ I. „An Agency O:/ The State, O'r'hi:s Sovereignty Land Chapter 712 expressly exempts from its provisions: "any right, title or interest of the United States, Florida or any of its officers, hoards. commis- sions, or other agencies reserved in the patent or deed by which the United States. Florida or any of its agencies parted with title... Fla. Stat. §7I2.04. It has been held that the Act can in some instances ex tinguish governmental ownership of land. hut only that which has been conveyed away from the State without - reservation. Odour v. fcltona Corporation. 341 So.2d 977 (Fla. 1977):.Satt_t•e'r v. atodrall. 286 So.2d 610 (4th Fla. UCA 1973). It has not been and cannot be held that the Act extinguishes governmental ownership of land which has never left the State or its agencies in the first instance. The State has parted ss ith title only once — conveying it to its agent the City of Miami "for municipal purposes only." The City of Miami has never parted with title. The City's title cannot he extinguished by the Act. The land in question is sovereignty land. The State of Florida accepted this land from the United States, upon ad- mission to the Union. subject to a trust for the benefit of the people of the State. The State cannot alienate this land in a manner incon- sistent with this public trust. A general act, such as Chapter 712, cannot be construed to divest sovereignty lands in favor of a wild deed. 21 II pI� II I i i m the prior purported State conveyance were for some reason voidable —St. Joe is charged with notice of the navigability of 13isca , ne Bay. In this case there is not even such a purported con— veyance out of the State. The State and its agencies have never parted with title. The City's ownership is therefore protected From extinguishment by 1=1a. Stat. ti712.O4.'i St..loe and Nir. Harris argue that the express language in the legislative grant limiting use by the City to "municipal purposes only" does not constitute a reserva- tion by the State within the exception in § 712.04. 1'his argu- ment is irrelevant as well as incorrect." Mr. Harris urges 1t..luc also misreads Justice Sundberg's dissenting opinion that the Act cannot extinguish the Slate's interest in sovercifrnty lands. St Joe refers to Justice Sundherg's point that the effect of apphmg Chapter 712 to the facts in %vas to alienate submerged land held by the Trustees of the Internal Impronenicnt fund absent the requisite s:tteguard. of statutory notice and hear- ing. St Joe then offers the following distinction: "In the case at bar. by virtue of the fact that the conteyance from the Mate to the C.ity of Miami was caused by the legislature's enacting a special statute. such requisite safeguards of public notice and hearing obviously were met." (St.Joe's brief. page 8.) The City would respectfully submit that St. Joe has missed the point. No one. certainly not the City of Miami, is challenging the conveyance of sovereignty lands from the State to the City of Justice Sundherg's point is that it is constitutionally impermissible for the State to convey submerged lands away from the State without the requisite safeguards. It therefore cannot he held that state legislation li.c.. Chapter 712) by implication extinguishes the ownership of the State's agent in this sovereignty land. The piracy of sovereignty land through recurdatiun of a wild deed is wholly inconsistent with the public in- terest. :: the State of Florida is not directly in ,his litigation protecting its property interests in this land. The Court is not called upon to determine what rights and remedies the State of Florida would have against St. Joe if the deci- sion of the courts below is upheld. However, acceptance of the St. Joe and Har- ris position would result in the alienation of an inalienable trust. See Flayes v. Bowman. 91 So.2d 795 (Fla. 1957); Pembroke v. Peninsular Terminal Co.. 108 Fla. 46, 146 So. 249 (1933); United States v. 2,899.17 Acres of Land. Etc..269 F.Supp. 903 (MLD. Fla. 1967). See also, McNight v. Broedcll, 212 F.Supp. 45 (E.1). Much. 1962). 24 111111111111111111N 11111111111111 111111111111111111111 11111 1111111111111111111111111111111111MIN 1111 Savvier t'. illodrnll, 286 So.2d 610 (4th Fla. DC.A 1973), cert. denied, 11)7 So.2d 562 (Fla. 197.4) as support. The court in that case held that there is no implied reset vation when the State conveys sovereignty land. But Sawyer did nut involve a conveyance by the State with an express use restriction. The importance of the use restriction in the present case is that it establishes that the City in its ownership- of this land is acting as an agency of the State. St. ,toe at- tempts to distinguish the agency cases cited in the CityF's main brief h., arguing that they . . . are nut in point because they relate to governmental functions that have been expressly delegated to cities for implementation and do not pertain to proprietary or land title matters where - cities compete with their citizens and taxpayers on equal basis under the law.— (St.Joe's brief, page 13.) Mr. Harris adopts the same argument. The legislative grant "for municipal purposes only" preserves the public trust in which the State held the lands, and reflects the legislative realization of the limitations on its power to alienate these lands. The City in its ownership of this land is performing a governmental function express- ly delegated to it by the sovereign.' Sec Alhury v. Central and Southern Florida Flood Control District, 99 So.2d 248. 252 (3d Fla. DCA 1957): —Government exists for functional purposes. All during the course of the nation's history, governmental functions have been transferred - from one agency to another. To have a rule of construction which would obviate the transfer of functions from one agency to another would merely thwart all efforts to improve government." 25 i ii■ IIiIIIIIIiUIII 11101 ■ The )urt responded to the argument that the repeal was a valid exercise of the police power in the interest of mass transportation. energy conservation, and environmen- tal protection: "'Vet the Contracts Clause limits otherwise legitimate exercises of state legislative authority. and the existence of an important interest is not always sufficient to overcome that li►nitation.. . . :Moreover. the scope of the state's reserved power depends on the nature of the contractual relationship with which the challenged law con- flicts.- 97 S.Ct. at 1517. The Court concluded that the statute could not stand i there were available less drastic alternatives: ". . . it cannot he said that total repeal of the covenant was essential: a less drastic modification would have permitted the contemplated plan without entirely removing the covenant's limitations. . . 97 S.Ct. at 1522. The interpretation of Chapter 712 rendered by the courts below is clearly not necessary to achieve title security. 4. Respondents Cite Nothing To Support The Holdings Of The Courts Below That Chapter 712 Extinguishes The City's Ownership. As 20 Mil i1E1111iiill 111111111111 1111111111111111 1111 An Agency Of The State. O_I{tis Sovereignty land Chapter 712 expressly exempts from its provisions: "any right, title or interest of the United States, Florida or any of its officers, hoards, commis- sions. or other agencies reserved in the patent or deed by which the United States. Florida or any of its agencies parted with title." Fla. Stat. § 712.(t4. It has been held that the Act can in some instances ex- tinguish governmental ownership of land. hut only that which has been conveyed away from the State without reservation. Odom v. D'ltona Corporation. 341 So.2d 977 (Fla. 1977): Sawyer v. .tfodrall. 286 So.2d 610 (4th Fla. f)CA 1973). It has not been and cannot he held that the Act extinguishes governmental ownership of land which has never left the State or its agencies in the first instance. The State has parted with title only once — conveying it to its agent the City of :Miami "for municipal purposes only." The City of Miami has never parted with title. The City's title cannot he extinguished by the Act. The land in question is sovereignty land. The State of Florida accepted this land from the United States, upon ad- mission to the Union. subject to a trust for the benefit of the people of the State. The State cannot alienate this land in a manner incon- sistent with this public trust. A general act, such as Chapter 712, cannot be construed to divest sovereignty lands in favor of a wild deed. 21 UIIII III III IIIIIiIII IIO 111) "The state cannot abdicate general control over the (ands under navigable vv-aters within the state. since such abdication would be inconsistent «ith the implied legal duty of the state to preserve and control such lands and the waters thereon and the use of them for the public good..' State ex rel. Ellis v. (ierhini,', 47 So. 353. 355 (Fla. 19O ). Nlindful of this public trust. Florida courts and others • ))ate scrutinized purported conveyances of sovereignty. lands. In Odom 1)eltona. this Court held that where the Trustees fttr the Intetn.tl Improvement Fund (Till:), under authority of the Swamplands,xct< purported to convey away sovereignty land «hose nature %vas such as not to im- port notice of navigability. the TI1F would he barred after 30 years by Chapter 712 1(01n challenging their oven conveyance. This Court said, however. that the result would he different "in the case of a large Lake. such as Lake Okec.hohce." In such a case. Chapter 712 would not preclude a challenge to the urauthorited conveyance. in 1-ntted Slates v. 2.) 49.17 Acres of Land. Etc.. 269 F Supp. 903 1.1a 19o-), the TI11 had purported to convey sovereignty lands at a tune when they had no such authority. [ he court held that the grantees thereby did not have title "If, by mistake or otherwise. sales or conveyances arc made by the i rustees (lithe Internal Improvement Fund of sovereignty lands . . . such sales and conveyances are ineffectual for lack of authority from the State. Sec also lints v. Bowman. 41 So.2d 795, 799 (Fla. 1957) ("Basically it is trust property and should he devoted to the fulfillment of the purposes of the Trust. to vvtt. the service of the people."): Pembroke v. Peninsular Terminal Co.. 108 F:a. 46. Ion So. 249 (Fla. 1933). t. Mcknight v Broedeli. 212 F.Supp. 45 (L.i). Mich. 1962): "The title of the state to submerged lands in the Great Lakes is impressed with it trust for the benefit of the public. The state has a duty to protect that trust and may not surrender the rights of the people thereto." 22 11111 111■I IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII IIII III II II II 111111 111 1111 111111 III in the instant case. the State has not even purported to coney away these sovereignty lands. Nevertheless, the courts helot, the language of §712.04 notwithstanding, have interpreted Chapter 712 to validate a wild deed and to extinguish governmental ownership in sovereignty lands. That this is not the last is made clear by this Court's opinion in Odom t. Deltaic: Corp., 341 So.2d 977 (Fla. 1977). That l:ame holds that —when the State conveys land which is not noticeably navigable to private citizens without reservation clt public rights —Chapter 712 applies. Justices Sundherg. Overton and England dissented, opining that the Act should not apply even in that situation. And Mr. Justice Boyd, writing for the Court, noted that the result ould he different "in the case of a large lake, such as Lake Okeechobee.- Governmental ownership of such land is not extinguished by Chapter 712. St. Joe misreads this Court's holding in Odom. argu- ing that because the State convened the land to the City in 1919 and St. Joe then took a wild, void deed to the same land in 1944. the City in 1975 could not quiet title. Odom sloes not support this. At most. Odom holds that if the City or State purported to convey property in 1944 to private grantees, State authorities cannot, by the terms of the Act, quiet title by proving that their predecessor authorities in 1944 acted without authority. When it conveys land the State is subject to the Act. But even this is subject to the im- portant exception discussed above ("notice of navigability.), which is studiously ignored by the briefs of St. Joe and Mr. Harris. Therefore, under Odom. even if the City or the State had purported to convey the lands in dispute to St. Joe, the City could nevertheless maintain an action to quiet title if 23 i 11111 11111111 III IN 1111111 IIIIIIIIIIIIII■IIIIIIIIIII 11111111111111 111111111111111111111111 ■ the prior purported State conveyance were for some reason voidable —St. Joe is charged with notice of the navigability of Biscayne Bay. in this case there is not even such a purported con- veyance out of the State. The State and its agencies have never parted with title. The City's ownership is therefore protected from extinguishment by Fla. Stitt. §712.04.'' St. Joe and fir. Harris argue that the express language in the legislative grant limiting use by the City to "municipal purposes only- does not constitute a reserva- tion by the State within the exception in § 712.0-I. This argu- ment is irrelevant as well as incorrect." Mr.- Harris urges Si Joe al•.a misreads Justice Sundhctg's dissenting opinion that the Act cannot extinguish the States interest in siwereienty lands. St .Joe refers to Justice Sundherg's point that the effect of;ipplxtng Chapter 712 to the facts in Oi„rr, a, to altcnate submerged land held by the Trustees of the Internal Ittthrouement 1-and absent the requisite safeguards of statutory notice and hear- ing. St Joe then offers the following distinction: "In the case at bar, by virtue of the fact that the comeyancc from the State to the City of Miami was caused by the legislature's enacting a special statute. such requisite safeguards of public notice and hearing obviously were met." (St. Joe's brief. page 8.) The City would respectfully submit that St. Joe has missed the point. No one. - iertatnly not the City of Miami, is challenging the conveyance of sovereignty • lands from the State to the City of Miami. Justice Sundherg's point is that it is constitutionally impermissible for the State to convey submerged lands way - frunt the State without the requisite safeguards. It therefore cannot he held that state Legislation (i.e . Chapter 712) by implication extinguishes the ownership of the Slate's agent in this sovereignty land. The piracy of sovereignty land through recordation of a wild deed is wholly inconsistent with the public in- terest. :; Die State of Florida is not directly in ',his litigation protecting its property interests in this land. The Court is not called upon to determine what rights and remedies the State of Florida would have against St. Joe if the deci- sion of the courts below is upheld. However, acceptance of the St..toc and Har- ris position would result in the alienation of an inalienable trust. See }(ayes v. Bowman, 91 So.2d 795 (Fla. 1957); Pembroke v. Peninsular Terminal Co.. 108 Fla. 46. 146 So. 249 (1933); United States v. 2.899.17 Acres of Land, Etc., 269 F.Supp. 903 (M.D. Fla. 1967). See also. McNight v. Brocdcll, 212 F.Supp. 45 (E.D. Mich. 1962). 24 .Satt•te_'r v. ;tfodrall, 286 So.2d 610 (4th Fla. DC A 1973), cert. denied. 297 So.2d 562 (Fla. 1974) as support. The court in that case held that there is no implied reset vation when the State conveys sovereignty land. But Sawyer did - nut involve a conveyance by the State with an express use restriction. The importance of the use restriction in the present case is that it establishes that the City in its ownership' of this land is acting as an agency of the State. St. Joe at- tempts to distinguish the agency cases cited in the City's stain brief h\ arguing that they . . are not in point because they relate to governmental functions that have been expressly delegated to cities for implementation and do not pertain to proprietary or land title matters where cities compete with their citizens and taxpayers on equal basis under the law." (St. Joe's brief, page 13.) Mr. Harris adopts the same argument. 'T'he legislative grant "for municipal purposes only" preserves the public trust in which the State held the lands, and reflects the legislative realization of the limitations on its power to alienate these lands. The City in its ownership of this land is performing a governmental function express- ly delegated to it by the sovereign., See Athury v. C cntral and Southern Florida Flood Control District, 9t) So.2d 24s, 252 (3d Fla. DCA 1957): "Government exists for functional purposes. All during the course of the nation's history, governmental functions have been transferred from one agency to another. To have a rule of construction which would obviate the transfer of functions from one agency to another would merely thwart all efforts to improve government." 25 I i i I I 111 Fatted wIuI this agency relationship, St. Joe and Mr. Harris irgue that because Chapter 712 at other points refers to "political subdivisions." and because other statutes use the word "municipalities." the exclusion of this term from §712.04 establishes that a political subdivision cannot be an agency of the State.' What the language of §712.04 in fact indicates is that the legislature did nut in- tend an all-inclusive list of governmental entities whose in- terests are protected. Such protection is determined by whether the entity is functioning as an agent of the State. As the case lax discussed in the Citv's main brief es- tablishes. a City, when performing a State function. is an agent of the State. The use restriction imposed by the State upon the City delegated to the City the State function of preserving the interest of the people of Florida in sub- merged lands. • t he leading mof.iern commentator on statutory construction puts this "expressio unis" argument in perspectite. "Soeral Latin maxims masquerade as rules of interpretation while doing nothing n,o:e. than describing results reached by other means. 1 he hest example is probably t1pressiu unius est etcfusiu afte•rius, µhigh is a rather elaborate, mysterious sounding, and anachronistic µat of describing the negative implication. Far from being a rule, it is no: cten lexicographically accurate. because it is simply not true. eci..crall!, that the mere express conferral of a right or privilege in one kihd of situation implies the denial of the equivalent right or prrile e in other kinds. Sometimes it does and sometimes it doe: not. and whether it does or does not depends on the particular cir- cumsti.r..cs of context. Without contcxival support. therefore. there is not e%en a mild presumption here. Accordingly. this maxim is at best a description. after the fact. of what the court has discovered from context " Dickerson, 1 he Interpretation and Application of Statutes. pages 234-235 (1975). And cf. Florida Statutes §20.03(I1) (1974) defining "agency" as "an of- ficial. officer, commission, authority, counsel, committee. department, division, bureau. board. section. or other unit or entitt of government.- [emphasis sup- plied] 26 5. The Trial Court Improperly .t•fade .1 tactual !)eterntination 0J Estoppel St. Joe contends that the trial court made no factual determination of estoppel. Judge Harvie Duval did indeed make the disclaimer quoted by St. Joe in its brief —the trial judge himself must have known that to rule on the basis of estoppel was reversible error. The trial judge nevertheless freely expressed his opinion on the issue. "TI IL COURT: Gentlemen, I frankly think that 712 is applicable. If it was not applicable, 1 think that the deeds and such in the past are good deeds, and probably the Act of 1922 Isicl cures that, and if all of that was not there, if anybody has ever been estoppcd or waived any rights —the City of Miami has been sitting here with this land having been filled hack in the 20's. i would have to take judicial knowledge that they have been getting taxes on all of it. all of this time. It is given or in- dicated as owned property. There has never been a protest of any kind. Under your argument, we could he trying this case 100 \'ears from now and say that the City owns some property. That is kind of like going hack to the Indians and Manhattan. C am going to dismiss it with prejudice." The implicit decision of estoppel is both procedurally infirm and substantively incorrect!' In State v. Zimnng. 566 P.2d 725 (Hawaii 1977), in quieting title in the state to land formed by a volcanic eruption extending the shoreline, the court held the state was not estopped by collecting taxes on the property and remain- ing silent when the land was leveled and landscaped. 27 Furthermore, the grantee of a wild deed may not he heard to argue that the true owner is estopped from clearing title. St. Joe must he charged with notice in 1944 that FEC did not own the land. and that the land was sovereignty land held by the City in trust for the people of Florida. This Court held in Price t'. Stratton. 45 Fla. 535, 33 So. 644. 647 (1903). "the rule applies only where the title is not equally open to the parties, and in favor of one who would be mislead by want of notice of the adverse right. It is essential to the application of the doctrine of estoppel that the party claiming the estoppel must have been not only destitute of knowledge of the true state of the title, but also of any convenient and available means of acquiring such knowledge. Where the condition of the title is known to both parties or both have the same means of ascertain- ing the truth. there is no estoppel. \11 of the Respondents took title to the City's kind before the enactment of Chapter 712. They were on notice of the City's ownership. They had no marketable record ti- tles act to rely on to believe that they had good title. There has been no reasonable reliance, only hope (or calculated risk). "[O]ne's own wrongful act ordinarily cannot serve as a basis of a claim of estoppel against another. and it can he applied as an estoppel against estop- pel.— 'Trice is follo«ed in Overstreet v. Bishop. 343 So.2d 958 (1st Fla. DC,\ 1977). 2g. i 111 111111■ IIIIII1111111IIII 11111 111111111111111111 Jefferson National Bank at Sunny Isles t'. Aro Dade County, 271 So.2d 207, 214 (3d Fla. DCA 1972?. Not only did the trial court reach an improper conclu- sion that the City is estopped to quiet title, the City was improperly denied the opportunity to plead and prove that the Respondents are estopped to rely on Chapter 712. 1 111 111 I II II i I I I CONCLUSION The City brought this suit to quiet title to sovereignty lands granted to it by the State in 1919. in 1944 Florida East Coast I lotel Corporation gave a deed to St. Joe pur- porting to convey the land to St. Joe. That deed was wild and therefore void. The courts below have held that the City's ownership is extinguished by the Nlarketahle Record Titles Act. That holding should he reversed. Chapter 712 was not intended and should not he con- strued to divest a feeholder in favor of a wild deed. Such a retroactive validation would he inconsistend with the basic principles of property law and with the constitutional protections of vested property rights. Nor was Chapter 712 intended to extinguish governmental ownership of sovereignty lands. Section 712.04 expressly exempts such ownership. Odom expressly preserves such interests. Florida became State under the condition that it hold such land in trust for the public. Neither it nor the City ever had the power or authority — by act or omission — to al- low others to steal the land. When those others were on legal (as well as, in all probability, actual) notice of the 11 public trusteeship of that land, both law and equ compel a ruling that the land belongs to the people. Respectfully submitted.. LAW OFFICES (GUY 13. BAILEY. SR. Attorneys for Petitioner Suite 1820, One Biscayne lower Two South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131 Guy B. Bailey. 1 • AERTIFICATE OF SERVICE WE IIERFI3Y CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing Petitioner's Reply Brief was mailed to Shutts & Bowen. 1000 Southeast First National Bank Bldg.. Miami. Honda 33131: Sibley, Levenson & Glaser. P.O. Bo‘ 390360. Miami Beach. Florida 33139: Steel, IIector & Davis. 1400 Southeast First National Bank 131dg., Miami, Florida 33131: and Russo, Van Doren & Allen, P.A.. 465 Ponce de I.eon Boulevard. Coral Gables. Florida 33147: this 29th day of August. 1977. , 1111111E11 1111111 111111111111 1111111 11 11 11 11111111111111INNIMEimmum i i i 11111111110 111 1 10 ■ 1111 111 111111111 iiiiii111 uuiii.l■u..1 i • iu the f4tupreme Cutrt ofoeia CASE NO. 5t, 775 CITY OF MIAMI, a Florida municipal corporation„ Petitioner, vs. ti'I'..1OE PAPER COMPANY.. a Florida corporation; SOUT1IEAST PROPERTIES, INC., a Florida corporation; I Ina!' E. NIATI I ESON, .1R.. individually; and SALLY S. UOMMERI('H, formerly Sally S. NIatheson, individually. Respondents. I'ETITIONER'S BRIEF ON THE. MERITS LAW OFFICES GUY R. BAILEY..JR. Attorneys for Petitioner 1820 One Biscayne Tower Miami, Florida a:il:ll 11111111 11 ■ I 11111111111111 III III III 11111111111 1111 11 111111 11 11 11 ■M CITATIONS OF AUTHORITIES Case Alden v. Pinney 12 Fla. 348 (1869) Banana River Props. v. City of Cocoa Beach 287 So.2d 377 (4th Fla. DCA 1974) ..... •. •.. • 3 Biltmore Village. Inc. u. Royal Biltmore Viltage; Inc. 71 So.2d 727 (Fla. 1954) 21, 24.27 Blankner v. City of Chicago . 26 504 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir. 1974) ..... Board of Com'rs. of Everglades Drainage Dist. v. Forbes Pioneer Boat Line 86 So. 199 (Fla. 1920), rev'd on other grounds, 23 258 U.S. 338 Board of Education v. Miles 207 N.E.2d 181 (N.Y. 1965), Brault v. Town of Milton 527 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1975) _.. ��-- Brickell v. Trammell, 36 82 So. 221 (Fla. 1919) •�•�4 - •-*4��4, - Broward v. Mabry 50 So. 826 (Fla. 1909) . _ .. 1.11 I Main I i 1111 1111 111111111111111111 111E111 111111111111111111111111111 ('ase Duck c. Mouradian. 100 tio.2d 70 (3d Fla. DCA 1958) Buck r. Triplett 32 Su.2d 753 (Fla. 1947) ........... Campbell v. Horne 3 ti0.2d 125 (Fla. 1941) ............... Chicago 13 & Q Ry. v. Chicago 166 U.S. 226, 17 S.Ct. 581, 41 L.Ed. 979 (1897) : rio of Miami V. Lewis 104 So.2d 70 (3d Fla. DCA 1958) Page 19 ('►auk V. Carlson 364 F.Supp. 24 (D. S.D. 1973) . Cornish r. Kinder Canal Co. 267 So.2d 625 (La. App. 1972) Cox t'. Holder 3•15 So.2d 846 (1st Fla. DCA 1977 C'reary c'. ('reary s Estate :338 ,o.2d 26 (1st Fla. DCA 1976) Croft v. Young 188 So.2d 859 (1st Fla. DCA 1966) . Empire State Insurance Co. v. Chafetz 302 F.2d 828 (5th Cir. 1962) �► Page Case Exchange National Bank v. Lawndate 243 N.E.2d 193 (Ill. 1968) ................ 13,. 14 Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Tharpe 179 So. 406 (Fla. 1938) ..... ---�- Hayes v. Bowman 91 So.2d 795 (Fla. 1957) ..... H.K.L. Realty Corporation v. Kirttey` 74 So.2d 876 (Fla. 1954) In Re Brown's Estate 117 So.2d 478 (Fla. 1960) ... . Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand 30:3 U.S. 95, 58 S.Ct. 443, 82 L.Ed. 685 (193&)1 2a Jefferson National Bank at Sunny Isles v. Metro Dade County 271 So.2d 207 (3d Fla. DCA 1972) cert. denied, 277 So.2d 536 37, 38 Kaufman v. City of Tallahassee 31 94 So. 697 (Fla. 19' L. C. Morris, Inc. v. Allison 277 So.2d 28 (3d Fla. DCA 1973),: appeal after remand, 309 So.2d 9 (3d Fla. DCA 1975) .... 36 Loeb v. City of Jacksonville _ 31 134 So. 205 (Fla. 1931) -- -- 19! 1 29 .�.. �. 29 pm" 11 Case 0 Mahood v. Bessemer Properties, Inc. 18 So.2d 775 (Fla. 1944) ....... !Hann V. (Goodyear T & R Co. 300 tio.2(1 6titi (Fla. 1974) ....... Marshall v. Hollywood, Inc. 236 So.2d 114 (Fla. 1970) Martin v. Busch 112 So. 274 (Fla. 1927) McConville v. Ft. Pierce Bank & Trust Co. 135 So. :392 (Fla. 1931) ............ _. McCord v. Smith 4:3 So.2d 704 (Fla. 1950) Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Nebraska 164 U.S. 40:3, 17 S.Ct. 130, 41 L.Ed. 489 (1896) Moyer v. Clark 72 So.2d 905 (Fla. 1954) Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co 3:39 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950)18,20 Murrison v. Fenstermacher 203 I'.2d 160 (Kan. 1949) 2 Odom v. Dcltona Corp. 341 So.2d 977 (Fla. 1977) iv :r =a5;li lk 111111III IIII III111111III Case 11111111111111 11 111111111111111 Patton v. Los Angeles 206 Cal. 662 (1929} 11 11 Pearce v. Cone 2 So.2d :360 (Fla. 1941)- . Pembroke v. Peninsular TerminaE' Ccr. 146 So. 249 (Fla. 19:33) 11111111111111111111111111111111.111 Poladian v. Johnson 85 So.2d 140 (Fla. 1956) Price v. Stratton 33 So. 644 (Fla. 1903) . Reed v. Fain 145 So.2d 858, 870 (Fla. 1962) Page 32 32: 38, Reid u. Bradshaw 29 302 So.2d 180 (1st Fla. DCA 19744 .. ....•.. • . Schneider u. Dist. of Columbia �6 117 F.Supp. 705 (D. D.C. 1953) _..__k-• -• Shavers u. Duval County .�4 7:3 So.2d 684 (Fla. 19541, . _ . � ......... • - _ ... . Smith Bros. v. Williams 131 So. 335 (Fla. 1930) .... . =w ."-••. -• 12, '20 Sotomura v. County of Hawaii '�6 402 F.Supp. 95 (D. Hawaii 19t15)) ...�.---.-.. v i i i Case State v. Black River Phosphate Company 13 So. 640 (Fla. 1893) State v. City of Auburndale 85 So.2d 611 (Fla. 1956) State Dept. of Highways v. Tucker 170 So.2d 371 (La. 1964) Thiesen v. Gulf, F & A Ry. Co. 78 So. 491 (Fla. 1918) Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward 17 U.S. 518, 4 L.Ed. 629 (1819) T.I.I.F. v. Claughton 86 So.2d 775 (Fla. 1956) 10, 32, 38 , Page 9 1 Turk v. Richard 31 47 So.2d 543 (Fla. 1950) Walton County v. Board of Public Instruction of Walton County 161 So.2d 45 (1st Fla. DCA 1964) Waterman v. Smith 94 So.2d 186 (Fla. 1957) Wernle v. Bellemead Development Corp. 308 So.2d 97 (Fla. 1975) West v. Town Lake Placid 120 So. 361 (Fla. 1929) vi 114 111111u1 A 1111111111111111111 IIIIIIIIIIIII 11 II 1 11 11 11 Case Whaley v. Wotring 225 So.2d 177 (1st Fla. DCA 1969).—..— Page 17 Wichelman v. Messner 1i3, I`5 83 N.V. 2d 800 (Minn. 1957) Wilson v. Kelley 17. 226 So.2d 123 (2d Fla. DCA 1969) ....»...�:��-- Wright v. Blocker 198 So. 88 (Fla. 1940) .... 12 Yamaha Parts Distributors, Inc. v. Ehrman K « 24, 2 316 So.2d 557 (Fla. 1975) - -- viu •11A OTHER AUTHORITIES 41 A.L.R.2d 1384 25 55 A.L.R.2d 554 1 Boyer Florida Real Estate Transactions §14.15 (1976) 14 Florida Constitution, Article I, 10 24 Florida General Laws, Ch. 791§ 2 (1856) (repealed) ("The Butler Act") 11, 36 Florida Statutes 6.01 9 Florida Statutes §20.03(11) (1974) 31 Florida Statutes Chapter 712 .. 3, 7, 12, 17, 18,19, 20, 21, 22, 2:3 29, 32, 33 Florida Statutes § 712.01(2) 14 Florida Statutes §712.01(3) 14 Florida Statutes §712.02 13, 14 Florida Statutes § 712.03(1) 1,47 Florida Statutes § 712.04 3, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34 'Model Marketable Record Titles Act 32 Session Laws of the State of Florida, Chapter 8305 (1919) 4, 33 111111111111111111111 111111 I 11 11111111111111 11 11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111m1 U.S. Constitution, Article I, §10,, CI.1 23,, 24 U.S. Constitution, Amendment XIV I8,, 26 . . . •f" 1 • 10111111 1111110111111 1111E1111111 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page. STATEMENT OF THE CASE STATEMENT OF THE FACTS ........ QUESTION PRESENTED «'HETHER 1'I' WAS ERROR TO DIVEST:. "I'HE ('I'I'Y OF ITS VESTED GRANT OF: SOVEREIGN"I'Y LAND BY RETROSPEC- TIVE VALIDATION OF A WILD DEED.... ARGUMENT WHERE FLORIDA GRANTED SUBMERGED SOVEREIGNTY LAND TO "I'HE (TI'Y. EXPRESSLY PRESERVING THE LAND'S PUBLIC CHARACTER BY USE RESTRICTION, IT WAS ERROR TO I)IVES1' THE CITY OF SUCH LANDS BY A('('ORI)ING RETROSPECTIVE VALIDITY To A WILD DEED TO A PURPORTED PRIVATE OWNER. 1. The Private Interests "Title" To The Land in Questiwz Derives From A Wild Deed Which Is Therefore Void. 2. 7'he Act Cannot Divest The City of Its Vested Property Rights 1'2 (a) Chapter 712 Does Not Apply To A Wild Deed. 9 x 1111111111111 1111111 11 111 1111111111.1111111111111111111 Page (h) A Wild Deed Is Not A "Root of Title" As Defined By The Act. 13 (c) The Inapplicability of the Act to=Wild Deeds Is Supported by Textual Authorities And By Decisions In Other Jurisdictions (d) Marshall v. Hollywood Does Not Hold The Act Applicable To Wild Deeds. 16 3. As Interpreted Below, The Act Is Uncon- stitutional 17 (a) The Act As Interpreted Below Deprives Vested Owners of Property Without Due Process of Law In Violation Of The Fourteenth Amendment. 18 (b) Retroactive Application Of The Act Deprives Vested Owners of Property Without Due Process of Law. 21 (c) As Interpreted Below, The Act Im- pairs The Obligations Of Contract. 23 (d) The Decisions Below Constitute An Unconstitutional "Taki -ig" Of Property . 25 (e) Other .Jurisdictions Hold Similar Legislation Unconstitutional Or Construe It To Avoid The Constitutional Problems Created Below. 27 xi 1� 11111111 ■ ■ 1111111111111111111111111 1111111 IIIIIII Page (f) Prior Florida Decisions Do Not Sup- port The Constitutionality Of The Act. 29 4. The Act Specifically Exempts An Agency Of The (Government, Such As The City of Alianzi, From Its Operation '30 5. It Was Error To Alake A Factual Deter- mination Of Estoppel In A Hearing Without Evidence On A Motion To Dismiss 35- CONCLUSION CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Jtt tie 'uprente (taut of J1 tia CASE NO.. 51, 77.5 CITY OF MIAMI, a Florida municipal corporation. Petitioner, VS. ST. JOE PAPER COMPANY,. a Florida corporation; SOUTHEAST PROPERTIES, INC., a Florida corporation; HUGH E. MATHESON, .IR., individually; and SALLY S. DOMMERICH, formerly Sally S. Matheson, individually, Respondents. PETITIONER'S BRIEF ON THE MERITS i i 11111 STATEMENT OF THE CASE' The Certified Question This is the City of Miami's petition based upon the Third District's Article V, > 3(h) (3) certification of the - tollowing question: Whether The Zlarketahle Record Titles Act Is Constitutionally Applied When It Is Held To Prevent The Claim Of A City Under A Statutory Land Grant From The State Granting The City All Of The State's Rights 'I'o Submerged Land Including Water -Front And Riparian Rights.= The Trial Proceedings The City sued to quiet title and to eject St. Joe from 10.69 acres of extraordinarily valuable, downtown, bayfront land which was part of a specific statutory grant to the City in 1919. St. Joe obtained a dismissal with prejudice from then Circuit Judge Harvie DuVal, whose expressed basis Petitioner. City of Miami. was plaintiff and appellant below. Respon- dents, St. .hut Paper Co.. et al.. were defendants and appellees. Parties will be called by name or as they stood in the trial court. Respondents will sometimes collectively be called "St. Joe." The appellate court below, the Court of Appeal, 'Third District of Florida, will he called "the Third District.' The Circuit Court in and for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Har- vie 5. DuVal, .1., will he called "the trial court." The Marketable Record Titles Act. F.S. Chapter 712. will he called "Chapter 712— or the 'Act. ' =The City's petition is, of course, not limited to the question. See peti- tion at A. 199. 2 ■I was a factual finding of estoppel and who:mplicit rul- ings were that St. Joe's acceptance of a wild deed in 1944 was constitutionally cured by a retroactive application of Chapter 712 and that that act applied despite §712.04's express exemption of state agencies (the City's status here) from its purview. Appellate Proceedings The Third District basically ruled that Marshall v. Hollywood Inc. s.' dictum on wild deeds and Odom v. Ueltona Corporation's.' dicta on sovereignty lands and Chapter 712 gave it reason to affirm, but it certified the quoted question to this Court. '236 Sold 114 (FIa., 1970)t. 4341 Se.2d 977 (Fla.. 1977)0.. 1111111111111 1■U1111 1111■1III 1 STATEMENT OF THE FACTS In 1845, by act of Congress admitting Florida to the union, the United States conveyed to the State all right, title and interest in lands under navigable waters, and within or about its shores "in trust for the benefit of the people of Florida.'' On .lane 2, 1919, by special act, Florida's legislature conveyed the submerged lands (and other land) to the ('ity of Miami, reserving its interest in having the sovereignty land remain public by imposing upon it the requirement t hat it he used in perpetuity, "for municipal purposes only.' There is no other con- veyance of this land out of the State from 1845 to 1977. In 1898 Henry Flagler conveyed 14 acres of upland property to Florida East Coast Hotel Corp.' Flagler owned no riparian rights in the adjacent submerged lands. In the 1920's and later, FEC illegally filled and Florida's statutory grant to Miami was subject only to two exceptions: ,at prior grants. and (10 existing riparian rights of upland owners. Since there had been no prior grants and were no existing riparian rights, as to the land in dispute, the exceptions were meaningless. Florida's statutory grant to Miami for municipal purposes only was otherwise absolute: the legislature expressly repealed "all laws and parts of laws- which conflict with the grant. Now known as the Flagler System, hereafter "FEC." Before 1921, owners of upland riparian lands had no rights in the foreshore other than their common law riparian rights in the nature of ease- ments (i.e., ingress, egress, fishing, bathing, etc.) except in the moat un- usual and extraordinary circumstances. It was settled law that one as- serting a claim to such lands did so in the face of the state's presumptive ownership. Thiesen v. Gulf, F & A Ry. Co., 78 So. 491 (Fla. 1918): Brickell v. Trammell, 82 So. 221 (Fla. 1919). 4 bulkheaded part of the City's submerged land and, in 1944, FEC purported to convey to St. Joe the 14 original. acres and the filled land. The putative 1944 conveyance also purported to convey 4.24 acres of unfilled land ("Tract B") denominated as a yacht basin. In 1949, St. Joe filled the yacht basin property; but no deed purports to convey that area as filled land at any time. Thereafter, St. Joe purported to convey portions of the property to the other defendants or to their predecessors in claimed interest. In summary: (a) the City's title chain is as follows: U.S --+-Florida—'City. (b) St. Joe's "chain of title" springs into being with the wild deed of 1944. I I r QUESTION PRESENTED WHETHER IT WAS ERROR TO DIVEST THE ('I"1'Y OF I"I'S VESTED GRANT OF SOVEREIGNTY LAND BY RETROSPEC- TIVE VALII)A'I'ION OF A WVILD DEED. Ins. .`�++, _.r;=,...a .._ .. ,.r. :; a'wti c�;,r���.w <<sn,: v�V,.�'__•'";;Y�µ�si 11111111111111111111111Misim ARGUMENT WHERE FLORIDA GRANTED SUBMERGED SOVEREIGNTY LAND TG THE CITY, EXPRESSLY PRESERVING THE LAND'S PUBLIC CHARACTER BY USE RESTRICTION, IT WAS ERROR TO DIVEST THE CITY OF SUCH LANDS BY ACCORDING RETROSPECTIVE VALIDITY TO A WILD DEED TO A PURPORTED PRIVATE OWNER. 1. The Private Interest's "Title" To the Land in Ques- tion Derives From a Wild Deed Which Is Therefore Void. 2. The Act Cannot Divest The City of Its Vested Property Rights. (a) Chapter 712 Does Not Apply To A Wild Deed. (b) A Wild Deed Is Not A "Root of Title" As Defined By The Act. (c) The Inapplicability of the Act to Wild Deeds Is Supported by Textual Authorities And By Decisions In Other Jurisdictions. (d) Marshall v. Hollywood Does Not Hold The Act Applicable To Wild Deeds. :3. As Interpreted Below, the Act Is Unconstitutional. (a) The Act As Interpreted Below Deprives Vested Owners of Property Without Due Process of Law In 7 ■ ■ 111111111 Violatio,• it The Fourteenth Amendment. (b) Retroactive Application Of The Act Deprives Vested Owners of Property without Due Process of Law. (c) As Interpreted Below, the Act Impairs The Obligations of Contract. (d) The Decisions Below Constitute An Uncon- stitutional "Taking" Of Property. (e) Other Jurisdictions Hdl Similar Legislation Unconstitutional ctrueItfoAv�idTheCon- stitutional Problems Created Below. (f) Prior Florida Decisions Do Not Support The Constitutionality of the Act. •a. The Act Specifically Exempts An Agency of The Goc'ernmcnt, Suclz As The City of Miami, From Its Operation. 5. It lVas Error To Make A Factual Determination Of Estoppel In A Hearing Without Evidence On A Motion To Dismiss. ARGUMENT WHERE FLORIDA GRANTED SUBMERGED SOVEREIGNTY LAND TO THE CITY, EX- PRESSLY PRESERVING THE LAND'S- PUBLIC CHARACTER BY USE RESTRIC- TION, IT WAS ERROR TO DIVEST THE CITY OF SUCH LANDS BY ACCORDING ItE'I'ROSPEC"aIVE VALIDITY TO A WILD PUR PURPORTED PRIVATE TO TE OWNER. 1. The Private eFt's "Title" To The Land m A Wild Deed Which Is In Question Derivesro Therefore Void. The only title to the land in question traceable to the sovereign is in and to the City of Miami. Title to all lands under navigable waters has its origin in the United States. In 1845, the United States conveyed this title to Florida "in trust for the benefit of the people of Florida." The State specifically accepted, acknowledged and ratified this trust. F.S. § 6.01 (1845). Title to such land is, therefore, held by the State subject to this inalienable trust. The 1968 Florida Con- stitution also expressly recognizes this trust.' Prior to the 1968 Constitution and to the Florida statute, this trust was recognized as a matte: of common law.' Even ^Fia. Const. Art. X, ;ill (1968). "Hayes v. Bowman, 91 So.2d 795 (Fla. 1957); Browardv. Mabry, 50 So. 826 (Fla. 1909); State v. Black River Phosphate Company,13 So. 640 (Fla. 1893); Alden v. Pinney, 12 Fla. 348 (1869). 9, i 1111111111 III II II .rinteeslienn the State take with notice that lands under obviously navigable waters are "sovereignty lands"sub- ject to this inalienable trust. This Court acknowledged this concept earlier this year in Odom v. Deltona Corp., :341 So.2d 977 9S8 ( Fla. 197 7) : -Appellants also argue for the application of the 'notice of navigability' concept. i.e., that the grantee of swamp and overflowed lands under a Trustee deed takes with `notice' that the con- veyance does not include sovereignty land. In the case of a large lake, such as Lake Okeechobee, a 500,000 acre lake, we agree." (emphasis supplied) Biscayne Bay and the Atlantic Ocean are at least as obviously navigable as Lake Okeechobee, and Flagler, FF.0 and St. Joe were and are all on legal notice of the sovereign nature of this land. And they would be even if the land had not been conveyed to another Florida public- • entity The State, by statutory land grant, conveyed these - submerged lands in 1919 to the City of Miami, imposing a restriction of its use, in perpetuity, "for municipal pur- poses only." The City took this property subject to this inalienable trust, "fur the benefit of the people of Florida. The putative 1944 conveyance purports to transfer from FEC to St. Joe 24.69 acres. FEC held record title to 'The validity of this grant was recognized in T11F v. Claughton, 86 So.2d 775, 784 (Fla. 19561. See also, Pembroke v. Peninsular Terminal Co., 146 So. 249 (Fla. 19:33); Hayes v. Bowman, 91 So.2d 795, 802 (Fla. 1957). - 10 14 acres of this land, by virtue of the 1898 conveyance to Henry Flagler. The City does not dispute respondent's ownership of this 14 acres. As to the remaining 10.69 acres, however, the putative 1944 conveyance is a "wild deed" — that is, one purporting to convey land which the grantor did not own. FEC did not own this 10.69 acres. The City did and still does. The 1898 deed conveyed to FEC 14 acres "together with all and singular the riparian rights and submerged lands appertaining thereto." This did not convey an es- tate in anything more than the 14 acres. There were no "submerged lands appertaining, thereto." Land does not pass as appurtenant to land. In the 1920's, FEC bulkheaded six acres of this land. FEC did not thereby obtain title." The land had in fact been previously conveyed, in 1919, to the City of Miami. The 1944 conveyance thus purports to convey 10.69 acres, title to which was in the City and not in the pur- ported grantor. Any good faith title searcher must have 1{espondents argued in the courts below that they obtained title to the submerged lands by virtue of the so-called "Butler Act." The "Butler Act" did nut vest title to the submerged lands in the respondents. As of 1919, the riparian rights act. of 1856 di l give rights to riparian owners to dredge, fill and bulkhead, and thereby ,o acquire title —but only to owners of land to the !our water rnnrk. Haves v. Bowman, 91 So.2d 795 (Fla. 1957); Thiesen v. Gulf F & A Rv. Co., 78 So. 491 (Fla. 19181. Respondents' predecessors in title to the then -existing land owned only to the high water mark. After 1919 the submerged lands were vested in the City. Any subse- quent tilling to this was devoid of legal authority. Moreover, all the dis- puted property is outside the channel which bounded even the putative claim by P.E.C. it found in .f944 that the grantor had no title, or even a colorable title, to this 10.69 acres, and that the only con- veyance of this land out of the sovereign was to the City of Miami, as an agent of the State and "for municipal purposes only.., The 1944 deed is wild and therefore void. Vet on the basis of this void instrument the courts below have granted the land to St. Joe and have divested the City. 2. The Act Cannot Divest The City of Its Vested Property Rights. (a) Chapter 712 Does Not Apply To A Wild Deed. "1'he decisions below erroneously presume that the Act validates a wild deed and that the 1944 wild deed is a "root of title" vesting the property in St. Joe. But it has always been the law that a wild deed is void and has no effect. See, e.g., Wright t,. Blocker, 198 `0 88 (Fla. 1910). As applied by the courts below, however, the Act does exactly that —it validates a void instrument, in clear violation of the ancient principle that a legislative enactment "cannot breathe life into a corpse.- Smith Bros. t'. Williams, 131 So. 335, 337 (Fla. Such an interpretation goes beyond the Act's in- tended and permissible scope. For the primary purpose of the Act is not to resolve disputes between conflicting chains of title, but rather to free the record chain of title "from the burdens of old conditions and restrictions which at each transfer of the 12 property transfer with its marketabi►l. The statute does not operate to provide the founda- tion for a new title." Wichelman v. Messner, 1957). To the same effect, a. Lawndale. 24:3 N.E.2d 83 N.W.2d 800, 819 (Minn. see Exchange National Bank 193 (III. 1968) : "A consideration of our Act, including the sec- tion declaring the legislative purpose of `simplifying and facilitating land title transac- tions by allowing persons to rely on a record chain of title' leads us to conclude that the Act contemplated the existence of only one record chain of title holder. We deem that the applica- tion of the statute in a case involving two com- peting record chains of title as are presented here was not intended. . . ." The courts should therefore avoid interpreting the act as validating a void instrument. (b) A Wild Deed Is Not A "Root of Title" As Defined By The Act. The Act does not, by its terms, purport to validate a wild deed. The Act protects persons who have "been vested with any estate in land of record for 30 years or more." Fla. Stat. ; 712.02. A F erson holding under a void deed, even if of record for 30 years, has no estate of any sort. He has never been "vested" with any interest in land. Thus a wild deed is exempted from the protections of the Act because it is not included within the defini- tion of marketable title in § 712.02.. to 1111 i i i • Before there can be a "marketable record title" un- der § 7 12.02, there must be a "root of title," § i 12.01(2)t which requires a "title transaction." "Title transaction" is defined by > i 12.U1(3) as one "which affects title." A void deed does not affect title. Even if a wild deed could he a "title transaction," it nevertheless would be exempted from protection by 1'?.O3(11, which provides in pertinent part that the Act does not extinguish "defects inherent in the muniments of title." A wild deed is inherently defective and thus within this exception. It purports to convey ownership by a grantor with no prior chain of title. (c) "The Inapplicability Of The Act To Wild Deeds Is Supported By Textual Authorities And By Decisions In Other Jurisdictions. 1 Boyer, Florida Real Estate Transactions, 14.15 (1976), states as follows: "The statute will not automatically result in abstracts of title going back only 30 years . . . an interest reflected in the root or in the recorded chain in that time, will have to be checked out back to its source. " [emphasis sup- plied I Wild deeds are not honored by other states' in- terpretations of virtually identical acts. In Exchange National Bank U. Lau•ndule, 243 N.E.2d 193 (III. 1968), the Illinois Supreme Court so held: "Were we to hold otherwise it could result in a 'wild deed' being enabled to serve as the foun- 14 .,. dation of a new record of chain of titi so that it, as the more recent 40-year chain of title, would he entitled to the benefit of the Act. This could result in an unwelcome holding and pos- sible constitutional complications, for it would he then possible for the grantee of a complete and even fraudulent stranger to title to divest the title of a record owner, who may have satisfied the usual responsibilities of ownership, such as paying taxes, but who did not file a statement of claim to preserve his in- terest, as the statute requires. The legislature not having so provided, we believe that it was not intended that a chain could be founded on a wild deed, or as one court expressed it, 'on a stray, accidental or interloping conveyance.' Too, the legislative purpose under the Act of 'simplifying and facilitating land title transac- tions' would hardly be furthered by a contrary holding. A purchaser, though he might trace title back to an original grant from the United States and might have examined grantor - grantee indices, could not be assured that a chain of title based on a 'wild deed' did not in- dependently exist, to the prejudice of his rights." lAt 195-196, citations omitted] In Wichelman v. Messner, 83 N.W.2d 800, 819 (Minn. 1957), the court stated: "We do not think the statute lends itself to an interpretation to the effect that title may be founded on a stray 'accidental' or interloping conveyance. Its object is to provide, for the recorded fee simple ownership, an exemption 15 11111111111111111 1111 i from t burdens of old conditions and restric- tions which at each transfer of the property transfer with its marketability. The statute ti.,es not .tjx'rat(' to prouid(' the foundation for a ,zeu title.- lot ir19. emphasis supplied] itl► llarshall v. Hollywood Does Not Hold The :Act Applicable to Wild Deeds The 'Third District. relying on Marshall e. tfol- i held the :act applicable to wild deeds. But t hat decision (foes not hold. or even say. that a wild deed :(n ire root of title. it saes that a deed subsequent t() a ow►Itl +tt•t.t1 may be a root ,:f title. In Marshall. this Court anicni tl the Fourth Districts holding `that the Act 0,111t.•:: !ni:eke tability to a chain of title arising Out of a ,:!'ild deed so long as the strict requirements of t he Act me met." I At 116. emphasis supplied' Pie root of title in Marshall was not the forged deed. 1iatlit:r, the root of title arose from a chain which included. prior to the :30-year old root of title. a forged deed. "►n summary, although the . . . deed initiating the chain of title involved here was forged, this (ii•ed baled but one link in the chain coming Le fore the effective root of title in this case defined by the act. . . . 236 So.2d at 120 \loreover..tit(zrshall did not involve two conflicting - chains of title. The deed challenged was a forgery pur- porting to convey property owned by a corporation. The plaintiff was the administrator of the estate of a two- thirds shareholder in the company, appointed in 1966, 16 4:3 years after the death of the shareholder 9 43 years after the forged deed. Unlike the City here, plaintiff - administrator did not have a chain of title to the real es- tate, but rather sought a decree establishing his equitable interest in the land, as administrator of the es- tate. Applied here, this means only that the deeds subse- quent to the 19.14 conveyance, by which the other respondents obtained purported title from St. Joe, can form roots of title as defined by Chapter 712. None of these subsequent conveyances, however, are 30 years o!d. Similarly, in Whaley v. Wotring, 225 So.2d 177 (1st Fla. DCA 1969), it was not the purported root of title which was claimed to be wild, but rather a deed prior to the root of title. Wilson u. Kelley. 226 So.2d 123 (2d Fla. DCA 1969), does state that a wild deed may serve as a root of title. The statement is ()bite'r dictum. The court, in fact, held against the party seeking the benefit of the Act, con- cluding that the appellant's quit -claim deed did not constitute a root of title. Thus, it has not been and should not be held that a wild deed can constitute a root of title. :3. As Interpreted By The Courts Below, The Act Is Unconstitutional. As interpreted by the courts below, the Act has divested the City of property it has owned since 1919— sovereignty lands title to which has never left the State 17 i I i 11111 1111111111111111111 since acquisition upon admission to the Union. 1'he courts below have held that title to this property is vested in private parties on the basis of a void instru- ment executed in 1941. Such alchemy is not only incon- sistent with the law of real property and legislative in- tent. it is also inconsistent with constitutional protec- tions of property rights. If the interpretation of the Act adopted below were correct, the Act would violate both the due process clauses and the contract clauses of the Florida and United States Constitutions. (a) As Interpreted Below, The Act Deprives A Vested Owner Of Property Without Due Process Of Law In Violation Of The Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "[NI() state shall . . . deprive any person of life. liberty, or property without due process of law...... There can be no doubt that the City has been deprived of property by Chapter 712 as applied below. - The he only quest ion is whether the deprivation comports with due process. A threshhold requirement of due process is notice "such as one desirous of actually in- forming . . . might reasonably adopt to accomplish it." Mullane r•. ('antral Honorer Bank & Trust Company, l'.S.:30(i, :315, 7O S.Ct. 652. 94 L.Ed. 8(i5 (1950). The constitutional notice requirement concerning statutes of limitations is included in the general rule that the statute does not begin to run until "there has been notice of the invasion of a legal right or a person 18 has been put on notice of his right to a cause of action." Buck v. Mouradian, 100 So.2d 70, 71 (3d Fla. DCA 1958); Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Tharpe, 179So. 406 (Fla. 19:38). Statutes affecting real estate, as well as valid deeds within a chain of title may satisfy, by constructive notice, the constitutional requirement. But as this Court has noted in Marshall v. Hollywood, Chapter 712 is much broader in scope than the recording statutes. The recording statutes in effect define the requirements for "perfecting" an interest in real estate. Such statutes are therefore similar to those defining the formal requisites of a conveyance —form, attestation, etc. The latter statutes define what is a valid conveyance of real estate, and thus in no way can be deemed a deprivation of property. The recording statutes determine the relative priority of conflicting, valid conveyances. They do not purport to declare interests valid or invalid, and they do not purport to extinguish interests. They merely es- tablish that to secure an interest which will be good against subsequent interests in the same real estate, that interest must he "perfected" by recordation. Chapter 712 attempts to go beyond this. It purports to define not how a vested interest is created, but to define how it is maintained. As interpreted below, Chapter 712 requires a vested owner to rerecord its in- terest in the real estate. On th ?. basis of its having failed to do so, the City's ownership was held extinguished by a void deed executed in 1944. Constructive notice is a legal fiction on which much of the law of property is based. However, constructive notice has no talismanic quality with relation to real es- 19 111III11111■IIIIII i i i III■II 1 tate. Eaeit''application should he scrutinized, to insure notice "such as one desirous of actually informing . . might reasonably adopt to accomplish it.'' Mullane, supra. To hold t hat landowners have constructive knowledge of a 196:3 legislative enactment requiring them to take affirmative acts to maintain their ownership of real estate might itself violate due process. .11c('ord r. Smith, So.2d 70-1 (Fla. 1950). But even if constructive notice of this Act were suf- ficient, it is clearly not sufficient with regard to a wild deed. 'I'o comport with due process, a property owner would have to be fairly held on constructive notice both of the Act and of' the wild deed. Recording of a wild deed is not notice of a claim to property; a wild deed is one executed by a stranger to the record title "hung out in the air like 1-lahomet's cof- tin. 1'oladian L. Johnson, 85 So.2d 140. 141 (Fla. 1956). Recording of a wild deed is not even constructive notice of anything. lived c. Fain. 1.15 So.2d 858 (Fla. 1962). The 1944 conveyance was a wild deed in 19-14 . and cannot be made valid by subsequent legislation. An act cannot "breathe life into a corpse." Smith Brothers v. Williams, 131 So. 3:15, 337 (Fla. 1930). Therefore. by this Court's own repeated decisions,. to apply Chapter 712 to validate wild deeds would divest owners of existing interests in real property without notice. Vet this was done below in clear violation of the United States Constitution. 11111111111111111111111111 (h) Retroactive Application s The Act Deprives A Vested Owner Of Property Without Due Process of Law. Retrospective application of Chapter 712 below has destroyed vested property rights and constitutes a viola- tion of due process. See, e.g.. Creary v. Creary's Estate, 338 So.2d 26 (1st Fla. DCA 1976); Biltmore Village, Inc. v. Royal Biltmore Village, Inc., 71 So.2d 727 (Fla. 1954). Yet the courts below have interpreted Chapter 712 as validating a void instrument recorded 19 years prior to the legislative enactment. The basic thrust of Chapter 712 is an attempt to -ef- fect what may be a legitimate state interest: to lessen the burden of title searches. As interpreted below, however, Chapter 712 obliterates the vested rights of property owners and awards them to persons whose interloping claims arise from the past mistakes or calculated risks or even deliberate omissions, made by a title searcher.''= By this interpretation Chapter 712 not only retroactively alters the duties of title searchers, it actually validates void in- struments. Such a result is wholly inconsistent with due process. And here it would divest the public of land which by law the private claimants were bound to know was sovereignty land. 'And the early dismissal with prejudice precluded any discovery on this subject. It seems clear that St. Joe must have actually as well as con- structively known of its illegal acquisition in 1944. Its failure to develop or deal with this prime property for more than three decades supports this conclusion. 21 11111 u As indicated. statutes of limitations which preclude a person from bringing suit after a reasonable time set by the statutes may not be unconstitutional depriva- tions of property, but a statute of limitations does not begin to run unt il "there has been notice of the invasion of a legal right or a person has been put on notice of his right to a cause of action." Such statutes may be held valid, therefore, because they give a person a reasonable time after effective notice to seek adjudication of a claim to property rights. Even retroactive statutes of limitation may he valid "where a reasonable time is allowed to prosecute an as- serted right." Bach, r. Triplett, 32 So.2d 753. 755 (Fla. 1947). however, Chapter 712, as interpreted below, dif- fers in effect from statutes of limitations in two signifi- cant ways. First, it would divest not merely a cause of action. but an existing. vested right in property. Sec- ond. it Mould impose a new obligation or duty to preserve a vested interest -- an owner would he required to re-record his interest. As interpreted, therefore, Chapter 712 is unconstitutional. for retrospective legislation is invalid "in those cases wherein vested rights are adversely affected or destroyed or when a new obligation or duty is created or imposed, or an additional disability is established in connec- tion with transactions or considerations previously had or expiated." McCord v.. Smith, 43 So.2d 704, 709 (Fla. 1950). In this regard, it is important to note that Chapter 712 is not merely curative of technical or administrative 22 fohSILV irregularities. It is not merely remedial ?`id therefore perhaps protected by the rationale of such cases as Board of ('nmm'rs of Everglades Drainage Dist. v. Forhes Pioneer Boat Line, 86 So. 199 (Fla. 1920), rev'd on other ;rounds, 258 U.S. :3:38 (1921) ). And unlike Moyer C. ('lark, 72 So.2d 905 (Fla. 1954), where referring to the general recording statute this Court stated that "the statute obviously was not intended to have the result of requiring a grantee to record his own deed within a specified time or lose an otherwise valid title," it is not merely a recording statute. Instead, the Act as applied divests vested (as op- posed to contingent) property rights in a retroactive way which Florida courts have repeatedly held violates due process. (c) As Interpreted By The Trial Court, The Act Impairs The Obligations Of Contract. United States Constitution. Article I, Section 10, Clause 1, of the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part: "No state shall . . . pass any . . . law impairing the obligation of con- tracts. . . ." Chapter 712, as interpreted below, actually ex- tinguishes vested property rig. -its, rights which are clear- ly protected by the constituhional prohibition against impairment of contract. A state may not be prohibited from validly exercising the police power for the public interest, and such laws as exist are implied into contrac- tual obligations. Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 58 S.Ct. 44:3, 82 L.Ed. 685 (1938). A state may 23 1 i T not, hots „- r, retrospectively exercise the police power to extinguish vested rights which in no way conflict in and of themselves with the public interest. 'l'he State of Florida may well have a legitimate in- terest in relieving the necessity for lengthy title searches. and may have the authority to enact legisla- tion which alters the methods and substance of creating obligations. The State of Florida may not. however, ex- tinguish otherwise Valid vested interests. if the Act is to he interpreted. as the trial court and the Third District have interpreted it, retroactively to extinguish a property oNvner's vested interest in property, the Act im- pairs contractual obligation in clear violation of Article 1. Section 10, Clause 1. of the United States Constitu- tion. See 'Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518..1 L.l:d. (329 (1819); Empire State Insurance ('i'mpany v. ('hafetz, 302 F.21 828 (5th Cir. 1962). The Florida Constitution The Florida Constitution, like the United States • Constitution, provides that "no . . . law impairing the obligation of contract shall be passed." Article I, Section 10. Florida courts have made clear that the State is not prohibited by this provision from exercising the police power in the public interest. See, e.g., Shavers V. Duval ('panty, 73 So.2d 684 (Fla. 1951); McConville v. Ft. fierce Bank & Trust Co., 135 So. 392 (Fla. 1931). However, as the Florida Supreme Court noted in Yamaha Parts Distributors, Inc. v. Ehrrnan, 316 So.2d 557. 559 (Fla. 1975), "virtually no degree of contract im- pairment has been tolerated in this state." It is clear that the police power does not allow the State to ex- tinguish vested rights which in no way conflict in and of - 24 themselves with the public interest. The Fyida case of Biltmore Village, Inc. v. Royal Biltmort Village, 71 So.2d 727 (Fla. 19541, has become a leading case for the rule that reversionary rights in property cannot be destroyed by subsequent legislation. See 41. A.L.R.2d 1384. Retroactive legislation is particularly suspect. In Yamaha, this Court held that a statutory requirement that a motor vehicle manufacturer give 90-days' notice to a franchisee prior to cancellation of a franchise con- tract did not apply retroactively. "To justify retroactive application it is not enough to show that this legislation is a valid exercise of the state's police power because that power, however broad in other contexts, here collides with the constitutional ban on laws im- pairing contracts." [at 559] (d) The Decisions Below Constitute An Uncon- stitutional "Taking" Of Property. The Fifth Amendment of the United States Con- stitution provides in pertinent part: ". . . nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." This provision applies to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Chicago, B & Q Ry. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 17 S.Ct. 581, 41 L.Ed. 979 (1897). When state action goes beyond mere regulation of property rights and actually deprives an owner of title to property, compensation is required. 25, ■ ''is inconceivable that a state could con- stitutionally authorize the taking or expropria- tion of property without just compensation, even if it did so after providing a hearing in all of the other procedural rights which are embed- ded in the concept of due process. Taking property, whether by the United States, by a state. a county, or by a municipality, requires just con pensat ion." Brault L. Town of Milton, 527 F.2d 730, 741-742 (2d Cir. 1975). See also, tiotomura v. County of Hawaii, 402 F.Supp. 95. 101 (1). Hawaii 1975); Cook C. Carlson, 364 F.Supp. 24, (D. S.D. 197 3). Even following procedural safeguards, the state is restricted to taking property for public use. "The taking by a state of the private property of one person or corporation, without the owner's consent, for the private use of another, is not due process of law, and is a violation of the Fourteenth Article of Amendment to the Constitution of the United States." Mo. 1'ac. Hv. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 417, 17 S.Ct. 130, 1:35, 41 L.Ed. 489 (1896); Blankner v. City of Chicago, 504 F.2d 1037, 1043 (7th Cir. 1974); Schneider v. District of Columbia, 117 F.Supp. 705, 716-717 (D. D.C. 195:3). The decisions of the courts below have deprived the ('ity of its title to real estate and vested title in the respondents, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 26 (e) Other Jurisdictions Hold : ii1ar Legisla- tion Unconstitutional Or Construe It To Avoid The Constitutional Problems Created Below. Murrison v. Fenstermacher, 20:3 P.2d 160 (Kan. 1949), held unconstitutional a statute which provided that deeds which had been of record more than 25 years prior to the effective date of the statute were conclusive- ly presumed to have conveyed perfect title, notwithstanding any defect in the grantor's title. The statute had a proviso that the presumption was not to be applied in any action brought within one year from the effective date of the statutory enactment. Noticing the distinction between the disputed statute and curative or limitation statutes. the court opined: "The power of the Legislature to prescribe within what reasonable time one having a mere right of action shall proceed is unquestionable; but there is a wide distinction between that legislation which requires one having a mere right to sue, to pursue the right speedily, and that which creates the necessity for suit by con- verting an estate in possession into a mere right of action, and then limits the time in which the suit may he brought. The mere designation of such an act as an act of limitation does not make it such, for it is in its nature more than that." Dingey v. Paxton, 60 Miss 1038 . . . [at 1621 In Board of Education v. Miles, 207 NE 2d 181 (N.Y. 1965), a statute precluded all reverters created prior to September 1, 19:31, unless recorded on or before September 1, 1961. The court acknowledged that, unlike 27 1 111111 1 i 1 the ret.,rding acts, the statute was not designed "to protect subsequent purchasers for value and without notice. but for an object more akin to that of title registration acts which are designed to perfect the marketability of title." The court fount[ that recording acts are a valid exercise of the police power to protect subsequent purchasers, while the purpose of the instant statute was merely to avoid lengthy title searches. ('iting Biltntnre L'illage. Inc. t. Royal Biltmore Village, 71 So.2d 727 ([•'la. 19541, the court concluded that under the circumstances, the statute "cannot be sustained . . . since it purports to bar the remedy before the right to enforce it has matured." [at 1891 In State. Dept. of Highways v. Tucker, 170 So.2d :371 (La. 19641. the Louisiana Supreme Court struck down a statute that raised a conclusive presumption that deeds to land abutting a right-of-way included the seller's right-of-way unless the seller filed suit. or recorded a notarial declaration. "Such an alteration disrupts established land tenure, transfers land from persons holding clear titles, and defeats the reasonable expecta- tions of landowners who have relied upon the law in effect at the time of conveyance. As retroactively applied, the statute impairs the obligat ion of contracts and divests vested rights. Consequently, it violates the federal and state constitutions." [at 374, footnotes omit- ted] See also Cornish v. Kinder Canal Co., 267 So.2d 625, 6:31 (La. App. 1972). 28 T 11 1111111111111 III (f) Prior Florida Decisions Do Not support The Constitutionality Of The Act. The Third District assumed that Chapter 712 has been upheld as constitutional by Marshall v. Hol- lywood, Inc.. 236 So.2d 114 ( Fla. 1970). This Court in that case in fact expressly reserved ruling on the issue of constitutionality, because it was not "framed as an is- sue" in the lower court; "we join with the District Court in declining tor consider such arguments because the con- stitutionality of the Act was not framed as an issue in petitioner's amended complaint, which is the only complaint now before us. For pur- poses of disposing with this litigation, we will act on the assumption that the Act is con- stitutional." [at 118, emphasis supplied] To say that this is a determination of the con- stitutionality of the Act is to ignore this Court's express language. The Third District also cited, as supporting the con- stitutionality of Chapter 712, Campbell v. Horne, 3 So.2d 125 (Fla. 1941); Mahood v. Bessemer Properties, Inc.. 18 So.2d 775 (Fla. 1944); Buck v. Triplett, 32 So.2d 75:3 (Fla. 1947); H.K.L. Realty Corporation v. Kirtley, 74 So.2d 876 (Fla. 1954); and In Re Brown's Estate, 117 So.2d 478 (Fla. 1960). Eacn of these cases involves statutes of limitations, and is wholly inapposite. Finally, it should be noted that the Act has been construed to avoid conflict with constitutionally protected property interests. See Reid v. Bradshaw, 302 29 ir IIuIuuIIIiIII 8;o._'d I ' '1st Fla. 1)('A 197.1). 4. The Act Specifically Exempts An Agency Of The Government, Such As The City Of Miami, From Its Operation. The question raised here is whether the City of Miami as an agency of the State is exempted from the Act with respect to this property. FSA 712.04 provides: .. I"i'Ihis chapter shall not be deemed to af- fect any right, title or interest of the United States, Florida or any of it officers, hoards, commissions or other agencies reserved in the patent or deed by which the United States, Florida or any of its agencies parted with title." (emphasis supplied] Miami is an agency of the State and, therefore, ex= empt from t he ent ire chapter. See State v. City of Auburndnli', 85 tio.2d 611 (Fla. 1956), where dealing with tax proceeds distributions, this Court said: "Within the orbit of the authority granted to it by the state, a municipality is an instrumen- tality or auxiliary agency of the state es- tablished for the more convenient administra- tion of local government. While it does not share the state's sovereignty and enjoys only such powers as are specifically granted, or necessarily implied from powers specifically granted, nevertheless, subject to these restric- tions, a municipal corporation is in substantial measure merely a projection of the state 30 Iuu uuII.■u1IuI■■I government to the local level." [at 613]'-•' Similarly, see Loeb v. City of Jacksonville, 134 So. 205= (Fla. 1931), in which this Court defined a city: "A 'city' is a mere auxiliary to the state govern- ment. It is a public institution for self- government and "local administration of the affairs of state. It is appointed and empowered for that purpose and is therefore an agent of the state for local administration of governmental affairs." [ at 207, emphasis supplied] Accord: Kaufman v. Tallahassee, 94 So. 697, 698 (Fla. 192:3); Turk v. Richard, 47 So.2d 543 (Fla. 1950); and West v. Toren of Lake Placid, 120 So. 361, 366 (Fla. 1929); City of Miami v. Lewis, 104 So.2d 70, 72-3 (3d Fla. DCA 1958). And cf. Florida Statutes 20.03(11) (1974) defining "agency" as "an official, officer, com- mission, authority, counsel, committee, department, division, bureau, hoard, section, or other unit or entity of government.'' [emphasis supplied] The patents or deeds by which both the United States and Florida parted with title reserved the right and the interest of both the United States and the State of Florida to have the use of the land restricted to public use or more specifically, as to Florida, that species of public use subsumed in the phrase "for municipal pur- poses only." [ 7, 8] When it conveyed the "submerged lands, including waterfront and riparian rights" to Miami in 1919, Florida delegated its duty as a trustee to Miami. For purposes of application of § 712.04, therefore, Miami 31 i stands ii► the place of the State, an agent with an in- terest (fee simple title in trust ► reserved in the patentor deed, and is. therefore, exempt from all of Chapter 712. The legislative intent revealed by the broad limita- tion of ;' 712.0.1 is clearly to preserve governmental in- terest in land. This legislative intent is more emphatic when Chapter 712 is compared to the Model Marketable Record 'Titles Act," from which it derived. That Model Act preserves only the "interests of the United States." Florida's Legislature specifically wrote in the expansive limitation of 712.04. The analogy to adverse possession is compelling. One cannot assert adverse possession against the State '. the City'' or other governmental body."`. The same should be true here. St. Joe should not be allowed to perfect an interest in the 10.69 disputed acres against the City, an agency of the State and a governmental unit of the people of Florida, by mere passage of time. Chapter 712's purpose is to simplify and facilitate land title transactions by permitting good faith reliance upon records which have existed not less than :30 years. But a grant in derogation of sovereignty must be strictly construed in favor of sovereignty. TIIF v. Claughton, .uupro. at 786. Contrary to the position espoused by St. Joe. the "strict requirements" of Chapter 712 are not See Appendix. 'Pearce v. ('one. '.'. So.2d 360 (Fla. 1941) (title held by Trustees of the interval Improvement Fund). Waterman v. Smith, 94 So.2d 186 (Fla. 1957). '55 ALR2d 554. See Esp. Patton v. Los Angeles, 206 CAL 662 (19293. :32 II 1111111 11111111111111 III III11 11111 1111 met by the mere passage of 30 years of a line of title. A title searcher must not only in good faith examine the records for a 30-year period. He must also ascertain that the statute applies in the first instance — he must review the conveyance out of the state.712.04. The purpose of the Act was not to relieve the title searcher of the burden of determining the validity of title. A good faith title searcher is charged with notice of all statutes affecting title, in this case with notice of the 1919 Act and the fact that the foreshore of navigable waters was held by the State in trust for the people of Florida. Moreover, Chapter 712 does not in any way purport to repeal the June 2, 1919, statute. Since it does not (and. totally apart from the constitutional prohibitions which would arise), the two statutes must be read if at all pos- sible so as not to conflict with one another and so as to give meaning and effect to each. Mann v. Goodyear T & R Co., 300 So.2d 666 (Fla. 1974); Banana River Props. v. City of Cocoa Beach, 287 So.2d 377 (4th Fla. DCA 1974); Walton County v. BPI, 161 So.2d 45 (1st Fla. DCA 1964). This property has been conveyed out of the State only in a limited way, by conveyance to its agent, the City of Miami. A good faith title searcher in 1944, fol- lowing even the liberalized standards of the Act (had it then existed), must have found that the land belonged to the City as agent for the estate. Chapter 712 should therefore be construed not to work a retroactive forfeiture of the City's interest. The Third District did so construe Chapter 712, citing Odom v. Deltona Corp., 341 So.2d 977 (Fla. 1977). 33 ■ i The "Phis% istrict ruled that interests reserved in the State can be extinguished by the Act, notwithstanding the Act's own language. Therefore, the City's interest was extinguished whether or not it is an agency within 712.01's meaning. Such a holding is clearly not sustainable on the basis of Odom. In Odom, the State was challenging a deed over :3(1 years old from the '1'ru-tees of the Internal Improvement Fund, deeds which indisputably purported to convey certain lakes to private persons. This Court held the State's arguments precluded by the Act. What the Court had before it, however. were "valid Federal and State grants of title to real property without any reservation of public rights in and to waters thereon." The Act, in fact, protects only those rights "reserved in the patent or deed by which the United States, Florida or any of its agencies parted with title.- Such reserved rights were not presented in Odom. Such reserved rights are clearly presented in the present case. In (ldum the State itself had conveyed the lands to private parties more than 30 years prior to bringing suit. In the present case, title has never left the State to go to any private party, but remains in the State's agent, the City of Miami. This Court in Odom further stated that notwithstanding the Act, if the state had previously pur- ported to convey to private persons submerged lands un- der navigable waters. an action by the State to establish its title to such lands would not be precluded by the Act. "Appellants also argue for the application of the 'notice of navigability' concept, i.e., that the grantee of swamp and overflowed lands un- 34 ■ii 111111I■IIll111 der a trustee deed takes with `notice' thi. a he conveyance does not include sovereignty land. In the case of a large lake, such as Lake Okeechobee, a 500,000 acre lake, we agree; however, it seems absurd to apply this test to small, nonmeandered lakes and ponds of less than 140 acres and, in many cases, less than 50 acres in surface." [emphasis suppliedl The opinion in Odom compels the conclusion that the State's interest in lands beneath obviously navigable waters, vested in its agent, the City of Miami, cannot be extinguished by the Act. The Third District ruled directly to the contrary. 5. It Was Error To Make A Factual Determina- tion Of Estoppel In A Hearing Without Evidence On A Motion To Dismiss. Even a cursory reading of the transcript leaves the unmistakable impression that the trial judge was presuaded by his conclusion that the City's vested right would ultimately he defeated by estoppel: "If anybody has ever been estopped or waived any rights —the City of Miami has been sitting here with this land having been filled back in the 20's. I would have to take judicial notice that they have been getti-ig taxes on all of it all this time." (R-208) A trial court may not raise the issue of estoppel on his own motion. Cox e. Holder, 345 So.2d 846 (1st Fla. DCA 1977). St. floe should have been required both to plead and prove such affirmative defenses, and the City 35 ■ i i ■ ;houl(I hay _ 'teen allowed to plead and prove any affir- mative defenses to St. Joe's claim of estoppel.' The trial judge's actions directly violated the rules of procedure. See r.g.. ('raft c. Young, 1SS So.2d 859. 8(10 (1st Fla. 1)('A 1966): 1.. C..11+trris. Inc. t'. Allison, 277 So.2d 28 (:Id Fla. 1)('A 197:3), appeal after remand.:309 So.2d 9 (:3d Fla. 1)('A 1975). Furthermore, if defendants had plead estoppel and waiver. that would have served only to raise a factual is- sue. A hare allegation of estoppel is not a legally suf- ficient ground for dismissal. See Thiesen v. Gulf F & A By. Co., 78 So. 491 (Fla. 1917); Brickell tv. Trammell, 82 So..221 (Fla. 1919); Wernle tv. Bellemead Development Corp., :M8 tio.2d 97 (Fla. 1975). Although this case was not allowed to proceed to discovery. the deeds alone support the conclusion that as a matter of law the City would not he estopped from asserting this claim. '1'„ the extent that the trial court held the City estopped, it denied the City its right to a trial on this and other important issues. Counsel for the ('its. at the hearing in the trial court on the motion to dismiss, objected that tit the trial court were going to hold that the respondents had title by virtue of the Butler Act. factual allegations could and would be made show- ing that FE("s putative dredge and fill rights were only to fill nut to the channel. At the time in question, the channel was located at the approx- imate present location of Biscayne Boulevard, thereby making all of the property east and .south of Biscayne Boulevard illegally tilled and not a proper basis for any claim of title by any of St. doe's predecessors in putative interest. The trial judge refused to accept such an amendment. saying that ..Quid he something "for the appellate court to consider." Such a refusal to ails'% amendments is improper. The pleadings also allege that the 4.24 acre yacht basin in question was not filled until 1949. No title transaction took place after the tilling and, therefore, the 30-year period has not yet com- menced to run. Even if the 30-year statutory period commenced after the filling was completed, the statutory period would not expire until 1979. :16 "While the doctrine of estoppel can Ix );plied against the state or its subdivisions (Trustees of Internal Improvement Fund v. Claughton, Fla.1956, 86 So.2d 775), the instances are rare when the doctrine will he so applied. It will be invoked only under very exceptional circum- stances, which trust include some positive act on the part of an authorized official, and in no instance does it appear that the do ctr ne of equitable estoppel has been appliedto divest the state of its land. Bryant v. Peppe, 238 So.2d 836. See also Adams v. Crews, Fla.App.1958, 105 So.2d 584." Jefferson National BankDC197) v.at Sunny Metro Dade County, 271 So.2d 201 214 (3d Fla. Estoppel requires a reasonable reliance directly upon the misleading acts or negligence of the party against whom this estoppel is being asserted, all to the asserting party's injury. Here, there was no reasonable reliance on St. Joe's part, only hope (or calculated risk). St. Joe was on notice of the City's title nndo nly butder the because`thelce of 1919 navigability" doctrine of grant of submerged lands to the City was a matter of great consequence, especially to commercial landowners around Biscayne Bay. Certainly, there was no mis- leading act or negligence which could steal thisland from the e in its unreasonable hope that it City. Though, as noted above,atare cases in which trialcompelled the the particular facts developed t 37 i 11111111 1 conclusion that estoppel should lie against a governmen- tal agency,' it has long been the law that where the con- dition of the title is equally available to all estoppel will not lie.' St. Joe has never disputed that it had knowledge of the City's title. Any acts on its part were made not in reliance but in hope. "Moreover, one's own wrongful act ordinarily cannot serve as a basis of a claimof estoppe as an eel against another, and it can be app s toppel against estoppel. Florida Land Inv. Co. v. Williams, 98 Fla. 1258, 116 So. 642." Jefferson National Bank at Sunny Isles t'. Metro Dade Count\•, supra, at 214. Finally, before there can be an estoppel there must be an injury to the asserting party. Clearly, St. Joe has not been injured by the rents which it hahb e n c greatly over the years. On the contrary, it benefited. St. Joe has no investment in this land which it has not long ago recovered. 'Odom v. The Deltona Corp., supra; TIIF v. Claughton. supra:: "Price v. Stratton, 33 So. 644 (Fla. 1903); see also Martin v. Busch, 112 So. 274 (Fla. 1927); and Odom, supra, page 988 at note 9. :38 111 11111111111 CONCLUSION The courts below have construed an act so as to validate a demonstrably void deed which was illegally placed of record nearly two decades before the passage of the Act. They have ignored Florida case law which has uniformly accorded no validity or even notice -ability to wild deeds. By so doing, the courts below have imposed upon the Act an unconstitutionality so pervasive that it runs afoul of almost every constitutional protection accorded vested property rights. Moreover, the courts below have disregarded the expressed, specific legislative intent not even as here, the con - have the veyance chapter apply at all —where, veyance out of the state not only is directly (and ex- clusively) to a state agency, but a specific, public use restriction is expressed in the conveyance. Finally, in order to achieve this completely er- roneous and unconstitutional construction, the courts below have looked the other way and ignored the most egregious procedural violations. Pleaded exceptions to the Act, though unchallenged and unstricken, are treated as non-existent. And the trial judge's engaging in a one -eyed fact-finding role at a hearing on a motion to dismiss is approved: "it doesn't matter." But it does matter. Sovereignty land has been usurped by private parties. Those private parties knew —or must be charged with knowing —that they were taking sovereignty really against the City (and there is theory of estoppelnot), 39 i I ■ ■ 1 IIII III1U they would be estopped to assert it. The opinion below should he quashed. The statute should he construed so as to comport with constitutional standards. And, in any event, it should he enforced only according to its own terms. It cannot therefore he ap- plied to the City. Respectfully submitted. LAW OFFICES GUY B. BAILEY. .JR. Attorneys for Petitioner 1820 One Biscayne Tower Miami, Florida 33131 By Guy B. Bailey, .Jr. CERTIFICATE OF SERVIC I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing Petitioner's Brief on the Merits was mailed to Shutts & Bowen, 1000 Southeast First National Bank Building, Miami, Florida :3:3131; Sibley, Giblin, Levenson & Ward, 1301 Dade Boulevard, Miami Beach, Florida :3:31:39; Steel Hector & Davis, 1400 Southeast First National Bank Building, Miami, Florida 33131; and Russo, Van Doren & Allen, P.A., 4685 Ponce de Leon Boulevard, Coral Gables, Florida 33147; this 7th day of July, 1977. Of CoanseE