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M-96-0717
C V T `.:''. `'. i t • ; ; E 1)� 1 �' Due- 1. ` ... �. COMMITTEE TOcE�� I;I CTI�BAN I T, � : . iil, j jlII III HISTORICAL ROOTS & MONUMENTS IN THE WORLD P.O. Box 44-1926, Miami. FI rida 33144 M E M 0 R A N D U M May i$,• Z759 6. -- CD _. T 0: CESAR ODIO, MANAGER CITY OF MIAMI ;..� F R 0 M: BERNARD L. BARKER, Secretary of Public Relations Committee to Rescue the Cuban Historical Roots & Monuments in the World SUBJECT: Request for Personal Appearence before the Miami x City Commission to Petition Approval for change of name of a park and co -designation of five streets adjacent to this park, located in the area of 55 Avenue Road (Howard F. Anderson Way) i 1. The request for the change of name for the above Park has received favorable consideration by Mr. Alberto Ruder, Director of the Department of Parks and Recreations. 2. Mr. David Hernandez, of the Section of Co -designation of Streets, has informed our Committee that the co- designation of these streets will receive approval contingent to the change'of name of the Park to Bay of Pigs Memorial Park. CONCLUSION: It is therefore requested, at the possible24 earliest date, that we be granted a Personal Hearing before the City of Miami Commission to seek approval for the above Project. Se�i tin -Vidal Aand L. Barker Preide Secretary of 2 Public Relations o Mesa Secretary SMV/BLB: am 96- 717 � N COMMITTEE TO RESCUE THE CUBAN HISTORICAL ROOTS & MONUMENTS IN THE WORLD 11111j"" P.U. Box 44-1926, Miami. Florida 33144 MEMORANDUM April 30, 1996 T 0: HONORABLFS MAYOR AND COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY OF MIAMI, FLORIDA, MR. STEVE CLARK, MAYOR MR. JOE CAROLLO, COMMISSIONER MR. WILLY GORT, COMMISSIONER MR. MILLER DAWKIN, COMMISSIONER MR. J. L. PLUMMER, COMMISSIONER SUBJECT: PETITION] TO RENAME FIVE STREETS OF THE CITY OF MIAMI AND A PARK, PROPERTY OF THE SAME CITY, WITH THE NAMES OF THE NORTH AMERICANS PATRIOTS THOMAS W. RAY, LBO F. Ems, WADE: C. GRAY, RILEY W. SHANBURGER, JR., RUDOLPH ANDERSON, JR. AND BAY OF PIGS. Honorables Mayor and Cam-issioners: By agreement of the Executives of this organization, COMMITI'E<E PRO -RESCUE OF CUBAN ROOTS AND HISTORICAL CUBAN MONUMENTS IN THE�WORLD we addressed to you to be so kind as to rename five streets and a park of the City of Miami, Florida, with the names of the North Americans patriots and heros, THOMAS W. RAY, LEO F. BAKER, WADE C. GRAY, RILEY W. SHANBURGER, JR., RUDOLPH ANDERSON, JR., AND THE PART< BAY OF PIGS, to honor pernaanently Post Morten to them, because they fought for the liberty of Cuba and lost heir lives in that historic moment known as Giron Beach or Bay of Pigs. We must add that these patriots were volunteers to fight and that the Major Rudolph Anderson, Jr. was flying over Cuba in an intelligence mission when he was knocked down on October 27, 1962 in the so called Crisis of the Missiles. We have the aspiration that the park get the name of this historic event in order that the grandsons of these North Americans heros and martyrs could meet with liberty to remember their grandparents together with citizens of this great country who loved too the liberty. Respectfully yours, ;9do Barker Secretary Public Relations Al sa Committee Secretary ��t g 9& 77, Wi11y Calvino Projects Director of the Cc Mittee 79710) r3�• SMV/BB/WC:am - 717 { 3 i 3 i CITY OF MIAMI, FLORIDA INTER -OFFICE MEMORANDUM rO Cesar Odio July. 18, 1994 ` %7E Cit) Nianager a,;ur:cr Request for Street - Codesignation 1 rROs+ J. L. I er,Jr. nrrt Rewcrs Commissioner ENCLOSURES Our office is in receipt of a request l.rom the Comite Pro Rescate de Raiccs k Monumentos I listoricos t'ubanos en el l-lundo Ibr street codesignation as outlined on the map, attached hereto and {or a waiver of the ices associated with tlic application. The president of the al()remcntioned organirition is Mr. Sergio Martin Vidal and its sccrctary is Mr. Bernard Barker; their address 9600 S. W. 20 Terrace, Miami, 33165, telephone number, 551-6887. Please investigate and respond accordingly. Thank vou. I 11 s t` 96- 717 5 You are cordially invited to the inauguration act at the North American Martyrs area, West Flagler Street & 55 Avenue Rd. (Anderson Way), in order to honor the historic memory of the North American heros and martyrs shot down at Playa Giron, on April 19, 1961 and at Baries, Oriente, on October 27, 1962, during the missiles crisis. Time: 10:00 a.m. Date: Your attendance will be appreciated. Fraternally, COMMITTEE TO RESCUE THE CUBAN HISTORICAL ROOTS & MONUMENTS IN THE WORLD P.O. Box 44-1926, Miami. FI rida 33144 P R O G R A M. Date Time PLACE: , 55 Ave. Rd. (Anderson Way) & West Flagler Street 1. Opening of the Act. Anthems of U.S.A. and Cuba. 2. Petition from the Master of Ceremonies: One minute of silence in honor of the North American Martyrs and Heros, Baker, Ray, Shanbuerger, Gray and Anderson, Jr. 3. Presentation by the Master of Ceremonies of Politics, civic, reli- gius, human rights leaders, etc., and the relatives of the martyrs present. 4. Invocation to God for the souls of the martyrs by the Priests and clergymen designates. 5. Words from Mrs. Janet Weininger, writer and daughter of the martyrs, Captain Thomas Ray. 6. Words from a relative of another of the martyrs. 7. Cutting of the simbolic ribbons of the streets renamed with names of martyrs by relative or representative present. The ribbon of the Park "Bay of Pigs" will be cut by Mr. Albert b. r Ruder, Director, Parks & Recreation, City of Miami. 8. Blessing of the streets and the park by the Priests and clergymen designated by the Cornnittee: Priest, Tomas Macho; clergymen Martin Anorga and Manuel Salabarria; and Reverend Obel Guzman. 9. Honor guard from the FA-U.S.A., the Natnal Guard from Alabama. Parade Lincoln -Marti School. C I-1 D I,15 b 1712 M Rao o 196045 P � Placing of a wreath at "Bay of Pigs" Park. J Ceremonial. ?AK14016 b� ( (,��` � ,ST/dl�� �%� t2M Fireworks. J0t27-L �l/� 961V10®Z i 10. Words by Mrs. Janet Weininger,- writer and daughter of Captain Thomas C. Ray; one relative of another martyr, two more persons 9 96- 717 Ii 10 2 that will be announced and the Major of the FA-U.S.A., Mr. Bernard L. Baker, Public Relations Secretary of the Committee and one of the organizers of the Brigade 2506. Final words from Mr. Willy CdlvihO, former member of the Special Forces from U.S.A. 11. Closing of the Act. Anthems of U.S.A. and Cuba. List of politic and civic personalities which organized the Act and the petition to the City of Miami for the rename of the streets with the names of the North American martyrs and heros. A. Sergio Martin -Vidal, President of the Corrm_ittee. B. Bernard L. Barker, Secretary of Public Relations of the Com- mittee. C. Alberto Mesa, Secretary of the Ccm ittee. D. Willy Calvino, Projects Director of the Committee. E. Janet Weininger, writer& daughter of Captain Thomas C. Ray. Collaborators: Luis Pinon, Metro -Dade Officer, Member of the Comittee. Heraclio Rodriguez, Technician, Member of the Committee. Gilberto Alba, Technician, Member of the Conanittee. Nelson Cartaya, TV and Audio Technician, Miami Senior High School. Victor Lopez, Principal, Miami Senior High School. Agustin Clemente, Miami Police Department Officer. David Herndndez, Executive Secretary, Public Works, City of Miami. Gustavo Reina, Member of the Committee. Roberto Pichardo, Technician, Miami Senior High School. Andres Fonseca, Teacher, Miami Senior Adult Education Center. *Residents of the area and future Committee of Preservation of the Streets. *Future project for the sowing of seven Royal Poinciana trees, surrounding the nark. *These projects will be financed by the Members of the Committee. We do not receive funds, donations or grants from universities, founda- tions, corporations or another entities from U.S.A. or other countries. ***Flight of Brothers to Rescue (Hermanos al Rescate) airplanes over the area. r-({ J'f' 01:=&Ve)�A) P(1)101_�5 ff&5 i j t 96-- 717 Alm . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1i COMMITTEE TO RESCUE THE CUBAN HISTORICAL ROOTS & MONUMENTS IN THE WORLE P.O. Box 44-1926. Miami, FI Aida 33144 i 12 BAY OF PIGS MEMORIAL PARK The park is located in the center of six streets that have been or will be co - designated to six Americans, five that died on April 19, 1961 during the Bay of Pigs for the cause of the liberation of Cuba, and a sixth that died over Cuba during the missile crisis, a direct result of the failure of the Bay of Pigs. This park is in the heart of a Cuban comzunity, it overlooks a cemetery where the majority that rests there is of Cuban -American exile extraction. The petitioners are members of the Cuban Miami ccnTmznity of Miami who wish to honor the memory of brave Americans that died at the Bay of Pigs, or as a result thereof, for the cause of the liberation of Cuba. An infantile park so dedicated will be part of the rich heritage of the City of Miami that in the hour of the greatest need of the Cuban people, opened its loving arms and generous harts to those who fled from tyranny and oppression to start a new life in a free society. In essence, this is what the country is all about. This park will remind the children that play there; of the concept of permanent vigilance of our heritage, and of the price we must pay for our way of life. CODESIGNATION APPLICATION CITY OF MIAMI PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT 275 N.W. 2ND STREET, 4TN FLOOR MIAMI, FLORIDA 33128 Conla�TE P,Qa R--SC4TE �Es ,E Ae4iC Applicant y1I eA1sd,qENToS Cildplos-,Fv f L /&VDpTe I ephone Number 4_-r_/-GJ0T7 Address Fiev -T41 g07& Type of designation requested: Location (Street): 1. Marker (Place) 2. P l a z a From Z�27 -QE'& M1'V1 eA&1< 3. Street Codes 1 gnat i on To �or21AS'&f'vaee�144, 0�.<- To be honored % C,'pAo,6,aZaA1 ,,g Ap T44,v Z.:Fd.6 6AIq aze Brief reason for codesignatlon request: -y4 _ C 4AI l�v D-1 '®may .CAI %> 0 ,= 7"x1a" 7�.47-Vs 7- e f ;Pkf,� fb 7-0 (Attach additional background Information If necessary) NON-REFUNOABLE APPLICATION FEE* A. Street co -designation ............................... $700.00 B. Marker designation .................................. $700.00 C. Plaza designation ................................... $700.00 I understand, as stated In the City Code, Section 54-92, all expenses on the part of the City or any other governmentalagency resulting from requests for street codesignationsr markers or plazas shall be paid by the applicant In addition to any fees. This application carries a non-refundable fee as stated in Section 4-9 f�� C Code . 2iagnfatur-oe of App (cant Oa e �If the application is approved by the City Commission, additional fees will be required. Please see the attached 13 General Instructions and Information. Gel,,eral Instruction and Informdtion 1 Submit completed application to City of Miami Public Works Department, 275 N.W. 2 Street, MIamI Florida 33128, ATTN: Executive Secretary, Co --designation Committee. 2. Three methods of designation will be considered: a. Marker, by which a plaque or sign bearing a designation shall be mounted separately on a stone or post In the right-of-way, and designated as "place." b. Plaza, by which the Intersection of two streets shall be designated or as relevant to the site. The designation shall be mounted on the post under the street signs at the.intersection. C. Co -designation of a street by which a numbered street shall receive an additional designation under the numbered street on the street sign, or traffic overhead cables. 3. After the application and fee have been submitted, the committee will review the request using the following criteria and to make recommendations to the City Commission. a. Named streets e.g., as In Coconut Grove, shall not be chang!sd where there Is a historical tradition attached to the existing name. b. Named streets shall not be codes Ignated because of the resulting confusion. C. Numbered streets shall not be codesignated for merely commercial purposes. d. Numbered streets shall only be codesignated if there is significant historical, neighborhood or community benefit to the codesignatlon. e. Numbered street codesignatlon shall not exceed five (5) blocks In length. Ideally, the Co-�deslgnatlon should begin and terminate at a signalized Intersection. f. Numbered streets shall not be codeslgnated with the names of public officials holding office at the time of the codesignatlon. A period of not less than five (5) years shall elapse after a living public official's termination of office before a numbered street shall be codeslgnated with the name of said public offlclal. g. Block numbers shall be added to any new street signs that reflect codesignatlon. 96" 717 { i 1 4. immediately after the City Commission approves the appIIcant '_s request, the applicant shall pay an additional fee In an amount as set forth In Section 54-93 of the City Code: a. Street codesignation, one (1) block ............. $400.00 Each additional sign ............................ $200.00 } b. Marker designation $400.00 ............................... C. Plaza designation $400.00 5. All expenses incurred by the City, or any other governmental agency resulting from request$ for street codesignations, i markers or plazas shall be paid by the applicant In addition j to these fees. This application carries a non-refundable fee as stated in Section 54-93 of the City Code. 6. Deslgnat.lon of a plaza, marker, or street shall become effective only upon approval by Resolution by the City Commission. I i E a i } j i i 15 717 .�\2\/ .� y .. . 7 Q�y¥+p. �: � /• � \� �� � � � \� d� \� I I i COMMITTEE TO RESCUE THE CUBAN "'::If HISTORICAL ROOTS & MONUMENTS IN THE WORLD P.O. Box 44-1926, Miami. FI rida 33144 CAPTAIN THOMAS WIL hRD "PETS" RAY Technical inspector at Hayes Aircraft. Before death was in the process of I changing over to the air division of the Alabama Army National Guard. Former pilot with the Alabama Air National Guard where he flew B-26. Born in Birmingham, Alabama on March 15, 1931. High School was Tarrant where he played football and was class president. Married high school sweetheart Margaret Hayden. Margaret died in December 1.992. Two children Thomas Morgan Ray born on July 11, 1953 and Janet Joy Ray born on July 16, 1954. Janet married Michael Joe Weininiger. Currently Mike is a Major in the 93rd Fighter Squadron known as the Makos with the U.S. Air Force Reserves at Homestead flying F-16's. Two grandchildren Pete 14 and Christina Joy 7, Weininger. The Weiningers now call Miami home. Ray was the younger of the four Alabama boys. Remains returned to the U.S. in December 1979, after spending 18 years in a Havana morgue, due to the efforts of his daughter, Janet. Death was due to bullet wounds with the final shot to the right temple. He was buried in Alabama over- looking the Alabama Air Guard. It was the place he spent all his time from his teens. E \ I 18 9 6 - 717 CODESIGNATION APPLICATION CITY OF MIAMI PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT 275 N.W. 2ND STREET, 4TH FLOOR MIAMI, FLORIDA 33128 GDO�IMiT�f 7'b �CSCl� �-;yE App i l cant6tpy FNTS Iv r&t oR b Telephone Numb erj�O: Address FsO. SOX -19-7. 4 , .�1i� �1/ �"L • ..3. � 5� 5� �� Type of designation requested: Location (Street): 1. Marker (Place) .5,rPaccT C. 4,)' 2. Plaza From J-6- 4VCA.(UE .s'. AJ. 3. Street Codes I gnat I on V_ To --6"7 4 V67,VL16 P/• To be honored 67iQeOT�A1 7-wAe f$ Brief reason for codes i gnat i on request: � /L. O T . `$ L � 4•'i��i/ q /I/ii4 T/ D.i/ •4G � !/.¢ �� � - .�{/ �► ff.,�cr6�G ,� ®T�.g� �.L ��.�4 4��k 41 ✓ ,Voff' !/¢: iV —�IZ �Ag= ,�®sie�d•�®U. �,�, �',4���D 7'*,G ",��sTi.✓�U/.r, Se-Vl �° .'®� (��1a o//wfa� oC rw A 4Z4RbV .s A(4- ; /C,V ®,& T&F / r:A1477o/J #, r,(1a& AP 7)V,6 (Attach additional background Infpr-mation if necessary) P",/ sR5 //C ,F D, //,e. )v 4WdF5/T4gTiV44Y VO4LIa/ s�6R E$ 70� �cA-,V LIVA"t4/,r9 qe 40-f!".0#S L4. c ® 400t Vq sm, #4! �a�' o,�s7 WIS 4R6r47-& r,0A 4C ($09.q4 ,4 A1,0 DvTS7-AjL>//��° NON-REFUNDABLE APPLICATION FEE*G��%�Bx/l.Sr Cd'.t�O.tlT��. OR JW4r .�� ass , 3 700Trmw' 7& Z&7y> 4V,� 9,We4ri®W 7`0 WVI-OA, 44 ZY7&RGy, OP 77W d%%l Pali Sg;,,Z.S 4lP#®46 71,06 Fi.�/�,�7' /M>V-T 0fi' 6��/r� �e�--RsP �G A. Street co -des I gnat I orwe0R-kVP 7.��'.f/.`! ! 4' �/T: /.M $700.00 .4eY b TAB d C-AIM.41, lA/TWt.L Ag6,A(e4 y�/ e'!~vb eQela B. Marker designation .................................. $700.00 C. Plaza designation ................................... $700.00 I understand, as stated In the City Code, Section 54-92, al expenses on the part of the City or any other governmental agenc resulting from requests for street codeslgnations, markers or Plazas shall be paid by the applicant In addition to any fees. This application carries a nonrefundable fee as stated in Sectio 54- 3 of the City Code. Signature of Applicant Date *If the application Is approved by the City Commission, additional fees will be required. Please see the attached 19 General Instructions and Information. 9 6_ 717 17 r General Instruction and Information 1. Submit completed application to City of Miami Public Works Department, 275 N.W. 2 Street, MIamI, FIorl.da 33128, ATTN: Executive Secretary, Co -designation Committee. 2. Three methods of designation will be considered: a. Marker, by which a plaque or sign bearing a designation shall be mounted separately on a stone or post in the right-of-way, and designated as "place." b. Plaza, by which the Intersection of two streets shall be designated or as relevant to the site. The designation shall be mounted on the post under the street signs at the Intersection. C. Co-designatlon of a street by which a numbered street shall receive an additional designation under the numbered street on the street sign, or traffic overhead cables. 3. After the application and fee have been submitted, the committee will review the request using the following criteria and to make recommendations to the City Commission. a. Named streets e.g., as In Coconut Grove, shall not be changed where there Is a historica.l tradition attached to the existing name. b. Named streets shall not be codeslgnated because of the resulting confusion. C. Numbered streets shall not be codeslgnated for merely commercial purposes. d. Numbered streets shall only be codeslgnated If there Is significant historical, neighborhood or community benefit to the codesigna.tion. e. Numbered street codesignatlon shall not exceed five (5) blocks In length, Ideally, the do=designat Ion should begin and terminate at a signalized Intersection. f. Numbered streets shall not be codeslgnated with the names of public officials holding office at the time of the codesignatlon. A period of not less than five (5) years shall elapse after a living public official's termination of office before a numbered street shall be codeslgnated with the name of said public official. g. Block numbers shall be added to any new street signs that reflect codesignatlon. m /ID Isla ISTINGUISHED INTELLIGENCE MEDAL DISTINGUISHED INTELLIGENCE CROSSFor Outstanding Servlce For Fxtreordlnery Heroism WIN INTELLIGENCE STAR For Coursgeous Action INTELLIGENCE MEDAL INTELLIGENCE COMMENDATION MEDAL E)(CEPTIoONtI jry or D�th In tOteALLION CAREER For Especlalty Commendable Servlcaa Performance of Hazardous Duties For Fjcceptlonal AcAbmmMt a GOLD RETIREMENT MEDALLION 35 Yaan of ApW1cY SO" o* SILVER RETIREMENT MEDALLION 25 Yeses of Agewi SerWce. BRONZE RETIREMENT MEDALLION 15 Yeah of Agency Serge i CIA Medals -. Distinguished Intelligence Cross For a voluntary act or acts of extraordinary heroism involving the acceptance of existing dangers with conspicuous fortitude and exemplary courage. Distinguished Intelligence Medal For performance of outstanding services or for achievement of a'distinctly exceptional nature in a duty or responsibility. Intelligence Star For a voluntary act or acts of courage performed under hazardous conditions or for out- standing achievements or services rendered with distinction under conditions of grave risk. Intelligence Medal of Merit For the performance of especially meritorious service or for an act or achievement conspicuously above normal duties. Career Intelligence Medal For a cumulative record of service- which reflects exceptional achievement. Intelligence Commendation Medal For the performance of especially commendable service or for an act or achievement significantly above normal duties which results in an important contribution to the mission of the Agency. Exceptional Service Medallion For injury or death resulting from service in an are a of hazard. Cold Retirement Medallion For a career of 35 years or more with the Agency. Silver Retirement Medallion For a career of 25 years or more with the Agency. Bronze Retirement Medallion For a career of at least 15 but less than 25 years with the Agency. 20 24 r l � ......... ..aEr:ywr�1=,th 4_,-+%�-`W�•.t �..t,r �� _, .t .:.' �,"-:' he Qf Pigs left 1300 BY CANDACE M. TURTLE • ____y lb patriots did �� 11 day and all night the planes take off and return. The steady, powerful, mesmerizing roar of their engines blankets the neatly trimmed lawns and the government -Issue Ca tudp s���oiAn � �.il housing below. Janet Weininger lives here at Homestead Air Force Base with her husband, a Filot, and their two e ye huiated by a f1ggy children, a 6-year-old boy and an infant daughter. They are the picture of military normalcy. On Friday nights the to the officer's club for drinks. Her red-haired, parents go freckled -faced little boy sneaks his Cub Scout uniform into li island nation a coo t � ®� his backpack and puts it on when is gets , school because he likes to be in uniform Just like his father, and on 9 Saturdays the whole family eats pizza together. el�. forced files forced t®become- eco � The furniture is sturdy and neutral, the kind that can blend In anywhere. The only note of disorder In the house is by kind supplied the pink vinyl valise, the a t.en-ages might take to a slumber party, fully opened on the beige plush • o o rants d �Il�� carpet of the living area, bursting with yellowed newspaper clips and old snapshots and cassette tapes and hand letters finally, improbable of• irl who would st� at scrawled notes and and most all, a tissue -wrapped set of dental impressions that Janet has carried with her everywhere . for 26 years. She has stared them; she has studied them; site !news how to F/ at Identify a body from them. There is no need for that anymore, of course. But Janet clings to them, like all the other Items In o her suitcase, because they are her history, the of her life, and all • ,e JiPI 6.6•t1.g n®t dV to �1ilP it daddy relics she will ever have of her father. and ® • home. Her family doesn't understand, nor do her friends, nor the Americana in whose ezrvice her father died at a place called the Bay of Pigs. Only Cubans understand. Only Cubans, with their own . suitcases overflowing with yellowing photographs and the documents of despair. The Cubans understand, and they embrace this girl -sized woman from the Deep South, recognizing that her loss is as large and as personal as theirs, and her obsession as enduring. Janet Weininger Is one South Florida Anglo who does not need to be persuaded that some struggles never end. L : . anet was excited. Her mother had told her to .. stay at home and wait for her brother, Tom, to come home from school because she had ti r something to tell them. Janet, 6, had tried teasing the secret out of her mother earlier, but It didn't work. Didn't matter. she was pretty sure she knew anyhow. Her mother was going to tell her that her father, a pilot, was coming home. Janet was waiting on the front porch with Chase. her dog. "Hurry up," she yelled when she saw Tom across the street. "Mom's got a secret to tell us." The children ran inside their grandmother's house where they were staying while their dad was away. They sat side by CANDACE TURTLE is a Herald staff writer. Pea Ray loved flying even when he was in high school (left). He would die at 30, shot down over Cuba. His daughter, Janet Weininger, JS (right). 96- 717 25 MISSION side on the bottom of their bunk bed. At first her mother didn't ay anything. Janet could tell something was wrong. Daddy isn't going to come baqk anymore, she said. "He died. He going to look after us front heaven." Janet felt only rage. "What a Ile," Janet thought. "Why would grown-ups tell me such things?" Her daddy wore flight suits. He was apediel. He took her tip in a plane, ai.d together they'd look down on the world transformed, a place she called Mldgetiand. "My father Is coming li-)me," she shrieked over and over aL,ain. "He always comes home." Her mother reached out to console her. How she hated those pats, that touch. She pulled away from her arms. Her body was stiff and hot. "I don't want anyone to touch me," she said. "Leave me alone." Janet had never even said a proper goodbye. Her father, Pete Ray had come home for a quick visit about three weeks before the Invasion. When it was time for him to leave, Janet was watching Tartan on television and wanted to see the end of the episode. At the last minute, she changed her mind. She jumped up and ran to the door, but she was too late. She could see the back of her father's head as the car drove off, but he didn't hear her call, he didn't turn around for one last wave. Tom wasn't crying. She hated him for that. She said the meanest thing she could. "You stupid fooi." she shouted at him. "Why aren't you crying? We just lost our daddy." Of all the people In her family, she was most like her dad. Not like her nom and Tom who were quiet and good and neat. She squirmed away from tier mother's embrace and picked up Chase. They sat on the front porch for hours while Janet cried. Her mother could say whatever she wanted to. Janet would listen only to the new voice Inside her. It said: Find him. anet was in first grade when Pete Ray's B-26 [I was shot down over Cuba. He was one of four Americans killed during the aborted April 1961 invasion. Ray had been hired by the CIA. He was to have supplied part of the massive air support the United States had promised the more than 1,400 U.S.-trained Cuban exiles poised to storm Castro's Island two years after his revolution had dispossessed them. Ray's mission was to train Cuban pilots for three months in Kcret Guatemalan and Nicaraguan bases, then fly bombing raids In the invasion Itself. When the time came, he flew in cutoffs and a T-shirt, without Insignia, in hopes of maintaining the illusion that the invasion didn't Involve Americans. With his fair hair. 12 26 closely cropped In the American style of the time, It was a vain hope. The 13-26 was a big, slow World War II -era bomber. The pilots set out from Nicaragua expecting to meet an escort of American fighter jets near Cuba. But President Kennedy changed the plans at the last moment; the fighters never showed. Ray was a sitting duck. Janet didn't understand the Invasion, she didn't know anything about Fidel Castro. She just wanted to know why they didn't have a funeral If her father was dead. No one would tell her anything about how her father had died — not her mother or her uncles or her grandfather. They couldn't even tell her for sure that her father was dead. There were rumors that Ile was a prleoner In one of Castro's jails along her husband In a military action In the service of her country, and all the government could come up with was . the word. "mercenary." She was angry, horribly depressed. and soon site would become frightened. The Rays had been caught up in the bizarre world of international Intrigue and covert action. They were briefly living under a media spotlight that brought out reporters and kooks. They may or may not have been the target of an official campaign of Intimidation. In retrospect, It Is difficult to know how much of the paranoia that blossomed In the Ray family was justified by reality, and how much was justified only by grief. But Janet's memories of those years are colored by a wash of peculiar events. Strange men would i stop the children on their way to with more than 1,000 Cubans school and question them. Ttie captured In the invasion. children found cigarette butts under "If he was dead," she thought, the trees near their home. "why wasn't there a body?" "Maybe people were watching us She asked questions at home. to keep us safe." said Tom Ray. "We "How did my dad die?" she asked. "is don't know." he a prisoner? Where's his body?" Janet's grandmother contacted the "Shush," her aunts said. "Don't general of the air base to try to find upset your mother." out more about Pete Ray's death. The "Now, Jan, don't go on so," her next day, a new man was hired at the uncles said. "Your father wouldn't JC Penney where she worked. He like it." walked up to her in the lunchroom Grown-ups stopped talking in front and told her she would be in trouble if of her and changed the subject when she didn't stop asking questions about she came into the room. the Bay of Pigs and what happened to At night, she made paper airplanes her son. Several months later, when for her father to fly home on. She hid she quit, he quit. them by the mailbox. Janet's mother's grief turned to He'd always returned from terror. She world sit up nights Midgetlsnd, hadn't he? holding a pistol, afraid of intruders. Communist agents? The CIA? Local t took years for the U.S. pranksters drawn by the publicity? government to admit She didn't know which. She told her that any of the family that a lawyer, supposedly Americans involved in hired by the CIA to handle the the Invasion were financial affairs of the widows of the employed by the CIA. The Americans downed American fliers, took the four who died had been on their own, women on a tour of the Birmingham mercenaries, nfficlal statements jail and threatened to have them Insisted, imprisoned and their children taken The problem was that Pete Ray away if they didn't stop asking had told his wife that he was working questions. for the CIA. Margaret Ray knew the The children took their cue from official version was a lie. She had lost the adults. When the family returned from an evening out, Janet and Tom would take butcher knives from the kitchen and slash them through closets, under beds, through the dirty laundry in case someone was hiding This went on for two years. "When we would come home. when It was dark, we would just normally go get the butcher knives." Janet says now. Nothing made any sense, but It all fueled Janet's anger. sharpened her conviction that things were being kept from her, secrets that she would have to discover for herself. That was when she began to hide her tape recorder under the living room couch. On her way home from school one day 18 months after her father disappeared, when Castro was releasing prisoners taken during the Invasion, Janet was stopped by a man in a suit, a stranger. "Is your daddy coming home today?" he asked. Janet's heart pounded; this was exactly what she had dreamed about. The man must know tier daddy was coming back. She flung her schoolbooks to the ground and started running. Her braids slapped her back as if urging her to run taster and faster. She slipped and rolled into a ditch and was covered with mud. Without stopping to brush herself off, she tore through the woods. "Daddy's coming home, Daddy's coining home." she yelled. Up the steps she ran and into the kitchen. "Mom. Daddy's coming home," she said. Her mother looked at her hard and didn't say anything. When the prisoners flew to Homestead, Janet watched them land on television, her nose inches from the screen. She scanned the black and white images for her father. When the last liberated prisoner disappeared from the screen, Janet began to weep Later, the Rays went over to Janet's great-grandmother's house. After they ate. the children were sent to bed In the pea room, a back bedroom lined with jars of preserves and pickled vegetables. Janet waited until her brother fell asleep. Then she sneaked out through the bedroom and under her great-grandmother Bailey's bed. There she could see across to the living room and hear the grown-ups. While she hid under a bed on the cold floor, peeking out behind the white fringe of the bedspread, she listened to her grandmother and mother talking. Something is wrong with Janet, they said. "Every time Jan sees something on TV, she gets her hopes up," her grandmother said. "She's just not accepting that Pete's gone. Maybe we should take her to a doctor." She was still hiding when Granny Bailey, her daddy's grandmother, came into the room, seized her by thi- foot and dragged her out from under the bed. Janet thought she was in trouble. but Granny Bailey didn't tell on her 96- '717 ' Wnat's the matter,' Granny Bailey asked. "Can't sleep? Come on let's go out on the front porch." She grabbed one of her handmade j quilts from the toot of the bed, and the two snuggled together on the old wooden porch swing. Janet's feet couldn't touch the porch, but her great-grandmother kept the swing raciving back and forth, making the stars look closer, then farther away, as if they were flying. The air was cool against Janet's cheeks, but there was a warm cloud of air under the quilt. "f'm not going to promise you life is fair, because it is nor," Granny Bailey said. "But no matter what happens to yiu, always fight for your happiness, tt�tht for what you know Is right and fight for your dad." Two year? after Pete Ray was shot down, President Kennedy was assassinated. Janet Ray heard the news when she was climbing onto the school bus. "Did you know the president was shot?" her classmates asked. They were sad. Janet wasn't. 'This serves you right, Kennedy. You didn't give my daddy a chance, now you didn't have a chance," she thought. She watched his funeral on TV quietly and felt a little sad for Caroline and John -John. They were like Tom and her now. They didn't have a daddy either. "If he can have a funeral, my dad should too," she decided. anet rigged her tape recorder so she could turn it off and on from the hallway with a string she ran under the `u g Mostly, she listened to her mother talk about her father to friends. Her memories of him were worshipful, Tut not very long on information. By •�avesciroppir g, she. learned the names �f uther pilots or her father's friends ind carefully wrote the names in a •piral notebook. so she could find the men later on. She became independent and single-minded. probably not the kind ,I girl her father, a man who believed that women should be naive and protected, would have understood. the clipped newspaper articles about 'he Bay of Pigs and slipped them into .1 hox with the family album. When :he was older, she spent the weekends at the Birmingham library reading and copying old newspaper :hps. She added those copies to the .rlhum. until her clips overflowed into another box and eventually into the pink suitcase. Nothing she had read or heard stripped her of the hope that :ter father was still alive. The Rays made frequent trips to relatives and friends, sometimes to 'he widows of the other three lmericans who died in the invasion. Wherever the Ray family went. Janet :arried the heavy family album, and the dentist's Impression of her father's teeth. She was afraid they would be lost or ttolen. They were all that remained of her dad. &net's search for her father gsWered momentum when she earned her driver license and could travel on her own. She really didn't know what to do. All she knew was that she had to keep asking questions. She'd take the names she'd gathered from the overheard conversations and call every matching name in the phone book until she found the right one. Many refused to talk. They said they'd been told to keep their mouths shut, that they were nearing retirement and didn't need the trouble. Other men wept when they remembered the deaths and the stupidity of the failed miss on. One of these was a man who had gone to high school with her father and was one of the last men to see him alive before he took off. The men had sat on the wing of the plane, and Pete Ray had given the man his identification, but kept his cash. Ray made a joke that he might need it in Havana that night. Janet collected information any way she could. Once she sneaked a book on the invasion out of her mother's bedroom. It was written by Buck Persons. another of the Alabamians who flew for the CIA operation. She called him up. "What happened to my daddy?" she asked. She wanted to know everything. The tall number of the plane her father flew, the names of the men who flew with him. What time was he shot down? What was he wearing when he flew? Was there an explosion when the plane crashed? She piled question upon question. She needed to pinpoint where his body • Janet Ray was in first grade when her father disappeared. When he left for the airport that last time, • n� Janet wanted to watch the • end of Tarzan. She never got to say goodbye. f' I might be, and whether he was dead or not. But she also had to build a man out of those photos and her fading memories. "Tell nie the good things, the bad things." she insisted. "That little bitty girl is going to wear Castro to a nubbin," Persons said to himself. (� n street corner on Miami's Celle Ocho, a young woman with a soft Alabama accent Stopped passersby and begged for their help. She had flown In earlier that day, a college student on spring break, choosing to spend her vacation on the streets of Miami while her friends leaded for the beach. She was directed to a hotel by the cab driver who picked her up at the airport, and who, in what she considered at the least a mildly happy coincidence, happened to Ix Cuban �' 13 I 9 - 717 27 r [E-1 28 - �_ st.d happened to know exactly how to the circumstances surrounding her father's disappearance. date him again. She was comfortable around bunks plied with stuff. You said. Jesus, what Is going on?" find little Havana. She walked the streets. One of her Some claimed they had heard there Welninger and his boisterous Some of the Cuban pilots refused to first stops was Domino Park, wiM Its roo n was a body-, othe rs said they had seen of her father taken after classmates who were so like her dad with their short haircuts, smooth fly the B-26s without fighter support. saying the missions were tantarnount concrete tables and arbored , utterly old-world enclave, the daily headquarters of many older Cuban photographs his death. There were rumors that an American's body had been kept at a faces and green Nomex flight suits. They even smelled the same as her to suicide. Meanwhile, the men on the beaches men who wear hats, smoke cigars and share a history of exile while slapping morgue In Havana. dad did after a flight, a mixture of hot fuel exhaust and synthetic flight suit were taking a beating. 'rhe pilots had grown close In their the black and white [lies on the table top. A woman, especially an Anglo, She made trips to Miami whenever she could. In many ways, It was the material. She felt they understood her. She months together — the Cubans who laughed at the Alabamians' attempts who attempts to Invade this macho wc•rld Is conspicuous. There was place she felt most at home. She searched out,the Bay of Pigs veterans, didn't talk much about her father, but she didn't need to. Welninger to speak Spanish. the Americans who liked to listen to the Cubans' music. something particularly needy about especially other pilots. Most were supported her. She kept hunting. it Is not clear If Ray knew of the the expression on the face of this happy to talk of what they knew. She learned that her father was not orders to keep Americans out, but it is young woman. She kept thrusting little scraps of paper into the hands of anyone who would take them, and the urgency of her gesture was rendered even more touching and useless by the fact that her message was written in English rather than In the language of the people whose attention she craved. "Do you know my father?" she asked. "His name is Pete Ray, and he was an American pilot shot down in the Bay of Pigs. He was from Alabama, he flew B-26s." She scanned their eyes for recognition of his name and pressed the paper with her home phone number on anyone who would take them. "Call me collect in Alabama it you know anything," she urged. Over and over she asked people. Many brushed her aside, not understanding her English, no,, understanding the desperation that brought a college student from Alabama to Little Havana. Finally one old roan who spoke both languages certain the decision was up to him: to fly, or to stay in Nicaragua. Ray flew Ray bombed Castro's headquarters at the Australian sugar mill about 15 miles north of the bay, finished his run and was ready to head for home when his B-26 was hit by fire from a Cuban T-33 fighter. He was forced It, crash land on a grassy field. His copilot, flight engineer Leo Francis Baker, probably was killed it the landing or shortly after. according to various accounts. Pete Ray came out fighting, pistol in hand. He was hit with a spray of automatic gunfin• across the abdomen and in the right hand by Castro's militiamen, but the killing shot probably was one of twn fired into his head at close range by Cuban militiaman. Pete Ray might be alive today it it hadn't been for the overzealous militiamen. Bay of Pigs veterans sa% Castro was furious when he learned the blond pilot had been shot instead of taken prisoner. He wanted him listened to her story. He told her fie They wanted to help her. 'their stands a man of special skills or talent. tie alive so he could prove that would help. lie wrote the words in dipped and scooped the air as they fell into history because he knew how Americans were behind the invasion Spanish. Me 11amo Janet Ray .... She demonstrated their air battles. Their to fly the B-26, an aging bomber that went into a store with a Xerox voices grew loud with excitement. happened to be the same type of plane The CiA apparently didn't know if machine and made copies of it. And They told her her father was a hero the Cubans used. The CIA hoped the Ray was dead or a prisoner. Castro amid the mingled odors of a city who died fighting Castro's men. To invading bombers would be confused certainly wasn't returning street, the garlic, the coffee, the car for hours every day, in her those who were reluctant to speak of for Cuban air force planes and that Weininger's telegrams, sent in care exhaust. the secret mission, she handed a blank people would believe Elie move to the presidential palace, Havana, Cuh:- practical sneakers, she walked into cassette tape. Record your memories overthrow Castro came from within. 1 tried calling a lot, but I never stores, into restaurants and bars. now, she told them, and leave the tape Ray seized the chance. He had been I got through of course," Weininger "Hello," she said. The people somewhere safe marked with my' flying on weekends for the Air said. "I must have sent hundreds of would turn, fastening their gaze on the peppy chubby-cheeked childlike name so it will get to me after you die. National Guard, and working on the telegrams. Short ones, I mean nothin: ground as an inspector for Hayes special just like: 'You have children face. alive with sincerity. Her voice She met children of Cuban pilots Aircraft in Birmingham the rest of the Would you do the same thing to yrni: was honeyed and Southern, soft and who had never returned from the week. The CIA would pay him I children?' " swaying. but not her words. They invasion and felt an immediate enough to support his wife, and his In 1978, the pieces came faster aft•' were direct and specific: "Do you know my daddy? His name is Pete kinship with them. children, and he would be flying all started falling together. Ray." For the first time Janet fell she the time. Her cousin Tom Bailey. a journal - could share her pain, her mission and If 1 die flying, you know I'll die with The Birmingham News, had Janet collected information piece her patrfotirm "without being happy," he once told his mother. started to help her. He steered her i by piece. Men said her father was a shamed." She was among people who government officials and wrote good pilot. careful. So he could have understood her. He almost didn't fly in the invasion several stories about the case that p,- landed safely. at all after Kennedy's last-minute pressure on politicians to help Janet There seemed little question that hen Janet met Mike order that Americans be kept out of She met Alabama Sen. John he went down in Cuba. Nobody could Weininger, an Air Force the fight. Cuban pilots were supposed Sparkman, then head of the Foreign tell her for sure If her father was officer who was in to do all the combat flying, but they Relations Committee, and asked for killed In the plane crash. If he was flight training at Craig were exhausted after a day or so. It his help. Sparkman actively worked shot by a firing squad or if he was a Air Force Base in Selma, was a six -hour round trip from on the case, writing letters to people prisoner. There was even a crazy near her home, she felt immediately Nicaragua to Cuba. The losses were within the Cuban Interest Section in rumor that the missing men were in at ease. She had dated other men, but heavy. I Washington as well as within the Vietnam, flying secret missions for 1.patriotic they weren't like her. She was very "It was terrible back at the United States government, until hie the CiA. In a time when most college I barracks," said Eduardo Ferrer, a retirement in January 1979. The search had no timetable. Janet students were protesting the Vietnam j Cuban cargo plane pilot and morale Janet told Sparkman that the Cl maintained her grades and dated. But War. If she learned that a date had officer for the pilots. "After someone had promised to give the families of she also worked on the mystery, and I enrolled in college to dodge the draft, was hit, they would put his stuff on I the four Americans medals but ne% piece by piece she gained a picture of j she didn't say anything, but wouldn't 1 his bunk. There were more and more I had. 96- 717 Within a week, a CIA agent called i Bay of Pigs photograph of two dead Cuban government confirmed that It f patiently to her talk when everyone the Ray family and said the agency American pilots, probably her father I I had Pete Ray's body. it had been kept else called her motor mouth and how would present them with the CiA's and his co lot. He had said he would in a Havana morgue. she loved to watch him shave his D15tingulehed intelligence Cross, the try to mal a copy to her. Frozen . whiskers In the mornings. Daddy, she hichest medal the CiA awards The envelope was heavy and stiff, intact. after 18 years. thought. I'm glad you're home. civilians, at their home in the evening. as%it contained photos. They agreed to return it. Before the men arrived, Janet went Janet froze. The wand, the jets Ray's body was taken to the outside. She adjusted the floodlights roaring ... the sound just turned off. There was a light drizzle at the morgue at Cooper Green Hospital in that usually bathed the exterior of the Her heart pounded and her hands Birmingham Municipal Airport. A Birmingham for an autopsy. A Cuban house at night to focus In a pool of shook as she tore into the envelope. few weeks pregnant, sick to her doctor volunteered to perform the light Just In front of the porch. When The prints were rough stomach and exhausted. Janet waited autopsy. Janet gave permission. the men approached the house, she black -and -whites without much for the plane carrying her father's Her cousin, Tom Bailey: her was ready. She snapped their photo. contrast, and the two men's faces coffin. It would land on the same husband, her brother and her father's She did it deliberately because she I weren't completely clear. runway 30-year-oid Pete Ray had brother were there. The coffin, a knew how much it would bother They were clear enough 1 taken off from IS years before. ! simple black box covered in black them. She kept the picture so she material sat on a dolly at waist would have something on them, an GM height. edge. Janet had made up her mind. She She had never ally trusted what was going to look at her father's � the told her. The Y had soft hands. hprints e rns were rough hotly. Alter all the cars of questions, Y She wanted to hear from the men rumors and disbelief, she had to see with calluses, the men who were • for herself. actually Involved In the Invasion. black -and -whites, but Her brother tried to talk her out of The agents weren't happy about it. having their picture taken or that her �„ they��� ����� enough. "Jan, you don't want to remember cousin (tie journalist was there. They g • Dad this way, it's not going to look handed over the certificate and the Yery t medal, a flat bronze disc about three Janet recognized the man The other men appealed to her inches in diameter. i� husband. "You can't show anybody any of "Let her do what she wants," Mike this," the men said. i n the white T-shirt, with Weininger said. ithout hard roof of her P the bullet holes in his face The morgue attendant hesitated. " If you don't open that casket so I can father's death, Janet • see him, 1'll do it," Janet said. kept pushing He pulled up the lid. government officials to tell her what had �-- ---73-.U"iy �,-_,- s—� �- - A white, gauze -like cloth stretched across the box from side to side, II{ happened to him. She recognized the man in the Janet waited next to the covering the body. Only Pete Ray's i white T-shirtwith the bullet holes in ambulance. The plane taxied up, and face was visible. surrounded by the In April 1979 Janet was living with his face. the body was quickly transferred. She material, which was gathered close her husbane at Hahn Air Base in It was April 19, 1979. the ISth wanted to accompany the body to the around his head. Germany. It was a rare sunny day, andiversary of her father's death. hospital morgue, but the driver said it Janet knew immediately. She roiled the windows down on the It was the hard proof she had been was against the rules. "I don't need any further car when she went to pick up her waiting for, but it wasn't enough. She Janet hadn't taken no for an identification," site said. "That's my mail and enjoyed the warm air still wanted to know what had answer from senators, CIA agents and daddy." blowing her hair, the roar of the jets happened to his body. Cuban officials. The driver was out of She stared at the body for about 10 low overhead. Ask her about it today, and she his league. minutes. She grabbed the mail, jumped back says this: "Emotionally, 1 just couldn't For the 30-minute drive to the This Is my last time, she thought. in the car and started for hoine. At a accept it." morgue, Janet huddled over the pine She hated the material being stop sign, she idly glanced at the from box that contained the coffin, her wrapped around his head. It looked envelopes. One was Peter n the summer of 1979. cheek resting on the cool damp wood. like a halo. The cloth was too clean Wyden, a man who was writing a after years of lobbying Her arm was draped over the top, I and white and pure. He died in battle, book about the invasion and had I senators, and hundreds where an American flag soon would she thought. He needs his uniform. interviewed her months before. of letters and telegrams lie. She thought she would hurry home to During the interview, Wyden told Janet the Cuban had a from Janet to the in Havana. She remembered again her father make sure it was dry cleaned and government . presidential palace the taking her flying. How he listened ready. Continued 15 96- 7-17- 29 MISSION Continued from page 15 ete Ray was buried Saturday. Dec. 9 19'79, with full military honors. Eduardo Ferrer O came to represent Brigade 2506, the Bay of Pigs invasion force, and presented the family with a Cuban flab and a plaque. About a dozen Cubans who lived in the area also came. Gov. George Wallace attended the service In his wheelchair to pay his respects. "Little girl, I'm mighty proud of you," he said. "The whole state of Alabama is mighty proud of you. You brought us home a fine Alabamian." Even her CIA caseworker came, ducking his head to a, hide from the newspaper cameras. There was a 21-gun salute. Overhead, four jets flew by the cemetery In the ceremonial fingertip formation. Then the lead plane peeled away from the others and disappeared over the horizon. Janet returned to the cemetery to sit near the grave k after the funeral. She needed to be alone with her fathet I M after the commotion of the past few days. The phone had r rung nonstop with calls from friends, relatives and the T, media. She really didn't want to talk to anyone else. P„ Earlier, she had written a five -page letter to her father and tucked it Into the breast pocket of the uniform Pete Ray H was buried in. She told him she was glad he was home. she N told him how proud she was. She told him that at first she T didn't understand why he had risked his life to fight in someone else's war. But after her years of talking to Cuban veterans and their families, she wrote, she now knew he had done it for freedom. "if you ever had to do it -over again," the letter said. "t P would want you to do it the same way." �t She sat quietly by the freshly turned dirt covered with u flowers and wished she didn't have to leave her father so soon after he had come home. On July 21, 1980, her baby was born. She named him Pete. anet Weininger Is serious about her job as an Air Force wife. She always says, "That's why we're in the service ... " or "We feel it's our duty." She is not morbid, far from it. She is lively, cheerful, funny. But death is a F matter-of-fact thing for her. She talks about It easily. It's a good thing to do. Death is a day -today possibility for jet -fighter pilots. Janet has already attended a half -dozen w funerals of her husband's comrades. "I think it's part of m% job to be strong and Independent and look after the kids." iif her husband died, she said. "i know 1 could handle it Janet stands on a street corner In Calle Ocho. t It's a beautiful Miami spring day. She has been asked if, i speak on the 26th anniversary of the Bay of Pigs invasion. Behind Janet is a monument to the fallen soldiers. It includes her father's name. "She is our daughter now," says veteran Eduardo Ferrer. Janet steps up to the microphone. She is the only persm who speaks in English, but her message is the same — Ihal the fight against communism must go on. Members of the brigade come to attention and salute w i daughter of the American who died in their country. I fighting their cause. And then the ceremony is over. But Janet is not finished. Here is an entire crowd of Bay of Pip - veterans, hundreds of people who may possess one more detail. She can never know enough. Janet steps into the crowd. "Hl," she says, pulling a notebook from her purse. "Did you know my dad?„ After the speech she returned to Homestead Air Force -' Base, where she lives in her government -issue house, with manicured lawn and Pete's bike in the driveway. At the er of the summer, her husband plans to leave the Air Force. but like her father, he too will pin the reserves. That nigh drained by the emotion of the day, sleep came quickly, surrounded as she was by her favorite sound, the constaw 1 ( enveloping roar of planes leaving and returning, leaving w returning. _ 16 I 30 95- 717 FROM THE EDITOR_-�_- FATHER'S DAY ENE STORYINGARTEN remember vividly the Kennedy -Nixon debates, and Alan 5hepard's 1t1-minute rocket ride Into "outer space," and the Cuban missile crisis, and Roger Marls' historic assault on The Babe's home run record. Those were important things in my life, at age 10, In the South Bronx. I do not remember the Bay of Pigs at all. I suppose It made no impression because it was comfortably remote, something that happened in another country, to tht other guy. It did not threaten my security: It was not an issue of spirited political debate In my household; it did not bench Roger for a crucial doubleheader. Later, when 1 studled history, I thought of the Bay of Pigs as little more than a harebrained suicide mission by poUtical fanatics. (Here la a curious fact about the study of hlatory: because you know the outcome, you tend to approach everything with d sense of predetermination. It all seems Inevitable. Of course the Bay of Pigs failed. It was destined to fail.) When I moved to Miami. I came to understand that the Bay of Pigs was far more important for what It represented — the strength of commitment of a displaced people — than for the bleak historical fact that a small band of citizen -soldiers perished or were. captured in an + ill-conceived and under-resourced invasion attempt. But the last piece of comprehension didn't really fall into place _ until I read today's cover story by Candace Turtle, about an airman named Pete Ray, one of the four Americans who died In Cuba in April 1961. Pete Ray wasn't a destitute foreigner living in bitter exilewith wild dreams of revenge. He was an American with a comfortable life and a 6-year-old daughter. In that sense, he was me. That caught my Interest. But it was the rest of the story that made me understand. Peter Ray was a military man doing his job, but his compatriots In this mission. the 1,3N young Cuban men. were not. They were Just men, not warriors — doctors and lawyers and laborers and merchants and journalists — who trained for three months to retake a country that had I been seized from them by a despot posing as n humanitarian, These broomstick soldiers had steeled themselves to fly and bomb and strafe and wade ashore onto hostile beaches with pistols and machine guns. Like Pete Ray, they kissed their wives and their 6-year-old daughters goodbye and headed for makeshift barracks In Nicaragua to prepare to die. You don't do that because you are an ideologue. You do that to redress it loss so profound that it becomes a mission forever entangled with your identity — with your sense of pride and family, with your sense of self. The lesson here Is simple, really, and it was rather naive of me not to have recognized it before. This is something that must be plain to all Cubans, as it is to Janet Ray Weininger, the real subject of our cover. The Bay of Pigs was not political. It was personal. And that makes all the difference. ere immediately painted to cover the in- aguan Air Force. During the night, pilots tafael Garcia-Pujol, Eduardo Herrera and ed the F-51 manual, preparing to fly the zing. None of us had any experience or ocular aircraft and the whole idea struck Nevertheless, next morning, one of the - I� 1 Chapter XVIII 19 APRLL 1961 I s flew to Giron earl 1 hree two -ship formation Y on the morning of the I9th. They were to give aerial support Tto the Brigade troops, whose situation was desperate. Again, American crews volunteered to fly in combat. We ; were moved by this gesture of solidarity on the hart of the advisors. By this time, in my mind they were no longer ad- visors. .. They were our brothers. i It was 0230 when the first two B-26 bombers, commanded by Billy Goodwin and Gonzalo Herrera, took off. At 0300, Joe Shannon and Nick Sedano, in one aircraft, led a second ` two -ship formation, with Riley Shamburger and Wade Gray on their wing. Thomas W. (Pete) Ray, with Leo Baker, took off sometime later, as did Mario Z&iiga, with Manuel Villafana.' A Lt. Colonel Joe Shannon emotionally recalled, "Being so closely associated with the -Cuban aircrews had given us a real sense of responsibility, and we felt a strong dedication: to their cause. Now was our time to show our friends how strongly we really felt." 1Major Billy "Do Do" Goodwin and Captain Pete Ray o•cre pilots in the Bv mingham unit of the Alabama Air National Guard, as was Major Riley Sham - burger, who was the operations Officer there. dick Sedann was an Air Guard mechanic, and Leo Baker and Wade Gray both worked for an aviation com- pany in Birmingham. 213 r t i 32: 96- 717 214 / OPERATION PUMA Soon after Goodwin had taken off from Happy Valley an official communiclud was received stating that American fighters from the carrier Essex would fly cover for our B-26's between 0630 and 0730. This was relayed to an elated Sham• burger, sitting in his cockpit minutes before take -off. "Now we'll smash them!" he shouted. Captain Manuel Navarro took off in a C-46 immediately after Goodwin and Herrera. His co-pilot was Jose Pell6n and the navigator was an American known only as "Bob." They were to land at Gir6n and deliver 8,500 pounds of ammuni• tion. Just before sunrise, Navarro had completed his mission. After unloading the plane, he picked up the injured Matias Farias, who had been shot down two days earlier. Navarro was told by a Brigade doctor, Juan Sordo, that a short distance from the airstrip was a field hospital where many wounded members of the Brigade were waiting to be evacuated. It would take more than an hour to transport them from the hospital to the airfield, therefore Navarro reluctantly decided to return to Happy Valley without the wounded. The long delay on the ground, in broad daylight, would make the transport an easy target for enemy fighters. Navarro's C-46 was the only plane to land and take off from Gir6n Airfield during the entire campaign. When he returned to base, Navarro reported to the Ameri- can advisors how serious the situation was. Ammunition was scarce and the Brigade was being driven steadily back, retreat- ing toward Gir6n. As Shannon and Shamburger approached Gir6n, they passed Goodwin, returning to base with a hanging rocket and jammed machine guns. "Do Do" and Gonzalo had attacked a convoy of tanks, armored trucks, and transport vehicles with napalm, reducing it to a pile of rubble. We were later to find that the raid had left eighty-three dead and fourteen wounded. The survivors had been taken prisoner by Brigade soldiers who had moved in following the air strike. Nearing the combat zone, Shamburger radioed Goodwin, asking if he'd seen "our friends," referring to the promised air cover. Goodwin was about to ask for an explanation when he was interrupted by Shamburger's shouted, "I'm hit! I'm hit and on fire!" Joe Shannon vividly remembers, "We made landfall shortly after dawn between Gir6n and Cienfuegos, then turned west, following the coastline and remaining just off shore. We were doing perhaps 300 mph and were down to two or three 33 95- 717 I t i had taken off from Happy Valley an vas received stating that American : w Essex would fly cover for our B-26's �. This was relayed to an elated Sham- ckpit minutes before take -off. "Now r touted. arro took off in a C-46 immediately 'era. His co-pilot was .losd Pellon and _ nerican known only as "Bob." They nd deliver 8,500 pounds of ammuni- !� Navarro had completed his mission. :ne, he picked up the injured Matias"� , of down two days earlier. a Brigade doctor, Juan Sordo, that ie airstrip was a field hospital where rs of the Brigade were waiting to be to more than an hour to transport l to the airfield, therefore Navarro •eturn to Happy galley without the ay on the ground, in broad daylight, k )rt an easy target for enemy fighters. Major Riley Shamburger Navigator wade Gray only plane to land and take off from killed in action killed in action entire campaign. hundred feet altitude. The sun was very low on the horizon base, Navarro reported to the Ameri- and Riley was a few hundred yards off shore. s the situation was. Ammunition was "Suddenly I heard a frantic radio transmission from Riley. as being driven steadily back, retreat- I looked off to my left just in time to see a T-33 coming out i• 19 APRIL 1961 / 215 hamburger approached Gir6n, they :ng to base with a hanging rocket and 'Do Do" and Gonzalo had attacked a :d trucks, and transport vehicles with pile of rubble. We were later to find !ty-three dead and fourteen wounded. . taken prisoner by Brigade soldiers ring the air strike. zone, Shamburger radioed Goodwin, r friends," referring to the promised ?bout to ask for an explanation when Shamburger's shouted, "I'm hit! I'm emembers, "We made landfall shortly 5n and Cienfuegos, then turned west, .nd remaining just off shore. We were -i and were down to two or three of the sun and firing at him. His aircraft went into the water at high speed and at a shallow angle. "I fully realized that my time was next. I instinctively made a violent left turn and, at the same time, pushed the throttles and propellor controls full forward. Before I com- pleted my turn, the Communist pilot made an abrupt -pull-up into a steep climb. I flew directly toward the sun at full throttle and as low as I could get without dipping my propel- lors4nto the water. I never saw the T-33 again." At the same time, near the Australia sugar mill, Pete Ray and Leo Baker were also engaged by an enemy fighter. "MAY -DAY! MAY -DAY! Mad Dog Four! A T-33's at- tacking us!" Gonzalo Herrera, in the midst of strafing an enemy con- voy, heard their desperate call. Listening helplessly, he heard nothing but silence. Ignoring the danger to himself, he con- tinued his attack, even more aggressively than before, remain- ing in the target area until he finally ran out of ammunition. 34 96- 717 216 /OPERATION PUMA If there was any one man in the whole operation who I believe deserved to be called "El Tigre," it was Captain Gon- zalo Herrera. Shamburger and Gray went into the sea near the coast of Gir6n. Ray and Baker were shot down near the Australia sugar mill. The Communist pilots, Alvaro Prendes and Enrique Ca- rrera-Rolas were credited with the respective kills. borrow with th., a fe w m. and bel Th, ever. Gir6n. requires C I I e J 0 L) Captain Thomas W. Ray Navigator Leo Baker killed in action killed in action F-51, J finder" About two hours later, back at Happy Valley, "Do Do" Gir6n a Goodwin had made several unsuccessful attempts to get rid and ren of the rocket which hung suspended nose down from his wing. out of Unable to shake it loose, he landed. The rocket scraped along Bade try the runway, sparked several times like a match that wouldn't foolhar light, but did not explode. brough- Exhausted, he pulled himself from the cockpit and sadly any evt reported the deaths of Shamburger and Gray and Ray and At Baker — the four American pilots who lost their lives in the Three air battle of the Bay of Pigs. in the now no -0 Get That same morning, Captain Antonio Bascar6, one of the me wet pilots who had been studying the F-51 manual the night an une. before, climbed into the cockpit of one of the Mustangs loss of V 218 / OPERATION PUMA sixty minutes of air cover had been scheduled in Washington and Gir6n time — Eastern Standard Time — and the fact that there was an hour's difference between Cuba and Nicaragua had been overlooked. The American jets flew into the airspace over 6ir6n after the American advisors had been shot down. During the time the Navy jets were in the air, none of our air- craft were in the combat zone. "Gar" broke the silence. "Don't toll the bell so loudly. This battle isn't over yet... Something's going to happen... I can't say any more right now, but..." Luis Cosme interrupted, "it's too late for a vague promise like that, `Gar.' Our hands have been tied from the very start. I believe this operation is a failure. We've suffered enough casualties. Half of our Air Force has already been lost, and the Brigade's situation is hopeless. There's no way we can help them now, and I see no reason to continue the flights and lose even more men. Appoint a new chief of operations if you want, but no Cuban pilot will fly out again while I'm in command." In four days of battle, beginning on 15 April and ending { on the 19th, thirty-six missions had been flown. Eight planes had been lost. Fourteen pilots, four of them Americans, had been killed. In Gir6n, the infantry troops of the Brigade were fighting a bloody retreat. At 1700, 19 April 1961, Brigade Chief Josd de San Romdn radioed his last message: "I have ordered all equipment destroyed. We have nothing left to fight with. The enemy tanks are overrunning our position. Good-bye, my friends." I felt a tremendous bitterness. There had to be a way to save our companions at Gir6n. I still had, deep inside, an un- shakable confidence in the government of the United States. Surely something would be done — a last-ditch effort — to strike a blow that would turn the imminent defeat into victory. I walked toward the flight line where seven 13-26's, five C-46's and four C-54's were parked. As I looked at the rows of bombs and rockets, the idea that we still had enough planes and ammunition for another raid ran through my mind. Wandering along the runway with only my thoughts for com- pany, the drive to keep on fighting was almost overwhelming — THERE MUST BE SOMETHING THAT CAN BE DONE! Hours passed before I finally surrendered to exhaustion. I had flown twenty-eight of the last forty-eight hours. I went into my tent, threw myself on the bunk, and slept for sixteen straight hours. li .o get to the beach by loaded and he was -it's chaplain, Father into the cockpit and I want to go." ). They've got priests to be on the beaches. ok anyone except his :e men called it "the officers) to keep the• .ind tie them in place defenseless aircraft. i to the front. way to shake off the in, thrust it into the in this airplane is if is eyes popped out. ids of ammunition, got runway "by one oo slow for his B-26 :ed that his machine 'orking. After some <. He couldn't have me alive with a crv: of Ferrer's friends, j a bomb run at the 33 jets and one Sea shot down another American jets from that was attacking 1 and left. j ring from the cabin on his right. Even 1 ut of a window. As ere American jets. .n. Only when the Invasion 235 navigator rushed back did the firing cease. Apparently all the shooting had gone wild. Ferrer identified himself to Crespo by his code name, Falcon One, and asked for Crespo's situation. The stricken plane's left engine was destroyed. Most of the navigation equipment wasn't working. Crespo couldn't tell what else was wrong; something vas, because he was losing air speed steadily. He wanted Ferrer to fly back to base within sight of him "so if I fall in the water you know where I am and they can pick me up tomorrow." Ferrer agreed. It was getting dark. He did not want to abandon his comrade. Besides, there was little chance that he could land his ammunition, no matter how urgently it was needed —not with two T-33s nearby. Two hours out of Cuba, Eddie Ferrer asked Crespo how he was doing. "I'm losing air speed and altitude," Crespo radioed. "I'm going to have to ditch pretty soon." Father Cavero asked to use the radiophone to call Crespo and his co-pilot. Would they like hiin to hear confession? They did. Ferrer and his men removed their earphones. The priest stepped behind a bulkhead and took the confessions in private. Another hour later, Crespo said, "Eddie, the situation -is bad. I'm three or four hundred feet from the water. I'm going to have to ditch in about two or three minutes." Ferrer responded, "God bless you. I hope you make it all right. You have been very brave, and your co-pilot too. I will try to look for you tomorrow. Give me a last holler just before you get into the water." About ten more minutes passed before Crespo's shout came over the radio: "Hitting the water!" The next day Ferrer returned to search the area. He found no trace of the plane or its men. By Tuesday the Cuban pilots at Puerto Cabezas had become an intractable,,problem. All were exhausted. Many were disgusted. Some had turned chicken. They were no longer making extra turns over the targets. Teegan found that only about one third were "ready to go." With the others, the Americans "had to beg them to go." By now, "it took several hours to get some of their crews in the aircraft, and then they aborted the mission." They constantly "found excuses not to do the job." You "could count the number of 'tigers' on one hand." The experienced, relatively rested American pilots had become desperately needed. For the first time, Bissell authorized American pilots to fly combat W_ 717 37 1W 236 BAY OF PIGS missions. They were volunteers known as "Peters" and "Seig"--CIA contract men, not from the Alabama National Guard. Joined by the most courageous Cubans, including Gus Ponzoa, they headed for Cuba at 2 P.�t. Barely over land, they spotted a long column of trucks and tanks approaching Giron and Blue Beach. The Castro troops mistook them for friendlies, an accident that happened consistently to both sides. Instead of dispersing, they began to cheer. It was a deadly mistake. The six Brigade planes swooped down, dropping napalm and regular bombs, firing rockets, inflicting an estimated eighteen hundred casualties and destroying seven tanks. Gar thought the mission had been remarkably fortunate. He had asked Washington for jet air cover from the Essex for the first time. Headquarters messaged back that it would try to get authority. No word had come. Gar briefed his bomber crews on a "scissors" maneuver which sometimes, with enormous luck, made it possible to trap a T-33 between two well -coordinated B-26s. What had really turned the mission into a shining success, as Gar knew, was the circumstance that Castro's pilot's happened not to have been in the air. Later that day, Gar called the two senior American pilots, Riley Shamburger and Joe Shannon, to the operations tent within its special bamboo security fence. Reid Doster was there. done had slept for three days. All were kept alert by Dr. Marrs's pills. As a squadron operations officer back in Birmingham, the boisterous Major Shamburger had been one of four Alabama pilots who had been briefed on the operation in Washington. Lieutenant Colonel Shannon, his squadron commander, had also been in that select group. The other Americans had been told they were back-up pilots, to fly in combat in the event of dire need. Shamburger and Shannon had been warned they could not fly at all. They had too much intelligence information in their heads. Shannon had been happy to hear that. He was a shy man, pink- cheeked, open-eyed, cherubic. He had flown fighters all over Africa and Italy in World War II and B-25s in China and India. He had been a full-time instructor pilot with the Air Guard ever since. He was almost forty, had three children and had not been eager to fight anymore. Now he felt differently. He had a stake in the success of the mission. He had been "terribly disappointed" when the "no-go" message had arrived canceling the second air strike while he had been on duty in the operations tent Monday morning. He couldn't understand what Wash- ington was waiting for. Now they had changed their minds again. Teegan told him and Shamburger that headquarters had given clearance S i l Invasion 237 for five B-26 missions to be flown that night. Four crews were to be American. All the others had already been briefed. Shannon felt "no reluctance." He was "excited." The sheer fact that he and Shamburger were permitted to fly was "sign of a desperation effort." It also made him think that Washington had not yet given up. Gar's instructions were brief. They were to penetrate the beachhead area and destroy whatever they could, especially trucks and tanks. Shannon and Shamburger knew the roads well; they had briefed the Cuban pilots about them repeatedly. Both pilots carried maps and photos. Both planes would have two extra tanks with spare fuel. Shannon would also carry a napalm bomb. Washington had only very lately authorized the use of napalm. The two pilots got about two hours of fitful sleep. Takeoff for the nine -hundred -mile trip was 3 R.M. Shannon went first, then they flew side by side. Shannon's napalm bomb, suspended under one wing, created a drag and slowed them down by five to ten knots per hour. Joe felt no trace of fatigue. The sun was still low when they hit land about j twenty miles east of the Bay of figs. They corrected their course and quickly spotted a cloud of dust. It was a column of trucks. "You go in first and get rid of your napalm," Shamburger radioed Shannon. "OK." They had earlier agreed on this tactic because flying with napalm created an extra hazard. Shannon started to turn toward the dust. Then he heard a hoarse, high-pitched yell from his comrade: "I'm hit and on fire!" "What'd you hit?" There was no answer. At that instant, Shannon saw Shamburger's plane at one hundred feet over the, beach, headed for the water at three hundred miles an hour. He watched him hit the sea hard at a shallow angle. There was no chance of survival for the happy-go-lucky pilot or for his co-pilot, Wade C. Gray, who had been a radio and electronics technician at Hayes Aircraft and lived in Pinson, a Birmingham suburb. It was not Shannon's first experience watching death in combat. He had lost several of his tent mates on two of his missions during the war in Africa. Anyway, there was no time for reflection. Directly over the beach at two hundred feet he spotted the Castro T-33 that had hit Shamburger. Shannon pulled right toward the T-bird as hard as he could. Instinctively, he knew that if he turned away from the jet it would hit his lumbering old plane too. As it was, the Cuban pilot had no choice. He had to evade. And he did, pulling up abruptly. Shannon slid by directly under him. ]Less than two hundred feet separated the 96- 1'� 39 238 BAY OF PIGS planes. Briefly, they headed in opposite directions. By the time Shannon turned to train his guns on the jet, it had turned steeply up into the sun to be less visible. Shannon never saw it again. He stayed at full throttle, heading toward base. The clouds were small and widely scattered. He stayed "inches off the water" —his only protection against attack. He was becoming angry thinking of Riley Shamburger and the beer -and -barbecue parties which he and his wife had attended at Shamburger's big house in suburban East Lake, with Riley munching his favorite addiction, "parched" peanuts. Joe Shannon "wanted revenge." When he landed at Happy Valley, the first to get back from that morning's missions, he said he wanted to fly another mission right away. Gar and Doster shook their heads. There would be no more flights. Billy Goodwin, another of the Alabama B-26 pilots who was substitut- ing for Cubans that morning, also learned of Shamburger's death at close range. He had left base at 1:30 A.M. with four rockets, two napalm bombs, and five hundred gallons of extra fuel instead of bombs in the bomb bay. For the past three days, he too had been too worried about "the war" to sleep, but his yellow "Bennies" kept him going. The sky was turning gray when he hit Cuba at 5:30 A.M., missing the beach at first by fifteen miles —"not bad for a nine -hundred -mile Right." Off the beachhead just before sunup he spotted an enemy convoy. Goodwin had not flown in combat before, and he never forgot his first target: two jeeps, one three -quarter -ton carryall and four two -and -a -half -ton trucks. He had the enemy vehicles lined up in the sights of his machine guns and pulled the correct switch. The guns would not fire. He was over the convoy now. Ile pulled the switch to release his napalm. The napalm would not release. Frantically he kept hitting the switches. Nothing happened. Then he spotted three tanks. He fired his rockets, but the ammunition was not armor -piercing. He hit one tank, but the rocket ricocheted right off. One rocket did hit a truck. It was 6:03 A.M., time to turn back, especially since the Cubans in the target convoy had shot one cylinder off his right engine. It slowed him to 190 knots from his normal cruising speed of 230. He was starting to fly just over the water when he heard Shamburger and Shannon talking to each other over the radio. It was a shock to hear and recognize their familiar voices after so many hours of silence. Billy made his presence known. "Have you seen any of our little friends?" asked Riley. Billy knew, this was Shamburger's way to refer to the enemy. "Yeah," he said, "but my guns won't fire." lis re 01 tl fr u1. b. b fr t( By the time led steeply up leading toward yed "inches off coming angry parties which e in suburban )n, "parched" ded at Happy is, he said he er shook their was substitut- ger's death at :s, two napalm bombs in the worried about oing. The sky the beach at light." Off the loy. Goodwin rst target: two alf-ton trucks. machine guns was over the The napalm hes. `nothing ,kets, but the ut the rocket _ubans in the slowed him to starting to fly ion talking to cognize their his presence illy knew this Invasion 239 "Don't feel like the Lone Ranger," Shamburger said. "Lune won't work, either." Billy heard Shannon say, "Riley; where are you?" "Behind you and to your right." Then Billy heard Shamburger's shout, "I'm hit and on fire!" He listened helplessly as Shannon repeatedly called Riley without getting a reply. Then Shannon said quietly, "T-birds got Riley." Moments later Goodwin encountered two unmarked jets that turned out to be American. A third one was about a thousand feet higher and to the left. Goodwin was amazed. Nobody had told him there were friendly aircraft in the area.' At first he thought the jets might he unfriendly. In fact, if he "hadn't been strapped in, I'd have jumped so bad I'd been off to the moon." His own plane carried Cuban markings, but the Americans somehow knew he was friendly. He could see the freckles in the area of the pilots' eyes between the oxygen masks and the tops of the helmets. He gave them a thumbs -up signal and tried to motion them toward Joe Shannon, who presumably needed help. It irked him not to be able to talk to the Americans. There was no way. Their radios operated on a VHF frequency, Billy was on UHF. It was another unanticipated flaw in the planning. Goodwin was almost over the Cayman Islands when he heard Shannon call for assistance. Goodwin told him he could not help. He said he was running low on gas, his right engine was missing, and his guns would not fire. He encountered two more B-26s and told them what had h-ppened over the beaches. They turned back. The only Cuban pilot to make it to the beaches that morning, Gonzalo Herrera, the most daring man in the Cuban crews, was still in the air. He had been assigned to strafe and bomb artillery positions in the San Blas area. He Liad managed to drop his entire bomb load on his targets, but he could tell that his B-26 had been hit. One propeller was vibrating, and the right engine was losing oil pressure. He was skimming across the swamp behind the beachhead just above treetop level when he heard an American pilot call in distress, "Mad Dog Four! Mad Dog Four! May Day! May Day! T-33 attacking us." He then heard the voice begging for help from the Essex: "We are Americans! Help us!" An American voice replied, "I am a naval officer and I must obey my orders." 'The message that the President okayed a 6:30-to-7:30 A.m. air cover from the Essex did not reach Puerto Cabezas until all but the last plane had left the base. Gar Teegan tore it out of the Teletype, jumped into his jeep, and made a dash to the flight line. The right engine of the B-26 was already turning. Car jumped on the left wing, ran to the cockpit, waving the yellow slip of paper, shouting, "We've got the air cover!" 9 6 - 717 1 4 i i. 41 �i 240 BAY OF PIGS Herrera turned when he reached the water, climbed to a thousand feet to check his engines, and spotted enemy trucks rolling down a highway. As he dived at them, his machine gun firing, he heard another May Day call from the American B-26 in distress. This time the call was broken off by an explosion. Herrera turned and saw a ball of fire approximately one mile to his right. Herrera had witnessed disaster for two more Americans: Thomas Willard (Pete) Ray and Leo Francis Baker. Ray had been a technical inspector at Hayes in Birmingham. He lived in Center Point and had maintained his pilot's proficiency rating by flying B-26s and F-84s in General Doster's Alabama guard unit. Baker, born in Boston, had been a flight engineer for Haves and also worked hard at running two pizza parlors in Birmingham." Navy in Handcuffs The Navy airmen on the carrier Essex had been confined to a maddening spectator role. On Tuesday Commander Mike Griffin landed his "Blue Blasters" A4D jet on the flight deck and came up to the bridge to report to Captain Searcy. Griffin had just overflown the beach area and helplessly watched the Brigade being driven back to the sea. Searcy was shocked by the pilot's appearance. Griffin's face was blue. Tears were running down it without restraint. He was so angry and upset that it took a couple of minutes before he could utter a word. "I hate to see a grown man cry, but I didn't blame him," Searcy said later. The captain was "surprised" that some of the pilots didn't take the battle into their own hands and drop bombs against orders. He "wouldn't have blamed them." Earlier, Jim Forgy, the executive officer of the jets aboard the Essex, 'Dr. F6rnandez Mell of Castro's inner circle of commanders found the remnants of the plane smoking heavily when he g6t there a few minutes later. Mell remembered his instructions to capture as many invaders as possible alive, especially any pilots. Leading some twenty militiamen, he came upon one of the pilots (Ray) holding a hand grenade. The American removed the firing pin and was ready to throw the grenade when a submachine gun blast killed him from two yards away. Mell and his group ran into a small swampy wooded area. He heard shouts: "Surrender! Surrender!" He yelled, "Don't shoot! Don't shoot!" He heard a shot followed by a burst of submachine gun fire. He was at the scene within seconds. A militiaman was standing over another body: a blond fair -skinned man wearing gray pants, white T-shirt and tennis shoes. He was still breathing. The doctor bent down. The man was clinically dead of multiple wounds up and down his body. Nell was furious. "Why did you shoot him?" he yelled at the militiaman. "He shot first!" Mell searched the body. He found a buffalo nickel; a U.S, pilot's license, number 0832321-M; and a Social Security card, number 014-07--6921, in the name of Leo Francis Bell, 148 Beacon Street, Boston, Massachusetts. (This was the identification given to Baker, one of four Alabama Air National Guard pilots killed that morning. On June 8, 1978, a spokesman for MIXREX, the Cuban Foreign Ministry, told the author that Baker's body was still in a Havana morgue. Why was it never reported or released? "We're waiting for the U.S. government to claim it," he said.) had flown orders onl troubled h the beach. beaten, an. one had ir. He was "tallyhoed with his 2 Forgy was lock on tr Essex. Fol the contra was franti, "Don't ' changed.* Forgy sea with 1 Patrolli for permi- away. Th �•isibility Castro S< Brigade. - closing it: „I've e controlle: "Stand The sil Fury, Sli: ' Negat Cursin much slo If he cou wing-to-k backed bomber bomber I to be goi On thi was plag, 96- 717 4 r r Copied Tian, 1964 from print reo#4 from F-01 Pb. Major Rudolf Anderson., Jr,. Official NPCFA+4vr. fZ yn �y�y r dtJ �.i �1�3 FP- - � -.J J >�• f. IT f L �yJ� ' � J fy}„•' '� �5 I M J• *� i}L 7 y- f r t t Nf� jz rµf t ! b rFJt • f i % � t w- Y .�.» � � T�''_. i c 1 �. ,• f• ; r s=yti c '• i,L!i���IIIIIi COMMITTEE TO RESCUE THE CUBAN i! II HISTORICAL ROOTS & MONUMENTS IN THE WORLD P.O. Box 44-1926. Miami, FI.-rida 33144 MAJOR RUDOLF ANDS SON JR. October 3rd. Undersecretary of State George Bull testified before the House Select Committee on Missiles that 15SAM Sites had been established in Cuba and the total might eventually reach 25. An additional 3 or 4 different sites (of coastal defense types sites with a 20-25 mile range. He stated all sites were of a defense capabilities and did not offer any offensive capability against the U.S. or other nations of the Hemisphere. Weather hindered further reconnaisance over Cuba. October 14, Sunday. The cloud cover over Cuba broke enough to send out U-2 reconnaisance. At 8:00 PM, Monday October 15, military and intelligence men developing and studying photographs taken from the U-2 piloted by Air Force Major, Rudolf Anderson Jr., finally concluded that they were looking at pictures of eight ballistic missile launch pads under con- struction in a remote area of Western Cuba. At 8:45 on October 16 Mac George Bundy informed President Kennedy of hard evidence of Russian offensive missiles in Cuba. On October 27 Major Anderson made his last ile fated mission over Cuba. The mission was designed to cover the Eastern Section of Cuba. He left McCoy Air Force Base, at Orlando, FL at 8:10 AM for an estimated 3.5 hour flight. He made land fall on the Northern coast of Cuba at 9:15 AM, flew South to San- tiago de Cuba, over Guantanamo and then North to Banes. His mission ended over the North coast of Cuba. It was determined that the Los Angeles surface to air (SAM) site near the town of Banes, Oriente, fired the SA-2 missile that shot down Major Anderson. The CIA reported that the SA-2 system was under the total and complete control of the Soviets. President Kennedy wrote Mrs. Ander- son.and her two sons, offering personal condolences. He also authorized the awarding of the Distinguished Service Medal posthumously, the highest honor that can be bestoned in peacetime. On November 5, Cuban authorities in keeping with a promise to Secretary General U-Thant of the United Nations, surrendered the body of Major Rudolf Anderson to the Swiss Ambassador in Havana, Cuba. Brigadier Indar Riknye flea frcm Miami to Havana and brought Anderson's body back to the United States. An autopsy revealed that fragments from the SA-2 had penetrated the pilot's pressurizer suit and that instant decompression had occurred.There were small flesh wounds on the body where fragments had been taken from it. The suturing of the wounds were that of a mortitian rather than of a surgeon. Major Anderson was buried with full military honors at Woodlawn Memorial Park in Greemvo;e. South Carolina. i CODESIGNATION APPLICATION CITY OF MIAMI PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT 275 N.W. 2ND STREET, 4TH FLOOR MIAMI, FLORIDA 33128 Corr/ 7Wr �,ev- �'� .��T� Ih� �y�ea�s T�c�n,�o,✓� Applicant `�one Number Address X e %27-•f &4t�c-, Type of designation requested: Location (Street): 1, Marker (Place) �4V64/ye ski' 2. Plaza From IAVe-6 - �JSQ a:;-7,—e,=E7- 3 . Street Codes 1 gnat i on To-�XIa--6i57- To be honored �`'✓a�� ���0� �'�"•�4�� �� 1 Brief reason for codes i gnat 1 on request: RRV PV 41c' IA1 l �C (Attach additional background Information If necessary) 1 NON-REFUNDABLE'APPLICATION FEE A. Street co -designation .....................:......... $700.00 B. Marker designation .................................. $700.00 C. Plaza designation ................................... S700.00 I understand, as stated in the City Code, Section r--4-92, all expenses on the part of the City or any other governmental agency_ resulting from requests for street codesignatlons, markers or plazas shall be paid by the applicant In addition to any fees. This ap IIcatlon carries a non-refundable fee as stated in Section 4-93 f'�de. 7th Signature of Applicant Date *If the application Is approved by the City Commission, 46 additional fees will be required. Please see the attache _ General Instructions and Information. 71'7 2 Gc,,eral instruction and Information Submit completed application to City of Miami Public Works Department, 275 N.W. 2 Street, Miami, Florida 33128, ATTN: Executive Secretary, Co-designatlon Committee. Three methods of designation will be considered: a. Marker, by which a plaque or sign bearing a designation shall be mounted separately on a stone or post in the right-of-way, and designated as "place." b. Plaza, by which the Intersection of two streets shall be designated or as relevant to the site. The designation shall be mounted on the post under the street signs at the intersection. c. Co -designation of a street by which a numbered street shall receive an additional designation under the numbered street on the street sign, or traffic overhead cables. 3. After the application and fee have been submitted, the committee will review the request using the following criteria and to make recommendations to the City Commission. a. Named streets e.g., as in Coconut Grove, shall not be changed where there is a historical tradition attached to the existing name. b. Named streets shall not be codesignated because of the resulting confusion. C. Numbered streets shall not be codesignated for merely commercial purposes. d. Numbered streets shall only be codesignated if there is significant historical, neighborhood or community benefit to the codesignation. e. Numbered street codesignation shall not exceed five (5) blocks In length. Ideally, the co-rdeslgnat [on should begin and terminate at a signalized Intersection. f. Numbered streets shall not be codesignated with the names of public officials holding office at the time of the codesignation. A period of not less than five (5) years shall elapse after a living public official's termination of office before a numbered street shall be codesignated with the name of said public official. g. Block numbers shall be added to any new street signs that reflect codesignation. { 464 EYEBALL TO EYEBALL orders from the president. Angered, LeMay hung up. "He chickened out again. How in the hell do you get men to risk their lives when the SAMs are not attacked?" When an aide said he would wait at the phone for the president's order, LeMay disgustedly said, "It will never come!" At 2 P.m. on October 27, the EXCOM met with the president to discuss the loss of Anderson's U-2 and the fact that pilots of low- level reconnaissance missions were beginning to report their air planes were being fired on by small arms and light anti-aircraft weapons. The U-2 shoot -down had escalated the crisis, and General III Taylor was concerned that some kind of retaliatory action had to be taken. As he would later relate, in the military when you are shot l at, you must let your men shoot back. If not, you shouldn't commit (j them to a mission in the first place. There were a variety of rec-ommendations. McCone felt that President Kennedy should send a strongly worded letter to Khrushchev protesting the shoot -down. He added, "If there's any continuation of this, we just take those SAM sites out of there." 18 McCone's idea of a strong letter to Khrushchev, however, was not seriously considered. There was general agreement that aerial surveillance of Cuba had to continue and that the SAM site that downed the U-2 should be destroyed, but no time for its destruction was agreed to. Downing of the U-2 had also raised the prospect that continued high -altitude reconnaissance of Cuba was now out of the question. Reconnaissance experts began to review options. One possibility was to use the new SR-71 aircraft. Although it had been test -flown, it had not achieved operational status. Use of the 240-inch camera also was reviewed, along with employing the Firebee reconnaissance drone. The i EXCOM agreed that U-2 reconnaissance would be suspended tem- porarily, but low -altitude reconnaissance would be continued and expanded, with the reconnaissance aircraft escorted by armed i fighters. ° The Joint Chiefs of Staff were concerned that the longer the EXCOM deliberations took, the more advanced the Soviets' prepa- rations and defenses became. In addition to all of the MRBM sites being operational, so too were all of the SA-2 sites, making it more difficult and more costly to destroy them. The EXCOM then returned to the two Khrushchev letters. General I 1 I 49 9 5 - 717 OCTOBER 27-ALL THE MRBM SITES ARE OPERATIONAL 477 That evening, too, Radio Havana boasted that Cuban anti-aircraft batteries had driven off unidentified planes. That night, soldiers were seen unloading medicine and surgical equipment in the base-..w. - ments of all the large buildings in Havana. The anti-aircraft guns around Havana were all manned. Shortly after midnight, hundreds of women reported to nursing stations. Havana, it appeared, was fully alerted for an attack. At midnight, Radio Havana would wearily announce that "This ends one of the longest nights of these times in Cuba." With no U-2's flying, low -altitude missions were directed to fly near the Los Angeles SAM site in an attempt to locate Anderson's downed U-2. The U.S. Navy was directed to also search the sea, since the Los Angeles SAM site was near the coast. The secretary of defense declared Major Anderson missing in action after all rescue and search efforts failed. The Cubans would later admit that Major Anderson was "downed by our anti-aircraft weapons." (In the November 5 edition of Revolution, two photographs of Major Anderson's plane were published. It had fallen on land and, from the look of the wreckage, had fallen hard.) That night, President Kennedy wrote to Mrs. Anderson and her two sons, offering his personal. condolences. He also authorized the awarding of the Distinguished Service Medal posthumously to Major Anderson, the highest honor that can be bestowed in peacetime. McCone had suggested that Major Anderson b`e awai 1&d the Congressional Medal -of Honor sirce the crisis was in_a near wartime environment, but he_was overruie.d_by McNamara. The dawning of Anderson at the eastern end of the island led to ( speculation that there were additional undiscovered offensive missile I bases there or some military activity so significant that the Russians ' would risk downing a U-2 to protect it. The premise that nuclear warheads were stored somewhere in this area was also raised. Pho- tographic searches of all target areas of Major Anderson's flight track were ordered by the Defense Department, but nothing of'significance was found. The timing of the'U-2 shoot -down was particularly unfortunate because the U.S. military was now strongly advocating that the only solution to the crisis was an immediate air strike and invasion of Cuba, since it was now obvious that the Russians and Cubans were 50 9 6 - 717 I not n tMU V tU 527 i of*the removal of that Mikoyan could resolve the issue in his negotiations in Havana. oection and on -site The Havana negotiations with Castro, of course, were on dead center. ensive weapons in On Sunday, November 5, McCloy, with additional support from to persuade Castro Sheldon, met with Kuznetsov again. McCloy emphasized again that cCone argued, and some U.S. administration experts, frustrated with Castro, were still -ing data and mon- strongly advocating the bombing of the two airfields where the .econnaissance. He bombers were located. Castro remained firm, claiming that the bomb - -ven days. Because ers had been purchased from Russia and belonged to Cuba. President want that on clear Kennedy remained just as adamant that the I1-28's had to be removed from Cuba. Premier Khrushchev, in several notes to Kennedy, had ie MiG-21 fighters made proposals regarding the 11-28's, all of which were labeled un- -d, "It was another acceptable by the White House. The president had implied politely air." The EXCOM but firmly that Khrushchev should not delay removing the "offen- 28's had to be re- sive" bombers as he had promised to do with the missiles. �At 4:15 P.M. on November 5, Cuban authorities, in keeping with pport on the I1-28 a promise to U Thant, surrendered the body of Major Rudolf An- on to keep McCloy derson to the Swiss ambassador in Havana. Brigadier Indar Jit Rikhye provided Sheldon flew from Miami to Havana and brought Anderson's body back to and ground pho- the United States. An autopsy revealed that fragments from the ailable at the CIA. SA-2 had penetrated the pilot's pressurized suit and that instant net with both Ste- decompression had occurred. There were small flesh wounds on the body where fragments had been taken from it. The suturing of the ith Kuznetsov and wounds was that of a mortician rather than of a surgeon. M___ya'or McCloy said that Anderson was buried with full military honors_ at Woodlawm Me- rs' presence. Kuz- mortal Park in Grenv_ille`South Carolina. r ----- - din the "offensive Eleanor Roosevelt would be buried besi e her husband in the rose that the bombers garden at Hyde Park, New York. President Kennedy, Vice -President �refore could cer- Johnson, and ex -Presidents Truman and Eisenhower attended the ; jy then raised the funeral. Others attending were Adlai Stevenson, Chief Justice Earl Cuba, the United Warren, Justice Arthur Goldberg, Governor Nelson Rockefeller, ex - have to intensify Governor Herbert H. Lehman, and cabinet members of Franklin Roo-. , guarantee not to sevelt's adgiinistration. President Kennedy, although recognizing stated there was Stevenson, paid more attention to Presidents Truman and Eisen- -I the Congress to hoover before hurrying back to Washington. More than ever, Ste- netsov ended the venson felt that the Washington establishment had forgotten him. e discussed again He instead turned to his friends. A week later, Stevenson would be uznetsov had no the principal speaker at a memorial service for Mrs. Roosevelt at the he Soviets hoped Cathedral of St. John the Divine in New York City. 1 `i 4 51 . . .............. . ; 162 EYEBALL TO EYEBALL naissance program over Cuba. The SAC plan contained no provision for the use of CIA pilots but did require the use of the Agency U-2's. Two experienced SAC U-2 pilots from the 4080th Strategic Wing, at Laughlin Air Force Base, Del Rio, Texas —Major Rudolf Anderson, Jr., and Major Richard Heyser—were sent to Edwards Air Force Base to be checked out in flying the Agency's more advanced U-2's. While the JCS was planning for the possible invasion of Cuba, Undersecretary of State George Ball, on October 3, was called before the House Select Committee on Export Control to testify on "Trading Relations between the Free World and Cuba." There had been con- siderable irritation and frustration among the congressmen and sen- ators regarding NATO allies either trading or providing ships to carry supplies to Cuba. There was special sensitivity about British trade with Cuba. After testifying on trade, Ball reviewed in great detail the Soviet arms shipments to Cuba. On missiles, he said that fifteen SAM sites had been established on the island and that the total might eventually reach twenty-five. Then he said, "In addition, three and possibly four missile sites of a different type have been identified. These sites are similar to known Soviet coastal -defense sites with a range of 20-25 miles. Quite likely several more sites will be installed."" When asked by Representative A. Paul Kitchin; chairman of the committee, if Cuba was becoming an offensive base, Ball confidently replied that our intelligence was complete, good, and very hard. "All the indications are that this equipment is basically of a defensive capability and that it does not offer any offensive capabilities to Cuba against the United States or the other nations of the hemisphere.' In the meantime, mission planners were particularly harassed be- cause it was the hurricane season. The 1962 season was marked by eight hurricanes: Alma, Becky, Carla, Celia, Daisy, Ella, Ester, and Hattie. On October 3, tropical storm Daisy began building up to hurricane strength in the Caribbean, dumping heavy rains on Cuba. Daisy headed up the U.S. coast to New England before battering Nova Scotia on October 8. Every available means for checking weather was employed on a daily basis. The intelligence community maintained steadfastly after the crisis that it was the weather that had hindered reconnaissance over Cuba 52 96- 717 �A 368 PRESIDENT KENNEDY there will be total surveillance of Cuba and there will be more turmoil in Cuba than Castro has yet experienced or imagined. On October 14, the President went out to Indiana to campaign against Senator Capehart, who was being challenged for reelection by a young Democrat named Birch Bayh. It was a Sunday and also happened to be the first day the cloud cover over Cuba broke enough to send out a U-2. In Indianapolis, Kennedy was saying: "These self. -appointed generals and admirals who want to send somebody else's son to war ought to be kept home by the voters and be replaced by somebody like Birch Bayh, who has some understanding of what the twentieth century is all about." The President then went on to Buffalo, New York, for more campaign speechmaking, getting back to Washington at 1:45 A.M. on Monday, The lights of at least one government office were on despite the hour. Inside the National Photographic Interpretation Center in the center of the city, military and intelligence men were developing and studying the photographs taken from the U-2, piloted by an Air.Forcc mayor If Anderson Jr. It was not until eight o'clock on iV1on av night, while the President was having dinner in the White House with his disabled father —Mrs. Kennedy was on a four -week holiday in Italy, providing the press of the world with lively pictures that the President thought were hurting him politically —when the photographic interpreters finally con- cluded that they were looking at pictures of eight ballistic missile launch pads under construction in a remote area in the west of Cuba. It was almost 9:00 P.m. before McGeorge Bundy, who was hosting a 1 dinner at home for Chip Bohlen before Bohlen left to take up his new l post as Ambassador to France, was informed. Bundy thought the Presi- dent was probably tired from his campaign trip and decided that there was no point in bothering him before morning. At 8:45 A.M. on Tues- day, October 16, the first photographs under his arm, he knocked on the President's door. Kennedy was sitting on the edge of his bed, wearing a bathrobe and slippers, surrounded by the papers and newspapers he had been reading. "Mr. President," Bundy said, "there is now hard photographic evi- dence, which you will see, that the Russians have offensive missiles in Cuba." Kennedy told Bundy to set up a meeting that morning, reeling off names, the first his brother. He called the Attorney General. "We have some big trouble. I want you over here." Robert Kennedy was already in his office, waiting for Richard Helms, who was coming with a Soviet defector he had asked to meet. { 96- 717 i OCTOBER 27---ALL THE MRBM SITES ARE OPERATIONAL 461 l :ff as to what action the 26 Red Star editorial had reflected the Russian concern: "It is no at the next Soviet move secret in the USA that the ill -famed reconnaissance plane —the I was disturbed by Khru- U-2--in violation of all the norms of international law, has pene- describe as offensive." trated Cuban airspace to photograph its defenses and other objec- dication of Soviet main- tives." Castro, meanwhile, was demanding an assurance from wever, that Khrushchev Moscow that if the U.S. invaded Cuba, the Soviets would launch the faced with either inglo- missiles against the U.S. Pons —either one a hel- The leadership of Strategic Air Command, responsible for con - { negotiations under the ducting U-2 overflights, was still extremely sensitive and possessive S. armed forces should of its authority. Although Agency U-2 pilots and flight personnel JCS concern was com- had been sent to McCoy Air Force Base to assist in flight operations, they were seldom called upon. The number of U-2 flights had been aon that the Soviet po- increased after the missiles were found in Cuba, and concern was )ordinated with Castro. expressed in Washington about the possible fatigue factor imposed ters and messages were upon the only two SAC pilots, majors Anderson and Heyser, who to put themselves in a were each flying as many as two missions a day. Washington was the U.S. When Castro demanding more and more photo -reconnaissance coverage, but it oposai, he was furious. was not known how long the need for such sustained reconnaissance Govern: "I would have would continue. General LeMay had suggested, however, to the furious when he com- undersecretary of the Air Force, Joseph V. Charyk, that Agency pilots er. I realize in retrospect were not needed and Charyk had agreed. The CIA had always been with Kennedy. If my careful in preparations of its U-2 missions over Cuba, ensuring that en a terrible war. I was adequate safety measures were employed. Major Anderson's October 27 flight, however, was not supported with radar, sigint, or optical ireatened on the mom- tracking coverage. There were no support aircraft with elaborate aircraft that violated sigint or elint monitoring equipment flying the periphery of Cuba ` USIB for the low-level while Anderson's U-2 was over the island. The CINCLANT land - photography had re- based radars were not capable of reaching the eastern end of Cuba, anti-aircraft positions and SAC had not requested naval vessels with sufficient radar ca- i pacity to act in a "fill-in" mode in monitoring Anderson's U-2. Be- ork underwent a major cause of the number of missions being flown by Anderson and issians had taken com- Heyser, SAC could not provide a second U-2 to fly the periphery of dcast channels and the Cuba with the capability of visually observing and conversing with sites were now tightly the photo -taking U-2. y;tern was also apparent The ill-fated U-2 mission of Major Rudolf Anderson on October s, and procedures now 27 was designed to cover the eastern section of Cuba. He left McCoy ie tracking of all U.S. Air Force Base, at Orlando, Florida, at 8:10 A.M. for an estimated persistent. An October I 3.5-hour flight. He made landfall on the northern coast of Cuba at f 95- '7117 54 462 EYEBALL TO EYEBALL 9:15 A.M., flew southward to Santiago de Cuba, over Guantdnamo, and then northward to Banes. Suddenly, at about 10 A.M., and with- out any warning or any voice transmission, his mission apparently ended near Cuba's northern coast. It was not immediately apparent whether Anderson's flight had terminated because of hypoxia—i.e., a failure in the oxygen system —or if he had been downed by an SA-2 missile. At first, military experts favored the first hypothesis because Major Anderson had equipment in his plane to detect an SA-2 fired at him and would have reported it. Representatives of the JCS hurried to the Steuart Building, and after tracking the flight plan and times against photography, it became obvious that the culprit had been the Los Angeles SA-2 site near Banes. It took NSA several hours to sort their data and conclude that Anderson's U-2 had been downed by an SA-2 missile. (There have been a number of reports that Castro gave the com- mand to down the U-2 or that there had been a firefight between the Russians and Cubans and that the Cubans had taken over the SA-2 site. Another version was that Castro had visited an SA-2 site and, knowing that the site was tracking a U-2, pressed the fire button, much to the consternation of the Soviet commander. The intelligence community would believe none of this.) The CIA reported that the SA-2 system was under the total and complete control of the Soviets: "The SA-2 surface-to-air missile sites have been assembled and are being manned exclusively by Soviet personnel; the speed with which the SAM sites have become op- erational precludes any significant participation of Cuban personnel in the firing batteries, fire control elements or support elements."16 The Agency reported rurther there was no evidence that a special cadre of Cubans had been sent to Russia for training to man an SA-2 site. Neither was there any evidence that there was a SAM training facility or program in Cuba. There was evidence that "the sole func- tion of Cuban nationals is to provide security personnel and some support facilities."17 (Kuznetsov would later lie, telling McCloy that all anti-aircraft weapons, including the SAM sites, were in Cuban hands. He never gave any details, however, on who downed the U-2. It wasn't until 1989 that the former Soviet ambassador to Cuba, Alekseyev, would admit that the downing of Anderson's U-2 was the result of a "trigger-happy Soviet air defense commander." Sergei OCTOBER 2' Mikoyan, hog• mander of So, the shoot -dog• The Joint C rected CINCL: Cuban SA-2 s tablished polio fired at a U-2. armed F-100 f minute alert a The Soviet complex orgar. Soviet doctrin, The Soviet air The intelligent why the Sovie!. this time to do - the crisis. When word LeMay, he orc weapons for tl- Force and Na% air -to -surface proved especia convoys, small forty-eight Zur or the Navy's the extremely armed with th1 units (CBU) Eh terial purposes in Vietnam, w- weapons woul, The White H� immediate dest: eral LeMay and replied that the, was admonisht over Guantanamo, 10 A.M., and with - mission apparently -nediately apparent ;e of hypoxia—i.e., °en downed by an he first hypothesis plane to detect an 1resentatives of the sing the flight plan is that the culprit took NSA several m's U-2 had been ro gave the com- firefight between d taken over the ;iced an SA-2 site 2d the fire button, The intelligence ier the total and :)-air missile sites sively by Soviet sve become op- :uban personnel art elements."Id e that a special to man an SA-2 a SAM training "the sole func- nnel and some ` -tg McCloy that �vere in Cuban o downed the 'sador to Cuba, son's U-2 was ander." Sergei 56 c OCTOBER 27—ALL THE MRBM SITES ARE OPERATIONAL 463 Mikoyan, however, would identify General Igor D. Statsenko, com- mander of Soviet forces in Cuba, as the person who had authorized the shoot -down.) The Joint Chiefs of Staff Operations Plan No. 312 specifically di- rected CINCLANT to be prepared to strike a single SA-2 site, or all Cuban SA-2 sites, within two hours of a U-2 shoot -down. The es- tablished policy, agreed to by the president, was that if an SA-2 site fired at a U-2, that site was to be immediately neutralized. Sixteen armed F-100 fighters stood by at Homestead Air Force Base on thirty - minute alert to attack that site. The Soviet military establishment was regarded as a large and complex organization with rigid standards and operating procedures. Soviet doctrine and practice reflected a do -it -by -the -book attitude. The Soviet air defense, especially, operated by established guidelines. The intelligence community could come up with no rational reason why the Soviets, who had been tracking the U-2 flights, would select this time to down a U-2. Most feared that the Soviets were escalating the crisis. When word of termination of the Anderson flight reached General LeMay, he ordered the F-100's readied to strike. The most modem weapons for the destruction of the SAM sites had been issued to Air Force and Navy strike aircraft. Zuni 5-inch high -velocity unguided air -to -surface rockets had been rushed to Florida. The Zuni had proved especially effective against pillboxes, gun positions, trains, convoys, small ships, and ammunition and fuel depots. As many as forty-eight Zunis could be carried on the Air Force F-100 Super Sabre or the Navy's A-4 Skyhawk. The Zunis would be used to knock out the extremely vulnerable guidance and control radars. Other aircraft armed with tife latest in fragmentation munitions —clustered bomb units (CBU) that had been designed for antipersonnel and antima- terial purposes —were rushed to Florida. The CBU were later used in Vietnam, with devastating results. The combination of the two weapons would be more than enough to destroy any SA-2 site. The White House, realizing that there was a standing order for the immediate destruction of a firing SAM site, frantically contacted Gen- eral LeMay and asked if the strike aircraft had been launched. LeMay replied that they were being briefed and prepared for launch. LeMay was admonished not to launch the aircraft until he received direct 96- 464 EYEBALL TO EYEBALL orders from the president. Angered, LeMay hung up. "He chickened out again. How in the hell do you get men to risk their lives when the SAMs are not attacked?" When an aide said he would wait at the phone for the president's order, LeMay disgustedly said, "It will never come!" At 2 P.m on October 27, the EXCOM met with the president to discuss the loss of Anderson's U-2 and the fact that pilots of low- level reconnaissance missions were beginning to report their air- planes were being fired on by small arms and light anti-aircraft weapons. The U-2 shoot -down had escalated the crisis, and General Taylor was concerned that some kind of retaliatory action had to be taken, As he would later relate, in the military when you are shot at, you must let your men shoot back. If not, you shouldn't commit them to a mission in the first place. There were a variety of rec- ommendations. McCone felt that President Kennedy should send a strongly worded letter to Khrushchev protesting the shoot -down. He added, "If there's any continuation of this, we just take those SAM sites out of there."1' McCone's idea of a strong letter to Khrushchev, however, was not seriously considered,. There was general agreement that aerial surveillance of Cuba had to continue and that the SAM site that downed the U-2 should be destroyed, but no time for its destruction was agreed to. Downing of the U-2 had also raised the prospect that continued high -altitude reconnaissance of Cuba was now out of the question. Reconnaissance experts began to review options. One possibility was to use the new SR-7I aircraft. Although it had been test -flown, it had not achieved operational status. Use of the 240-inch camera also was reviewed, along with employing the Pirebee reconnaissance drone. The EXCOM agreed that U-2 reconnaissance would be suspended tem- porarily, but low -altitude reconnaissance would be continued and expanded, with the reconnaissance aircraft escorted by armed fighters. a The Joint Chiefs of Staff were concerned that the longer the EXCOM deliberations took, the more advanced the Soviets' prepa- rations and defenses became. In addition to all of the MRBM sites being operational, so too were all of the SA-2 sites, making it more difficult and more costly to destroy them. The EXCOM then returned to the two Khrushchev letters. General Taylor's opt in this vacii loss of face. shift in Sov military pos Taylor thou: to go to w; had awway% edness, bu+ seemed to > possibility could not b in the sam heard any , of my coil. Armagedd+ too unobsc A very fr a major cr away. Secr bens of the posed a to countries. sites' achiL sadors: "� received r: real hope withdraw, mitment 1 in New Yt offer hops Khrushch outside qt been dim! President from Turf work alo. and that 9 6 - 717 57 p ..., .3 uoLu�sea in the meeting. That j Bobby Kennedy and Llewellyn Thompson maintained that the pres- preside ident should respond only to Khrushchev's first letter. According to swap. 1 Taylor, this left a hollow feeling, since nothing had been agreed to out to ` concerning the downing of the U-2. provide Shortly after the Soviet Cuba -for -Turkey missile proposal was re- matter ceived at the White House, Vice -President Johnson called General to disci Lemnitzer to the White House..Johnson stated he thought the Khru- noddet shchev proposal was a reasonable one and should be accepted by was sc the U.S. Lemnitzer later wrote: "I had great difficulty in convincing Generr Vice -President Johnson that our Jupiter missiles in Italy and Turkey accord were there by NATO's approval and were an important part of He tol, NATO's deterrent posture. Accordingly, they were not there as U.S. positio weapons.1132 The vice-president adopted a rather belligerent attitude, lems 1 stating that "since we damn well gave them to the Turks, we can de Gat damn well take them back." Then Johnson, in his inimitable manner, Dean said, "We can make it up to the Turks." militar At 3:35 P.M., the Pentagon announced that a U.S. reconnaissance The pr. plane was missing on a flight over Cuba and presumed lost. A large the Ni air and sea search for Major Anderson_ continued throughout the cordin•. aftemoon and evening. about z j At 4:36 P.M., two low -level -reconnaissance pilots returning from air car a mission over Cuba reported that they had been fired on, apparently Comm. by 20mm or 37mm anti-aircraft guns, as they flew near the San was ni Cri5t6bal and Sagua la Grande missile sites. Photography acquired French by the reconnaissance aircraft showed anti-aircraft personnel run- worsen l ning to man three 57mm and two 37mm anti-aircraft guns at a site the Nr immediately east of San Crist6bal MRBM site no.1; none, however, COMM- could be identified actually firing at the reconnaissance aircraft. Lemni* At 4:34 P.M., the White House issued a press release on the missile a fool crisis, acknowledging that "several inconsistent and conflicting pro- overwi posals had been made by the Soviet govemment. The statement to strip confirmed that "work on the offensive missiles is still proceeding at Soviet a rapid pace.' The president emphasized that it was imperative that One before any Soviet proposal could be considered, work on the Cuban during bases had to cease and the missiles rendered inoperable; that further out an arms shipments must cease; and that all of this activity be placed that th under effective international control. they bt r i f 96- 717 58 ff as to what action the ! 3t the next Soviet move was disturbed by Khru- describe as offensive." lication of Soviet main - Never, that Khrushchev raced with either inglo- )ons—either one a hel- negotiations under the S. armed forces should CS concern was com- ton that the Soviet po- sordinated with Castro. ers and messages were to put themselves in a the U.S. When Castro )posal, he was furious. ,ovem: "I would have furious when he com- -r. I realize in retrospect with Kennedy. If my -n a terrible war. I was reatened on the mom- ; . aircraft that violated JSIB for the low-level photography had re- i I anti-aircraft positions A underwent a major ssians had taken com- lcast channels and the sites were now tightly rem was also apparent and procedures now e tracking of all U.S. persistent. An October OCTOBER 27-ALL THE MRSM SITES ARE QPERATIONAL 461 26 Red Star editorial had reflected the Russian concern: "it is no secret in the USA that the ill -famed reconnaissance plane —the U-2—in violation of all the norms of international law, has pene- trated Cuban airspace to photograph its defenses and other objec- tives." Castro, meanwhile, was demanding an assurance from Moscow that if the U.S. invaded Cuba, the Soviets would launch the missiles against the U.S. The leadership of Strategic Air Command, responsible for con- ducting U-2 overflights, was still extremely sensitive and possessive of its authority. Although Agency U-2 pilots and flight personnel had been sent to McCoy Air Force Base to assist in flight operations, they were seldom called upon, The number of U-2 flights had been increased after the missiles were found in Cuba, and concern was expressed in Washington about the possible fatigue factor imposed upon the only two SAC pilots, majors Anderson and Heyser, who were each flying as many as two missions a day. Washington was demanding more and more photo -reconnaissance coverage, but it was not known how long the need for such sustained reconnaissance would continue. General LeMay had suggested, however, to the undersecretary of the Air Force, Joseph V. Charyk, that Agency pilots were not needed and Charyk had agreed. The CIA had always been careful in preparations of its U-2 missions over Cuba, ensuring that adequate safety measures were employed. Major Anderson's October 27 flight, however, was not supported with radar, sigint, or optical tracking coverage. There were no support aircraft with elaborate sigint or elint monitoring equipment flying the periphery of Cuba while Anderson's U-2 was over the island. The CINCLANT land - based radars were not capable of reaching the eastern end of Cuba, and SAC had not requested naval vessels with sufficient radar ca- pacity to act in a "fill-in" mode in monitoring Anderson's U-2. Be- cause of the number of missions being flown by Anderson and Heyser, SAC could not provide a second U-2 to fly the periphery of Cuba with the capability of visually observing and conversing with the photo -taking U-2. The ill-fated U-2 mission of Major Rudolf Anderson on October 27 was designed to cover the eastern section of Cuba. He left McCoy Air Force Base, at Orlando, Florida, at 8:10 A.M. for an estimated 3.5-hour flight. He made landfall on the northern coast of Cuba at 96- 717 �l f i y OCTOBER 27-ALL THE MRBM SITES ARE OPERATIONAL 463 i, Cuba, over Guantanamo, Mikoyan, however, would identify General Igor D. Statsenko, com- j c about 10 A.M., and with mander of Soviet forces in Cuba, as the person who had authorized n, his mission apparently the shoot -down.) iot immediately apparent The Joint Chiefs of Staff Operations Plan No. 312 specifically di - because of hypoxia---i.e., rected CINCLANT to be prepared to strike a single SA-2 site, or all nad been downed by an Cuban SA-2 sites, within two hours of a U-2 shoot -down. The es- ored the first hypothesis tablished policy, agreed to by the president, was that if an SA-2 site n his plane to detect an fired at a U-2, that site was to be immediately neutralized. Sixteen it. Representatives of the armed F-100 fighters stood by at Homestead Air Force Base on thirty- °r tracking the flight plan minute alert to attack that site. obvious that the culprit i The Soviet military establishment was regarded as a large .and nes. It took NSA several complex organization with rigid standards and operating procedures. nderson's U-2 had been Soviet doctrine and practice reflected a do -it -by -the -book attitude. The Soviet air defense, especially, operated by established guidelines. it Castro gave the com- The intelligence conununity could come up with no rational reason een a firefight between why the Soviets, who had been tracking the U-2 flights, would select ins had taken over the this time to down a U-2. Most feared that the Soviets were escalating iad visited an SA-2 site the crisis. pressed the fire button, When word of termination of the Anderson flight reached General sander. The intelligence LeMay, he ordered the F-100's readied to strike. The most modern weapons for the destruction of the SAM sites had been issued to Air as under the total and Force and Navy strike aircraft. Zuni 5-inch high -velocity unguided face -to -air missile sites air -to -surface rockets had been rushed to Florida. The Zuni had exclusively by Soviet proved especially effective against pillboxes, gun positions, trains, ites have become op- convoys, small ships, and ammunition and fuel depots. As many as n of Cuban personnel forty-eight Zunis could be carried on the Air Force F-100 Super Sabre support elements."'a or the Navy's A-4 Skyhawk. The Zunis would be used to knock out idence that a special the extremely vulnerable guidance and control radars. Other aircraft fining to man an SA-2 armed with the latest in fragmentation munitions —clustered bomb was a SAM training units (CBU) that had been designed for antipersonnel and antima- e that "the sole func- terial purposes —were rushed to Florida. The CBU were later used personnel and some in Vietnam, with devastating results. The combination of the two telling '�icCloy that weapons would be more than enough to destroy any SA-2 site. ices, were in Cuban The White House, realizing that there was a standing order for the n who downed the immediate destruction of a firing SAM. site, frantically contacted Gen- !mbassador to Cuba, eral LeMay and asked if the strike aircraft had been launched. LeMay j Anderson's U-2 was replied that they were being briefed and prepared for launch. LeMay ommander." Sergei was admonished not to launch the aircraft until he received direct 60 9 - 717 �i ort B 462 EYEBALL TO EYEBALL OCTOBER 27-- 9:1 S A.M., flew southward to Santiago de Cuba, over Guantanamo, Mikoyan, hovvr and then northward to Banes. Suddenly, at about 10 A.M., and with mander of Sovi, out any warning or any voice transmission, his mission apparently the shoot -down ended near Cuba's northern coast. It was not immediately apparent The Joint Chi whether Anderson's flight had terminated because of hypoxia--i.e., rected CINCLA' a failure in the oxygen system —or if he had been downed by an Cuban SA-2 silt SA-2 missile. At first, military experts favored the first hypothesis tablished policy because Major Anderson had equipment in his plane to detect an fired at a U-2. t SA-2 fired at him and would have reported it. Representatives of the armed F-100 fie JCS hurried to the Steuart Building, and after tracking the flight plan minute alert to and times against photography, it became obvious that the culprit The Soviet n had been the Los Angeles SA-2 site near Banes. It took NSA several complex organi, hours to sort their data and conclude that Anderson's U-2 had been Soviet doctrine downed by an SA-2 missile. The Soviet air d (There have been a number of reports that Castro gave the com- The intelligence mand to down the U-2 or that there had been a firelight between why the Soviet the Russians and Cubans and that the Cubans had taken over the this time to (Jog% SA-2 site. Another version was that Castro had visited an SA-2 site the crisis. and, knowing that the site was tracking a U-2, pressed the fire button, When word c much to the consternation of the Soviet commander. The intelligence LeMay, he ordt. community would believe none of this.) weapons for tht The CIA reported that the SA-2 system was under the total and Force and Nav,, complete control of the Soviets: "The SA-2 surface-to-air missile sites air -to -surface r have been assembled and are being manned exclusively by Soviet proved especial personnel, the speed with which the SAM sites have become op- convoys, small erational precludes any significant participation of Cuban personnel forty-eight Zunr in the firin batteries fire control elements or su elements 1116 or the Navy's A g 1 pp The Agency reported Further there was no evidence that a special cadre of Cubans had been sent to Russia for training to man an SA-2 site. Neither was there any evidence that there was a SAM training facility or program in Cuba. There was evidence that "the sole func- tion of Cuban nationals is to provide security personnel and some support facilities."17 (Kuznetsov would later lie, telling McCloy that all anti-aircraft weapons, including the SAM sites, were in Cuban hands. He never gave any details, however, on who downed the U-2. It wasn't until 1989 that the former Soviet ambassador to Cuba, Alekseyev, would admit that the downing of Anderson's U-2 was the result of a "trigger-happy Soviet air defense commander." Sergei the extremely armed with the units (CBU) the terial purposes - in Vietnam, w►1 weapons would The White H1 immediate destr eral LeMay and replied that the, was admonishe 9 6 - 717 61 i f i ail « a 4 it '�' ? ,,., may::. _ • . IN 11 -MAJOR RILEY WATTS SHANBURGER JR.-' y 62 96- 717 1i COMMITTEE TO RESCUE THE CUBAN HISTORICAL ROOTS &MONUMENTS IN THE WORLD 0.0. Box 44-1926. Miami. FI eida 33144 MAJOR RILEY WATTS SHANBURGER JR. Test pilot for Hayes Aircraft, which repaired and modified planes for the military services in Birmingham, Alabama. Operations officer in the Alabama Air National Guard. Rank Major. Over 6 feet 2 inches. Born in Birmingham, Alabama on November 1.7, 1924. Married his childhood sweetheart, Marion Jane. Graduated from Woodlawn High School in Birmingham. Flew combat in World War II and Korea in the U.S. Air Force. 18 years flying experience. 36 years old when he died. The oldest of the four. Religion was Baptist. Daughter was named after mother, Marion Jane, but called Candy. Candy was born November 15, 1947. Her married name is Matthews. There are 10 grandchildren and 4 great grand- children. Riley was an only child. i j CODESIGNATION APPLICATION CITY OF MIAMI PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT 275 N.W. 2ND STREET, 4TH FLOOR MIAMI, FLORIDA 33128 App I I cant�IAV// j ae?4&z£F,v , I ephone Number S,37 ' P,?7 Address Type of designation requested: Location (Street): 1.. Marker (Place) q-T,!21 2. Plaza Fromffo!yA1e A' CAI k%4,� 3. Street Codes I gnat I on To �.1'�q 1/ErVl1E S ' To be honored /1�1.¢.�`0� /�/L�': W4 %TS Brief reason for codes i gnat i on request: .Q PI46r (Attach additional background information If necessary) NON-REFUNDABLE APPLICATION FEE* A. Street co-deslgnatlon ............................... $700.00 B. Marker designation .................................. $700.00 C. Plaza designation ................................... $700.00 I understand, as stated In the City Code,. Section 54-92, al; expenses on the part of the City or any other governmental agency resulting from requests for street codesignations, markers or plazas shall be paid by the applicant In addition to any fees. This application carries a non-refundable fee as stated in Section �54-93 of the City Code. Signature of Applicant Date i *If the application Is approved by the City Commission, 64 additional fees will be required. Please see the atta�t�;d General Instructions and Information. 717 �i General Instruction and :nformatlon 1. Submit completed application to City of Miami Public Works Department, 275 N.W. 2 Street, Miami, FIorl.da 33128, ATTN: Executive Secretary, Co -designation Committee. 2. Three methods of designation will be considered: a. Marker, by which a plaque or sign bearing a designation shall be mounted separately on a stone or post in the right-of-way, and designated as "place." b. Plaza, by which the intersection of two streets shall be designated or as relevant to the site. The designation shall be mounted on the post under the street signs at the Intersection. C. Co -designation of a street by which a numbered street shall receive an additional designation under the numbered street on the street sign, or traffic overhead cables. 3. After the application and fee have been submitted, the committee will review the request using the following criteria and to make recommendations to the City Commission. a. Named streets e.g., as In Coconut Grove, shall not be changed where there Is a historical tradition attached to the existing name. b. Named streets shall not be codesignated because of the resulting confusion. C. Numbered streets shall not be codesignated for merely commercial purposes. d. Numbered streets shall only be codes lgnated If there Is significant historical, neighborhood or community benefit to the codesignation. e. Numbered street codesignation shall not exceed five (5) blocks In length. Ideally, the co -designation should begin and terminate at a signalized intersection. f. Numbered streets shall not be codesignated with the names of public officials holding office at the time of the codesignation. A per lod of not less than .flve (5) years shall elapse after a living public official's termination of office before a numbered street shall be codesignated with the name of said public official. g. Block numbers shall be added to any new street signs that reflect codesignation. 9 6 - 717 61 WADE CARROLL GRAY - i t i 9b- 717 67 CODESIGNATION APPLICATION CITY OF MIAMI PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT 275 N.W. 2ND STREET, 4TH FLOOR MIAMI, FLORIDA 33128 C'b.Nl7_6 Pe0-,E'67S,:;4TC 25C e41C,'7 y A p p t 1 cantoNuHENioS C'rJQ4h'�.S SvEz #4ty_,)0 Te I ephone Number A d d r e s s �l(r e-'O S.0/ .21O T ,¢ZCC f11,4-4!/ Al - X33 /6 S-" Type of designation requested: Location (Street): 1. Marker (Place) SrReET .67 W. 2. Plaza From5'74V6NVe o7W. 3. Street Codes I gnat I on To . -�5-'4 'Nue X kt; To be honored 1 .4'D 4�'rR4 K Brief reason for codes i gnat i on request: * -�V4VA9-47 e' A_ ©OS4 y IgAl4e 0:4> 7"�1E . ,%sT��t �Ur "�/" ' i ..�•yT�l,�1, '1clC�' CfOQ . (Attach additional background Information If necessary) NON-REFUNDABLE APPLICATION FEE* A. Street co -designation .....................:......... $700.00 B. Marker designation .................................. $700.00 C. Plaza designation ................................... $700.00 l understand, as stated In the City Code, Section 54-92, all expenses on the part of the City or anX other governmental agency resulting from requests for street codesignations, markers or plazas shall be paid by the applicant In addition to any fees. This application carries a non-refundable fee as stated in Section 54-9 of the ty Code. ignature of Applicant Dat *If the application Is approved by the City Commission, additional fees will be required. Please see the attached 69 .General Instructions and Information. i� - 717 General Instruction and Information 1. Submit completed application to City of Miami Public Works Department, 275 N.W. 2 Street, Miami, Florida 33128, ATTN: Executive Secretary, Co-designatlon Committee. 2. Three methods of designation will be considered: a. Marker, by which a plaque or sign bearing a designation shall be mounted separately on a stone or post In the right-of-way, and designated as "place." b. Plaza, by which the intersection of two streets shall be designated or as relevant to the site. The designation shall. be mounted on the post under the street signs at the Intersection. c. Co -designation of a street by which a numbered street shall receive an additional designation under the numbered street on the street sign, or traffic overhead cables. 3. After the application and fee have been submitted, the committee will review the request using the following criteria and to make recommendations to the City Commission. a. Named streets e.g., as In Coconut Grove, shall not be changed where there Is a historical tradition attached to the existing name. b. Named streets shall not be codesignated because of the resulting confusion. C. Numbered streets shall not be codesignated for merely commercial purposes. d. Numbered streets shall only be codesignated if there is significant historical, neighborhood or community benefit to the codesignatlon. e. Numbered street codesignatlon shall not exceed five (5) blocks In length. Ideally, the co -des ignat lon should begin and terminate at a signalized Intersection. f. Numbered streets shall not be codesignated with the names of public offlcial-s holding office at the time of the codesignatlon. A period of not less than five (5) years shall elapse after a living public official's termination of office before a numbered street shall be codesignated with the name of said public official. g. Block numbers shall be added to any new street signs that reflect codesignatlon. 70 J i 72 General Instruction and information 1. Submit completed application to City of Miami Public Works Department, 275 N.W. 2 Street, Miami, Florida 33128, ATTN: Executive Secretary, Co -designation Committee. i 2. Three methods of designation will be considered: Y a. Marker, b which a plaque or sign bearing a designation j shall be mounted separately on a stone or post in the right-of-way, and designated as "place." b. Plaza, by which the intersection of two streets shall be designated or as relevant to the site. The designation shall. be mounted on the post under the street signs at the intersection. I c. Co -designation of a street by which a numbered street l shall receive an additional designation under the numbered street on the street sign, or traffic overhead cables. Ii 3, After the application and fee have been submitted, the committee will review the request using the following criteria and to make recommendations to the City Commission. a. Named streets e.g., as In Coconut Grove, shall not be changed where there is a historical tradition attached to the existing name. b. Named streets shall not be codesignated because of the resulting confusion. c. Numbered streets shall not be codesignated for merely commercial purposes. d. Numbered streets shall only be codesignated if there is significant historical, neighborhood or community benefit to the codesignation. e. Numbered street codesignation shall not exceed five (5) blocks In length. Ideally, the +ro=designation should begin and terminate at a signalized Intersection. f. Numbered streets shall not be codesignated with the names of public officials holding office at the time of the codesignation. A period of not less than five (5) years shall elapse after a living public official's termination of office before a numbered street shall be codesignated with the name of said public official. g. Block numbers shall be added to any new street signs that reflect codesignation. li. 72 I 4. Immediately after the City Commission approves the applicant's request, the applicant shall pay an additional fee in an amount as set forth In Section 54-93 of the City Code. a. Street codesignation, one-(1) block ............. $400.00 Each additional sign ............................ $200.00 Ib. Marker designation...............................$400.00 jC. Plaza designation ............................... $400.00 5. All expenses Incurred by the City, or any other governmental agency resulting from requests for street codeslgnations, markers or plazas shall be paid by the applicant in addition to these ,fees. This application carries a non-refundable fee I as stated in section 54-93 of the City Code. 6. Designation of a plaza, marker, or street shall become effective only upon approval by Resolution by the City i iCommission. I i I _ i 71 96- 3 i I•��.� '���!ill�, COMMITTEE TO RESCUE THE CUEAN HISTORICAL ROOTS & MONUMENTS IN THE WORLD ..`'' P.O. BOX 44-1926, Miami, F1:.rida 33144 EM FRANCIS BAKER Flight engineer who worked at Hayes Aircraft and the owner of two Pizza Shacks. Had been in the Army Air Core during WW II and later the U.S, Air Force where he advanced to the rank of Tech Sergeant. Flew 29 combat missions as left blister gunner on a Bg29 in the Pacific, maintained and fired 50 cal. machine gun at enemy fighters, helped with maintenance of the plane. Received Air Medal (Oak Leaf Cluster, on August 14, 1945 for successful combat missions , against the Japanese. Received the Distinguished Flying Cross on August 23, 1945 for strike against Mitsubishi aircraft plant at Tamashima, Japan. The plane was named Forever Amber. Flew B-29 in Korea. 13 years in the Air Force/ Army Air Corp. Religion Catholic. Born in Ohio on April 24, 1926. French and British heritage. Daughter Theresa A. Geiger born in Sept. 1.949 by first wife Mavis Beatrice Baker. Theresa married David Geiger in later 60's and has two children a boy and a gi..r. Later married Katherine Walker Baker and had two children Mary Francis born in September 26, 1961 and Beth born April 22, 1960. One granddaughter by Beth. Mother died before 5 leaving him with one sister Marie Ingemil of Boston. Graduated from high school in Boston. Leo was 34 when he died, 7 days from his 35th birthday. i I i i c { i I s i 96'7 1 '7 73 CODESIGNATION APPLICATION CITY OF MIAMI PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT 275 N.W. 2ND STREET, 4TN FLOOR MIAMI, FLORIDA 33128 COAo' l T6E' 7-b RECd OC 7-Ale L?C/,S*A/ 6,ts7-0, r.. ,L R0vrZr - T� I ephone Number 30� A p p I I cant &EA1L1&-EVZZ /.V %�E FdURl.b t! ).S".SY-4'gpr A d d r e s s tPEP & 4` �1- /f.Z 4 231--Sa`• y- Type of designation requested: Location (Street): 1. Marker (Place) Psr- & Z4 W. 2. Plaza From ,, �'�° .�y4-1w F 5kl. 3. Strdet Codes i gnat l on V To ,-,5'X4 vcmyE To be honored L EO 4-,Rq.,VC1S ,Bg�Fg Brief reason for codes I gnat I on request: !-9-4RCC4,VLgLjj P�T�f3 (Attach additional background Information If necessary) NON-REFUNDABLE P P I CAS° I •4� '' '�� '' E • �iVe A. Street co•-designatlon ............................... $700.00 B. Marker designation .................................. $700.00 C. Plaza designation ................................... $700.00 1 understand, as stated in the City Code, Section 54-92, all expenses on the part of the City or any other governmental aaenc5 resulting from requests for street codesignatlons, markers or plazas shall be paid by the applicant In addition to any fees. This application carries a non-refundable fee as stated in Section 54-9 ofte City Code. Signature of Applicant" 4aD *If the application Is approved by the City Commission, 74 additional fees wlII be required. Please see the attached General Instructions and Information. 9 6_ 717 Ge,teral Instruction and Information 1. Submit completed application to City of Miami Public Works. Department, 275 N.W. 2 Street, Miaml, Flor!da 33128, ATTN: Executive Secretary, Co -designation Committee. 2. Three methods of designation will be considered: a. Marker, by which a plaque or sign bearing a designation shall be mounted separately on a stone or post In the right-of-way, and designated as "place." b. Plaza, by which the Intersection of two streets shall be designated or as relevant to the site. The designation shall be mounted on the post under the street signs at the intersection. C. Co -designation of a street by which a numbered street shall receive an additional designation under the numbered street on the street sign, or traffic overhead cables. 3. After the application and fee have been submitted, the committee will review the request using the following criteria and to make recommendations to the City Commission. a. Named streets e.g., as In Coconut Grove, shall not be changed where there Is a historical tradition attached to the existing name. b. Named streets shall not be codesignated because. of the resulting confusion. C. Numbered streets shall not be codesignated for merely commercial purposes. d. Numbered streets shall only be codesignated if there is significant historical, neighborhood or community benefit to the codesignation. e. Numbered street codesignation shall not exceed five (5) blocks In length. Ideally, the codesignation should begin and terminate at a signalized intersection. f. Numbered streets shall not be codesignated with the names of public officials holding office at the time of the codesignation. A period of not less than five (5) years shall elapse after a living public official's termination of office before a numbered street shall be codesignated with the name of said public official. g. Block numbers shall be added to any new street signs that reflect codesignation. s6- 717 i i 75